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Abstract
Cross-cultural Linguistic Politeness: Misunderstanding between Arabs and
British Speakers of English
This research investigates misunderstanding between Arabs and native speakers of 
English in verbal interaction. It examines the factors that might influence understanding 
and interpretations of politeness in interactants' linguistic utterances at the cultural and 
contextual levels. Its main argument is that the ‘core theories’ of politeness do not 
provide an adequate methodology for analysing cross-cultural interactions as they do 
not engage sufficiently with the dynamics of context selection in interactions. Through 
critical evaluation of politeness theories such as Grice (1975), Lakoff (1973), Leech 
(1983) and Brown and Levinson (1987), this research establishes that they do not adopt 
a sufficiently pragmatic approach to analyse politeness in cross-cultural interaction, and 
that they cannot explain how misunderstandings between interlocutors from different 
cultures , are generated. Thus, through reviewing how other scholars such as Spencer- 
Oatey (2000), Eelen (2001), Mills (2003), and Watts (2003) analyse politeness, and 
using theories of cognition, such as Sperber and Wilson (1995)'s relevance theory, this 
research tries to introduce a more contextual pragmatic approach that better analyses 
politeness in cross-cultural interaction.
This study examines data from interactions between native and non-native English 
speakers. It uses two types of recordings involving native and non-native speakers of 
English. The first type of recording is of face-to-face casual conversations. The 
candidates for this type had to fill in a questionnaire and some of them attended follow- 
up interviews. The second type of recording is taken from television and radio 
broadcasts. Data was selectively transcribed and the situations where 
misunderstandings seem to have arisen were analysed in relation to what influenced 
both interactants' production and interpretation of utterances in relation to what is 
considered polite or impolite by the interactants' cultures.
This research proves that Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987)'s theory of linguistic 
politeness strategies fails to reflect patterns of politeness differing from one culture to 
another linguistically, culturally, and contextually. It proves that the notion of politeness 
is interpreted differently across cultures, and involves many more issues than can be 
investigated through the analysis of individual utterances as Brown and Levinson do. 
The originality of this research, besides its criticism of the core theories of politeness in 
analysing politeness in cross-cultural interaction, lies in the fact that it introduces a 
contextual pragmatic approach that not only considers additional cultural and contextual 
variables that influence the production and interpretation of politeness between 
interactants, but also provides different interpretations of these variables that influence 
interaction. It analyses variables in relation to both speakers and hearers and the context 
of interaction, which makes it more suitable for cross-cultural analysis. Applying this 
approach helps us to consider whether misunderstanding between interactants is due to 
interactants failing to understand the politeness norms of other cultures or whether it is 
due to interactants failing to recognise differences in the way that politeness is realised 
linguistically in different cultures. The thesis proves that notions such as face and 
indirectness are not universal, and that politeness is a cultural contextual issue Thus, my 
approach identifies pragmatic failure, and isolates the cultural differences that lead to 
misunderstandings, through investigating the different implicatures that an utterance 
might give rise to in certain cross-cultural contexts.
I
Transcription Convention
The transcription conventions used in this research for transcribing the selected 
conversations reflect the standard that has emerged in conversation analysis. This 
evolving system has been developed chiefly by Jefferson (1989:193-196). For the sake 
of this research, I have added some symbols. These symbols represent words and 
expressions which exist only in Arabic, which is the mother tongue of the non-native 
speakers of English.
N
0
Symbol Designation
1 CAP Louder speech Capitalised letter indicates that a section of 
speech is louder than the surrounding speech.
2 Underscoring Stress or 
emphasis
Underlined fragments indicate stress or 
emphasis.
3
[ Overlappingutterance
To indicate that that someone has started 
speaking, but that someone else speaks during 
their turn, a single left hand square bracket is 
used, linking the overlapping utterance at the 
point where the overlap begins.
4
= Contiguousutterance
When there is no gap between utterances, 
where they latch on to one another without 
overlapping, an equals sign is used. This 
equals sign can also be used to indicate the 
continuity of an utterances when someone 
overlaps or interrupts.
5 (,) A micropause A micropause (roughly 0.2 seconds or less).
6 (0.0) Measured pause Indicates a measured micropause.
7 ( ( not clear)) Difficult to 
transcribe
Indicates that some actions such as (snorts), 
(sniff), cough or conversational scene such as 
(telephone rings). The double round brackets 
are also used when it is not possible to hear 
the interaction well.
8 • Extension of the 
sound or 
syllable
Indicates a sound stretch, e.g Ah: If the sound 
is more prolonged use more colons>
9 hh Aspirations An inbreath or outbreath. The length is 
indicated by a number of hs
11 9 asking Indicates a question.
12 9 •  ? Indicates a rising intonation weaker than that 
indicated by a question mark.
13 Indicates speech not included
14 (hhh) Laughing The letters (hhh) in brackets means laugh in 
talking.
15 (AR) Used when an Arabic word is used
II
Convention for transliteration Arabic 
sounds into English
Arabic
Letter
Name in 
Arabic
English letters used to 
transliterate Arabic 
sounds
£ hamza 1 (disappears after 'al-' and where there is a lif was.
1 alif Aa
L_J ba B
ta T
. d i ta 9 "th"
C gim jlm ,glm J
C ha h
t ba x "kh"
dal D
dal d "th"
III
J ra R
J zay Z
' CH sin S
i* sin S
.O 3 Sad S
dad d
Ja - ta t
Ji za D
t  ■ ayn R
t gayn g "gh"
fa F
**
lS qaf Q
<4 kaf K
J lam L
IV
mTm M
u nun N
& ha H
J waw
w
(consonantal) 
0
(lengthening)
iS ya
y
(consonantal) 
e
(lengthening)
\ alifmamduda 'aa
Vd tamarbuta T
alif
maqSura A
V lam alif Laa
Jl alif lam al-
V
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Chapter 1
1.1 Introduction
In this thesis, culture and context are analysed in terms of the way that they influence 
interaction and affect linguistic utterances. It focuses on the analysis of misunderstanding 
in verbal communication that takes place between strangers belonging to different cultures. 
It investigates the relationship between misunderstanding and the notion of politeness, in 
particular, perceptions of politeness in the context of cross-cultural communication1, and 
the role that culture and context play in producing and interpreting utterances. There is 
particular focus on politeness in relation to Arabs and the English. The languages and 
cultures of both groups are so diverse historically, linguistically and culturally, that 
misunderstandings are almost inevitable.
Interactants' cultural backgrounds and their understanding of the context of interaction 
influence their politeness strategies in cross-cultural situations. Culture and context are 
central to the analytical framework of this study, and I argue that they are not adequately 
considered in the core theories of politeness.4 Suszczynska (1999), analysing the 
contextual and cultural differences in cross-cultural interaction in relation to politeness, 
states that
It seems that politeness theory, in its present form, is not enough to explain 
such differences since they stem less from universal norms of politeness and 
more from culture-specific values and attitude. Understanding these values 
and attitudes is essential to understanding language use (1999:1064).
1 Some researchers use the term ‘cross-cultural interaction’ when referring to differing conceptual 
interactions within separate cultures. Others use this to refer to interactions where interactants from different 
cultures are interacting with each other. I am using this term both to refer to interactions where comparisons 
are made between ideas and concepts in separate conversations, but also where these comparisons occur in 
face to face or other interactive conversations between two parties from differing cultures. However, in 
explaining the difference between cross-cultural and intercultural communication, Kecskes (2004) states that 
'while cross-cultural communication is usually considered a study o f a particular idea(s) or concept(s) within 
several cultures that compares one culture to another on the aspect o f interest, intercultural communication 
focuses on interactions among people from different cultures' (2004:2).
2 House states that ‘cross-cultural differences in communicative preference are responsible for causing 
misunderstandings and mismanaged rapport’ (2000:145). Misunderstandings in cross-cultural interactions are 
not always caused by linguistic errors such as misuse o f the grammar or phonology o f the language o f the 
interaction by one of the interactants; they can also be a result o f different interpretation of the context o f the 
interaction which may lead to the misunderstanding of the pragmatic meaning of an utterance.
J Wierzbicka (2003) discusses the importance of cross-cultural pragmatics, providing a wide range of 
examples to illustrate the differences in the ways of speaking associated with these two different cultures, and 
argues that their ways of speaking reflect independently established differences in cultural traditions, values, 
and priorities.
4 'Core theories o f politeness', in this research, refers to Lakoff (1973), Leech (1983) and Brown and 
Levinson (1978, 1987).
1
Thus, I will be investigating the relationship between the production and interpretation of 
utterances, and exploring the role of culture and context, however problematic such 
concepts may appear in cross-cultural interaction. I will examine the effect of culture on 
linguistic utterances and the influence this has on judgements of politeness and
impoliteness.5 I will also examine the role of context in determining the meaning of 
linguistic utterances in relation to culture, and how it may affect interaction between 
people from different cultures. Van Dijk argues that ‘contexts are, so to speak, the
interface between discourse as action on the one hand and social situations and social
structures on the other hand’ (1997:7). This means that context is inseparable from other 
factors that influence interaction such as culture, and what we perform verbally or non­
verbally is influenced by contextual factors.
This research argues that, unlike misunderstanding caused by problems of linguistic 
competence (which may be relatively easily overcome), socio- and pragmatic
misunderstanding sometimes creates miscommunication, communication breakdown, or 
even conflict. Lyons states that ‘most linguists view language as systems of symbols 
designed for the purpose of communication’ (1981:8). Such a view is adequate when we 
talk about language as a tool of interaction, but language works alongside other factors to 
convey meaning, whether implicit or explicit. Furthermore, a pragmatic misunderstanding 
may not be recognised as a cultural problem, but may be assumed to be an individual fault.
When fluent speakers construct their utterances, their cultures usually influence their 
evaluation of the context and linguistic choices. Interactants may experience 
misunderstanding, embarrassment or conflict if they belong to different cultures and hold 
certain stereotypical views of their interlocutors. This research investigates the current 
state of play in linguistic politeness research and communication, surveying the field from 
the core theories of politeness, in particular Brown and Levinson's work (1978/87) to the 
more theoretical critical work which emphasises the role of culture and context in 
interaction, (Eelen, 2001 Spencer-Oatey, 2000, Mills 2003a, and Watts 2003). I also 
examine the role of cognition in communication (Sperber and Wilson 1995 and Toolan 
1996), because in this research I argue that politeness is first of all a process of
5 Foley argues that anthropological linguistics 'seeks to uncover the meaning behind the use, misuse, or non­
use of language, its different forms, registers and styles.’(1997:3). He emphasises the understanding of 
language through cultural understanding.
2
understanding what is intended. I will investigate politeness in relation to the core 
theories of politeness and understanding, which include: Grice's (1975) conversational 
maxims; Lakoff s (1973) rules of pragmatics; Leech’s (1983) politeness principles and 
Brown and Levinson's (1987) linguistic politeness strategies. I will study the theoretical 
analysis of politeness and suggest that in order to be able to analyse politeness in cross- 
cultural interaction we need a more contextual, pragmatic approach.
The main theory of politeness I am critical of in this research is that proposed by Brown 
and Levinson (1987/1978). Working with data gathered from Tamil speakers in South 
India, Tzeltal. speakers in Mexico, and speakers of American and British English, they 
provide a systematic description of politeness phenomena which is used to support an 
explanatory model capable of accounting for any instance of politeness. Their claim is that 
broadly comparable linguistic strategies are available in each language but that there are 
local cultural differences in what triggers their use.6 My work is mainly concerned with 
critiquing Brown and Levinson’s (1987) claim of universality of linguistic politeness 
strategies. They assume a straightforward relationship between specific linguistic uses and 
specific strategies, and certain meanings they convey in relation to politeness. They 
support their claim of universality by cross-cultural data. I suggest that native/non-native 
interaction demonstrates that such globally shared knowledge of what politeness consists 
of - which utterances are polite, which are impolite, how polite sentiments may be 
expressed and so on - cannot be sustained. My argument is not that Brown and Levinson's 
claims are wrong and that we therefore need to discard them completely, nor is it that their 
claims are valid only in cross-cultural comparison. It is, rather, they are too Western- 
oriented in focus and assume a universalistic basis for some of their theoretical discussions 
of politeness in general, and the context of interaction is not adequately considered.7
By contrast, I will evaluate Brown and Levinson's work from the perspective of the views 
of politeness and the values attached to their work within a broadly defined Arab culture in 
order to demonstrate the culture-specific nature of politeness theories in general and 
politeness itself, and will argue for the adoption of a much more context and culture-based
6 See chapter 2 for a detailed discussion o f their work.
7 Bargiela and Harris (2006) argue that 'the growing interest in inter-cultural and cross-cultural analysis adds 
a further set o f challenges pertaining to the uncritical transfer o f Western concepts and categories to distant, 
cultures and language' (2006:6). They continue: 'it is perhaps from within cultural and cross-cultural research 
that the most fruitful challenge to (Western) analytical categories arise' (2006:8).
3
oapproach to the way politeness and impoliteness function within cultural groups. By so 
doing, I hope to show that conventional linguistic politeness theories are inadequate for 
describing and explaining conflicts and misunderstandings occurring in cross-cultural 
interactions, where participants are likely, for example, to have different perceptions of 
what constitutes positive or negative politeness and impoliteness.
My theoretical approach is different from that of Brown and Levinson (1987). Their work, 
to some extent, ignores the role of context in the analysis of linguistic strategies. 
Therefore, by reviewing some other models of analysing politeness which are critical of 
Brown and Levinson's model, I propose a different approach to analysing cross cultural 
interaction. For example, in my approach, I will refer to Eelen (2001), who argues that 
culture should occupy the highest position in theoretical frameworks, and that politeness 
norms establish the links between culture, social structure and individual behaviour.9 I 
also refer to Sperber and Wilson's (1995) Relevance Theory, in which they define 
relevance as ‘a relation between a given assumption and a given context’ (1995:142). 
Their view is that people can distinguish relevant from irrelevant information.10 I do not 
use Relevance Theory as the core theory of this research to analyse politeness in cross- 
cultural interaction, rather it is one which I use to make the analysis of politeness more 
contextually based. In this thesis, throughout its different sections, I will discuss the main 
arguments of Relevance Theory to show how it can be exploited in analysing politeness, 
and what can be done to shift the dependence on the current theories of politeness such as 
those of Brown and Levinson. The goal, generally, is to move towards the use of a 
cognitive approach to understanding politeness along with a more social approach. 
Consequently, the different chapters of this thesis will use other existing models of 
linguistic politeness so that they may be more able to account for the conflicts and 
confusions of understanding what is appropriate, which arise in native/non-native 
interaction because of cultural and contextual differences between interactants.
In this introduction, I will provide the rationale, the scope for the research, the hypotheses 
and research questions. Following this, I will discuss the Arab world, and varieties of
8 See chapter 3 for a detailed discussion.
9 See chapter 2 where there is a discussion o f the other models which try to discuss understanding politeness 
differently from Brown and Levinson (1987) such as Spencer-Oatey, (2000), Mills, (2003a), Watts (2003).
10 Sperber and Wilson (1995) argue that ‘the assumption explicitly expressed by an utterance is seen as 
combining with a context present in the hearer’s mind at the start o f the act o f utterance’ (1995:133). (See 
chapter 4 for more discussion on understanding and misunderstanding.
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Arabs and Arabic dialects as background to the arguments of the thesis. Finally, I define 
the main terms used in this research and provide brief outlines of the chapters of this thesis.
1.2 Rationale for research
Several incidents from my own and others’ experiences have led me to think about the 
reasons behind what makes certain linguistic utterances or strategies seem appropriate to 
one of the interactants and not to the other. For example, why is ‘directness’ in certain 
contexts acceptable in one culture and may be considered impolite in another; and why are 
certain linguistic utterances considered polite by one group, and considered impolite and, 
sometimes, insulting by another? The rationale for undertaking a cross-cultural linguistic 
study of politeness between Arabs and English people is the existence of 
misunderstandings between interactants from these two groups due to cultural differences. 
Misunderstanding or assessment of appropriateness might be due to misinterpretation by 
the addressee of the strategies that a speaker uses, and not necessarily only to 
misunderstanding what the speaker means.
I argue directness and indirectness, in relation to certain linguistic contexts, is differently 
interpreted in Arabic-English cross-cultural interaction. From my understanding of the two 
languages, the understanding of the indirect utterance, ‘Could you do this for me?’ by a 
native English speaker would be different to that of an Arab speaking English. The Arabic 
speaker may understand such an utterance as a question or as being given a choice to agree 
or disagree. Thus, an Arab employee, when asked by his/her Arab boss ‘Could you do this 
for me?’ might think that s/he is being asked whether s/he has the ability to do it. In such a 
context an Arab boss speaking Arabic would use "do this for me". " ^  I " j,
“ehmal hatha lee”. In a different context where there is no power imbalance, the expression 
‘Could you do this for me? might be understood by the hearer as being given the choice. 
Although in such a context, the hearer would often do what is requested, such an 
expression would not be understood as a polite way of ordering or requesting, as it would 
be understood by a native English speaker. Hence, the issue is not only whether 
interactants from different cultures agree or disagree about the necessity of indirectness in 
certain contextual situations, but rather whether people use directness or indirectness for 
the same communicative goals, for example, such as to express politeness. Such aspects 
may need more consideration when an interaction is taking place between interactants 
belonging to different cultures.
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It is worth considering some incidents which demonstrate the influence of cultural 
differences and different understanding of context in the assessment of politeness. These 
took place in the English language classes I gave in the Department of English, University 
of Sebha, Libya, in 1998, where most of the Arab students did not use what are considered, 
in English, to be linguistically polite request terms when they asked me to explain, 
illustrate or repeat something. They rarely used expressions such as ‘Excuse me’, ‘please’, 
‘pardon’, ‘Could you repeat that?’ or ‘sorry’. They usually used words or expressions such 
as ‘W hat....?’, ‘W hy...?’, ‘Repeat that’, ‘Explain to me.’ Although they were 
communicating in English, they talked to their teachers using the imperative, which in 
English is considered inappropriate in such contexts.11 Such a way of talking indicated 
that students were communicating using strategies transferred from their mother tongue, 
considered appropriate in their own culture, while talking in English. Ball and Farr (2003) 
states
teachers, like most other members of society, are generally unaware of the extent to 
which they believe that their own cultural and linguistic patterns are natural or 
logical, nor do they generally realize how they tend to interpret other behaviour 
according to their own cultural norms. For example, indirectness in language or 
nonverbal behaviour can signify respect in one culture and dishonesty in another 
(2003:437).
Such a way of speaking may upset speakers from different cultures. For example, a 
foreign English language lecturer at the University of Sebha warned his Arab students that 
he would not answer any of them if they did not say “please” when asking him about 
something. Ball and Farr (2003) discuss such misunderstandings due to cultural 
differences. According to them
it is crucial that teachers understand that their own views of the world, or ways of 
using language in that world, are not necessarily shared by others. A deep 
understanding of cultural and linguistic differences, either through living in another 
culture or through pre-service or in-service coursework, can help reduce the 
ethnocentrism that is widespread in Western societies (2003:438)
11 This is discussed by Nelson, Batal, and Bakary (2002) in their article "Directness vs. Indirectness Egyptian 
Arabic and US English communication style" In their investigation o f the similarities and differences 
between English and Arabic, they argue that Egyptians use less indirectness than Americans in their 
interaction.
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In contrast, in Arabic, using the imperative is not classified as impolite or inappropriate in
talking to teachers. If asked by their teachers to do so, students would use ‘please’ or
‘excuse me’ as these expressions exist in Arabic as well, but in Arabic not using them does
not mean that students are being impolite. Even in contexts such as casual conversations
between strangers or interaction in a business place, Arab interactants may sound brusque
10to a British person. Sometimes Arabic-speaking interactants do use words such as
Bellahi
by Allah
If you don't mind ...
or a title of respect such as
t f lu i l
Ostad
Teacher
[No equivalent in English, as teacher is not used as a vocativ]
tlXui•*
Sayed
Sir
Excuse me
However, not using them in Arabic would not make the speaker sound inappropriate.
Another illustrative incident happened early in 2000, in Libya, where I was trying to make 
a phone call to the British High Commission in Malta. The following exchange took place 
between the operator and myself in Libyan Arabic:
AH ? JalLa
? Malta Ella Moukalamh momken Samahet Laaw
? Malta to phone call possible you allow if
If you do not mind, Could I make a phone call to Malta?
12 In my representation o f Arabic, I use the following conventions to explain the difference between Arabic 
and English structure and the literal meaning and the pragmatic meaning 
line 1 - Arabic script;
line 2 - Transliteration o f the Arabic script; 
line 3 - Literal values of words; and 
line 4 - pragmatic meaning.
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Operator:
AH
Operator :
When speaking in Arabic it is usual to make a very direct request.
For example,
UalLu JtufljV! Jujl
Malta AletSal Ouried
Malta the calling I want 
I want to call Malta
This might be preceded by the expression
Bellahi
by Allah
If you do not m ind......
Another example illustrates similar misunderstanding between interactants using different 
interpretations of what is appropriate linguistic behaviour. The source of the following 
incident is the Aljazeera Channel (2001). The following incident took place in France late in 
2000, between the PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and the Arab chairman of an Islamic 
organization in the United States of America. Interacting in Arabic, the chairman of the 
Islamic organization addressed Mr Arafat by his first name alone, by saying ‘Yasser’, and
? Leebee Anta ?
? Libyan you
Are you a Libyan?
? j i^ u d !  I4A ( j i d  4 U! AjI
? Asoual Hada Lais , Leebee Ana Iyah
? the question this why , libyan I yes
Yes, I am, but why do you ask me this question?
gariba Asoual Fee tariqatk , seii , Laa
strange the question in way nothing no
q u a  Ailb ^KjI t i h l  j ^ j l j
rrabia Mos beloagh etekalam enak ybdou
Arabic not the language you speak you it seems
No, nothing, but the way you speak to me is strange; it seems as if 
you are not talking in Arabic
8
then mentioned the president of Egypt by his first name as well by saying ‘Husnee’. Here Mr 
Arafat interrupted him and asked him to respect him and President Mobarak if he wanted him 
to carry on talking to him. When he asked Arafat what he should do to show the required 
respect, Arafat told him to use the expression “his Excellency” before mentioning Husnee 
Mobarak and “Chairman” before addressing him. The chairman of the Islamic organization 
told Mr Arafat that when he had met the-then President of the United States, Bill Clinton, on 
several occasions, he always addressed him by using only his first name, “Bill”. What this 
implies is that the use of titles to show respect is understood differently across the cultures of 
the interactants. Because the Arab chairman of the Islamic organization belonged to a 
different culture, i.e. American culture, than that to which Mr Arafat belonged, he was 
misunderstood. While the Chairman of the Islamic organization thought that he was being 
positively polite by using first names, Mr Arafat considered him to be impolite and 
disrespectful to President Mobarak and himself, and warned him to use titles.13 In Arabic, if 
you speak to people who are in power such as teachers, tribal leaders, your elders, bosses, 
presidents, medical doctors, etc., a speaker needs to use "titles" or "words that show respect" 
in order to be classified polite.
In these three incidents, we find that there are misunderstandings of what is appropriate 
between the speakers and their addressees because of different evaluations of what counts 
as polite or impolite behaviour. The use of directness/indirectness in these situations or the 
use of titles is interpreted differently. Because of disagreement about what an utterance 
may mean, or the appropriate way of requesting or asking, the utterances in the above 
incidents were differently interpreted and sometimes considered impolite. Interlocutors’ 
linguistic competence, their cultures and their understanding of the context play a major 
role in the interpretation of utterances. The acceptance of certain utterances as appropriate, 
then, depends on a number of factors and variables that interlocutors may interpret 
differently in an interaction, which may cause misunderstanding or breakdown in 
communication.
13 Another incident happened in a London hospital when a Libyan friend o f mine, who was visiting a patient, 
stopped a nurse and asked her in English, “I want to visit the patient ‘Lyla’, tell me where is she”. The nurse 
angrily answered him that she did not know, and that he had to go back to the receptionist as it was their job 
to tell people how to find someone they were wishing to visit; and that he was completely in the wrong place
and asking the wrong person. In Arabic, a;' akhbemee ayna ajeed ....,Tell me where to fin d .......is
a normal way o f communicating and does not mean that a person is rude. The Libyan did not mean to be rude 
or sound brusque* and did not understand why he was treated in this way.
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1.3 Scope of the research
It is not just linguistic representations that contribute to understanding between 
interlocutors in a cross-cultural context. In the early 1970s, the notion of social 
appropriateness in communication started to attract the same attention that formal 
grammatical accuracy had attracted earlier. Hymes argues that
competence is not only knowledge of grammar, but also knowing what is socially 
appropriate or inappropriate. Interlocutors need to consider the topic, situation, and 
human relations, when communicating (1972:278).
What is socially and culturally appropriate is as important as what is linguistically 
acceptable. Thus, we can conclude that both linguistic and sociolinguistic competence 
have roles in any kind of communication, and together construct what is termed 
communicative competence. In communicating politeness, Watts, et. al. (1992a) state that 
politeness phenomena should occupy a firm place on more social science and humanities 
research agendas than it does at present (1992a:2). Thus, ‘linguistic politeness’ is 
considered as a social as well as a linguistic phenomenon, and analysing it in these terms is 
an important key to comprehending a number of misunderstandings that take place 
between interactants, especially in cross cultural interaction.
Wierzbicka states that ‘different cultures find expression in different systems of speech 
acts, and that different speech acts become entrenched, and, to some extent, codified in 
different languages’ (1991:26). She argues that social experiences are needed in 
communication and social conventions, and social discourse strategies govern our 
linguistic performance and behaviour. Aijmer (1996) holds that sociolinguistic and cross- 
cultural analysis involves attention to the functioning of language in societies. He agrees 
with Lyons who argues that ‘language behaviour of particular persons on particular 
occasions is determined by many other factors over and above their linguistic competence’ 
(1981:5). For example, Zahama examines how two cultures, Arab and American, have 
distinct preferences for structuring persuasive and appealing messages and what these 
differences mean for American practitioners working with Arab clients in the U.S. He 
maintains that 'without a conscious awareness of how another culture is different from 
one’s own, there is a tendency to see the differences of another through the prism of one’s 
culture’ (1995:2). All this is in line with the research's argument that misunderstandings in 
cross-cultural communication are attributable to cultural differences and different
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contextual understandings, and that culture is an important aspect that determines linguistic 
strategies between the interactants and influences the interpretation of context.14
1.4 Research Hypotheses and Research Questions
Like linguistic differences, cultural and pragmatic differences may be transferred from one 
language to another in cross-cultural interaction, sometimes leading to disagreement, 
conflict or communication breakdown between the interactants. The main hypothesis of 
my research is that Brown and Levinson’s (1978) theory of politeness does not adequately 
distinguish different cultures' linguistic utterances in different situations in their analysis of 
politeness, and their claim of universality for linguistic politeness strategies is inaccurate.15 
Linguistic strategies in English and Arabic are different in some situations, which may lead 
to misunderstanding between interlocutors. In the choice of requesting strategies, for 
instance, Arabs are more likely to be very straightforward in their everyday interaction. 
They usually, in inviting each other, do not give their interactants the choice to refuse or 
agree; otherwise their linguistic strategy might be interpreted as a compliment rather than a 
real invitation. For example, an Arab may invite someone to have lunch with him/her by 
saying,
pLuixll j
Marie Alrasha Tanawel wa
with me the dinner have and
Come and have lunch with me today
Or asking his/her friend for help:
rendee
I have
14 Hall considers culture and communication as two faces o f one coin. He argues ‘culture is communication 
and communication is culture’ (1959:169, cited in Gudykunst, 1998:41). Searle also makes links between 
structure and what it does in context. He argues that ‘it is possible to study the structure independently o f the 
function but pointless and perverse to do so, since structure and function so obviously interact’ (1972:19). 
(See chapters 3, 4 and 5).
15 Meier (1997) argues that Brown and Levinson’s framework o f politeness is not appropriate for determining 
universal rules o f politeness.
16 This seems to be a contextual issue. I know an English friend who is as blunt as this to his friends when 
inviting them without being thought rude.
(_gj.lC.Lui J  (J lx J  t (J-ttC.
Sarednie wa Tarala ramal
help me and come work
I have got work to do; come and help
Jbu
tarala
come
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This way of requesting may sound strange or even, in some contexts, inappropriate to an 
English person as an English native speaker might use "would you like to come and have 
dinner with me?" or "I have got some work to do, could you help me?". What is common 
in English is that the interactants' strategies usually give choice to the addressee to agree. 
In Arabic, interpreting what is polite, is left to understanding what is considered 
appropriate in such contexts of interaction. Thus, different understanding of what is 
appropriate or inappropriate in certain cultures is due to the different understanding of 
what is appropriate in the context of the interaction. Levinson argues that
we would need to make an important distinction here between universal 
pragmatics, the general theory of what aspects of context get encoded and how, 
and the language-specific pragmatics of individual languages (1983:10).
I will argue that an utterance may provide different implicatures built on different 
assumptions made by the addressee depending on the explicitness of the utterance. An 
addressee may come with different assumptions that lead to interpretations that are 
different from those intended by the speaker because of different cultural backgrounds and 
understanding of the context. However, because the aim of this research is to investigate 
misunderstanding involving politeness in cross-cultural communication, and not just to 
compare what is said in Arabic with what is said in English, I hypothesise that depending 
purely on Brown and Levinson’s theory of politeness for the analysis of misunderstandings 
in cross-cultural communication may not lead to understanding whether interactants from 
different cultures are being polite or impolite towards each other. The gap between what is 
said and what is understood is more complicated in cross-cultural communication, and 
such investigation may necessitate combining more than one model of analysis in order to 
consider more factors that influence the production and interpretation of an utterance that 
Brown and Levinson's model does not consider.
On the basis of the above mentioned considerations and the arguments and evaluations in 
the literature survey chapters, my main research question is: Do linguistic politeness 
theories, including Brown and Levinson’s, provide an adequate theory of analysis of 
politeness/impoliteness in cross-cultural communication, or is there need for another 
analytical approach that considers contextual and cultural differences between interactants? 
The question "why an utterance is considered a polite utterance by one interactant and 
impolite by the other?" is not answered by the core theories of politeness. The questions
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which we need to ask, therefore, are: how is politeness interpreted in cross-cultural 
interaction and how do native and non-native speakers of a particular language interpret 
each other’s utterances? What are the situations where native and non-native speakers 
experience pragmatic difficulties in cross-cultural interactions and why? The following 
questions are subsidiary questions designed to supplement the main research questions:
Is linguistic politeness different in cross-cultural interactions and, if so, 
do such differences cause misunderstandings?17
Are there different understandings by interactants of what influences 
communication across cultures? If there are, how do these influences 
affect cross-cultural communication?18
Is politeness a significant aspect in analysing cross-cultural interaction, 
and how do other pragmatic and cognitive theories analyse politeness, 
especially across cultures?19
Does misunderstanding lead to interpretation of impoliteness in cross- 
cultural settings, and does misunderstanding(s) involve impoliteness?20
Have cultural and contextual factors and other influences been 
considered appropriately in the theories of politeness? Is there a need 
to modify or suggest an approach of analysis that is more appropriate 
to analyse cross-cultural interaction?21
The goal of the literature review chapters, which answer the main research questions of the 
thesis, is to argue a) that being familiar with the target language does not necessarily lead 
to appropriate communication; understanding the language of the interactants’ culture is as 
important as understanding the language itself; b) that both interactants’ understanding of 
the context of interaction is important; we cannot simply concentrate on analysing certain
17 See chapter 2.
18 See chapter 5
19 See chapters 4 and 5.
20 See chapter 4
21 See chapters 3 and 6.
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linguistic uses or speech acts, or just one interactant’s utterances, in order to come to a 
conclusive analysis of the effectiveness of cross-cultural communication; and d) that 
politeness is not a static issue, restricted to certain linguistic choices and strategies; it is 
rather dynamic and influenced by cultural and contextual factors relevant to the context of 
interaction.
My critical position on Brown and Levinson’s linguistic strategies, as well as other core 
theories of politeness, is that if interactants are communicating in the mother tongue of the 
addressees, then they will be influenced by their own native culture and they may have 
different understanding of the context. If we agree that cross-cultural interaction, or 
interaction in general, is influenced by culture and context, then this leads me to put 
forward the following as the main aims of the thesis:
a- to argue that the ‘core theories’ of politeness do not provide an adequate 
methodology for analysing cross-cultural interactions.
b- to show that this is because the theories do not engage sufficiently with the 
dynamics of context in interactions.
Thus, the goal of the literature review chapters is to argue, through a critical evaluation of 
existing scholarship, that it is because the existing theories do not adopt a sufficiently 
contextual, pragmatic approach to politeness that they cannot explain how 
misunderstandings between interlocutors from different cultures are generated. And the 
goal of the data analysis chapter is to show that misunderstandings between interlocutors 
from different cultures arise from (a) the failure of interlocutors to understand the 
politeness norms of other cultures, and (b) their failure to recognise differences in the way 
that politeness is realised linguistically in contexts of interaction because of cultural 
differences. The data analysis chapter is also designed to show that an approach to 
politeness that focuses on the pragmatics of interpretation is needed to explain where 
pragmatic failure occurs, and to isolate the cultural differences that lead to 
misunderstandings.
Hence, I will investigate the role of variables such as gender, religion, attitude, stereotypes, 
power, etc., and their effect not only on the interactants' performance, but also on their 
understanding, especially when their linguistic uses are differently interpreted across
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cultures. Thus, through analysing specific features considered polite or impolite within 
particular cultures in particular contexts of interaction, I will examine how situations of 
misunderstandings arise between interactants of different cultures, and what implicatures 
they might give rise to. Rather than holding to the idea that culture and language are 
homogeneous phenomena, I will investigate the way that context and culture are enmeshed 
in how interactants try to negotiate a position for themselves from what they hypothesise to 
be a cultural stand on a particular issue, such as directness and politeness in Arabic and 
English.
1.5 Arabs
This section is meant to provide some background information about the Arabic language 
and Arabs. It provides an idea of Arabic language and how it developed, and the stages 
that it went though and how that influences Arabs' linguistic production and 
interpretations. It also provides information about varieties of Arabic, the different spoken 
Arabic dialects, what influences the language, and who is considered to be an Arab.
1.5.1 The Arab world
The term Arab refers to a particular group of people who live in a land extending from the
99Arabian gulf to the Atlantic coast of North Africa. Arabs share one language, which is 
Arabic, and regardless of the different religions in the area, they share similar historical 
and cultural values. They consider themselves as a unified state because of the land, 
language and cultural backgrounds which is influenced by religious teachings, Islamic or 
non-Islamic. For examples, whether an Arab is a Muslim, Christian, Yazeede, Jewish, etc., 
they still agree on what is acceptable or unacceptable behaviour, and understand that their 
language is highly influenced by their religions. Of course there are differences in 
understanding what Arabic culture is or what constitutes Arabic culture among Arabs from 
different regions, but generally, it is understood that Arabic language is influenced by 
religion. (See Neydell (2002) and chapter 5)
22 Atiyah (1968) and Badawi (1996) point out that Westerners often do not understand the difference between 
Arabs and Muslims. Westerners frequently do not appreciate that Arabs come from a number o f different 
countries. It is true that the majority o f Arabs are Muslims, (about 92% of the Arabs are Muslims), but not all 
Muslims are Arabs. Some are Turkish, Pakistani, Indian, Malaysians, Indonesians, Asians and Europeans. 
Muslims are the majority in at least 55 countries; only 22 of these countries are Arab.
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Because Arabs themselves may be of mixed-race, what defines an Arab is the language 
s/he speaks and the culture that influences his/her behaviour. This means that if a person 
speaks Arabic, and his culture is an Arab culture, then s/he can be considered an Arab, 
regardless of his race. Thus, although there are non-Arab minorities, who are not Arabs 
but live among Arabs, such as Berbers (in Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco), Kurds 
and Turkomans (in Iraq, Syria) and some others, but they cannot be distinguished if they 
speak Arabic and adopt what is culturally acceptable to Arabs. Sadiqi (2003) points out 
that
Berber [the language] is more used in rural than in urban areas. In towns and 
cities, Berber is mainly used in informal and intimate situations such as the 
family and among close friends. It is also allocated limited space in the audio­
visual media, namely radio and television (2003:46).
What Sadiqi says about Berbers in Morocco is also the case in different parts of the Arab
• 9Tworld where there are other ethnic groups. For example, Berbers in Libya, Algeria, or 
Kurds in Iraq, use Arabic when they communicate with Arabs, but between themselves 
they use their mother tongues.24 This is why it is difficult to distinguish them when they 
are among Arabs. Sometimes these minorities are classified as Arabs not because of their 
origin, but because they speak Arabic and because Arabic culture influences their linguistic 
behaviour.
1.5.2 Varieties of Arabic
Arabic is a Semitic language, closely related to Hebrew and Aramaic. In old Arabic or 
pre-Islamic Arabic, there were dialects such as Qahtan, Adnan, and Himyar (Al-Saied, 
1995). During the Islamic era (635-1160) and after, Arabic dialects started to be closer to 
each other because of the Quran which created what is called "Classical Arabic”. Classical
9Arabic is the dialect of the Arabic language used to write the Quran. It is very similar to
23 In Morocco, Berbers are the majority. They construct about 60% of the population of the country, but Arab 
culture and Arabic language are prevailed due to the religion of both groups which is Islam.
24 Only recently have the constitutions of some countries in the Arab world allowed people o f different 
ethnicities to use their mother tongues in education.
25 The Islamic era began in the year 622 AD with the Hijra (or emigration) o f the Prophet Muhammad from 
Mecca to Medina. Within little more than a few decades of the Prophet’s death in 632, Islam had already 
spread to territories stretching from the Atlantic to the China Sea and from North Africa to the frontiers o f 
Siberia and, within a few centuries, sizeable Muslim communities had been established across an even wider 
area.
26 Halimah (2001) states that 'classic Arabic represents a style used in the pre-Islamic literature, the Holy 
Quran, and the Prophet Muhammed's Saying: Standard Arabic represents a style used in education, business 
and commerce' (114)
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what is now called "Modem Standard Arabic",27 which is the parent language of all 
varieties of Arabic. Different Arabic dialects are called "colloquial dialects" which is a 
collective term for the spoken languages or dialects of people throughout the Arab world. 
Classical Arabic spread from the Arabian Peninsula through the Islamic expansion. Maxos
(2004) holds that there are two major reasons leading to differences between Arabs and the 
issue of dialects is one of them. He cites Chomsky as stating:
In the old Ottoman Empire, regions such as the Levant incorporated numerous 
local communities, related to each other in various ways, and with a good deal 
of linguistic variation as well. Nobody spoke the classical Arabic taught in 
schools, but the so-called dialects were considered inferior. The intervention 
of the Western imperial powers led to a system of states, leaving bitter and 
unresolved conflicts and antagonisms, a system in which each individual must 
define himself as belonging to a nation or a nation-state. It is a system imposed 
from the outside on a region ill-adapted to it (Chomsky, cited in Maxos, 2004:1).
This means that Westerners influenced Standard Arabic language and Arabs' ways of 
communication by dividing them into small states. As Sawaie (1987) states, although the 
goal of invading the Arabs’ world was to wipe out the Arabs’ loyalty to their identity as 
Arabs and instead make them belong to certain pieces of land by creating small states, this
9Rcontributed more to the creation of varieties of Arabic. But such differences are usually 
more noticed in accents and dialects, and less in what is thought to be appropriate or 
inappropriate language (Neydell (2002). What is appropriate and inappropriate is usually 
influenced by religion and conventions of Arabs, and rarely by their dialects and accents.
1.5.3 Arabic dialects
Dialects in the Arab world vary according to vocabulary, accents and sometimes the
90meaning of what is said; they influence understanding between interactants belonging to 
different regions. This means that the influence of dialects can be felt in almost every part 
of the Arab world, and more in the regions where their citizens belong to different ethnic
27 Also known as Modem Arabic; Halimah (2001) states that 'Modem Standard Arabic represents a style 
normally used in newspapers; Educated Arabic is a style used when Arabs meet and verbally communicate
with each other in other Arab country' (114)
28 Lawson and Sachdev. (2000) 'Though Arabic is the official language o f Tunisia, French, a strong legacy o f  
Tunisia's recent colonial past, is another superimposed variety that continues to be widely used. Over the last 
decade, English has also been appearing increasingly on the Tunisian linguistic landscape' (2000:1346). Also 
Maxos (2004) shows that countries such as Egypt and Lebanon have given more attention to their dialectal 
Arabic than to the standard Arabic, and that there were calls to use Egyptian Arabic in stead o f standard 
Arabic.
29 Arabic accents are usually not barriers between interactants from different regions, because accents are 
related to how a word or an utterance is pronounced.
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groups. They can create differences, for example, between urban and rural societies, or 
between Yemeni Arabs and Libyan Arabs, but these differences are not considered as 
major differences that might lead to pragmatic misunderstandings. According to Neydell 
(2002) such differences are usually understood as minor and rarely produce 
misunderstanding or conflict between Arab interactants. She points out that
in most Arab countries the elite differ considerably from rural or tradition-oriented 
social groups; indeed, some types of behaviour required by the norms of one group 
are considered obsolete by another. At the same time, many basic traditions and 
customs still determine the way of life of all Arabs and affect their goals, values, 
and code of accepted behaviour (2002:xxi).
She maintains that because similarities among social groups are greater than the 
differences, then generalizations are possible, and differences can be overcome.
Social dialects in Arabic derive from occupations, places of residence, levels of education, 
ethnicity, cultural backgrounds, social class (tribe), religious group, gender and age. In 
relation to the religious group, for example, Al-Saied (1995) describes how
in a city such as Baghdad, Muslims and Christians and Jews speak different 
Arabic social dialects, so Christians and Jews use their own social dialects, but 
the language that Muslims speak is the shared one between the three groups 
when they meet’ (1995:145).
In the different locations of the Arab world, there are different dialects. They include the 
Maghreb31, Egyptian Arabic32, Al-Hassaniya 33, Tunisian Arabic34, Sudanese Arabic35,
30 Davies (1987:82-83) argues that ‘formulas may seem restricted to the kind o f speaker who uses them, the 
kind o f addressee to whom they may be used, the medium through which they may be expressed and various 
aspects o f the setting in which they are used, (see chapter 5)
31 The Arabic dialect o f the Maghreb shares many common characteristics. These characteristics set them 
apart from the dialects o f the Middle East and most o f Egypt. Maghreb Arabic is a dialect o f Arabic in the 
Maghreb, plus French and Berber additions, including Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya. It is only used 
as a spoken language; the news and the other media are in modem standard Arabic.
32 Egyptian dialect is an Arabic spoken in Egypt. It is the variety o f Arabic with the largest amount o f  
speakers.
33 An Arabic dialect derived from the Arabic spoken by the Ben Hassan tribe, which extended their authority 
over most o f the Mauritanian Sahara between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries.
34 Basically a Maghrebi dialect spoken all over Tunisia, as well as the eastern part o f Algeria and the Western 
part o f Libya. It is a dialect spoken by all Tunisians.
35 Sudanese dialect is derived from the language of the Quran, but the mixing o f Egyptian dialect and Arabic 
from the Arabian peninsula with the local languages led to the creation o f a variety o f Arabic not necessarily 
specific to Sudan.
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Syrian or Levantine Arabic36 and the Gulf dialects.37 Maxos (2004) sets out how ' localism 
flourished after the World War I when the British and French divided the Arab world into 
small separate states and each state proceeded to establish its own government, media and 
educational system' (2004:1). Because of this division and the sense of anger at deeper 
separatism, a decision was taken to adopt a written Arabic in all the districts, but the 
spoken language can cause difficulties.
In fact, there are different reasons for such variations in Arabic, which sometimes might 
cause misunderstanding, the main reason being the impact that other languages have had 
on Arabic, either due to an Arab nation invading others or being invaded by a Western 
nation. Islam, for example, spread the Arabic language to all of the places it invaded, but 
the people who spoke Arabic in those areas spoke a different Arabic from classical Arabic 
because of the languages spoken in those areas before invasion. When Westerners invaded 
the Arab world, they imposed their languages as a means of communication. This also 
created different accents and dialects among Arab people who sometimes have difficulty in 
understanding each other, but as we have explained, most of these differences remain on 
the linguistic level, and not the cultural. All the accents and dialects are Arabic, and are 
influenced by Arab culture which is based on a set of religious beliefs.
1.6 Definition of Terms
In this section, I will define the terms used in the thesis as they are crucial to my overall 
argument and are often contentious. My definitions of these terms are a brief introduction 
to how these terms are used in the thesis and in the chapters where they will be addressed 
in more detail.
Politeness
As discussed in chapter 2, politeness, besides its usual association with notions such as 
courtesy, rapport, deference and distance, involves other issues influencing interaction.39 
In sociolinguistics and pragmatics, 'politeness phenomena' is a term which characterizes
36 Levantine Arabic is a group o f Arabic dialects spoken in the 100 km-wide eastem-Mediterranean coastal 
strip, i.e. in Syria. Palestine/Israel, western Jordan and Lebanon and parts o f Iraq. This corresponds to the 
western wing of the Fertile Crescent.
37 Gulf dialect is spoken in what are now called the Gulf States and parts o f Iraq, or what we may call the 
Arabian Peninsula.
38 Comprehension between Arabs from different regions differs when they interact using their own dialects. 
Although this usually does not create misunderstanding, sometimes interactants do not understand each other.
39 For more details see chapters 2 and 5.
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linguistic features mediating a variety of norms of social behaviour. Such writers as Grice 
(1975), Spencer-Oatey (2000a), Lakoff (1989:102) and Leech (1983:82) expound on 
politeness issues across a range of aspects: harmony in social relationships, for example as 
a means of managing potential or actual confrontation, as a means of maintaining social 
equilibrium, or as a way of establishing a co-operative relationship.40 Others, notably 
Brown and Levinson (1987), Werkhofer (1992), Watts (1992) and Mills (2003a), address 
such issues as the possibility for appropriate politeness to make communication possible 
between potentially aggressive parties.
I will therefore, throughout the thesis, treat "politeness" as any implicit or explicit 
linguistic behaviour intended to be polite by the speaker and which is understood as polite 
behaviour by the hearer according to the context of interaction. Through understanding the 
different implicatures to which an utterance may give rise, and whether these cause Face 
Threatening Acts or even discomfort to the listener in a particular interaction context, we 
may decide whether what is said is intended to be and understood as polite or not. This 
means that utterances are not analysed in relation to their linguistic meaning, but rather in 
relation to the. cultures of the interactants and the context of the interaction. (See chapters 
2, 3, 4, 5 and 6)
Impoliteness
I will discuss in detail the differing definition of impoliteness offered by different writers. 
Those of Mills (2003a.), Culpeper (1996) (who makes it clear that the subject is not a 
marginal issue), Goffman (1967) and Brown and Levinson (1987) include such examples as 
attacks on interlocutors, especially attacks on face. (See chapter 2, 4 and 5) They show that 
issues such as lack of co-operation; a threat on face whether real, imaginary, or potential; 
surprise contradictory opinions; warnings; intimidation; social conflict; disruption or 
disharmony, might all be considered impolite, but these judgements are influenced by culture 
and context.
In this research, I shall be using the term 'impoliteness' to refer to any linguistic behaviour 
that might lead the listener to classify his/her interactant as impolite regardless of the 
linguistic strategies used. It is an assessment of a linguistic behaviour through analysing
40 For more details see chapters 2 and 3
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the whole conversation and what might influence interaction, and not just by analysing an 
individual utterance.41 It is a contextual judgment and up to the interactant to decide 
whether his/her interactant is impolite.
Appropriateness / inappropriateness
Appropriateness / inappropriateness is discussed by Grice (1975) in his work on the 
Cooperative Principle.43 I shall use two interpretations of this term. The first is on the 
level of an individual utterance, as used by Mills (2003a), who sees appropriateness as 
‘differently understood in relation to individual speakers and within the community’. The 
second level is that of the context and the whole conversation as expounded by Eelen 
(2001) and Fraser and Nolen (1981) in their definitions of politeness as doing what is 
socially appropriate measured against behavioural standards relative to the speech 
community and context (as discussed by Attardo 2000), which cannot be determined by 
specific linguistic forms. This means that a speaker can be appropriate linguistically, but 
not necessarily be considered as polite because of the influence of the context.44 (See 
chapter 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6)
Face
The term 'face', to different scholars, has different meanings. Goffman’s (1967, 1971) 
notion of face is the image that a person adopts for themselves, and acquires from society. 
Goffman (1967:7) deems face as a person’s 'most personal possession and the centre of his 
security and pleasure', which, however, 'is only on loan to him from the society' and 'will 
be withdrawn unless s/he conducts her/himself in a way that is worthy of it'. Brown and 
Levinson (1987) define face as 'the public self-image that every member wants to claim for 
her/himself. They believe the notion of face should be seen at a more social level, existing 
in all languages and cultures. As discussed in chapters 1, 2 and 3, I will consider the 
notion of face differently to Brown and Levinson (1987) in terms of whether face is an 
individual issue or a cultural issue, and whether it relates to the speaker or to both 
interactants. Thus, face is defined and interpreted differently across cultures. Consequently 
the linguistic choices or strategies used to threaten face or mitigate any face threatening act
41 See Mills, (2003a) and Culpeper (2005).
42 See chapter 2 for a discussion o f impoliteness.
43 See chapter 2.
44 See Watts, 2005 who argues that even when an interactant intends to insult his/ her interactant s/he still can 
be appropriate.
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are differently interpreted, and most likely judged contextually. Hence, in this research, I 
use the term 'FTA' to refer to any linguistic behaviour that might lead the listener to 
consider what is said to him/her as threatening his/her face. I will not link that to certain 
speech acts or strategies from the speaker to his/her addressee. I will treat FTA judgement 
as contextual and hold that it is, therefore, only the interactants who can determine whether 
what is said is an FTA or not. (See chapter 2 and 6)
Indirectness / Directness
Brown and Levinson (1987) state that indirectness or off-record utterances are more likely 
to be considered as polite than direct or on-record utterances. Disagreeing with Brown and 
Levinson (1987), Tsuda (1993) states that 'indirectness is realized in various ways' 
(1993:11); Fetzer (2006) indicates that 'the speaker's communicative intention is not 
realized explicitly' (2006:181); and Blum-Kulka (1987) believes indirectness and 
politeness are not necessarily linked. Wierzbicka (1985) sees ‘terms such as ‘directness’ 
and ‘indirectness’ as much too general, too vague to be really safe in cross-cultural studies’ 
(1985:175). Cultures vary in their understanding and the effects of indirectness/directness, 
and why and when it is used. In Arabic, indirectness, in some contexts, is linked to 
impoliteness, and directness refers to closeness, even with strangers in some contexts.
However, as discussed in chapter 2, 3, 4 and 5 ,1 will consider indirectness / directness and 
politeness in relation to the context and the intended meaning. Therefore, I do not simply 
consider any indirect utterance to be polite. Rather, I examine what makes the speaker 
prefer indirectness, and whether his/her interactants consider that the indirectness strategy 
used indicates politeness or not.
Understanding / Misunderstanding
In discussing understanding and misunderstanding in chapter 4 and 5 ,1 shall be using the term 
‘misunderstanding’ to refer to situations in which one of the interactants fails to understand 
the pragmatic meaning of an utterance or the reason behind its use, and may understand an 
utterance differently to how it is intended. Thus, a generated explicature of an utterance may 
give rise to more than one implicature to the interactants. This means that an implicature of an 
utterance may be inferred, but if it is not the intended implicature of the speaker, I consider it 
a misunderstanding.
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Culture
As addressed in chapters 3 and 5 ,1 treat culture in this research as a factor in the context of 
interaction that influences the formulation or interpretation of an utterance to do with power, 
gender, class, religion, beliefs, tribe, age, or background, collective attitudes or conventions, 
or any values that are shared by a group of people or which an individual has experienced 
because of history, geography, religion, or situational background. Spencer-Oatey (2000b) 
states that
culture is a fuzzy set of attitudes, beliefs, behavioural conventions, and basic 
assumptions and values that are shared by a group of people, which influence 
each other’s behaviour and each member’s interpretations of the ‘meaning’ of 
other people’s behaviour (2000b:4).
I will explore the range of definitions (See chapters 2, 3 and 5) of culture and its influences, 
by such writers as Watts (2003), Foley (1997), Goodenough (1964), Sadiqi (2003), Mills 
(2003a) and Scollon and Scollon (1995), to examine how culture influences linguistic 
production and interpretation, and whether it is possible to analyse such by a strategic model 
such as Brown and Levinson (1987)'a model.
Context
I treat context as a crucial factor in generating and interpreting any verbal interaction that may 
be defined in relation to both the speaker and the addressee. I shall refer to writers such as 
Dilley (2002) and Goodwin and Duranti (1992), who view context as having a broad currency 
traversing the boundaries of various disciplines and as the most important factor in providing 
interactants with intended meaning. I will consider Schiffrin (1994) and Toolan (1996) who 
see context as indispensable in making sense of language; and also Christie (2000) who holds 
it as dynamic and inferred rather than static or predetermined. At the same time, I will argue 
that while context influences production and interpretation of language, it will not always be 
interpreted with the same significance for the interactants. (See chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6)
Stereotypes
I will refer to stereotypes as meaning the assumptions that we have about others, or may 
share with them, that influence our performance or interpretation of the language, and 
which Aikhenvals (2003) and Gudykunst (1998) see as our mind pictures of the people
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with whom we interact. They are identifiable characteristics which are not always 
accurate, shared to a high degree in a particular culture. I will argue that the way speech is 
influenced by these aspects is not constant, especially in cultures as Arabic and English, 
and consequently their effect on each individual is different. Agreement on stereotypes’ 
roles in interaction is difficult (Mills 2003a, chapter 5).
1.7 Outline of the thesis 
Chapter 2: Politeness Theories
This chapter reviews research on politeness first by critically investigating the core theories 
of politeness in relation to cross cultural interaction according to the notion of politeness in 
Brown and Levinson’s theory. I review the criticisms of the main components of Brown 
and Levinson’s theory of politeness and concentrate on the notion of face, rationality, the 
model person, and universality in linguistic politeness strategies. I discuss how other 
scholars, post-Brown and Levinson, view politeness, and the models that they suggest for 
analysis. I aim to critically review Brown and Levinson’s work and the work of those 
theorists who have tried to move beyond their model in order to modify the current theory 
of analysing politeness (See chapter 2).
Chapter 3: Pragmatics and the Analysis of Linguistic Politeness
This chapter builds on the work of Chapter Two, introducing pragmatics as a model of 
analysis of linguistic politeness and focusing on why it should be analysed from a more 
contextually, pragmatically based perspective. Firstly, I explore the relationship between 
the fields of linguistics and pragmatics, and how politeness can be analysed by drawing on 
pragmatics. Secondly, I examine linguistic politeness in relation to pragmatics and- 
question why theories of politeness, regardless of their claims, fail to provide an adequate 
analysis of politeness, especially in cross-cultural interaction. The main claim of this 
chapter is not that politeness theories are not pragmatic theories; rather that there are issues 
in interaction that are not sufficiently considered in these theories, and that a more 
contextual, analytical approach is required to consider such issues.
Chapter 4: Understanding, Misunderstanding Politeness
Here I review the relevant literature that deals with understanding and misunderstanding in 
interaction, including theories that investigate pragmatic failure, such as Relevance Theory 
(Sperber and Wilson, 1993, 1995), and Integrational Linguistics (Toolan, 1996). In this
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chapter, I argue that using a theory of cognition enables us to understand the relationship 
between misunderstanding and politeness and examine the process of understanding in 
cross-cultural interaction, especially between strangers. In particular, I will investigate 
language misunderstanding between Arab speakers of English communicating with native 
speakers, and what influences their production and interpretation. My aim is to establish 
what is needed to assist understanding in politeness analysis, showing that politeness is not 
just what the linguistic choices or strategies used may mean to the speaker, but rather what 
the listener understands in a particular context of interaction.
Chapter 5: Analysing Cross-cultural Interaction
I investigate the relationship between language and culture, and the role of culture in the 
interpretation and performance of linguistic utterances. I also discuss the variables that 
determine linguistic strategies in cross-cultural interaction, issues of gender and religion in 
relation to cross-cultural interaction, and whether a native culture's construction of gender 
and religious difference affects communication. I investigate stereotypes and how they 
may influence interactants’ performance and interpretation of linguistic utterances in cross- 
cultural settings. This chapter argues that utterances are influenced by the interactants' 
cultures. Consequently, in cross-cultural interactions, an utterance may be interpreted 
differently by the listener to what, the speaker intended. I aim to highlight the need for a 
broader approach to analysing politeness in cross-cultural analysis that considers cultural 
factors in relation to all interactants.
Chapter 6: Data Analysis and Discussion
Here I investigate the questions and hypotheses of the thesis by examining data collected 
from interaction between native and non-native English speakers. The focus is on 
examining misunderstandings between the interactants in relation to politeness. I first 
describe the pragmatic approach that I use in analysing my data, and explain how it 
analyses politeness more adequately than the core theories of politeness. Thus, by 
analysing three different types of data and then exploring the issues that should be 
considered in analysing politeness, my approach shows a clear link between analysing 
understanding between interactants in general and understanding politeness in particular. 
In this chapter, drawing on Relevance Theory and the work of those theorists who have 
tried to move beyond Brown and Levinson's model, my approach emphasises the role of 
the listener, cultures of both interactants, and what constructs the context of the
25
interactions to be analysed. Thus, the aim of this chapter is, though analysing the data, to 
show that misunderstandings between interlocutors from different cultures arise from the 
failure of interactants to understand the politeness norms of other cultures; and the failure 
to recognise differences in the way that politeness is realised linguistically in different 
contexts of interaction in cross-cultural interaction. Thus, this chapter aims to show that a 
contextual, analytical approach to politeness that focuses on the pragmatics of 
interpretation is needed to explain where pragmatic failure occurs, and to isolate the 
cultural and contextual differences that lead to misunderstandings.
Chapter 7 Conclusion
Chapter 7 concludes this thesis. It reviews the research as a whole and highlights the main 
arguments of the whole thesis. It also sets out the implications of the thesis and makes 
recommendations for further research.
1.8 Conclusion
This research investigates how the context of interaction may generate different 
interpretations because of cultural and contextual differences in cross-cultural interaction. 
Factors such as social systems (whether class or tribe), gender, age, stereotype and religion, 
affect cross-cultural interaction, and can cause interactants to have more than one 
interpretation for the same utterance. Gudykunst argues that
Our cultures have tremendous influence on the way we communicate, whether 
we are aware of it or not. We generally are not aware of how our cultures affect 
our behaviours. In communicating effectively with strangers, we must 
understand how our cultures influence our communication (1998:40).
Thus, the aims of this research are a) to examine linguistic politeness theories in relation to 
native/non-native interaction between Arabic speakers of English and native speakers of 
English; b) to evaluate these theories according to whether they may be used to adequately 
analyse cross-cultural interaction; c) to investigate the factors that influence linguistic 
utterances and their role in creating misunderstanding between interactants in cross-cultural 
interaction; and d) to develop a more appropriate, analytical approach for the analysis of 
politeness and impoliteness in cross-cultural interaction.
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Chapter 2: Theorising Politeness
This chapter will critically review research on politeness, focusing particularly on Brown 
and Levinson’s theory. There are three main sections. Section One is concerned with the 
core theories that discuss politeness and which influenced Brown and Levinson’s 
(1978/87) work. The aim of this section is to critically investigate their claims in relation 
to politeness in cross-cultural interaction. This will include examination of Grice (1975), 
Lakoff (1973), and Leech (1983), whose analyses and critiques provided many of the 
theoretical assumptions upon which Brown and Levinson's politeness theory is based.
Section Two provides details of Brown and Levinson’s theory of a universal principle for 
linguistic politeness strategies. It is the most comprehensive theory developed to date, but 
needs scrutiny as it fails to adequately explain types of communication that include cross- 
cultural variations. Besides discussing the main claims of the theory, such as the notion of 
face, universality of linguistic politeness, and variables for politeness. strategies, I will 
investigate these claims in relation to cross-cultural communication in order to see whether 
they are universal, and whether their implications are the same in a cross-cultural context.
Section Three will discuss how other scholars, post-Brown and Levinson, view politeness. 
These will include Blum-Kulka (1992) and Fraser and Nolan (1981) and also Arab views 
of politeness such as those of Al-Fayyad (1984), Albassier (2004) and Al-Saied (1995). I 
will also discuss Eelen (2001), who has mounted the most sustained attack on Brown and 
Levinson's work and related politeness theories.45 I will examine Spencer-Oatey's (2000) 
work, in which she advocates less concentration on loss of face and more on the listener, 
social norms and cultural meaning, and Mills's argument (2003a) that politeness and 
impoliteness are in essence judgements about another’s interventions, and not simple 
speech classifications. Finally, the section will focus on Watts (2003), who holds similar 
views to Spencer-Oatey arguing that theories such as Brown and Levinson’s put limitations 
on the analysis of politeness, and that the most effective analysis must be of commonsense 
notions of politeness. Thus, this chapter aims to review Brown and Levinson critically and 
to review the work of theorists who have tried to move beyond their model to use them in
45 Eelen does not offer a model o f analysis o f politeness as such. Thus the aim o f my research is to formulate 
a way o f incorporating Eelen's criticism o f Brown and Levinson whilst constructing a working model 'of 
analysis, (see chapter 6)
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order to provide an analytical approach of politeness which considers cross-cultural 
interaction more adequately than Brown and Levinson's model do.
2.1 The Theoretical Background to Brown and Levinson
2.1.1 Grice’s (1975) Cooperative Principle
Grice's Cooperative Principle and maxims are considered by most researchers of politeness 
to be central to their theories. Brown and Levinson (1987), their first edition, consider 
Grice’s Cooperative Principle and maxims to be the basis of their work, as they are mainly 
concerned with the effective exchange of information, drawing on a set of assumptions 
guiding the conduct of conversation. Grice assumes that each participant in a conversation 
aims to be cooperative with his / her interactant and thus he /she will avoid threatening 
their face. Brown and Levinson apply Grice's Cooperative Principle to the investigation of 
linguistic politeness across different cultures.
Grice, in his article ‘Logic and Conversation’, (1975) draws a distinction between what is 
the antecedent46 and what is the conventionally implicated implicature. An implicature is 
defined as the implied meaning that might be inferred by the addressee drawing on the 
expressed meaning.47 Escandell-Vidal (1996) states that
there is a crucial difference between implicature and explicature. Implicatures 
are the assumptions that the speaker tries to make manifest to the hearer without 
expressing them; implicatures are recovered by inference. Explicatures are the 
assumptions that the speaker explicitly communicates, i.e., the assumptions that can 
be directly developed from the logical form of the utterance (1996:637).
Grice discusses issues such as how speakers may have a different intention from those stated 
by the literal meanings of the utterances they have used. He asks ‘How is it that in almost 
every utterance we can distinguish between what is said and what is meant? And what are the 
factors that are important in determining what someone means by what they say?’ (1975) 
These questions make the Cooperative Principle relevant to the notion of politeness, because 
cognition of what is meant, plus what is literally said and how it might be interpreted, are an
46 Antecedent is a ‘term taken over from traditional grammar by some grammarians, and used for a linguistic 
unit from which another unit in the sentence derives its interpretation, typically a later unit. In particular, 
personal and relative pronouns are said to refer back to their antecedents’ (Crystal, 1997:20).
47 Levinson (1983) believes ‘the conversation principle is presented as not simply a set o f arbitraiy conventions ' 
but, much more strongly, as capturing rational means for conducting co-operative exchange’ (1983:103). Harris 
(1995) also ’concludes that Grice at present provides a conceptual framework which can adequately and 
easily be applied to handle natural language data’ (131).
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important part of any interaction involving conversational and social norms which are inferred 
from the notion of linguistic cooperativeness. (See Watts 2003).
Grice (1975) maintains that speakers intend to be cooperative when they interact, and do 
not deliberately confuse or withhold relevant information from each other. He understands 
meaning to refer to two different kinds of meanings; natural and non-natural meaning. To 
Grice, the natural meaning or entailment is one that is always associated with an 
expression. It is supposed to capture something similar to the relation between cause and 
effect. Christie (2000) states that 'According to Gricean characterisation of meaning, 
natural meaning would include instances where a link between two phenomena is inferred 
on the basis of a causal relationship or where one is a symptom of the other' (2000:125). 
For example, I can never say ‘Ali has passed the course’ without entailing that he has 
achieved the required mark. Natural meaning is different from what Grice call non-natural 
meaning. The non-natural meaning is when there is no relationship between what is said
A nand what is intended. According to Christie
non-natural meaning is where two phenomena are linked but where there is 
not necessary connection: where the relationship is based on convention. And 
this is of course, the relationship which holds between things in the world and 
the linguistic signs we use to refer to them (2000:125).
For example, inferring what is meant by the utterance ‘Ali has passed a course’, depends 
on the context in which it is spoken. For instance, in a job application, it might mean ‘He 
has satisfied one of the conditions’; in a social context, ‘He has passed one course, but he 
has still another exam is left to take’. In general, non-natural meaning, to Grice, is 
analysed in terms of speaker's intentions, what s/he intends to communicate, and the 
implied meaning is conveyed indirectly or through hints, without them ever being directly 
stated (See Grundy 2000, section, 4).
Grice (1975) also distinguishes two types of implicatures of conveying implied meanings: 
conventional and conversation implicatures. Conventional implicature is always conveyed 
regardless of considering the context where it is said. For example, the word "therefore" 
generally has the same implicature. On the other hand, conversational implicatures depend 
on a particular context of the utterance to be understood. They arise from certain principles
48 An implied meaning is what might be inferred by the addressee drawing on the expressed meaning.
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of conversational behaviours as they apply to conversation. Conversational implicatures 
are part of the conventional meaning, give rise to entailments and are independent of it. 
(See Kaplan, 1999) Grice holds that conversational implicatures can always be worked out 
or inferred from the Cooperative Principles. He argues that in order to interpret 
conversational implicatures, participants employ the ‘Cooperative Principle’. Grice’s 
(1975) ‘Cooperative Principle’ describes speakers as making relevant, expected 
contributions to conversation.49 This Cooperative Principle is detailed by reference to a set 
of four maxims, and each of these maxims consists of different sub-maxims which can 
apply to speakers in any conversation:
Quality : Contributions ought to be true.
Quantity : Speakers should be as informative as is required for the current
purposes of the exchange.
Relevance : Contributions to a conversation should clearly relate to the 
purpose of the exchange.
Manner : Speakers should be perspicuous -  in particular, orderly and brief, 
avoiding obscurity and ambiguity (Grice, 1975:45).
Grice argues that sometimes the listener understands that the speaker means something 
more than what it is said literally. He argues that implicature cannot be part of what is being 
said, and forces more understanding from the hearer. The reason Grice raises the issue of 
implicature is to understand whether the addressee understands what the speaker is 
suggesting by using particular utterances. He associates what he calls non-conventional, or 
conversational implicatures with certain general features of discourse. Firstly, our 
exchanges would not be rational if they consisted of a succession of disconnected remarks. 
Secondly, our talk is, to some extent, cooperative effort. Finally, each participant recognises a 
common purpose or mutually accepted direction.50 However, although the issue of what is 
said and what is intended is very important to this research, and is one of the reasons for 
discussing Grice here in this section, his approach has been criticized in relation to 
understanding and politeness by different scholars.
49 Grice suggests: ‘as a rough general principle (ceteris paribus) ‘Make your conversational contribution such 
as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction o f the talk exchange in 
which you are engaged’ (1975: 45).
50 Grice argues that ‘the word "means" derives from what speakers mean by uttering it’ He further holds that 
‘what a particular speaker or writer means by a sign on a particular occasion may well diverge from the 
standard meaning o f the sign.’ (Grice 1975: 45).
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2.1.1.1 Criticising Grice's Cooperative Principles
As discussed above, some theoreticians considered Grice's CP as the starting point for their 
models of analysis. In spite of this, Grice's theory has been variously attacked, defended, 
and revised by scholars such as Thomas (1995), Sifianou (1992), Grundy (2000), Sperber 
and Wilson (1995), Lakoff (1973) and Brown and Levinson (1987), in their later edition. 
Lakoff (1973) views all of Grice’s maxims as falling within her rule ‘be clear’. Sperber and 
Wilson, in their cognitive view of communication, hold that Grice’s maxims can be 
reduced to one maxim of relevance. They maintain that ‘communication does not 
necessarily involve a distinct and homogeneous set of empirical phenomena...the main 
defect of Grice’s analysis is not that it defines communication too vaguely, but it explains 
communication too poorly’ (1993: 32).51 Sperber and Wilson (1995) view Grice’s 
principle as not being in accord with the cognitive view that human communication is built 
upon, which they consider as the aim of Relevance Theory.
Brown and Levinson (1987) see Grice’s Cooperative Principle as different from the 
politeness principles that offer principled reasons for deviation, in that it assumes each 
participant will attempt to contribute appropriately to a discussion. Levinson points out 
that ‘the cooperative principle is intended to embody rational considerations as a guideline for 
effective and efficient use of language in conversation to further cooperative ends’ 
(1983:101). It seems that Levinson considers Grice’s theory as the link between the meanings 
of an utterance and the purpose it serves in a particular context.
Despite Grice’s maxims, we cannot consider non-native speakers of English, for example 
when using an incorrect grammatical rule, to be breaking the maxim of manner, if  they 
make themselves clear. From this point of view, Grice’s Cooperative principle does not 
clearly recognize differences across cultures, or linguistic strategies that each culture 
adopts in order to secure harmony in communication. To some extent, this is supported by 
Sifianou’s (1999) argument concerning the universality of Grice’s Maxims. She observes 
that
Grice repeatedly states that observance of the co-operative principle and its
subsequent maxims constitutes ‘reasonable’ and ‘rational’ behaviour. He does
51 Verschueren (1999) holds that 'Grice’s theory....is predicated on a model o f communication which 
attaches the highest normative value to demands for rationality and efficiency. However, social behaviour 
also incorporates norms which would seem to require breaches of maxims’ (1999:35). ■
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not, however, explain how he interprets these notions. Furthermore, when he 
says “it is just a well-recognized empirical fact that people DO behave in these 
ways” (p. 48), he does not make explicit whether he is referring to conversational 
behaviour only in his own society’ (Sifianou 1999:17).
Moreover, Eades (1982) sees informativeness as culturally dependent. This militates 
against Grice’s claim of universality for these maxims. Grice's Cooperative Principle 
concentrates more on the speakers than the hearers, who, in Grice’s maxims, are 
cooperative whether there is conversational implicature or not. He assumes that inferring 
the meaning depends on how speakers follow his maxims, and whether hearers are able to 
interpret them when flouted. Such a claim should be accompanied by a strong 
consideration of culture and context, which is particularly important when interactants are 
from different cultures. Grice does not explain what happens if the hearer fails to 
understand the intended meaning. However, whether we agree with Grice or not, it is clear 
that he refers to the underlying meanings or the implicatures an utterance might give rise 
to. This brief discussion of Grice's view provides us with the base of the core theories of 
politeness and how they developed.
2.1.2 Lakoff s Rules of Politeness52
Lakoff (1973) introduces what she calls the ‘politeness rule’. Her view is that our use of 
language embodies attitudes as well as meanings. She holds politeness as a form of 
behaviour that has been ‘developed in societies in order to reduce friction in personal 
interaction’ (1973:64). Many consider Lakoff s rules of politeness as a development of 
Grice’s view. Lakoff argues that Grice’s Cooperative Principle and maxims do not pay full 
attention to what she calls pragmatic factors. She points to situations in which the speaker 
tries intentionally to be unclear in order to achieve certain goals, and states that ‘... 
violation of the rules of conversation secures the rules of politeness’ (1973:303); the aim of 
the message may diverge from the aim of clarity because of pragmatic goals such as 
achieving a relationship or finding common ground. Lakoff (1977) reiterates this view, 
showing that asking for things from others requires different levels of politeness, 
depending upon the situation and the relationship between the interactants. She introduces 
the notion of pragmatic rules and argues that we need pragmatic rules in order to determine
52 Eelen (2001:2) states ‘Lakoff could well be called the mother o f modem politeness theory, for she was the 
•first to examine it from a decidedly pragmatic perspective’ (2001:2).
53 This is similar to Brown and Levinson (1987), who see politeness as conflict avoidance. Morand and 
Ocker (2002) also define politeness as "phrasing things in such a way as to take into consideration the feeling 
of others' (2).
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whether an utterance is pragmatically well-formed or not. Lakoff proposes what she calls 
“rules of politeness” such as ‘do not impose’, ‘give options’, ‘make the other person feel 
good’, which she later describes as ‘formality’ or clarity, (keep aloof), ‘deference’ (give 
options) and ‘camaraderie’ (show sympathy). Lakoff believes her rules allow the speaker 
to emphasise politeness or clarity, when it is not possible to achieve both, and that 
sometimes the speaker’s first aim is to achieve the former, when clarity is less important. 
She states
If the speaker’s principal aim is to navigate somehow or other among the respective 
statuses of the participants in the discourse indicating where each stands in the 
speaker’s estimate, his aim will be less the achievement of clarity than an 
expression of politeness, as its opposite (1973:296).54
She argues that her rules of politeness are applicable to different situations, and that 'being 
polite is thus defined - but only implicitly so - as operating according to those rules which 
are in effect each time, and doing so in "speech and action alike"' (1993:304).55
As with Grice, we still cannot judge if Lakoff s rules ascertain whether or not politeness is 
understood by the hearer. In spite of her claims of universality of her rules of politeness, it 
is still not clear how different societies interpret or perceive these rules. Bargiela et. al. 
(2001) hold that ‘we may intend to show solidarity and friendship with our interlocutors 
but may be understood as showing insufficient deference or being overly familiar’ 
(2001:17). Rules exist in all cultures but are restricted to social conditions and contexts, 
and given different priority accordingly. Lakoff does not explain how situations of 
misunderstanding might occur between people of different cultures when they have 
different concepts of propriety, and different evaluations of the context of interaction. She 
only explains the relationship between language and politeness and the level of language 
needed, without adequately considering the context of the interaction.
54 The issue o f clarity and the social aspect in both Lakoff s and Grice’s work is discussed by Eelen (2001), 
who explains that 'whereas the Cooperative Principle is geared to the ‘information content’ o f  
communication, the politeness rule attends to social issues. If hearers notice that speakers do not seem to be 
following the Gricean maxims to the fullest, they search for a plausible explanation in the politeness rule: if  
speakers are not entirely clear, then maybe they are trying to avoid giving offence’ (2001:3). (See Eelen 
2001).
55 Verschueren (1999), by contrast, holds that ‘norms o f politeness, in particular, often do not allow for fully 
informative utterances, unmitigated truth or complete clarity’ (1999:36).
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2.1.3 Leech’s (1983) Politeness Principles
Leech's politeness principles are not applicable in analysing cross-cultural interaction. His 
view of politeness comes from his understanding of communication.' He sees linguistic 
communication as communicating social behaviour.56 He does not reject Chomsky’s (1986) 
point of view that language is structured and that we have to master these structures in order 
to be able to communicate effectively, rather, he adds that communication must be studied in 
relation to a fully developed theory of language use. He builds his pragmatic view on the 
Speech Act Theory of Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) and enlarges it to include politeness, 
irony, and other social principles of linguistic behaviour. His work on politeness can be 
considered as an extension of Grice and LakofFs views of conversation.
Lakoff and Leech adopt Grice’s Cooperative Principle and add what they consider to be 
missing, that is politeness. Leech introduces politeness principles, which are, to some extent, 
different from LakofFs politeness rules. Leech argues that interactants endeavour to reduce 
friction or minimize the risk of being impolite in interaction. He introduces six politeness 
maxims, which, while showing that interactants observe Grice’s Cooperative Principle, also 
see speakers sometimes flouting it and sacrificing quality or quantity. These maxims are:
(1) Tact : The speaker minimizes costs and maximizes benefit to others.
(2) Generosity : The speaker minimizes benefit and maximizes cost to him/herself.
(3) Approbation: The speaker minimizes dispraise and maximizes praise of others.
(4) Modesty : The speaker minimizes praise and maximizes dispraise of him/herself.
(5) Agreement : The speaker minimizes disagreement and maximizes agreement with
others.
cn(6) Sympathy : The speaker minimizes hostility, and maximizes sympathy with others.
Judgements as to whether these maxims are at work are not precise. For example, Leech does 
not explain how we guarantee that our utterances maximize the benefits and minimize the 
cost to others, and vice versa. The tact maxim may be differently perceived, with the 
addressee thinking the opposite of what is intended by the speaker, and perceiving the way
56 ‘The role o f the politeness principle is to maintain the social equilibrium and the friendly relations which 
enable us to assume our interlocutors are being cooperative in the first place’ (Leech 1983:82).
57 Fraser (1990:227) criticises these maxims and argues that ‘Leech has not provided specific examples o f how 
each maxim would work in real life and how the maxims would be linked to the pragmatic scale in practise’.
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they are addressed as inappropriate. For example, saying to an Arab person “do you want 
tea?”, might be considered inappropriate. This is because, traditionally, bringing tea without 
asking is better. In Arabic, “do you want tea?” may give rise to the implicature that the 
speaker does not really want to offer tea. In Arabic, the appropriate strategy might be to say 
“coffee or tea?” “ “,"qahwa am sahe". The choice is whether the interactant wants
tea or coffee, leaving out the option of declining the offer.
Leech's (1983) Politeness Principles investigate human interaction as either polite or 
impolite communicative acts. He stresses social equilibrium and friendly relations and tries 
to establish links between the utterance and its social goals. A question this research might 
raise about Leech's principles of politeness is whether politeness is always aimed at 
conflict avoidance and geared to establishing comity. Also, we might question these claims 
in relation to cross-cultural interaction, where methods of avoiding conflict are sometimes 
differently perceived between interactants.
2.2 Brown and Levinson’s Theory of Linguistic Politeness
Brown and Levinson’s work on linguistic politeness (1978, 1987) can be considered as the 
first, and most comprehensive, comparative study of linguistic politeness. In their model, 
Brown and Levinson note the importance of politeness phenomena in social relationships 
and describe some of the strategies used to convey politeness. Their main argument is that 
“politeness phenomena are universal” (1987:2). They claim that their model is built on the 
assumption that interlocutors are rational agents, (which seems very close to the 
assumptions that underline Gricean principles of communication), and the assumption that 
the hearer intends to cooperate, and rationally chooses a means that would achieve these 
ends. They conclude that implicatures of politeness would presumably arise in the same 
way as all other implicatures.
Brown and Levinson (1987:132) discuss whether actions that can be achieved by means of 
utterances are limited, and whether sentences carry in their structures indications of their 
paradigmatic use or illocutionary force. They refer to Searle’s (1969) theory of Speech 
Acts and the issue of indirect speech acts, and see a straightforward relationship between 
indirectness and politeness. Their research is based on a detailed study of three different 
languages and cultures: Tamil speakers in southern India, Tzeltal speakers in Mexico, and
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American and British speakers of English. Brown and Levinson notice many similarities 
in the linguistic strategies employed by speakers of these three unrelated languages.
2.2.1 Brown and Levinson’s Claims and Aims
Brown and Levinson (1978) claim that (a) Politeness and face are universal (b) that we are 
rational, therefore, we will choose the means that will achieve our aims (c) there are certain 
kinds of acts that can be considered as Face Threatening Acts, and (d) any rational agent 
will employ strategies to avoid Face-Threatening Acts. The use of any such strategy will 
be dependent on social distance, relative power, and degree of imposition (Brown and 
Levinson, 1987: 55-56).
Brown and Levinson’s aims can be summed up as follows:
a- To describe and account for what is, in the light of current theory, a most 
remarkable phenomenon, and to identify some principles of a universal yet ‘social’ 
sort, thereby providing a possible social candidate for deep functional pressure on 
the shape of grammars in general (Brown and Levinson, 1987:56). 
b- To provide an antidote to the undervaluation in the sociological sciences of the 
complexity of human planning (Brown and Levinson, 1987:56). 
c- To explain the systematic use of social aspects of language and identify message 
construction as proper datum for the analysis of strategic language use (Brown and 
Levinson, 1987:56)
Brown and Levinson’s theory is that ‘...across cultures, the nature of the transaction being 
conducted in a verbal interchange is often evident as much in the manner in which it is 
done as in any overt performative acts’ (1987:57). Their overall problem is: ‘what sort of 
assumptions and what sort of reasoning are utilized by participants to produce such 
universal strategies of verbal interaction?’ They want to account for the observed cross- 
cultural similarities in the abstract principles which underlie polite usage.58 In order to find 
an answer to this problem and provide evidence for their assumptions, Brown and
58 Brown and Levison hope further that ‘a formal model that accounts for these cross-cultural similarities 
will also provide a reference model for culturally specific usage; that is, it promises to use an ethnographic 
tool o f great precision for investigating the quality of social interactions in any society’ (Brown and Levinson 
1987:57).
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Levinson attempt to answer the questions; ‘what would our rational face-endowed being 
do?’ and ‘how would such a being use language’? (Brown and Levinson, 1987:58).
2.2.2 Rationality
Brown and Levinson draw on the notion of the Model Person (MP) - the fluent speaker of 
a natural language who is endowed with the properties of rationality, i.e. the ability to 
reason from ends to the means that will satisfy those ends and face (both positive and 
negative).59 They state that
discovering the principle of language usage may be largely coincidental with 
discovering the principles out of which social relationships, in their 
interactional aspects, are constructed: dimensions by which individuals manage 
to relate to others in particular ways’ (1987:55).
They consider rationality as the main factor for understanding the intended or implicit 
meanings of utterances.
2.2.3 Brown and Levinson and Goffman’s (1967) notion of face
Brown and Levinson refer to Goffman’s (1967, 1971) notion of face60 as the image that a 
person adopts for themselves, and acquires from society. They argue that face can be 
damaged, maintained, or enhanced through interaction with others. They note that certain 
illocutionary acts may threaten a person’s face, which they call "FTAs (Face Threatening 
Acts)". They are acts in which the speaker risks impeding the hearer’s freedom of action, 
for example requests, orders, suggestions, advice, reminding, threats and warnings. Other 
FTAs include putting pressure on the hearer to accept or reject an act, for example, by 
offers or promises, or by complimenting a person or performing an act interpreted as 
indicating that the speaker would like something from the addressee.
59 Brown and Levinson's (1987) politeness theory holds that some speech acts threaten interactants' face 
needs. They divide face concerns into a) a person's sense o f self-esteem and his/her wish to be well thought 
of, which is classified as positive politeness. This includes the desire to be understood by others and be 
treated as a friend; and b) a person's desire to determine their own course o f action and wish not to be 
imposed upon by others, which is classified as negative face. It is the desire for autonomy (negative face) 
(Brown and Levinson, 1987). (The notion o f face is fully discussed in the next sections.
60 The term face in the sense o f ‘reputation’ or ‘good name’ seems to have been first used in English in 1876 
as a translation o f the Chinese term ‘diu lian’ in the phrase ‘Argument by which China has lost face’ Since 
then it has been used widely in phrases such as ‘losing o f face’, and ‘saving o f face’ (Thomas, 1995:168)
37
Goffman (1967) states that the image that people adopt reflects their understanding of 
themselves.61 He argues, to maintain face, people take into account their position in society 
and normally refrain from actions or activities that would be awkward to face up to later 
(Goffman 1967:7). He deems face a person’s 'most personal possession and the centre of 
his security and pleasure', which, however, 'is only on loan to him from the society' and 
'will be withdrawn unless s/he conducts her/himself in a way that is worthy of it' 
(1972:322). This concept is separated by Brown and Levinson into ‘positive face’, 
essentially the wish that others will respect the individual’s public self-image, and 
'negative face', which is the desire for freedom of action to project this image. Goffman 
defines face as:
the positive social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line 
others assume he has taken during a particular contact. Face is an image of self 
delineated in terms of approved social attributes - albeit an image that others 
may share, as when a person makes a good showing for himself (1967:5).
• Brown and Levinson approach this notion from two different angles. First, they define face 
as 'the public self-image that every member wants to claim for her/himself.62 They state:
in general, people cooperate (and assume each other’s cooperation) in 
maintaining face in interaction, such cooperation being based on the mutual 
vulnerability of face. That is, normally everyone’s face depends on everyone 
else’s being maintained, and since people can be expected to defend their faces if 
threatened, and in defending their own to threaten others’ face (1987:61).
Secondly, they believe the notion of face exists in all languages and cultures. They argue 
that
the desire to be unimpeded in one’s actions is (negative face), and the desire 
(in some respect) to be approved of is (positive face). This is the bare bones of 
the notion of face which (we argue) is universal, but which in any particular 
society we would expect to be the subject of much cultural elaboration (Brown 
and Levinson 1987:13).
61 Ho (1975) argues that ‘face is a translation o f Mandarin mianize and lian which carry a range o f meanings 
based upon the concept o f honour’ (1975:867).
62 Brown and Levinson presume that speakers use language to achieve their goals on strategies, that they 
want other people to respect their face, and that face is interpreted in negative and positive terms. People try 
to achieve their goals, and at the same time avoid threatening their interlocutors’ face.
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Their theory presumes all adults in any society are concerned about their self image, the 
'face' that they display to others, and recognize that other people have similar or different 
face wants. They state that
while the content of face will differ in different cultures (what the exact limits 
are to personal territories, and what the publicly relevant content of personality 
consists in), we are assuming that the mutual knowledge of members’ public 
self-image of face, and the social necessity to orient oneself to it in interaction, 
are universal (Brown and Levinson 1987:61).
According to them, the hearers’ face could be threatened if the speaker imposes on them 
their own beliefs about the world in a way with which the hearer might not agree.
They also discuss different kinds of Face Threatening Acts, distinguishing between those 
that primarily threaten the speaker’s face and acts that threaten the addressee. The first 
types are those that offend the speaker’s negative face, for example, expression of thanks, 
acceptance of hearer’s thanks, excuses, acceptance of offers, or unwillingness to accept 
promises and offers. In such acts, speakers put some pressure on the addressee to do or 
stop doing certain acts. Other threats are those that directly damage the speaker’s positive 
face. Examples are apologies, acceptance of compliments, self-humiliation, behaving 
stupidly, self-contradiction, confessions, admission of guilt or responsibility, emotional 
outbursts, and non-control of laughter or tears. Acts that threaten the positive face needs, 
by indicating that the speaker does not care about the addressee’s feelings include: acts 
which show that the speaker has a negative evaluation of an aspect of the hearer’s positive 
face, for example, expressing disapproval, criticism, accusation, insult, contradictions or 
disagreements, challenges, etc. Expressions of violent emotions, irreverence, bringing bad 
news about hearers and addressing hearers in an embarrassing way are some other acts that 
show the speaker does not care about the hearer’s positive face.63 However, the above 
discussion indicates that the' notion of face can be differently interpreted. Brown and 
Levinson (1987) claim that they have expanded upon Goffman's notion of face, but they 
sound as if they are insisting on individual understanding of what is appropriate rather than 
social values as Goffmain claims. The next section discusses some other views of the
63 Carrell and Konneker (1981) investigate the judgement o f politeness made by both speakers o f American 
English and non-native speakers of English. They argue that there is a high correlation between native and 
non-native judgment o f politeness. They also conclude that ESL learners tend to perceive more politeness 
distinctions than do native English speakers (1981:27).
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notion of face, and argues that face is sometimes differently understood across cultures, 
and that Brown and Levinson's understanding of face is not universal.
2.2.3.1 Other views of face
Because face is interpreted differently across cultures, Brown and Levinson's view of face 
as a universal notion has been criticised. Nwoye (1992) proposes a view of face which is 
slightly different from Brown and Levinson’s; instead of negative and positive face, he 
introduces what he calls individual face and group face. He posits that
Individual face refers to the individual’s desire to attend to his/her personal needs 
and to place his/her public-self image above those of others. Group face on the 
other hand, refers to the individual’s desire to behave in conformity with culturally 
expected norms of behaviour that are institutionalized and sanctioned by society 
(1992:313).
Group face, however, might better be understood as the individual’s acts which have the 
group’s reputation in mind.
Scollon and Scollon (1995:34) argue that, from a cross-cultural perspective, it is necessary 
to ask 'Is it the society that gives a person face or do people decide it for themselves?'. 
Spencer-Oatey (2000a) suggests that we should use the term ‘rapport management’ instead 
of the notion of face. This is a broader notion because 'it examines the way that language is 
used to construct, maintain and/or threaten social relationship' (2000:12). She argues that 
rapport management suggests more understanding of the relationship between self and 
society (See Spencer-Oatey later in this chapter).
I consider Spencer-Oatey's term is certainly more appropriate for describing face in Arabic. 
Loss of face differs from context to context, from culture to culture. It is sometimes a 
collective rather than an individual issue in some cultures. The notion of face, in Arabic, is 
derived from the conventional expressions
wajhi maa’a Afqed
of my face water I lose
I have done something socially unacceptable.
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wajhe maa’a Ahfad
of my face water I protect 
I avoid doing something socially unacceptable.
Thus, when someone is impolite they are described as losing the water of their faces.64 
Eckert and McConnel-Ginet (2003) describe face ‘as the social glue that keeps people 
attuned to each other in interaction -  it is what keeps them coordinating their actions 
closely’ (2003:59). However, Mills (2003a) criticises this notion. She argues that
the notion of face is not adequate to encompass the negotiations between people 
in conversation: although it covers the details of managing harmonious 
relationships, it does not deal with the negotiation of interests, 
manipulativeness, external pressure, and one’s relation to the community of 
practice (2003a:77).
Mills broadens this issue to involve analysis of more factors than individual interaction. 
Face seems to involve not only consideration of your interactant’s face, but also what is 
culturally appropriate. Thus, while face exists in every society, the term is interpreted 
differently and the strategies that a person may adopt to protect his/her self-image in a 
society remain culturally and contextually dependent.
2.2.3.2 Criticism of Brown and Levinson’s notion of face
The notion of face as proposed by Brown and Levinson can be seen as not being as 
universal as they claim, and is challenged by scholars. Mao (1994) argues that face is 
differently understood by interactants from different cultures. Ide (1989) too, holds that 
speech acts such as honorifics and greetings are not the same across cultures and that the 
use of ritual expressions differs. Grundy points out that:
more egalitarian societies [...] will employ positive politeness strategies as a 
way of encoding and thus confirming a less territorial view of face. In such 
societies face is said to be "ascribed" on merit rather than "acquired" by birth. 
(2000:162)
The first criticism which might be made is that a Face Threatening Act is not just an 
exchange between individual interactants, as Brown and Levinson claim. Locher and Watts
(2005) distinguish between their notion of face and Goffman’s, arguing that
64 The water is associated with face because face colour changes in front o f other people when they realise 
their behaviour is unacceptable.
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for Goffman face does not reside inherently in an individual, as wpuld appear 
to be the case of Brown and Levinson, but is rather constructed discursively 
with other members of the group in accordance with the line that each 
individual has chosen (2005:12).
Face is, therefore, a social issue and reflects the relationship between individuals and their 
social group or community of practice.65 A second criticism is that Brown and Levinson 
do not discuss how face is perceived cross-culturally. This relationship between 
individuals and their social groups leads us to consider again what happens, in relation to 
understanding what is appropriate, in interactions between people from different cultures. 
In such interactions, we would expect to find social principles that may organize 
interaction differently from what has been suggested by Brown and Levinson.
Hiraga and Turner (1996) examine the presentation and response to FTAs in tutor-student 
interaction in British and Japanese academic contexts. They show that Japanese students 
show more concern for the positive face of the tutor than British students. According to 
them
Complexions vary within cultures as well as across cultures, and this translates 
to different individual reactions in the same situation, although each situation 
usually throws up a dominant type (1996:625).66
Thus, face, in certain contexts, is interpreted differently across cultures. O’Driscoll (1996), 
however, in his paper 'A defence and elaboration of universal dualism1, attempts to 
elaborate the concept of positive and negative face, with a view to upholding the claim that 
these are universal phenomena.
Watts (2003) argues that ‘a more satisfactory model of linguistic politeness that is 
grounded in a theory of social interaction needs to return to Erving Goffman’s notion of 
‘face’ rather than continue with the dual notion of positive and negative politeness’
65 A community o f practice consists o f a loosely defined group o f people who are mutually engaged on a 
particular task and who have ‘a shared repertoire of negotiable resources accumulated over time’ (Wenger, 
1998:76)
66 They argue that 'the interaction displays different complexion according to where they are predominantly 
‘shame faced’ (losing positive face), ‘bold-faced’ (defending own or threatening other’s face), or ‘effaced’ 
(where there is no face to attend to). (1996:625)
67 The aim o f the paper is to revise the notion of face in Brown and Levinson’s model, in the context o f its 
application to studies o f cross-cultural communication. For a detailed discussion of the notion o f face 
Bargiela (2002 and 2003).
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(2003:25). He sees Goffman as viewing the notion of face as when someone is considered 
socially appropriate, whereas Brown and Levinson hold face to be concerned with 
maintaining good relationships with another person. Watts introduces the term ‘relational 
work’ as a return to Goffman’s notion of face. According to Locher (2004)
relational work comprises the entire continuum of verbal behaviour from direct, 
impolite, rude or aggressive interaction through to polite interaction, 
encompassing both appropriate and inappropriate forms of social behaviour 
(2004:51).
Following Goffman, Watts believes that ‘any interpersonal interaction involves the 
participants in the negotiation of face. The term “facework”, therefore, should also span the 
entire breadth of interpersonal meaning’ (2005:11). Watts also believes that face work 
concentrates only on appropriate and polite behaviour with a focus on face threat 
mitigation, whereas ‘relational work’ encompasses, in addition, rude, impolite, and 
inappropriate behaviour. However, we may conclude this section with Eelen's (2001) 
argument that what is positive politeness in one culture might not be in another, and what 
is an FTA in one culture might not be so in another. Furthermore, Brown and Levinson's 
negative and positive politeness and the way in which rationality operates in different 
cultures are not universal.68
2.2.4 Brown and Levinson’s Strategies
Brown and Levinson’s interpretation of face as negative and positive leads them to 
introduce what they call politeness strategies. They explain these two aspects as follows;
a- Negative face: the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, right to non­
distraction -  i.e. to freedom of action and freedom from imposition (Brown and 
Levinson, 1987:61).
b- Positive face: the positive consistent self-image or ‘personality’ (crucially 
including the desire that this self-image be appreciated and approved of) 
claimed by interactants (Brown and Levinson, 1987:61).
They claim that both face needs are universal in avoiding breakdown in communication. Ji 
(2000) argues that ‘Brown and Levinson’s dichotomy of positive and negative faces is
68 Fraser (1982) considers politeness as face saving; Watts (1992d) analyses politeness as a political issue; 
Al-Saied (1995) sees face as when a person does or says something unacceptable by others; Spencer-Oatey 
(2000) sees face as rights-threatening behaviour. The notion o f face might be a result o f religious beliefs, 
social agreements or norms, and there are therefore different interpretations across cultures.
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justifiable because, although the two types of face may play an unbalanced role in a 
particular culture, there has been no evidence that they cannot be identified in that culture’ 
(2000:1061). Brown and Levinson suggest that language strategies explain the speaker’s 
intention, instead of using norms and conventions that already exist in a particular society 
(cf: Ide,1989), with the speaker deciding strategies after evaluating his/her relationship 
with the addressee. They suggest there are certain strategies performed by speakers which 
threaten the face needs of hearers, and that politeness strategies are developed to save the 
hearer’s face and deal with these Face Threatening Acts.
Brown and Levinson suggest four types of politeness strategy, covering all human 
linguistic ‘politeness’ needs, and dealing with face threatening acts. These strategies are:
a- Bald On Record: These provide no effort to minimize threats to the hearer’s 
face.
b- Positive Politeness:. The speaker recognizes that the addressee has a desire to 
be respected, and confirms that their relationship is friendly and expresses 
group reciprocity.
c- Negative Politeness: The speaker recognizes needs for respect, and also 
assumes that he is imposing on them.
d- Off-record or indirect: The speaker tries not to directly impose.
Through these strategies, Brown and Levinson link linguistic politeness with redress and 
argue that the degree of indirectness is reflected in the positives and negatives a speaker 
uses, (i.e. on-record and off-record).69 They say that ‘there are good arguments for 
insisting that off-record strategies are generally more polite than on-record...the appearance 
of utterances constructed as off-record hints in cases where they are actually on-record 
requests’ (19987:20)
69 Nelson, G. et. al. (2002) 'The danger in accepting the universality o f an indirect communication style in 
Arabic is that multiple opportunities for cross-cultural misunderstandings arise. For instance, non-Arabs, who 
have been taught that Arabs use indirect communication, may perceive Arabs as impolite, rude, or arrogant if  
they use direct strategies .in refusing or in other face-threatening acts when, in fact, they are behaving 
appropriately according to the norms and rules with which they were socialized' (2002:53).
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Thus, the indirectness or off-record acts are more likely to be considered as politeness 
strategies than direct or on-record in Brown and Levinson’s terms.70 They consider off- 
record as: direct in relation to the implicit meaning, and indirect in relation to the explicit 
structure of the utterance. They point out that
off-record strategies are a solution half-way between doing the FTA on-record 
and not doing it at all; therefore, in the absence of context-specific implicature 
to the contrary, we would expect them to be more polite than on-record 
performance of the FTA (ibid:20).
However, even if we agree that off-record is the more polite, it is not easy to agree that it is 
universal, as cross-culturally we may not find agreement on what is classified as off- 
record, and what meanings an off-record utterance would imply to interactants from 
different cultures.
2.2.5 Universality in Brown and Levinson’s Model
One of the criticism of Brown and Levinson's model of politeness is its claim of 
universality in the linguistic strategies used between interactants to minimize FTAs, or 
their connecting of particular linguistic forms with politeness across cultures. Scholars 
such as Held (1992), Kerbrat-Orecchioni, (1997) Janney and Arndt (1993), Christie (2000), 
Mills (2003a), Watts (2003), Eelen (2001) and Spencer-Oatey (2000a) suggest that Brown 
and Levinson’s claim of universality of linguistic politeness is indicative of Anglo-
• •  71 •centrically biased research. Mills (2003a) considers their claim of universality of their 
linguistic politeness strategies to be one of the causes of difficulty - theoretically and 
methodologically. She argues that ‘when we analyse deference in Asian cultures, we may 
be working with a Western model of deference which does not fit those cultures’ 
(2003:105). She goes on to say that ‘this tendency to characterise classes and cultures as 
homogeneous is not easily sustained when we examine the complexity of politeness in 
even one culture, or even within one class’ (2003:107).
70 Critical discussion o f this assumption is left to the next section, where different views o f Brown and 
Levinson's work are presented in relation to the aims o f this thesis.
71 Wierzbicka (2003) states that ‘Brown and Levinson see two principles as the most important ones in 
human interaction: ‘avoidance o f imposition’ ( ‘negative face’) and 'approval o f the other person’, which they 
exemplify with the English compliment "what lovely roses!"’ (2003:67).
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Sifianou (1999) does not completely agree with Brown and Levinson's claim of 
universality of linguistic politeness, but she tries to justify their claim of universality on the 
grounds that
it seems reasonable to assume that the concept of politeness, which represents 
an abstract social value, is most probably universal in some form or other, even 
though the way in which this concept is visualised and thus defined and how it is 
realised verbally .and non-verbally will most probably be culture-specific 
(1999:46).72
Sifianou’s argument is that, although we have different interpretations to our behaviours 
because of cultural differences, there are common grounds that we draw on in our 
interaction even when we are from different cultures.
Disagreeing with Brown and Levinson's view about universality in repairing FTAS, 
Liebersohn et al. (2004) point out that
while there are cultures that deny any possibilities of repairing a face- 
threatening act through a verbal act per se (such as classical Greek culture), 
there are cultures that support their members with cultural resources for repairing a 
face-threatening act through a verbal speech event' (2004:298).
Thus, there is disagreement about understanding face and face repair and Brown and 
Levinson's strategies of politeness as being universal. In cross-cultural interaction, a 
particular utterance which is supposed to repair face damage in English, would lead to 
more FTA in another culture, because the hearer did not feel there to be a need for a 
repairing utterance.
72 Sifianou seems to be convinced by Brown and Levinson’s claim o f universality in linguistic politeness 
strategies across cultures. She does not entirely agree, but states that ‘the many similarities detected by 
Brown and Levinson in their study of politeness phenomena in three unrelated languages do point to a certain 
degree o f universality, but they do not preclude major differences which were not detailed so extensively in
their study’ (1999:38).73 Sifianou (1999) also argues ‘the fact that there is a possibility o f translation and o f comparative study is, I 
believe, indicative o f the fact that there is some common ground on which studies o f politeness may be 
based’ (ibid.:4). But at the same time in an earlier work on the use o f diminutives in expressing politeness. 
Sifianou (1992) argues that ‘Brown and Levinson’s arguments to the effect that such elements minimize 
imposition are rather unconvincing’ (155). She also argues that ‘requests, one o f the most common speech 
activities, do not necessarily entail imposition on the addressee’ (1992:172).
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The other issue in criticising Brown and Levinson's claim of universality in linguistic 
politeness is that their model does not clearly classify some speaking situations; for 
example, ‘irony’ or what happens when people intend to insult each other indirectly. 
Because some speaking situations are not clearly specified in Brown and Levinson, we 
may support the claim that their model is speaker-specific rather than hearer and speaker 
specific. As argued by Werkhofer (1992) ‘Politeness involves speakers and hearers and/or 
any third party who might be part of the interaction. It is a mixture between interactional 
relations and linguistic behaviour’ (1992:159). This view is supported by Haverkate 
(1987), who says ‘politeness is a social interaction, a form that mediates between 
individual and social’ (1987:28). In addition, Grundy reasons that if Brown and Levinson’s 
theory of universality of their model of politeness is right, ‘we should be able to 
extrapolate the intra-societal politeness behaviour we noted in over- and under-class 
communication to whole societies’ (2000:162). For example, in most Arab societies, a 
tribal social system rather than a class social system prevails. According to Ali (2004) the 
tribal system is the real power structure for most Iraqis, which makes it difficult for the 
West to understand them. I consider such an argument to apply to different parts of the 
Arab world, regardless of the class system which is preferred by some Arab groups. Such 
tribal system of the Arab societies may entail different interpretations of what is thought to 
be negative or positive politeness in English.74 Thus, Brown and Levinson (1987)'s claim 
of universality for linguistic politeness cannot be accepted in cross-cultural interaction. The 
strategies they suggest as universal strategies for linguistic politeness do not engage 
sufficiently to analyse cross-cultural context of interaction, and the variables that they 
propose to their analysis are not interpreted similarly in a cross-cultural context.
2.2.6 Brown and Levinson’s Variables for Politeness Strategies
Brown and Levinson assert that speakers think of their relationships and social distance 
before formulating the appropriate linguistic politeness strategy. They note variables that
74 Tribal system is different from the class system, as the tribal system is related to how a person is important 
in his/her tribe, and a particular tribe has agreed upon to organize its people's life. In the Arab world, the 
creation o f the state system (which is understood as a class system) in stead o f a tribal system has always 
faced difficulties. Although the I and II World War had brought changes in the lives o f Arab people which 
were run in a tribal way, people, until now, use their tribal system to solve their problems or manage their 
everyday lives. As argued by Atiyah (1968), 'the emergence o f colonial governments with centralizing 
ambitions; the creation o f international borders; rapid economic changes; and the spread o f national 
ideologies were among the factors that threatened the survival o f old tribal order and indeed put enormous 
pressures on tribespeople everywhere'. He argues that 'Even today, tribal identities, though significantly 
modified since the days o f the Mandate, continue to play a major role in Jordanian politics' (1968:99).
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influence interaction and affect not only the choice of forms and their meanings, but also 
the strategies used by speakers and the way they conceive of each other’s linguistic
ncbehaviour, including the choice of the topic.
Brown and Levinson (1987) note the importance of cultural variations in social 
relationships and highlight some of the implications. Besides the politeness strategies 
discussed above, they propose three universal cultural/social variables in assessing the 
seriousness of an FTA in many, and perhaps all, cultures: social distance (D), relative 
power (P), and absolute ranking (R) of imposition in a particular culture (1987:74). They 
describe (D) as a regular social dimension of similarity/difference between the speaker and 
hearer, (P) as the relative power between the hearer and the speaker and (R) as a culturally 
and situationally defined ranking of imposition. They suggest that P, D, and R are used by 
the actors to assess the danger of FTAs (1987:80), and that these are context dependent. 
They explain:
Our social dimensions P, D and R can be viewed in various ways. Taking P as 
an extended example, we would argue that individuals are assigned an absolute 
value on this dimension that measures the power that each individual has relative to 
all others (Brown and Levinson 1987:78).
Brown and Levinson see these variables as important in any Face Threatening Act saying 
‘in any case, the function must capture the fact that all three dimensions P, D, R contribute 
to the seriousness of an FTA, and thus to a determination of the level of politeness with 
which, other things being equal, an FTA will be communicated’ (1987:76). How these 
variables function in cross-cultural interaction and which affects the utterance most is not 
specified. Whereas these variables are essential in deciding the strategy required for each 
situation, which might be universal, their importance is not the same in different cultures.
Unless we can define more clearly what is considered to be social distance, power, and 
ranking of imposition, we cannot accept Brown and Levinson’s claims (see chapter 5). 
Classifying power, distance and ranking of the imposition between interlocutors from 
different cultures cannot be determined by comparing what happens in every culture 
separately from others. How a variable such as power influences an interaction, and how it
75 Boxer (1993) argues that ‘social distance is one of the foremost factors that determines the way in which 
interlocutors converse precisely because it is an important determinant o f the degree o f comfort or politeness/ 
deference in a verbal exchange’ (1993:103).
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is interpreted in a cross-cultural context is not clearly explained in Brown and Levinson's 
model. To them context is fixed, and such variables are working in a systemic way in 
interaction, which might not be the case in cross-cultural interaction.
2.2.7 Brown and Levinson’s model of cross-cultural interaction
Brown and Levinson’s linguistic strategies have been heavily criticised by researchers 
from different cultures, particularly Japanese and Chinese (Meier 1997). They find that 
Brown and Levinson's classification of acts of thanks, apology and compliments as FTAs, 
to either of the interactants, is not accurate in all cultures, such classification being defined 
by scholars such as Wierzbicka (1985), Blum-Kulka (1987) and Meier (1997) as being 
specific to Westerners. In Arabic, for example, ‘expressing thanks' is too complicated to be 
included in just one strategy that threatens the speaker’s face. For example, if someone is 
insulted, instead of reacting aggressively, they may thank their interlocutors;
1A: You are a bad person.
tZljf
Anta shakhs sayee 
2B: Thanks 
IjZJi
Shoukran
Analysing such an incident is complicated within Brown and Levinson's model. For them, 
thanking usually comes as a result of an invitation or an offer. In Arabic, 'thanks’ in such a
n(\context constitutes a ‘threat’ from the speaker to the addressee. Utterance 2B cannot be 
discussed using Brown and Levinson’s model, for three main reasons; firstly because their 
model assumes that all interactants aim for a good relationship, and that there are strategies 
that people use to avoid or redress any Face Threatening Acts. Secondly, because their 
model is speaker-centred, the way the utterance is understood is not analysed. Thirdly, 
because the influence of context and meaning of the utterance in relation to what precedes 
and succeeds it is not analysed. In Arabic, when you thank someone for insulting you, you
76 Hobbs, P. (2003) argues that ' positive politeness, which functions to express interest in, and approval o f  
the hearer (Brown and Levinson, 1987:101), may appear to have no place in all types o f communications' 
(261).
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are in fact insulting them and telling them that you are better than them because you will 
not insult others as they do.
However, even if we examine an utterance as an individual act, we find that, according to 
Brown and Levinson’s classification, thanking is a Face Threatening Act to the speaker, 
whereas this might not be the case in other cultures. The issue of different interpretation of 
negative face is discussed by Matsumoto (1988), who explains that in ‘Japanese the 
structures associated with negative politeness strategies in Brown and Levinson’s model do 
not have a negative politeness function’ (cited in Grundy 2000:162). Discussing how 
negative politeness is differently understood, Sifianou, (1992) in her comparative study of 
English and Greek politeness, also notes that requests are frequent in everyday encounters 
in Greek, and different strategies can be assigned to them.
Thus, in their model of politeness, Brown and Levinson argue that speakers are solely 
responsible for finding the appropriate method to protect their own and their hearer's face. 
In Arabic, particularly in Libya, almost all people use the strategy of bald-on-record in 
their everyday life. The direct request and imperative is common between people, whether 
they are requesting others or offering them something. For example:
‘Give me your car to get my children to school’
.Aj j j j X J I  f i l i a l  J L uSj ) J a J  £>-• d ljj L-uj ^  n h & l
Ehtenee sayaratic men ajele eysal atfalee ela almadrassa 
‘Come in and have a cup of tea’77
< - jjA j il  j  Ja«j|
Eoudkhal wa esrab shaye
If we analyse these strategies we find that, in spite of being imperatives, they do not 
threaten the face of any of the interactants. Firstly, this is because, culturally, Arabs, 
especially Libyans, do not classify speech acts that are direct or imperative as threatening 
to face; secondly, because implied meaning is usually judged contextually. Thus, it is true 
that sometimes a speaker threatens his/her interactant's face by using certain types of 
strategies, but the evaluation of the context plays the most important role in judging 
whether there is an FTA or not.
77 It should be noted that this is also the case in English. These imperatives signal intimacy and positive 
politeness amongst close friends and family.
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To sum up, what I have argued here is that Brown and Levinson (1987) have not shown 
real consideration of analysing politeness and considering the role of culture and context in 
relation to all interactants. Their model of analysis does not consider all that influences 
interaction in relation to the context of interaction. The need to find an approach of 
analysis that does not just compare different cultures through analysing certain speech acts 
is needed in cross-cultural interaction. My claim is that cultural backgrounds and 
understanding of context can lead to misunderstandings in interaction between native and 
non-native speakers of English, and that Brown and Levinson have not considered such 
factors accurately. I will, in what follows, move away from the reliance on a theory that 
emphasises individuals and their strategies, to develop a form of analysis which is more 
focused on culture and context. In the next section, I will discuss post-Brown and 
Levinson theorizing of politeness, and consider the issues, in relation to cross-cultural 
interaction, that post-Brown and Levinson scholars have considered. The discussion of all 
these issues will be developed further in the next chapter.
2.3 Post-Brown and Levinson Theorizing of Politeness
In this section I draw on the work of post-Brown and Levinson theories and views of 
politeness and their criticism of Brown and Levinson's model in order to develop an 
adequate approach to analysing politeness in cross-cultural interaction. The post-Brown 
and Levinson theories of politeness consider more variables than those addressed by 
Brown and Levinson, and they suggest that because of such ignorance Brown and 
Levinson's model is inadequate in analysing politeness.
2.3.1 Blum-Kulka (Cultural norms)
To Blum-Kulka (1992), politeness is a linguistic behaviour upon which others judge us. 
She suggests that
politeness is positively associated with tolerance, restraint, good manners, showing 
deference and being nice to people, but is simultaneously referred to in a negative 
manner as something external, hypocritical, unnatural (1992:257).
She emphasises the difference between cultural and strategic aspects of politeness, building 
on previous theories, but perceiving their analytical methods as inadequate. While agreeing 
with Brown and Levinson’s notion of face, she sees this as determined by culture and not
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individuals. In her article ‘The metapragmatics of politeness in Israeli society’ she details 
the role of culture in negotiating perceptions of politeness. She notes that
it is when Israelis are called upon to formulate their ideas and feelings of 
politeness in the private sphere that a strong cultural bias emerges. Among 
friends and family, some find politeness completely irrelevant, others severely 
restrict its appropriate modes of expression (1992:259).
She sees similarities and differences between cultures in what is considered polite, noting 
that Israelis and Americans are not similar in respecting the Maxim of Relevance in some 
interactional situations. To Blum-Kulka, all differences are due to culture. She believes
expression of impolite illocutions distinguishes cultures and individuals sharply; for 
acts threatening the other’s (positive) face, Israelis can view as polite the 
expressing of unpleasant “truth” ... where other cultures would view it as impolite; 
for acts threatening the positive face of self, they often recommend avoidance as 
the preferred strategy (1992:266).
While acknowledging individual performances and cognitive understanding of what is 
polite and impolite, she suggests that these draw on cultural backgrounds emphasising 
cultural norms as an important factor in analysing politeness, and arguing that face is 
culturally determined. This view adds more dimensions in analysing politeness, as it argues 
against Brown and Levinson's claim of universality in lingustic politeness strategy. In 
cross-cultural interaction, we need to admit that there are differences between interactants 
because of their cultural backgrounds that might lead to misunderstanding.
2.3.2 Fraser (Conversational contract)
The social-norm view, in Fraser’s (1990) classification of politeness, is associated with 
'good manners'. Definitions of ‘good manners’, however, again depend on culture and the
nonature of society. Fraser adds the association with style -  a more formal style implying 
greater politeness. Fraser depends, to some extent, on Grice’s Cooperative Principle in his 
conversational-contract view, and refers to the group as well as to society. This means that 
the Conversational Contract he proposes is not fixed by society alone; it can also be up to 
the interactants to decide on the rules or rights that should prevail in conversation
78 As Nwoye (1992) points out, ‘in the social norm view, politeness is seen as arising from an awareness of  
one’s social obligations to the other members o f the group to which one owes primary allegiance, while the 
face view espouses the notion that politeness is a strategy acquired and manipulated by individuals to attain 
specific objectives, goals, or intentions’ (1992:312).
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(Conversational Contract).79 Fraser argues th a t' being polite does not involve making the 
hearer ‘feel good’ ‘a la Lakoff or Leech, nor making the hearer not ‘feel bad’ ‘a la 
B[rown] and L[evinson]. It simply involves getting on with the task at hand in light of the 
terms and conditions of the CC.’ (Fraser, 1990:123).
However, although I consider Fraser’s view to be inadequate for analysing cross-cultural 
interactions - because it does not clearly tell us what is and is not polite when the 
interactants are strangers to each other - it does demonstrate the complexity of analysing 
politeness. Unlike Brown and Levinson, who only consider the speaker, Fraser's view 
emphasises the role of the hearer in determining whether what is said is polite or not. It 
suggests especially that analysing politeness is more complicated in cross-cultural than in 
monocultural interaction. In an earlier article, Fraser and Nolen (1981) point to their 
awareness of the difficulty in judging politeness. They make it clear that one cannot follow 
linguistic traditions and appeal directly to the intuitions of the native speaker to decide the 
degree of deference associated with a particular expression (1981: 93). Thus, Frazer's view 
differs from Brown and Levinson’s in that it emphasises the argument that politeness is an 
issue of both the speaker and the listener understanding of what is meant, and that 
misunderstanding may occur if what is considered polite is contentious or debatable to all 
interactants.80
2.3.3 Arabic views of Politeness (religion and politeness)
What is politeness in Arabic, although it is highly contextual, is influenced by religion as 
the main base of Arabic culture. (See details in chapters 1 and 5) Al-Gorgani (1978) and 
Alnayhome (2001) point out that there are different ways in which utterances can be 
understood as polite in Arabic. The usual way is through a religious formula according to 
the context of the interaction. I am not arguing that most of the polite strategies among 
Arabs are taken from religious beliefs; rather that interactants, in Arabic, are influenced by, 
and prefer to use socially agreed religious expressions to appear polite. Not all Arab 
societies are religious, and there are different ways of interpreting religious expressions, 
but generally an Arab interactant would feel it appropriate if such religious expressions are
79 This is different from Goffman’s (1967) notion of face, in which all are expected to behave in a certain 
way to protect their own and their interactants’ face.
80 Fraser, like Lakoff and Leech, agrees that Grice’s Cooperative Principle has established rules in 
interaction, but Fraser’s view is still deficient in cross-cultural situations as it is not clear how strangers or 
people from different cultures can be bound by a set o f rights and obligations in a casual conversation.
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used. According to Albassier (2004), whatever the source of their religious differences, 
Arabs use religious expressions and strategies that are accepted by society. Even if there 
are contextual or societal differences in understanding these religious expressions, they are 
all concerned with signalling politeness.
There are words in Arabic that are either not mentioned or are mentioned mainly through 
euphemisms. This would be the case when describing certain parts of the body or sexual 
intercourse. For example, the euphemism ‘approaching’ " v A "  "yaqtareb" is used in place 
of the words ‘making love’ which itself a euphemism. The topic or the context would lead 
listeners to understand the implied meaning, because in the Quran such issues are usually 
spoken about indirectly. Mary asks Allah "O my Lord! how shall I have a son when no
01man has touched me?"(Chapter 19, verse 20). This example of what is thought to be 
appropriate in Arabic is influenced by religious background. A person speaking openly 
about such things would be classified as inappropriate or impolite.
Although not all Arabs are Muslims, such strategies are recognised even if they are not 
always complied with. They are religiously motivated, and even if violated, the 
interactants will be reminded from a religious standpoint on how to behave towards others. 
For example, greeting in Arabic is influenced by religion. To be considered appropriate, a 
person needs to greet their interactant in a better, or the same, way as that used to greet 
him/her, but never less than the greeting received, and with a welcoming intonation.82 This 
is the rule in the Quran of how to appear appropriate. In Arabic, greeting is systemized. 
Some Arabs complain that Westerners do not greet them properly, and sometimes do not 
answer greetings. Thus, we may conclude that what influences politeness is not the same 
across cultures, and what might be considered an important factor in one's culture, does not 
have an effect in the other. This argument enforces the call for a new broader approach to
81 Similarly, in the Christian Bible, Mary says ‘How can this be when I have never known a man?
82 Different cultures place different emphasis on what is considered appropriate in their strategies of 
communication. Arabic culture is described as collective culture by El-Barouki (1987), Tannen (1984),
Cohen (1987), Coates (1988), and therefore greeting is very important. In Arabic, for example, it is not 
acceptable that a person passes by someone without greeting him/her, regardless of whether s/he knows 
him/her or not. In English, this [i.e. such absence of greeting] is something that is more likely to happen 
between people who do not know each other. Greeting is one of the most important aspects in Arabic culture, 
and warm greeting is essential between people who know each other. If greeting has not been performed 
appropriately between interactants, they may not communicate as they usually do or may not communicate at 
all. In addition, in Arabic, if the speaker used a two word expression to greet his/her addressee, then the 
addressee should use a greeting expression that has the same number of words or more to express his/her 
appropriateness.
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analysing politeness. As we have seen, religion plays an important role in shaping what is 
considered polite in Arabic, and it influences most interactants’ linguistic strategies. It is a 
factor that needs to be analysed in a similar way to gender and power in cross-cultural 
interaction.
2.3.4 Eelen’s critique of the core theory of politeness (Politeness and Social 
reality)
Eelen, in his critique, disagrees with the major politeness theorists. He criticises some 
for relying on Speech Act Theory, and others because they have not considered different 
interpretations of what might influence linguistic politeness. Eelen (2001) believes that all 
the core theories of politeness confuse two perspectives on politeness; that is politeness 1 
and politeness2 (see Watts,1992b). To Eelen, politenessl refers to the commonsense view, 
and politeness2 to the scientific notion of politeness. He believes that even if a theory pays
o4attention to one perspective, the other perspective also exists implicitly or explicitly. He 
states that
this uniquely scientific viewpoint is also evidenced in the integration of 
politeness rules with Gricean CP and its maxims: rather than capturing ordinary 
speakers' argumentative evaluations, they are general linguistic principles, involved 
in the process of how people understand each other (Eelen, 2001: 49).
Eelen considers Lakoff s rules of politeness as capturing ordinary speaker’s politenessl 
evaluation, for example, do not impose; remain aloof. Therefore, he argues that, although 
she claims to be dealing with politeness2, she is in fact dealing with politenessl.
Eelen also sees two perspectives on politeness existing in Leech’s Politeness Principle. 
Leech, he says, shows an awareness of the distinction between politenessl and politeness2 
when he qualifies his framework as a 'scientific paradigm' and situates it within 
pragmatics. He argues that ‘the PP does provide specific stipulation on how to be polite: 
by "minimizing the expression of impolite beliefs" and "maximizing the expressions of 
polite beliefs" ' (2001:54). According to Eelen, Leech’s claim that his theory is more 
concerned with real communication constructs only one part of the politeness principles.
83 Eelen, in his book A Critique o f Politeness Theories, criticises most o f the theories o f politeness such as 
those o f Lakoff, (1973) Leech, (1983), Fraser and Nolen, (1981 ;1990), Brown and Levinson (1987), Ide, 
(1989),Gu, (1990), Blum Kulka, (1992), Watts (1992b), and Arndt and Janney, (1993).
84 Eelen argues that Lakoff s rules o f politeness confuse the two perspectives, and that in spite o f the fact that 
Lakoff does not explicitly mention the distinction between them, her rules o f politeness are seen as part o f  
pragmatic rules.
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In discussing Ide's work, Eelen suggests that ‘overall Ide’s position regarding the 
distinction does not seem to be directly and unequivocally inferable from her own 
theorizing’ (2001:56). Ide’s (1989) explicit view of politenessl as an everyday concept 
and politeness2 as a strategy of language use distinguishes her from other scholars, but 
Eelen thinks her position regarding the distinction is not clear and that she confuses the
Ofdistinction between the two modes of politeness. According to Eelen, Watts (1992b) is
O/Jquite clear about the concept of politeness. His general epistemological and 
methodological approach to research indicates a concern for understanding and capturing 
ordinary speakers’ assessments of the interactional process.
2.3.4.1 Eelen’s critique of Brown and Levinson
0*7Eelen sees Brown and Levinson's model as similar to Lakoff’s., seeing their concept of 
politeness as a linguistic tool used by interactants (Model person) and the social context. 
Thus, their theory is broader than the commonsense notion. He refers to their 
conceptualisation of politeness as FTA redress. Eelen holds that all the theories, including 
Brown and Levinson’s model, focus too closely on the speaker’s utterance, and whether an 
utterance is understood as intended by the speaker or not, and also see politeness as a 
strategy, as principles or as rules. This view can be considered an extension to his first 
conclusion that their theories pay attention to speakers at the expense of hearers. For him, 
these theorists reify politeness, characterising it as something which hearer and speaker can
85 ‘Ide’s explicit reference to the politeness 1-politeness2 distinction is offset by its equivocal definition, and 
although by subsuming both Volition (politeness2) and discernment (politenessl) her theory appears to place 
itself above the distinction, this is only seemingly true, since in order to accomplish this it needs to blur the 
distinction itself, watering it down to one between formal and strategic politeness’ (Eelen, 2001:57) Eelen 
also analyses Blum-Kulka’s (1992) research in relation to the distinction between politenessl and 
politeness2. Politeness, to Blum-Kulka, looks as if  it is identified by its situational contextual factors that are 
associated with the interactants. He also discusses Gu’s (1990) approach as similar to Ide’s view, and 
describes Fraser and Nolen’s model as an approach which aims to analyse politeness2. Eelen holds that Gu’s 
notion o f politeness is based on Leech’s, as it consists o f a number o f maxims, with the addition o f  an 
explicitly moral component, and also manifests itself in the ordinary speakers’ minds. He also argues that’ 
Fraser and Nolen’s definition o f the notion o f politeness stays within the then-current terms o f the 
Conversational Contract. Their approach, generally, attempts to set up a rank order o f linguistic structure on a 
high-low deference scale. Eelen considers Arndt and Janney's (1985) explicit focus on intuitive concepts 
places them in politenessl. They argue for a shift from a logical approach to a socio-psychological approach 
in which the people are the focus o f language and politeness. Eelen thinks that their model contradicts Blum- 
Kulka (1992) who associates commonsense notions o f politeness with hypocritical, insincere behaviour. 
However, this clash between Arndt & Janney and Blum-Kulka o f the understanding o f sincerity and 
insincerity comes back to how politeness is understood.
86 For further discussion, see the section on Watts in this chapter.
87 He cautions ‘their concept o f politeness warns us that it should not be confused with an ordinary everyday 
understanding o f the concept. It is a concept carved out by the linguist, in an attempt to grasp the relationship 
between language and social context’ (Eelen, 2001: 50).
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recognise unproblematically. Furthermore, Eelen holds that the theoretical frameworks 
involve a conceptual bias towards the polite end of the polite-impolite distinction, 
conceptualising politeness and impoliteness as opposites, and displaying bias towards the 
production of polite behaviour.
Eelen provides five qualities of politenessl:
a) evaluativity, where politeness and impoliteness are connected to social values and 
always evaluative in nature;
b) argumentativity - situations where there is something to lose or gain;
c) politeness, where each individual considers themselves and their cultural group as 
polite, others impolite;
d) normativity, where politeness is the result of the pressure of social norms; and
e) modality and reflexivity, which refer to optionality of polite interactional strategies 
for the actor.
Eelen sees notions and norms differing not just from culture to culture, and one language to 
another, but also from one regional and social variety to another. Eelen (2001) suggests a 
possible alternative conceptualization of politeness. Drawing on Bourdieu, he considers 
the issue of culture as the core issue in the field of politeness, and questions ‘how do these 
theories handle the normativity of commonsense politeness and the situation of culture?’ 
(2001:227). He sees politeness as subject to cultural expectations arising from cultural 
norms that are its driving force, an approach inspired by Bourdieu’s notion of ‘habitus’ that 
takes full account of the hearer’s culture and position.88 Unlike Brown and Levinson 
(1987), Eelen (2001) introduces politeness as a social reality, which is consciously built up 
and maintained through interaction among human beings. He argues that politeness 
research should focus on social reality, which should be analysed by involving longer 
stretches of talk between interactants responding to each other, rather than in one particular 
context. This argument along with Eelen's other criticisms of Brown and Levinson's model 
of analysing politeness and the'other models, supports this thesis's argument that politeness 
is not subject to the analysis of utterances in isolation from other utterances in the same 
conversation.
88 This is also argued by Weizman (2006). He states that 'we conceive o f people in terms o f their social rights 
and obligations and we form our expectations accordingly (2006:174).
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2.3.5 Spencer-Oatey (Cross-cultural communication)
Spencer-Oatey also emphasises culture as central in understanding politeness and how it is 
understood, and in understanding whether an utterance is judged to be appropriately 
performed.89 She maintains speakers should be judged to be polite or rude, depending on 
subject and context (2000:3). She defines politeness in relation to culture and context, with 
culture being notoriously difficult to define.
The issue of politeness is seen, by Spencer-Oatey (2000), as more than just an analysis of 
certain speech acts from the notion of face of Brown and Levinson (1978-87). She also 
disagrees that politeness is only for minimizing the risk of confrontation as Lakoff (1989) 
argues. In her article with Xing (2000) she introduces what she calls ‘rapport 
management’ instead of ‘politeness’, and suggests that research into the management of 
relations in cross-cultural communication needs to use a broader analytic framework than 
that typical of cross-cultural discourse research.
Theoretically, Spencer-Oatey (2000a) provides five interrelated domains for managing 
‘rapport’: illocutionary (the performance of speech acts); discourse (the choice of
discourse content, such as topic, and the management of the structure of an interchange, 
such as organization and sequencing of information); participation (the procedural aspects 
of an interchange such as turn-taking, inclusion/exclusion of people present, and the 
use/non-use of listener responses); stylistic (such as choice of tone, choice of genre- 
appropriate lexis and syntax, and the use of honorifics); and the non-verbal, such as 
gestures and other body movements, eye contact, and proxemics (Spencer-Oatey 
2000a:20). These domains provide a model for how interaction is influenced by different 
situational or contextual and social factors, which affect rapport. These include norms, 
conventions (sociopragmatic, pragmalinguistic), values, and linguistic strategies. She 
accepts that people from different cultural groups may assess these factors differently but
89 Spencer-Oatey (2000) agrees with Brown and Yule (1983) that language has two main functions; the 
‘transactional’ and the ‘interactional’. She defines the former as ‘information-transferring’, and the latter as 
‘maintenance o f social relationships’. This is an interesting issue in cross-cultural interaction. As there may 
be disagreement on what is appropriate, when and how, there may be disagreement on what is considered to 
be transactional and/or interactional. It is not clear whether the distinction between these two aspects is clear- 
cut.
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believes these differences do not necessarily cause misunderstanding in cross-cultural 
encounters.
Spencer-Oatey insists that ‘rapport management’ is a social judgement, which is therefore, 
largely dependent on the hearer to judge whether what is said is polite. This might support 
the argument that there are no correct or incorrect interpretations of pragmatic meaning. 
The different understandings or knowledge of the world, which probably lead to different 
understandings of the context, and the different conventions, norms, and values derived 
from different cultural backgrounds, all contribute in any cross-cultural interaction.
Like Brown and Levinson (1978/87), Spencer-Oatey considers face a crucial issue in 
understanding interaction, but she explains that
I use the term ‘rapport management’ rather than ‘face management’ because 
the term ‘face’ seems to focus on concerns for self, whereas rapport 
management suggests more of a balance between self and other. The concern 
of rapport management is also broader: it examines the way that language is 
used to construct, maintain and/or threaten social relationship (2000a: 12).
The introduction of rapport management, and the way in which Spencer-Oatey defines this, 
provides a better view of what is happening in communication between interactants.90
Because of the criticism that Brown and Levinson’s notion of face has received, Spencer- 
Oatey reacts to what she sees as the overemphasis on individual freedom and autonomy, by 
proposing a modified framework conceptualizing face and rapport. She states that
face is associated with personal/social value, and is concerned with people’s 
sense of worth, dignity, honour, reputation, competence and so on, solidarity 
rights, on the other hand, are concerned with personal/social expectancies, and 
reflect people’s concerns over fairness, consideration, social 
inclusion/exclusion and so on (Spencer-Oatey 2000b: 14).
This broader view of the notion of face suggests more interrelated aspects to face which 
include a) quality face - a fundamental desire for people to evaluate us positively in terms 
of our persona; b) identity face - a fundamental desire for people to acknowledge and
90 It is clear that Spencer-Oatey has taken her view o f face from Brown and Levinson, who consider face as 
the key force for politeness, and conceptualise it as including negative and positive face, but Spencer-Oatey 
considers face to be the positive social value a person effectively claims for themselves by the line others 
assume they have taken during a particular contact.
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uphold our social identities or roles; c) equality rights - a fundamental belief that we are 
entitled to personal consideration from others, so that we are treated fairly; and d) 
association rights - a fundamental belief that we are entitled to an association with others 
that is in keeping with the types of relationship that we have with them.
Spencer-Oatey argues that her framework considers the role of the listener as well as that 
of the speaker, and also takes into account the factors that influence communication. She 
maintains that ‘the framework thus differs from Brown and Levinson’s (1987) model of 
politeness in two ways. Firstly, it incorporates a social or interdependent perspective to the 
management of relations’ (2000b: 15). Secondly, in this framework, Brown and Levinson’s 
view of face is treated as a sociality-right.91 Spencer-Oatey suggests that not every 
uncomfortable or offending act means ‘loss of face’, and accordingly that face can be 
threatened through face threatening, and rights threatening behaviour. She points out that
sometimes, though people’s treatment of us may not simply irritate or annoy 
us: it may go a step further and make us feel as though we have lost credibility 
or have been personally devalued in some way (2000b: 16).
She does not consider all minor incidents as face threatening acts; some may infringe on 
context and the hearer’s interpretation may play a part. This, she points out, is not the case 
in Brown and Levinson’s model, where certain speech acts are inherently threatening to 
either positive or negative face.92
I do not see a crucial difference here, but what is perhaps important is how such acts are 
managed in cross-cultural interaction, and how the notion of face is managed in cross- 
cultural interaction. The difference between Spencer-Oatey’s view of face and Brown and 
Levinson’s view is that Brown and Levinson’s view of face is related just to whether a 
certain speech act is face threatening or not, whereas Spencer-Oatey is related to the 
individual in relation to society. This means that loss of face is not only linked to
91 According to Spencer-Oatey, the management o f sociality rights involves the management o f social 
experiences, which she defines as ‘fundamental personal/social entitlements that individuals effectively claim 
for themselves in their interaction with others’ (2000:14).
92 This view might be felt in Arab-English interaction. For example, Arab friends or close relatives usually do 
not include any form o f explicit request when they ask for something to be done, and usually do not thank 
their friends for their help. Such linguistic behaviour does not include any threat o f face, because, culturally, 
respect o f face is included, but not necessarily in linguistic behaviour. English use different forms o f request 
and show their gratefulness to everybody for any type o f work. Failing to do so may cause loss o f face 
between the interactants. Such different views o f face come back to cultural differences in strategies.
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particular speech acts in relation to particular speaking situations, but may extend beyond 
that to include more cultural factors and issues relating to all interactants.
2.3.5.1 Contextual variables and Culture
An important, issue not fully considered by Brown and Levinson’s theory, but which 
Spencer-Oatey sees as important, is what she calls ‘contextual variables’. Although seeing 
power and distance as key variables relating to participant relations, she analyses them in 
terms of how they influence rapport-management strategies, and not just when conveying 
messages, as suggested by Brown and Levinson. Power here includes social power, status, 
dominance and authority. She adopts French and Raven’s (1995) five bases of power: 
reward power is when a person has control over positive outcome94, coercion power is 
when a person has a control over a negative outcome95, expert power is when a person has 
some expert or special knowledge96, legitimate power is when a person can prescribe or
07 •expect things from another , and referent power is when a person admires another
Q Operson. Although this classification is contextual and as such not relevant to every 
interactional situation, power should have more consideration than it is given by Brown 
and Levinson (1987). Spencer-Oatey considers the concept of power to be understood 
differently across cultures, because it is culturally influenced. Interactants from different 
cultures associate different cultural and contextual variables, which change according to 
the context of interaction. For example, the conception of power in teaching contexts or 
leadership is different between the English and Arabs, which might be a result of religious, 
cultural and even ideological reasons.
93 ‘In sociolinguistic and pragmatic research, power is typically operationalised in terms o f unequal role 
relations, such as teacher-student or employer-employee. Very often there is no problem with this, but 
sometimes it can lead to confusion’ (Spencer-Oatey 2000:32). An example is the problems that non-English 
teachers experience when they teach English young students or pupils. In Arabic, teachers are allowed to 
beat, threaten, shout, or sometimes swear at their students. Such behaviour is not accepted here.
94 Reward power is if  a person, A, has a control over positive outcomes (such as payment) that another 
person, B, desires, A can be said to have reward power over B.
95 Coercive power is if  a person, A, has control over negative outcomes (such as allocation o f undesirable 
task adds that another person, B, wants to avoid, A can be said to have coercive power over B.
96 Expert power is if  a person, A, has some especial knowledge or expertise that another person, B, wants or 
needs, A can be said to have expert power over B.
97 Legitimate power is if  a person, A, has the right (because o f his/her role, status, or situational 
circumstances) to prescribe or expect things o f another person, B, A can be said to have legitimate power 
over B.
98 Referent power is if  a person, B, admires another person, A, and wants to be like him/her in some respect, 
A can be said to have referent power over B.
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Another variable that Spencer-Oatey considers is distance. She associates this with social 
distance, solidarity, closeness, familiarity and relational intimacy. Spencer-Oatey points 
out that ‘it is much more embarrassing and face threatening to be criticised in front of one 
or more other people (for example in front of a class of students) than to be criticised 
privately’ (Spencer-Oatey 2000b:35).99 The difference between Brown and Levinson and 
Spencer-Oatey is that whereas the former argue, that depending on the speaker’s 
understanding of the context, speakers compute the amount of power, distance and degree 
of imposition, Spencer-Oatey's model involves social rights, and allows previous 
experience for both participants to influence assessment of power and distance between the 
interactants. Spencer-Oatey has not completely rejected Brown and Levinson's model, but 
modified it. She states that cross cultural interactions require a more analytical method 
than that of Brown and Levinson, one that goes beyond the analysis of individual 
utterances in isolation from the cultures and the contexts that are involved in the 
interaction.
However, Spencer-Oatey's view of the rapport management model of communication 
proposes that face is not subject to certain linguistic strategies. It investigates face in 
particular, and politeness behaviour in general in relation to social rights of the speaker and 
the listener in producing polite and impolite utterance. She argues that power and distance 
or any contextual variable influence rapport management. The issue of contextual 
assessment of politeness involves how people from different cultures assess differently 
what influences interaction, which is crucial in my research's argument. It supports the 
argument that interactants’ ability to understand what is meant in relation to what is said is 
important, especially in cross-cultural interaction, where what is said might lead to 
different implicatures for each interactant. This view is important in relation to this thesis's 
argument, that politeness is an issue of understanding between all the interactants and not 
judged by the meaning of linguistic choices and adopted strategies in isolation from the 
context..
2.3.6 Mills (Individual speaker and wider community)
Mills, like Eelen, tries to provide a more widely applicable model for analysing linguistic 
politeness. She raises the problem associated with data collection, analysis and
99 In Arab societies, the loss o f face or gaining face is highly related to the presence o f a third party.
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interpretation in linguistic research. (Mills, 2003al6). Mills concentrates on discussing the 
problematic aspects of linguistic analysis of the speaker, the individual's relation to the 
group, the model of communication and language, and methodology.
Mills sees the term ‘model speaker’ as problematic in Brown and Levinson's research. In 
her model, Mills shows that treating interactants as identical in all types of interactions, 
and assuming they are not subject to any changes because of culture, relationships, mode, 
or any other factor, is an inadequate method of analysis. She says:
I would like to move away from the use of the notion of the Model Speaker in 
linguistic analysis to a form of analysis which questions the autonomy of the 
individual and tries to set him/her in relation to a range of communities of practice 
where they negotiate their position and their gender, race, and class identities. ... I 
would like to question the degree of control which this model of speaker is assumed 
to have’ ‘Whilst I do not wish to portray the speaker as simply being subject to a 
range of discursive pressures which determines what is said, it is necessary to be 
aware of the forces which are at play in shaping the construction and interpretation 
of utterances by individuals (2003a:33).
Mills believes individuals are not always in control of their utterances, and sometimes 
factors such as social pressures influence their production and interpretation. She points 
out
speakers do not necessarily decide consciously to utter every word that they 
say; there are other factors, such as subconscious motivations, verbal routines, 
and social pressure which play a major role too (2003:19).
Thus, considering more factors that influence the construction and interpretation of 
utterance is a key issue in Mills's model of analysing politeness.
2.3.6.1 A community of practice approach
Mills emphasises the shift from traditional approaches such as Brown and Levinson’s to 
the more social approaches of Eelen (2001) and Spencer-Oatey (2000a). She argues that 
we need to see the utterance as a result of a longer process of thinking, habit, and past 
experience (2003a). Thus, Mills calls for analysis of interaction that involves not just a 
single utterance, but a discursively complete discourse. Mills concentrates on motivation 
and intention to be considered in the analysis of interaction. Thus, even if a certain 
linguistic behaviour is classified socially as impolite, the motivation and intention of the
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interactant should be considered in the analysis and also the interpretation made of that 
utterance by the hearer.
Millls sees the intentions of the speaker as crucial in analysing utterances, since 
'individuals expect others to judge them on the basis of their verbal habits; particularly in 
relation to politeness. They expect to be judged not only in relation to the community-of- 
practice norms or the wider society’s norms, but rather in relation to their own particular 
habitual style’ (2003:22). She states;
whilst I am not suggesting that individuals have no power to create their own 
meanings in utterances, it is important to distinguish between those. utterances 
which can be seen as relatively creative and those which are more recycled or 
which seem to be determined by agencies outside the individual her/himself. 
We need to be aware that the utterances have a history outside the individual 
(2003:24).
She maintains that individuals are evaluated in relation to others, not through immediate or 
wider groupings. She sees Grice’s Co-operative Principle and Speech Act theory as 
omitting the analysis of interactants' motives and aims, which are very important in 
understanding what they intend to say.
Mills opposes generalisations which do not involve issues that might influence interactions 
such as identity, motivation and interest, because such analysis cannot be justified on 
theoretical or methodological grounds. In other words, she calls for a shift from 
dependency on models that idealise, generalise, or stereotype, to a model that considers 
more variables, plus cultural or contextual differences.
These aims in analysis differentiate Mills (2003a) from Spencer-Oatey (2000a) and Watts 
(2003,1992b) and even Eelen (2001), and she sees her model of analysis as achieving 
better understanding than those, for example, of Brown and Levinson (1987) ‘which 
cannot deal with the way politeness operates in real conversations as a form of assessment 
of behaviour’ .(2003al 16). Mills is calling for an analysis in relation to context, who is 
involved and how they judge these things, particularly in relation to the community of 
practice and interaction, rather than analysis of a surface message in isolation.
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Mills's view is important for this research's argument in that it suggests that appropriate 
decisions over what is polite or impolite can only be achieved through turning from the 
isolated sentence level to the level of discourse. She does not say that analysing politeness 
is impossible, but that while Brown and Levinson’s model appears to be very systematic, it 
is insufficient for considering all possible variables, which we have argued are changeable, 
especially in cross-cultural interactions. She supports the call that analysing politeness 
requires a flexible approach that considers these complexities of cross-cultural interaction 
more comprehensively.
2.3.7 Watts (assessing social behaviour)
Like Mills, Watts (2003) focuses on the fact that evaluating behaviour as polite is not 
simply a matter of analysing the expressions used but of the interpretation of the behaviour 
in the context of the cultural and social environment. He concentrates mainly on Sperber 
and Wilson's (1995) work, and how their model of analysis might be exploited in the 
analysis of politeness.
Watts reiterates the views of Spencer-Oatey 2000a, Eelen 2001, Mills 2003a who consider 
politeness to be contextually, culturally and socially influenced, and, as a development of 
his earlier work on ‘polite and politic behaviour’ (1992) aims to provide a more 
appropriate analysis of what is socially acceptable/unacceptable. He defines politic 
behaviour as
socio-culturally determined behaviour directed towards the goal of establishing 
and/or maintaining in a state of equilibrium the personal relationships between the 
individuals of a social group, whether open or closed, during the ongoing process 
of interaction (1989:135).
Watts identifies four main problems in analysing and forming theories of polite/impolite 
behaviour.
a) The impossibility of evaluating behaviour out of context
b) Consideration of the perspectives of speakers and hearers
c) As a corollary of the above two, the impossibility of developing a predictive model, 
and so, in consequence
d) The impossibility of producing an idealised, universal, scientific concept of 
politeness. (Watts:2003:23)
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Watts discusses a social model for analysis as an alternative to Brown and Levinson’s, 
which, like Mills, he sees as a production model, and aims to offer ways of recognising 
polite or impolite utterances. Instead of evaluating in terms of social harmony, mutual 
consideration for others, comity, etc., he provides a means of assessment by understanding 
'how lay participants in verbal interactions assess social behaviour that they have classified 
as (im)polite utterance' (2003:143). This, he feels, allows us to understand politeness from 
the point of view of social members.100
As explained earlier, Watts uses Bourdieu’s theory of practice together with his own theory 
which emphasises the importance of culture and participants’ understanding, since 
politeness is not just a matter of the spoken word or fixed structures, nor, he points out ‘is 
it restricted to forms of language usage. Its value is not only realizable in linguistic capital, 
it can also be converted into different forms of cultural capital, e.g. acquired competences, 
behavioural skills, etc.’ (2003:152). He argues 'the struggle over politeness thus represents 
the struggle over the reproduction and reconstruction of the values of socially acceptable 
and socially unacceptable behaviour' (2003:11). Therefore, what is considered polite or 
impolite is subject to how it is interpreted socially. Similarly to Mills (2003) Watts leaves 
the decision about whether the utterance is polite to the interactants, whereas Brown and 
Levinson base their model on what a speaker says and means, regardless of the hearer's 
interpretation.
2.3.7.1 Watts and Relevance Theory
Watts (2003) considers that the implicit meaning which is inferred through context is not 
adequately considered by applying Gricean's pragamtics, and that what is ‘said’ will 
automatically be communicated.101 According to Christie (2007) 'a problem that Watts 
(2003) attempts to resolve by drawing on Relevance Theory in his analysis is the failure of 
the Gricean account to sufficiently predict or explain how either explicit or implicit 
meanings are generated' (2007:9). Basing his work on Relevance Theory (Sperber and
100 Watts, in (1989) argues that 'maintaining Group cohesion' is achieved by means o f relational work. He 
states that relational work considers every thing that interactants, in an activity, are engaged in such as the 
nature o f the social activity, the type o f speech event, the degree in which interactant share a common set o f  
cultural assumptions relating to the social activity, and the social distance between and the status o f  
interactants with respect to the social activity. (Watts, 1989:137)
101 According to Christie (2007) 'Watts uses the utterance Sorry I  don’t know to illustrate this issue, pointing 
out that the word sorry in this instance could be interpreted by the addressee ‘as a stalling strategy or as a 
genuine expression of regret’ (2003: 211).
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Wilson 1995), Watts sees importance in how the individual ‘knows’ when a structure is 
open to interpretation as politeness or impoliteness. He asserts that politeness is an area of 
discursive struggle in every society and language, and can be evaluated morally. 
According to him, 'Relevance Theory provides an excellent means of assessing how 
potential violations of politic behaviour can be recognised and inference process can be 
postulated that result in the interpretation of (im)polite behaviour' (2003:203). He 
introduces Relevance Theory because he holds that the models which he discusses pay 
more attention to what he calls politeness 1. Such models cannot be cross-culturally 
universal. He states that
it is therefore a model of (im)politenessl rather than politeness2, and it makes 
no claim to be cross-culturally universal, even though we can expect other speech 
communities to apply roughly equivalent attribution in other language or varieties 
(2003:201).102
Watts further argues that
in Sperber and Wilson’s terms any utterance within a discourse is a stimulus 
which alters the cognitive environment of the hearer(s). In making the 
utterance, the speaker goes on record as having done something which is 
ostensively manifest to his hearer(s) and which alters the context within which 
the speaker and the hearer(s) are interacting socially (2003:209).
Sperber and Wilson see what is missing in understanding communication as the role 
played by cognition and the nature of inferencing processes. The agreement between 
speakers and hearers on their shared knowledge will lead them to infer the intended 
meaning, and whether it is polite or not. Thus, what is relevant is subject to shared 
knowledge and the interactants’ understanding of the context,
Relevance, therefore, is not a black-and-white property of utterance -  either 
the utterance was relevant or it was not -  but a sliding scale which may differ 
from speaker to addressee, from one addressee to the next and from one context 
to another (Watts, 2003:210).
102 Having stated that utterances cannot be analysed in isolation from their cultures or contexts and that 
decisions as to politeness/impoliteness should be left to the participants, Watts does qualify this by claiming 
that there are types o f linguistic behaviour which are open to interpretations as polite, but which might not be 
understood so by others in the same interaction. He sees Gricean Cooperative Principle as simply too static to 
allow us to judge the appropriateness of an utterance according to when and how it is used. This also argued 
by Alshnatic (1970) who argues that the meaning of what is said changes according to the context o f  the 
interaction.
67
Thus, the utterance does not have a fixed meaning intended by the speaker and understood 
by the hearer. Watts thinks that hearers usually make more than one assumption, but that 
they exclude certain assumptions because of the new contextual effects that they infer. 
He claims that Relevance Theory is flexible in understanding an utterance, as it can help us 
to measure what we say against the possible reactions of the addressee, and it helps us in 
understanding that politeness is not limited to face-threat avoidance or mitigation, whilst at 
the same time not abandoning the idea of face altogether.104
What is polite/impolite is not necessarily always explicit. What is not clear is whether 
interactants interpret polite behaviour positively or negatively, and Watts points out that 
interactants tend to notice the appropriate politic behaviour only when an interactanf s 
strategy is different from what is considered to be appropriate. Christie (2007) explains
Watts' distinction between 'politic behaviour' and 'polite behaviour' is 
predicated on the assumption that the former is unmarked and the later is marked 
behaviour. While, consequently, this might appear to be consistent with Brown and 
Levinson's model, in that politeness in Watts' model potentially constitutes a 
message, the models differ in that the strategies and forms that Watts considers 
politic behaviour would, within Brown and Levinson's model, be categorized as 
politeness (2007:8).
Watts identifies two major criticisms that can be applied to most of the current empirical 
investigations being carried out in linguistic politeness using the Brown and Levinson 
model. Even when speakers use strategies of positive or negative politeness, when faced 
with the need to mitigate the force of a projected face-threatening act to their interlocutors, 
there is no guarantee that the addressee will not be offended. Watts asks
what about a situation in which the speaker would be quite within her/his rights 
to be absolutely blunt towards the interlocutor, i.e. to commit a ‘bald on-record 
FTA’, but chooses instead to ‘soften’ it in some way, intending the interlocutor to 
infer that this was a deliberate strategy? (2003: 251).
He states
103 By contextual effects Sperber and Wilson mean that the assumptions which can be derived from the 
utterance will significantly alter the speaker's and addressee's mutual cognitive context, i.e. their shared 
knowledge of that part o f the ongoing social and discursive practice (2003:209).
104 Watts suggests ‘this presents a further problem for a theory o f politeness that equates politeness with 
mitigation o f face-threatening (cf the Brown and Levinson model), since face-threatening itself has become 
the appropriate form o f politic behaviour, in such programmes' (2003:248).
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the principal problem with the current theories of politeness, in particular Brown 
and Levinson’s model, and at the same time the major reason for the lack of 
any substantial progress in empirical work based on it, is the status of those 
theories as quasi-objective descriptions and/or explanations of an abstract term, 
‘politeness’/ ‘impoliteness’ (2003:252).
In conclusion, what politeness is may not be agreed upon even in one community of 
practice, so it is not strange to find dispute on what is considered politeness between two 
interactants from the same culture. Watts explains that
A speaker might use a linguistic expression intended to be heard as more than 
adequate to uphold the level of appropriately polite linguistic behaviour, but 
the hearer may not interpret the utterance in the way it is intended to be 
interpreted (2003:253).
Hence, Watts, by emphasising the social aspect of politeness, indicates that politeness 
might be differently interpreted by interactants, and criticises Brown and Levinson’s claim 
of universality for linguistic politeness strategies. Watts, like others who criticise Brown 
and Levinson, concentrates on new issues in the area of politeness that they do not consider 
in their model. He holds that politeness exists in all cultures, but he argues that it is not 
possible to develop a theory that can be applied to all languages because politeness is 
performed in different ways. He also integrates Relevance Theory to the analysis of 
politeness, firstly, because politeness is a process of understanding what is intended as we 
have argued in this thesis. In his suggested model of analysis, Watts argues that judging 
politeness depends on interactants and their understanding of the context and what is 
socially appropriate.
2.4 Conclusion
Identifying universal politeness strategies that can be used cross-culturally, as Brown and 
Levinson claim, does not seem to be an easy task. Different crucial criticisms of the main 
theories of politeness have been raised by linguists who argue that these theories 
sometimes fail even in considering politeness in mono-cultural interactions, and that there 
are many different interactional situations where these theories fail either to consider or 
classify their strategies. In response to this need, my research calls for an approach that 
does not simply compare Westerners to Arabs or any other cultures, and describe what 
constitutes polite and impolite linguistic behaviour in every society; rather this research 
investigates how interactants belonging to different cultural backgrounds communicate
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with each other. It challenges Brown and Levinson’s claim of universality by providing 
evidence that what might be considered as polite linguistic behaviour in one culture may 
not be so in another, and shows that this may create misunderstanding in cross-cultural 
communication, which might lead to conflict or accusation of being impolite.
Cross-culturally, it is not easy to decide whether there is a face threatening act or not in an 
interaction. Differences between cultures may affect what is perceived by the hearer in 
relation to what is intended by the speaker. Fraser (1990) argues that ‘nearly all (perhaps 
all) acts can be construed as non-FTAs under appropriate circumstances’ (1990:220). He 
disagrees with Carrell and Konneker (1981) who conclude that ‘use of interrogative mood, 
stating requests as questions, gives the hearer far greater negative “face,” or negative 
politeness, than does either declarative or imperative mood’ (1980:22).
If we accept that an utterance allows only one or two interpretations, then we are denying 
the role that culture and context may play in determining the appropriate meaning. Christie 
argues that ‘where sentence meaning appears to be largely explicable in terms of the 
language system, utterance meaning clearly requires an engagement with contextual 
phenomena’ (2000:7). As we have seen, Spencer-Oatey (2000a) argues that a face 
threatening act should not necessarily mean the loss of face as Brown and Levinson claim, 
even if we feel uncomfortable, annoyed or angry because of it. The call for moving 
politeness research away from the analysis of necessarily strategic behaviour by Mills 
(2003a), Watts (2003), Eelen (2001) and others highlights significant reasons why Brown 
and Levinson's model is not applicable for analysing politeness. Mills (2003a) argues that 
we need to move to
an analysis which views politeness as a practice enacted within a community
of practice with all the gender, race, and class constraints on linguistic
behaviour that this entails, and which also stresses the flexibility and 
variability of the assessment of politeness from group to group and from person 
to person (2003:74).
Because of such problems in Brown and Levinson's theory we see scholars such as 
Spencer-Oatey (2000a) incorporating interdisciplinary perspectives and arguing that we 
need to analyse what she calls 'management of rapport in spoken interaction' (2000:29). 
Eelen (2001) concentrates on social reality in analysing politeness. Watts (2003) shares
Eelen’s views on analysing politeness and argues that the concentration should be on
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politeness and impoliteness on the same level; Mills (2003a) stresses the need for 
investigating politeness in relation to all participants and at a discourse level and calls for 
the investigation of politeness and impoliteness as a judgement about other’s interventions 
in an interaction.
Hence, politeness or impoliteness are long term strategies, and are left to interactants to 
decide through their understanding of the context. An interactant might be classified as 
impolite not because s/he has not used what is socially thought to be a polite utterance, but 
because the context does not give it its force as a polite utterance. This means that such 
behaviour is assessed by the interactants as well as the factors that influence the context of 
interaction. Investigating all the factors that might influence interaction provides us with a 
better understanding of what is considered polite or impolite by interactants. Investigating 
pragmatically the strategies used by speakers, and how they are interpreted by their 
addressees, helps us to understand whether there is any misunderstanding between 
interactants. In other words, investigating the conversation as a whole, and not as 
individual utterances, understanding cultural differences, and consequently how the 
context of the interaction is interpreted, helps in understanding what politeness is and how 
it is perceived across cultures.
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Chapter 3: Pragmatics and politeness
The aim of this chapter is to examine politeness as a pragmatic issue, having too wide a 
range of influencing factors to be understood simply by analysing linguistic utterances out 
of their interactional context. I will first define the role that pragmatics plays in analysing 
interaction and show that there are issues that cannot be addressed if we depend only on 
linguistic analysis of utterances such as ‘apology, ‘blame’ or ‘thanks’ taken out of context, 
as is the case with most politeness theories. Instead, I consider cultural, contextual 
variables and personal differences between interactants, and how these influence the 
construction and interpretation of utterances. I then go on to show how the core theories of 
politeness such as those of Lakoff (1973), Leech (1983) and Brown and Levinson (1987) 
encounter problems when analysing misunderstandings and pragmatic failure that can take 
place in cross-cultural communication, and can lead to interactants considering each other 
impolite. I will first show that the core politeness theories do not analyse culture 
adequately, and then I will explain their lack of analysing context in cross-cultural 
analysis. The goal of this chapter is to prove that, despite claims that they consider culture 
and context in their models, these core politeness theories have concentrated on analysing 
linguistic utterances out of context, and there is insufficient consideration of the cultures of 
all the interactants involved and understanding of the contexts of the interactions.
3.1 Pragmatics and linguistics
As I have argued, an issue such as politeness cannot be analysed adequately if we only 
depend on what is literally said, as what is communicated might not be what is literally 
said. As Ravid et. al. (2003) point out, in language communication105 there are many issues 
that cannot be solved by concentrating only on the structure and meaning of vocabulary 
(syntax, phonology or semantics). Syntax, semantics and phonology traditionally deal with 
grammar, meaning and sound systems as a dyadic relation, but pragmatics deals with 
meaning as a triadic relation as defined by Davis (1991).106 The distinction between the study
105 Language communication is generally the communication o f thoughts, assumptions and information 
(Sperber and Wilson 1993). All conversational theories o f communication were based on a single model, 
which is, according to Sperber and Wilson, called the ‘code model’; that is, communication is achieved by 
decoding and encoding messages. What is proposed as an alternative model is what Sperber and Wilson call 
an ‘inferential model’; that is, communication is achieved by producing and interpreting what is relevant, or 
rather by interactants paying attention only to information which seems to them relevant.
106 Crystal (1997) defines the term "triadic" as a term used to characterize a theory o f meaning which 
postulates that there is an indirect relationship between linguistic forms and the entities, states o f affairs, etc., 
to which they refer (i.e. referents). 'Instead of a direct two-way relationship (a dualist theory), a third step is 
proposed, corresponding to the mental concept or sense o f the linguistic form' (1997:398). In relation to
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of the general conditions of the communicative use of language, and the more specific ‘local’ 
conditions of language use explains the difference between syntax, semantics and pragmatics. 
Taylor defines pragmatics as being ‘concerned with relations between words, things, and 
the speakers of a language’ (1998:81-82). Whereas semantics attempts to establish the 
relationships between verbal descriptions and states of affairs in the world as accurate 
(true) or otherwise, regardless of who produces the description, pragmatics studies the
107relationships between linguistic forms, the users of these forms, and their meanings. 
Thus, pragmatics involves different factors that traditional linguistic analysis does not take 
into account.108 It relates the sense (grammatical meaning) of an utterance to its pragmatic 
meaning (illocutionary force), which is an act performed by the speaker and understood by 
the hearer by virtue of the utterance having been made, in relation to whatever the 
influence of the context of interaction, whether ‘promising’, or ‘commanding', etc. As 
Crystal (1997) defines it ‘the field pragmatics focuses on an "area" between semantics, 
sociolinguistics, and extralinguistic context; but the boundaries with these other domains are 
as yet incapable of precise definition’ (1997:301).
3.2 Pragmatics and Sociolinguistics
Every speaker of a language is a part of a community, whose social dialect will be largely 
determined by their environment, and this in turn will become apparent in their speech. 
The mode of study that investigates such a relationship is called sociolinguistics, the study 
of language in society.109 Foley (1997) defines it as the analysis of language that individuals 
and groups use in social interaction. Holmes (1992), Crystal (1980) and Dittmar (1976) 
define it as a branch of linguistics which studies all aspects of the relationship between 
language and society.110 I aim to make clear in this section that sociolinguistics is different 
from pragmatics, since, as suggested by Thomas (1995), sociolinguistics concentrates only
pragmatics, triadic means the relation between linguistic forms, their meanings (direct and indirect) and the 
interactants (what they mean and understand from the utterances).
107 Morris (1938) points out that ‘syntactical rules determine the sign relations between sign vehicles; 
semantical rules correlate sign vehicles with other objects; pragmatical rules state the conditions in the 
interpreters under which the sign vehicle is a sign (cited in Verchueren 1999:6).
108 Although pragmatics is described as principle-controlled and non-conventional by Austin (1969), Grice 
(1975), Lakoff (1973), Leech (1983), Levinson (1983) and Biletzki (1996) argue that it is perhaps difficult to 
decide principles.
109 Al-Issa (2003) argues that for L2 (2nd language) learners to become competent in the target language, 
they need more knowledge not only about grammar but also about the sociolinguistic rules o f the L2 speech 
community (2003:595).
110 This includes matters such as the linguistic identity o f social groups, social attitudes towards language, 
standard and non-standard forms o f language, and the patterns and needs o f national language use, social 
varieties and levels o f language, the social basis o f multilingualism (Crystal 1998:353).
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on social relations, and analyses language in relation to certain fixed social variables 
without linking them to the context of interaction, which is considered as a core issue in 
pragmatics.111
Thomas (1995) identifies overlaps between the goals of sociolinguistics and pragmatics:
sociolinguistics is mainly concerned with the systematic linguistic correlates 
of relatively fixed and stable social variables (such as region of origin, social 
class, ethnicity, sex, age, etc.) on the way an individual speaks. Pragmatics is 
parasitic upon sociolinguistics, taking the sociolinguistic description of an 
individual’s repertoire as the point of departure (1995:185).
Thus, the call for the analysis of cross-cultural issues through pragmatic analysis can be 
considered a step towards considering all types of interaction and factors that influence 
them.112 Rather than looking at an utterance with a specific social meaning which might have 
been allocated to it in a different context, pragmatics calls for analysis of an utterance in 
relation to the context in which it is used.
3.3 Defining Pragmatics
Pragmatics is defined as a concern with how people make sense of each other’s verbal 
interaction (Yule, 1996). It investigates meaning in conversations and how it is understood 
in relation to the context of interaction. Blommaert and Verschueren (1991) and 
Verschueren (1999) see pragmatics as being defined as the study of language use, arguing that 
‘pragmatics cannot possibly be identified with a specific unit of analysis’ (1999:2). He 
considers pragmatics as a field of study that does not constitute an additional component of a 
theory of language, but offers a different perspective to that which deals with syntax, 
semantics, and phonology.
Pragmatics is also seen as adding more dimensions to the analysis of language than 
linguistics has so far dealt with. But the question here is ‘what part does linguistic
111 Muhawi states 'Sociolinguistics can act as a bridge between literary criticism—the text—and the folklore- 
the context. It can serve as corrective to excesses of both, and they in turn will keep it aware o f the expressive 
element in all communication' (1994:172)
112 Richards and Schmidt (1983) point out that ‘sociolinguistic competence ... addresses the extent to which 
utterances are produced and understood appropriately in different sociolinguistic contexts depending on 
contextual factors such as status o f participants, purposes o f the interaction, and norms or conventions o f  
interaction’ (1983: 7). Harley et al. (1990) also argue that sociolinguistics is ‘the ability to produce and 
recognize socially appropriate language in context’ (Harley, 1990:14).
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knowledge play in the process of communication and what is the other knowledge that 
interactants need in order for communication to occur?’ (See Christie 2000). The knowledge 
we have is what makes us understand each other. But interactants, especially non-native 
speakers, complain that although their linguistic knowledge is excellent, they sometimes 
cannot convey their messages appropriately, and tend to misunderstand native speakers or be 
misunderstood by them. Christie maintains that
... it is axiomatic to pragmatics that our linguistic knowledge does not provide us 
with sufficient information to be able to understand examples of language 
performance, that is to say actual uses of language (2000:4).
Christie analyses utterances in which only the literal meaning, and not the intended meaning, 
is comprehended, when the only way to understand the utterance correctly is to go beyond the 
literal meaning. This means pragmatics considers language as it is spoken and in terms of 
what influences it, rather than just dealing with written or spoken texts as sentences and 
words isolated from context.
Pragmatics requires a consideration of how speakers organize what they want to say in 
accordance with who they are talking to, as well as where, when, and under what 
circumstances the interaction is taking place. It studies contextual meaning, explaining 
how hearers can make inferences about what is said in order to understand the speaker’s 
intended meaning.
Many authors stress that using linguistics alone is not sufficient to understanding the 
intended meaning. Green defines pragmatics as ‘... the study of understanding intentional 
human action’ (1996:2).114 Mills (2003a:2) maintains that ‘pragmatics focuses on the 
interaction of individuals and context’, while Mey (1993) defines pragmatics as ‘... the 
science of language as it is used by real, live people for their own purposes and within their 
limitations and affordances’ (1993:5). These definitions all stress that using linguistic 
analysis alone is not sufficient for understanding what is meant by an utterance, and that 
analysing factors such as context and culture, and how these influence utterances, is as
113 As El-Sayed (1990) argues 'a failure to grasp the often subtle differences between first language and target 
language formulas can lead to serious misunderstandings and misjudgements' (1990:1).
114 Toolan considers communication as a matter of what might be interpreted and predicted or presupposed 
between the interactants. He argues that ‘... we are constantly making provisional assessments o f the current 
gestalt -  o f what we are at now and what will likely be understood (what probable sense will be made or 
taken)’ (1996:31).
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important as analysing linguistic knowledge. In an interaction, the link between what 
people say and its effect on their relationships should be made clear by analysts, which 
means going beyond what linguistic evidence allows us to understand.115
Many Arab scholars hold views similar to Verschueren’s (1999:1) that ‘pragmatics is the 
study of language in use’, that is, of the meanings that are exchanged in a particular 
context. Yunis (1999), Jahfar (2000) and Albasseir (2004) emphasise pragmatics as 
focussing on the hearer understanding the message as intended, and pragmatic failure 
occurs when this understanding is not achieved. This view is also held by Eben-Jenee 
(1952), Al-Saied (1995) and Albeseer (2004).
Al-Gorgani (1978) is one of several Arab scholars who discusses the relationship between 
language and its use, arguing that ‘a language generally is not the speech that a person 
uses, its rhythm or structure; rather it is what allows meaning to be understood from 
speaker to interactant enabling interactants to communicate effectively, whether that was 
linguistic or non-linguistic’ (1978).116 Al-Saied, who adopts Eben-Jenee’s view (1952), 
argues that
language and society are inseparable, because society consists of a number of 
people who meet to achieve certain goals, and language is the tool used to achieve 
their collective or individual goals (1995:6).
So, language to Eben-Jenee and Al-Saied, is not just a number of sounds put together to 
construct meaning; rather it is what these sound systems mean within the context of the 
interaction, which involves other factors that influence the production and interpretation of
117utterances that need to be considered in analysing.
115 Pragmatic analysis may include the analysis o f phonology, syntax and semantics. For example, if  a high 
voice, pitch or intonation means intimacy; or if a certain structure conveys politeness, or if  the selection o f a 
certain lexical item refers to closeness or reflects distance in a particular context, in relation to a particular 
culture.
116 Alnayhome (2001) similarly argues that 'any language consists o f a set o f sounds which are created by 
certain machines, but people do not listen to these sounds and how they are put together, rather they listen to 
what is meant by putting these sounds together. The brain understands the meaning o f what is put together in 
relation to the context o f the interaction, and not digging out about the meaning that has been stored for the 
words or the utterances used.
117 There is no mention o f the term pragmatics in Eben-Jenee’s and Al-Gorgani’s books, but their argument is 
that language is not what is grammatically and phonologically appropriate, but is what constitutes relevant 
meaning in a particular context to interactants.
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3.3.1 Pragmatic Competence
Pragmatic competence means that speakers should be appropriate in their speech not just
i 10linguistically, but also socially and contextually. Crystal sees it as ‘the study of the 
principles and practices of conversational performance -  this including different aspects of 
language usage, understanding and appropriateness’ (1997:301). He defines pragmatic 
competence as the knowledge that an interactant needs in order to be able to communicate 
effectively. Hymes (1972) and Levinson (1983) also investigate the social use of language 
from a cultural perspective. They believe studying pragmatics involves dealing with the 
relationship between language and the principles that influence language use. Leech sees 
understanding an utterance as a process starting from understanding the literal meaning, 
and then what might be inferred in relation to the context of the interaction, not just to the 
meaning of the linguistic units in isolation.119 The same linguistic structure might generate 
more than one interpretation depending on the context in which it is used.
3.3.1.1 Pragmatic analysis
As argued above, pragmatics explores how a great deal of what is unsaid is recognized as 
part of what is communicated. Christie observes that 'inferring meaning is not only based 
on linguistic evidence, but also visual and cultural evidence' (2000:6). Wong (2004), 
similarly states
meaning is in fact the missing link between language and culture, in that cultural 
values, social attitudes, and world views are all captured in meaning, which is 
in turn encoded in the cultural key words and grammar of language or dialect 
(2004:744).
Thus, pragmatics focuses on implicit meaning - that is the meaning that exists beyond the 
literal - and engagement with contextual phenomena (Christie, 2000:7). It is necessary to 
discuss the relationship of the interactants, who need to assess their social distance in order 
to construct appropriate speech forms. Pragmatic analysis explains how the influence of 
factors such as context and culture may allow for different interpretations of one utterance. 
Wolfson (1989) shows that
118 Pragmatic competence is one o f the main issues in the fields o f communication which pragmatics focuses 
on. Ladegaard (2004) emphasises the importance of the socio-cultural context and peer group influence on 
children's language, as well as children's sensitivity to contextual norms, i.e. their pragmatic competence.
119 Leech discusses "pragmalinguistics", a term ‘applied to the study o f the more linguistic end o f pragmatics 
-  where we consider the particular resources which a given language provides for conveying particular 
illocutions’ (1983:83).
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a sentence interrogative in form may be now a request, now a command, now a 
statement; a request may be manifested by a sentence that is now interrogative, 
now declarative, now imperative in form: and one and the same sentence may 
be taken as a promise or a threat, depending on the norm of interaction applied 
to it (1989:6).
In conclusion, we may argue that we need pragmatics to be able to consider all the factors 
that influence communication, especially in analysing cross-cultural interaction. As Nuyts
(2004) reflects:
dealing with the pragmatics of intercultural communication requires the 
consideration of quite a number of different dimensions, which probably all 
extend beyond the domain of language use and even communication, and which 
will therefore require interdisciplinary attention and collaboration, far beyond the 
linguistic sciences (2004:149).
Thus, we may argue that grammatical errors in target languages are more recognizable and
191can be more easily overcome than pragmatic errors. As Sperber and Wilson (1993) 
point out, the role of pragmatics is supplementary to grammar, and utterances may still be 
interpreted to mean something that is not said literally. Because of cultural and contextual 
factors in the context of interaction, an utterance might have a completely different 
meaning from what it means literally. In the next section, I will concentrate on the 
importance of culture and context, key factors in pragmatics, in interaction. I will suggest 
that these two important factors are not adequately considered in the core theories of 
politeness, in spite of their claims that they incorporate pragmatics, and especially that 
culture and context sometimes receive different understanding in cross-cultural interaction.
3.4 Problems with the core theories of politeness
Having explained how pragmatics considers more variables in analysing interaction than 
linguistics or sociolinguistics, I will examine how the core theories of politeness have
120 Kreckel argues that ‘... what counts as (for example) a “warning” depends on rules evolved and sustained 
in concrete interaction within social groups' (1981:60).
121 Yule (1996) discusses the role o f pragmatics in interactions, specifying that pragmatics studies speaker 
meanings because it pays more attention to what people mean by their utterances in a particular context and 
how more gets communicated than is said. He argues that pragmatics ‘explains how listeners can make 
inferences about what is said in order to arrive at an interpretation of the speaker’s intended meaning’ 
(1996:69).
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problems in analysing cross-cultural interaction, and argue that pragmatic analysis 
addresses these issues.
In relation to pragmatic analysis, Kopytko (1995) makes a distinction between what he 
calls ‘rationalistic pragmatics’ and ‘empirical pragmatics’. According to him, rationalistic 
pragmatics is the means-ends or ends-driven explanation. In other words, it is when prior 
assumptions are made about the data. He sees Brown and Levinson’s treatment of 
politeness as an example of rationalistic pragmatics. He calls for what he describes as 
‘empirical pragmatics’ in analysing politeness. He believes data should drive our 
theorizing, and not the opposite, which the core theories of politeness do. Grundy (2000), 
in relation to Kopytko’s view, argues that ‘the conversation analytical approach to 
language understanding is characterized by the search for patterns in talk which reflect its 
culturally recognizable and therefore acceptable nature’ (2000:186). This section 
concentrates on the failure of the core politeness theories in analysing politeness, their lack 
of analysis of interactants' cultures, and their understanding of the context of interaction.
3.4.1 Lack of analysis of culture
In order to explain the importance of culture in analysing politeness, and how it influences 
the context of interaction in cross-cultural interaction, I will first discuss various 
definitions of culture and how that definition of culture is too broad to be considered in a 
politeness model of analysis such as Brown and Levinson's. I will then discuss culture in 
cross-cultural interaction and suggest that the different understandings of what culture is 
across cultures are not adequately considered in the core theories of politeness. In this 
section, I will argue that cultural differences are too complicated to be considered in 
theories of politeness such as Brown and Levinson’s (1987), and that a broader approach to 
politeness analysis is needed in order for it to be applicable in a cross-cultural context.
3.4.1.1 Defining culture
Defining culture and how it influences interaction has always been a controversial issue 
among scholars. According to Agar (2002:23) ‘communication in today’s world requires 
culture' and 'without the knowledge of culture you won’t communicate' (2002:29-30).122 
Similarly, Gudykunst (1983) sees interaction as more effective when interactants are aware
122 Nida and Reybum (1981:2) argue that ‘difficulties arising out o f differences of culture constitute the most 
serious problems for translators and have produced the most far-reaching misunderstandings among readers’.
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of the cultural meaning of utterances. But defining culture is complicated, as we will see in 
this section. However, the aim of this section is not to show that culture is difficult to 
define, or that it has no precise definition; rather, it is to explain that many of the theories 
of politeness have failed in considering it adequately in analysing interaction, especially in 
cross-cultural interaction, because their methods of analysis depend on linguistic analysis, 
and do not consider culture in relation to the context of interaction. As discussed above, 
this thesis argues that culture is an important factor to be considered in analysing 
interaction. It also argues that, in different speech contexts, culture is interpreted 
differently among interactants. Culture might influence interactants differently in cross- 
cultural interaction, for example, than it would when both interactants belong to the same 
culture. Although Spencer-Oatey (2000a) emphasises that there is a problem in defining 
‘culture’, she views it as:
a fuzzy set of attitudes, beliefs, behavioural conventions, and basic assumptions and 
values that are shared by a group of people, and that influence each other’s 
behaviour and each member’s interpretations of the ‘meaning’ of other people’s 
behaviour (Spencer-Oatey, 2000:4).
Spencer-Oatey includes almost every experience an individual may have, whether within 
their immediate group, or from their own understanding of meanings. Similarly, Watts 
(2003) considers the term 'culture' to be difficult to define, arguing that ‘the term itself is 
probably as discursively disputable as the term politeness’ (2003:78).123 Mey (1993) and 
Foley (1997) agree with Goodenough (1964) who maintains that ‘culture consists of 
whatever one has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to its 
members’ (1964:36, cited in Foley, 1997). They all agree that culture is not defined clearly 
and needs to be considered more adequately in interaction.
In relation to gender and interaction, Sadiqi (2003) provides a general definition of culture. 
In her book Women. Gender and Language in Morocco she holds that culture is ‘a system 
of practices, rituals, beliefs, values and ways of meaning of a community’ (2003:17), a 
view reflected and supplemented in the definitions of writers such as Watts (2003) and 
Scollon and Scollon (1995:126). Mills characterises culture as 'a set of assumptions made 
by the individual because of his/her involvement with groups where those values are
123 Eelen also argues that ‘culture should not be treated as a given entity, but rather as an argumentative 
practice' (2001:158).
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affirmed and contested’ (2003a:32). This is also discussed by Gudykunst (1998) who 
argues that culture includes everything that is human. Keesing conceives of culture as
a system of competence shared in its broad design and deeper principles, and 
varying between individuals in its specificities, is then not all of what an 
individual knows and thinks and feels about his [or her] world (1974:89).124
Such a definition interprets culture as something that people in one society share, but also 
something for which every individual has her/his own interpretation. Cushner and Brislin 
(1996), to some extent, do not agree with Keesing (1974) in that they consider culture as a 
collective creation. They state that
Culture is socially constructed by human beings in interaction with others. Cultural 
ideas and understandings are shared by groups of people who recognize the 
knowledge, attitudes, and values of one another, and who also agree on which 
cultural elements are better than others. Culture is, thus, transmitted across 
generations by parents, teachers, respected elders, and religious leaders, and is 
mediated through a variety of sources, including the media, the stories parents tell 
their children, and the various experiences individuals have in a given culture’s 
schools (1996:7).
Mead (1994) also holds the view that 'culture includes systems of values, it is particular to 
one group and not to others, it is learned and is not innate; it is passed from one generation 
to the next' (1994:6). But there is a problem with such definitions in terms of 
understanding and interaction, because it classifies culture as something specific and 
known to all, transmitted from one group to another, perhaps performed in a specific way. 
Even if we agree with such definitions, they would create a problem in cross-cultural 
interaction where such means of transmitting such values are different from one culture to 
another.
However, as a link between the above views that discuss about culture as the value that 
society shares, and what individuals have as their own interpretations of culture, 
Fukushima (2000) presents Robinson’s (1988) four different views of culture, as follows: 
a) The behaviourist view of a ‘culture of discrete behaviours or sets of behaviour’, which
124 In defining culture, Keesing (1974) goes on to state that culture is the theory to which a native actor [or 
actress] refers in interpreting the unfamiliar or the ambiguous, in interacting with strangers (or 
supernatural), and in other settings peripheral to the familiarity o f mundane everyday life space; and with 
which he [or she] creates the stage on which the games o f the life are played.
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‘...is something which is shared and can be observed, (p 8); b) Culture: as ‘...an attempt at 
making sense out of social behaviour’ and as a sharing of ‘... reasons and rules for 
behaving’ (p 8-9); c) Culture as a shared ‘means of organizing and interpreting the world, a 
means of creating order out of the inputs’ and ‘...a process through which experience is 
mapped out, categorized and interpreted' (p 10); and d) the symbolic view which considers 
‘culture as a system of symbols and meanings’ (Robinson, 1988:11, cited in Fukushima, 
2000:102).125 These four views may be considered as one multi-faceted view which 
broadens the meaning of culture, rather than emphasising one view over the other.
With this in mind, we should bring to bear a greater number of considerations when 
analysing politeness, especially in cross-cultural interaction, Verchueren (1999) argues that
19Aculture correlates to linguistic choices along with norms and values and that such values, 
norms and identity are expressed in utterances, and these aspects constitute the greater part 
of culture. According to Gumperz and Robert (1991)
in the existing literature on culture and communication, "culture" tends to be 
treated as a loosely defined term to refer to the group level values, attitudes, 
beliefs and dispositions which an individual brings to an interaction’ 
(1991:52).127
Whether culture is acquired or learned, it influences the verbal and non-verbal behaviour of 
individuals in a certain society, but, as explained, is still subject to their understanding of 
it, and their evaluation of it in relation to the context of interaction. Understanding its 
components in relation to what influences the context of the interaction in relation to all 
interactants is what shapes individual linguistic production and interpretation.
125 Vedder and Virt (2005) and Barraja-Rohan (2003) argue that people's experiences and past events may 
have some impact on their language production and interpretation.
126 Verschueren argues that ‘norms and values use in linguistic analysis has a tendency to unduly reify or 
even mythologize cultures as real-world ‘entities’ that can be handed as natural organisms with clearly 
identifiable properties’ (1999:92).
127 They further assume that ‘understanding in everyday encounters is in large part a matter o f inferences that 
rely both on linguistic presupposition and on knowledge o f the world, much o f which is culture bound’ 
(1991:52).
128 Mills (2003a) states 'I shall not be assuming that culture exists "out there" in any simple form, but that 
rather I shall characterize it as a set o f assumptions made by the individual because o f his /  her involvement 
with groups where those values are affirmed and contested' (2003a:32).
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3.4.1.1.1 Defining culture in cross-cultural interaction
The argument of the above section is that culture, in spite of the fact that it is too complex 
to be limited to one definition influences interactants’ linguistic choices and interpretation 
of speech. In this section, I argue that sometimes in cross-cultural interaction, interactants 
do not share the same language knowledge, do not use the same strategies in conveying 
their messages, and may not deduce the same meaning because of different interpretations 
of the language.129 Interactants, in cross-cultural interaction, might experience problems 
because issues such as norms and values differ from one culture to another. Akman and 
Bazzanella (2003) note that in interaction 'problems arise when one tries to cope with a 
different cultural context that asks for different behaviour' (2003:322). Wierzbicka 
(1991/2003), Janney and Arndt (1992), and Caffi and Janney (1994) also agree that the 
meaning a speaker tries to convey may not be understood because of cultural 
differences.130
Cultures differently determine the linguistic choices that a speaker produces, and how that 
is interpreted. Alhouf (2003) and Abu-Haider (1994) state that societal evaluation gives 
meaning to what is said in certain contexts, and Mills (2003a) holds that culture is what 
individuals assume about their societies. In this concern, Sadiqi (2003) explains that
all cultures control their members, but they differ in the degree of the control 
they impose on the individual and social behaviours of their members, as well 
as parameters within which the members exercise control over their destiny 
and their environment (2003:17).
While Farghal (1995) also notes that
the language user's option for a euphemism often emanates from contextual 
factors such as the social relationship between speaker and addressee or the 
level of formality induced by the setting (1995:367).
Al-Khatib (2001) states 'speakers engage in stylistic variation not because they are affected 
by a particular topic, but because they identify themselves as speakers belonging to or 
addressing a particular group of addressees' (2001:407). In native/non-native interaction,
129 Mei (2002) argues 'that the lack o f speech convergence in the speech styles o f both native and non-native 
speakers may be attributed to differing participant backgrounds in cultural and communicative conventions' 
(2002:79).
130 Wierzbicka (2003) explains that ‘Anglo-Saxon institutions such as schools, courts or government 
departments, as well as the streets and “market places” are, inevitably, an arena o f cultural clashes and 
cultural misunderstandings for foreigners’ (2003:64).
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one of the interactants has to depart from his/her way of speaking to his/her interactant, which 
might be different from his/her own because of cultural differences. For example, the way 
Arabs greet each other is different from greeting in English. An Arab, interacting with an 
English person, has to depart from his/her way of greeting to appear appropriate.131 If an 
Arab, greeting an English person, has not departed from his/her own way to take on his/her 
interactant's way, then a pragmatic failure between them might take place. Cohen (1987), 
discussing the influence of culture on diplomatic relations between Americans and Egyptians, 
explains that the US Secretary of State Kissinger was always clever in being warm with 
Egyptians, whereas the then president Carter failed, which made it more difficult for Carter to
179achieve a good personal relationship with them. Scollon and Scollon’s view is that non­
native interactants’ cultural backgrounds do not always allow them to communicate in their 
own way. For example, if we compare swearing between the English and Arabs, Arabs find 
it difficult to swear in an English manner (Al-Saied, 1995).
Thus, we may argue that every culture emphasises different norms and values, which means 
that in cross-cultural interaction, there is more possibility that interactants will misunderstand 
each other, and also accuse each other of being inappropriate. For example, Wierzbicka 
(2003) argues that
the complex of cultural attitudes which conditions every individual to be 
constantly aware of other people, other voices, other points of view, to see oneself 
as one individual among many ... leads to objectivism and anti-dogmaticism being 
regarded as important social and cultural values (2003:49).
However, all this emphasises my argument that social, cultural, and linguistic differences 
between interactants, in cross-cultural interaction, are more salient than in monocultural 
interaction, and may cause trouble in communication. In the next section, I will discuss 
how theories of politeness fail in analysing certain cultural aspects, and how we need more 
consideration of cross-cultural differences in analysing interaction
131 Arabic greetings usually take from eight to ten exchanges or more. Cohen (1987), in his article on the 
problems o f intercultural communication in Egyptian-American diplomatic relations, argues that a truly 
yawning gulf clearly separates the two cultures.
132 ‘Kissinger’s reward for this nonverbal diligence was to be called first “friend” and then “brother” by the 
Egyptian’ (1987:43). For example Carter in the early 70s was described as ignorant when he kissed Anwar 
Alsadat's wife ( the ex-president o f Egypt) in public on their visit to America. Also Alsadat's wife was attacked 
by the media by allowing him to receive her in this way in public.
133 Arabs rarely swear in the same way as English do because it is culturally unacceptable due to the 
teachings in the Quran and the Prophets' sayings, although it must be noted that English people are not 
homogeneous on this issue. For some, swearing is highly problematic for religious or moral reasons.
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3.4.1.2 Politeness theories’ weakness in analysing culture
Although theorists of politeness (Lakoff, 1973, Brown and Levinson, 1978, Leech, 1983) 
claim that they have concentrated on the function of utterances and their relations with 
social aspects, the problem of misunderstanding in conversations due to cultural 
differences has still not been adequately analysed.134
Examining how cultural influences are seen in the core theories of politeness we find that 
these theorists have not explained themselves clearly enough to enable us to apply their 
work in the analysis of cross-cultural interaction. By way of examples, Lakoff does not 
explain how her rules work in relation to social relationships, and she is not clear about 
how social differences are treated when the interaction is cross-cultural. Eelen (2001) 
explains that rules of politeness exist in any interaction, but cultures are different in 
determining what is polite or appropriate. He states that 'definitions of politeness -  of how 
to be polite -  differ interculturally' (2001:3). Fraser (1990) also criticises Leech’s principle 
of politeness, in seeing an utterance as polite or impolite, with no consideration of any 
cultural or situational influences on its meaning.
Brown and Levinson (1978/87) build their analysis of politeness on the premise that there 
are two forms of politeness: positive and negative, which are universal. Eelen (2001) and 
Mills (2003a) criticising Brown and Levinson's view, point out that Brown and Levinson 
only consider their own culture in their two central themes: the principle of rationality and 
their notion of face (See chapter 2). Their claim of rationality is also challenged by Ide, 
who argues that
if the framework of linguistic politeness is to restrict the scope to a rational or 
logical use of the strategies, we will have to exclude not only the use of 
honorifics but also greetings, speech formulas used in rituals, and many other 
formal speech elements which are used according to social conventions 
(1989:242).
She views the principle of rationality as dissimilar across cultures, because sometimes we 
use interactional strategies according to our social conventions and norms.
134 See chapter 2.
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Mills (2003a) suggests that 'the individual is not generally assumed to be a self-contained 
unit, but rather a process, a site in construction through interaction’ (2003:18). Eelen’s 
(2003:18) argument is that politeness, because it is determined by cultural norms, is a 
cultural phenomenon before it can be a linguistic phenomenon, and regardless of whether 
what is performed is polite or impolite it should be evaluated in relation to culture. Thus, 
whether Brown and Levinson mean that the model person is one who can be rational in 
general, according to what is acceptable culturally, or according to the situation of 
interaction, the principle of rationality faces a challenge in cross-cultural interaction.
As argued above, one utterance may convey different meanings to different interactants 
because of cultural differences. For example, as I have mentioned before, from my 
experience as a teacher of English as a second or a foreign language, there are different 
linguistic strategies requesting something in Arabic and English. A request in Arabic 
sounds like an order to an English person. For example, in a classroom context, if an Arab 
student were to ask a teacher to provide the meaning of a word; s/he would say in standard 
Arabic.
o’*  La
? al-kaleemah hathehee Mafna ma
? the word this meaning what 
What is the meaning of this word?
Or
Lee hathehee Tarjm
for me this word translate
Translate this for me.
The above example is a "request" in Arabic, but is considered an order in English (See 
chapter 1). An English speaker would prefer an utterance like "What is the meaning of this
torword please? or "Could you tell me the meaning of this word please?” Despite this,
Pavlidou (2000) believes that, in a classroom, students and teachers seem to agree that
135 The word “Bellahe” (^ »h) which means “By God” cannot be considered to substitute for “please” or 
“pardon” because even in quarrelling or conflict the word or the expression “Bellahe” is used. For example, a 
person may say to her/his interactant “Bellahe Eskot” (c jiJ  Aty which means “By God keep quiet” in 
quarrelling; or “Bellahe Sahednee” ^k) which means “By God help me” Therefore, “Bellahe” is
rather an expression to start a conversation or to ask your interactant to pay attention to what you intend to 
do.
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what is considered a face threatening act in normal life should not be considered so in 
classrooms as long as the objectives are attained.
An example such as the above illustrates that universal theories of politeness sometimes 
are not workable when cultural differences are not adequately considered. A fixed strategy 
of politeness might not be found in an utterance, but the utterance can be polite to one 
particular group and impolite to another because of cultural differences. It is difficult to 
accept a model of analysis if this model is not flexible enough to consider cultural 
differences and all the factors that may influence the context of the interaction differently.
3.4.2 Lack of analysis of context
In order to support this thesis's claim that context is differently understood in cross-cultural 
interaction and that, because of this, it differently influences interactants' understanding of 
each other's utterances; I will first discuss different definitions of context. I will then 
discuss context in cross-cultural interaction and the different understandings of it. Again in 
this section, similarly to what I have discussed in the above section, I will argue that 
context is too complicated to be considered in the core theories of politeness, and that a 
need for an approach that considers context is necessary in order to be able to analyse 
politeness in cross-cultural contexts.
3.4.2.1 Defining context
Context has always been a controversial issue in linguistic research, because of the fact
1that there is no clear agreement among scholars on defining its roles in interaction. 
Crystal holds that
context refers to ‘specific parts of an utterance (or text) near or adjacent to a 
unit which is the focus of attention. The occurrence of a unit (e.g. a sound, 
word) is partly or wholly determined by its context, which is specified in terms 
of the unit’s relations, i.e. the other features with which it combines as a 
sequence (1997:87).
This definition of context appears very general, as there are no details of the other features 
and how they join together. Dilley (2002) holds that
136 According to The Oxford English Dictionary ‘The word “context” is derived from the Latin verb textere, 
“to weave”, and the related Latin verb contexere carries the meaning o f “to weave together”, “to interweave”, 
“to join together” or “to compose”.
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the concept of context has a very broad currency (in social anthropology, 
linguistics, philosophy, history and so forth), and its forms of exchange are 
varied across the boundaries of various disciplines (2002:437).
Dilley’s view of context involves linguistic aspects and social aspects surrounding the 
environment of interaction. Goodwin and Duranti, in relation to “context”, agree that it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to provide an accurate definition. They explain that
it does not seem possible at the present time to give a single, precise, technical 
definition of context, and eventually we might have to accept that such a 
definition may not be possible (1992:2).137
They consider context as the most important factor in providing interactants with the 
intended meaning. They state that ‘the context, in the sense of a set of recognizable 
conventions, provides the infrastructure through which the utterance gains its force as a 
particular type of action’ (1992:17). This is similar to Schifffin's (1994) view that through 
context we can argue whether the utterance “can you pass me the salt?” is a ‘question’ or a 
‘request’. Her argument is that, although there are two different interpretations of this
I  *5 0utterance, they are largely separable by the context.
Meanings of utterances are agreed socially or culturally between participants. These 
meanings might be associated with certain factors such as age, gender, the relationship 
between participants, class/tribe, religion, occupation or education. These variables play 
different roles depending on the context of interaction. Levinson (1983) holds that context 
is related to how participants understand each other’s messages in a certain discourse. 
Thus, analysing interaction involves more than one force for a speech act.139 Context 
determines or provides the interactants with the appropriate way of understanding the
137 Asher (1994) considers context as one o f the linguistic items that is constantly used, but he argues that it is 
never explained (1994:731). Asher believes context too wide a concept to be included in one specific 
definition.
138 Schirato and Yell (2000) argue that even agreeing that a context is a simple amalgam o f cultural features 
such as meaning system, material conditions and participants and members would not solve the problem o f  
defining what context is. Also Toolan (1996)along with Schirato and Yell (2000) agree that there is a 
problem in defining context because a) the perception o f what constitutes a particular context is not likely to 
be shared by everyone; and b) the meaning o f those communication practices will change across persons, 
places and time.
139 Grundy (2000) distinguishes two types o f contexts: presumptive contexts which he describes as ‘distal’ or 
‘macro’; and contexts created in talk which he describes as ‘micro’ (2000:273).
intended meaning, and means that an utterance may have different meanings in different 
contexts.140
What makes context more complex is that individual participants can attempt to shape 
context in ways that further their own interests. This is why providing a concise definition 
of what context may mean is not an easy process. Goodwin and Duranti remind us that 
‘within interaction participants are faced with the task of accomplishing understanding’ 
(1992:22). They argue that there is no obvious agreement among scholars on how context 
influences interaction.141 They suggest that context is shaped by talk in the same way that 
talk is shaped by context, but they diminish the importance of other variables that influence 
interaction. Alshnatie (1970) and Astytyh (2005) similarly perceive that context does two 
things; firstly it determines a specific meaning, and secondly it excludes any other meaning 
that the utterance might have.
To sum up, context is an important factor in interaction and the importance of the 
relationship between linguistic, cultural and cognitive factors is woven by the context. It i s ' 
crucial in determining the appropriate meaning of an utterance, and should be considered 
in relation to all interactants, which the core theories of politeness fail to do. One of 
Dilley’s (2002) stresses the different implications of context. In interactions that involve 
strangers there may be miscommunication because of how context is defined, which is 
crucial to this thesis's argument.142 In other words, he stresses the importance of context 
and challenges the theories and perspectives that view language as context-free grammars 
or structures of meaning. Dilley (2002) stresses that context can not be seen in terms of 
linguistic factors only; situational factors need to be considered in analysing any type of
143interaction.
140 Bouquet et. al. (2003) argue that 'each context has its own content, lexicon, and transaction rules but, 
although named with different identifier, the same unit can belong to two (or more) context' (2003:479).
141 Goodwin and Duranti (1992) argue that ‘context' involves a fundamental juxtaposition o f two entities: (1) 
a focal event; and (2) a field of action within which that event is embedded’ (1992:3).
142 In the 'Language and Communication' special issue on “context”, context is explained as being ‘based on 
the premise o f agents who share a common linguistic code and employ it as a means o f communication. It is 
at the interface o f any sociocultural linguistic performance where social, linguistic and cognitive contexts 
meet. It is a necessary condition for a successful performance of a communicative act to be tied to linguistic, 
cultural and cognitive surroundings’ (Language and Communication: 2002:391).
143 Taylor (1998) links context with the notion o f circumstances, although he considers them as two different 
issues. He argues that ‘circumstances and contexts do not have the same sorts o f coordinates because o f the 
factors relevant to determining the content o f expression in context are not, in general, identical to the factors 
relevant to determining its extension at a circumstance once its context is fixed’ (1998:275).
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However, the view that individuals may have different interpretations of the same 
utterance makes relationships between such factors more complicated. Discussing the role 
of context in interaction is complicated and it does not seem that the theories of politeness 
discussed manage to consider it adequately. Context in cross-cultural interaction is not 
interpreted similarly, and might be distinguished differently by the interactants.144 Mey 
(1993) argues that
the pragmatic approach has been often criticized for failing to account for the full 
role of context in the process of communication. One of the main arguments 
has been that by focusing on single speech acts, it underestimates not only the 
role of the situational and socio-cultural contexts as frames of reference for 
interpreting speech, but also the role of context in shaping the talk or text that 
emerges on any given occasion’ (1993:58).
Thus, Mey’s definition of context includes whatever factors may influence the meaning. 
He suggests that dependence upon certain speech acts in analysis does not allow for the 
analysis of all factors that may influence interaction, such as the previous and proceeding 
utterances or interactants' attitudes towards each other, etc. How context is analysed, then, 
differs from one individual to another and from one group to another, which makes 
establishing what is appropriate or inappropriate too complicated to be judged by analysing 
linguistic use in an utterance, especially in cross-cultural interaction where context is 
differently interpreted.145
3.4.2.1.2 Defining context in a cross-cultural context
In this section, I contend that a context of interaction is more likely to be interpreted 
differently by interactants in cross-cultural than in mono-cultural interaction. This is a
144 Grundy also distinguishes two types o f contexts: presumptive contexts which he describes to be ‘distal’ or 
‘macro’; and contexts created in talk which he describes as ‘micro” (2000:273). To him, context is related to 
meaning because it helps interactants to decide the intended meaning. The meaning o f an utterance is related 
to the context it occurs in, which helps in deciding the intended meaning o f what is said. Schegloff 
(1992:195) discusses two types o f interactional contexts: the ‘external’ or ‘distal’ in one hand and ‘intera- 
interactional’ or ‘discourse,’ or ‘proximate’ on the other. The external refers to social life such as class, 
ethnicity, gender; on the institutional level such as legal order, economic or market order, and also ecological, 
regional, national, and cultural settings. The second type (intera-interactional/proximate), (Schegloff 1992) 
refers to stories, request sequences, the initiator of a conversation or topic, or its recipient, etc. Schegloff 
compares what shapes what goes on under social life with the sort o f occasions or genre o f interaction which 
participants make.
145 Fadel (2004) argues that the linguistic text as a whole is a context which is linked not only by the 
modifications that the interactants make to their language but also those modifications that happen in their 
behaviour as well (2004:121).
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crucial argument in this thesis.146 In cross-cultural communication, the meanings that a 
word carries may be different, perhaps because the salient meanings of an utterance or a 
word are differently interpreted between cultures, which may lead to different inferring of 
what is intended.147 The investigation of the problem of context necessitates an 
appreciation of the orders of knowledge that provide the conditions for the context 
emergence. For example, nowadays, the salient meaning of the word “love” "y*", “houb” 
in Arabic (in Libya) refers to the romantic relationship between men and women, or 
between people who intend to marry. Because of this meaning, males rarely use it when 
talking about loving their close female relatives such as mothers, daughters, sisters or 
aunts, just as females when they talk about loving their close relatives such as fathers and 
brothers. Instead people use expressions such as “my sister is everything for me”, "
lb (jut “Oukhtee heya koul shaee be anesba lee”, “You are the most important
person to me”, " <4^  oaaui oil "s “anta aham shakhes hendee”. Although context 
would reveal only the appropriate meaning for a particular word, a speaker may prefer to 
avoid using it in certain contexts, because of the other meanings that are associated with it. 
Thus, what an Arab would bring to the context of interaction is sometimes different from 
what an English speaker would.
Arab linguists such as Eben-Jenee (1952), Al-Saied (1995), and Albeseer (2004) 
concentrate on context as the basic reference point of what is meant by what is said. They 
agree that there is no way that the speaker can assume that the intended message has been 
understood until the listener responds in a way which reflects the same understanding of 
the context of the interaction. They argue that any interaction is influenced by the 
interactants’ understanding of the context, and this may lead to misunderstanding in cross- 
cultural interaction. Takahayashi et. al. (1993) and Takahayashi (1996) also state that there 
are different factors that influence any context of communication, and as these are different
• 1 dfifor each interactant, they may allow different interpretations in cross-cultural interaction.
146 Dilley (2002) argues that ‘different constructions o f the concept o f context rest upon different bodies or 
forms o f knowledge’ (2002:452).
147 Rogers, et. al. (2003) argue that 'the degree to which various strategies are interpreted as polite is 
ultimately determined by the communication context. In other words, politeness is situated and interpretative' 
(2003:383).
148 Takahayashi (1996) states ‘it is argued that redressive strategies (see Brown and Levinson, 1987) for 
refusal can be explained as two-way interactive, goal-oriented operations based on global and local 
knowledge o f discourse’ (1996:228). She argues that ‘many things contribute to the interactional happenings 
in a conversation -  the physical and social context, the history o f the participants’ relationship, both verbal 
and nonverbal cue’ (1996:243).
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Kakava (2002) investigates disagreement strategies at three levels of contexct; 1) 
conversation in Greek among family members, 2) conversation in Greek among friends, 
and 3) classroom discourses by Greeks in English. Using tape-recorded data, he argues 
that disagreement constitutes a social practice and that context is a crucial factor at the 
macro- and micro-level that shapes and reflects the various strategies that the interactants 
use.
Thus, we may conclude that context is important in analysing interaction because it plays a 
central role in determining the intended meaning. This view also raises the question "are 
factors that influence contexts of interaction different and understood differently in cross- 
cultural communication?"149 If the context of an interaction is understood differently by 
interactants, then disagreement on what is appropriate may arise, and interactants1 
expectations of what is considered an appropriate strategy may also differ.
3.4.2.1.2.1 Native and Non-native cultures in cross-cultural context
Misunderstanding in native and non-native interaction can be felt at almost all levels and in 
different contexts. Children who have parents from different cultures usually experience 
difficulties in communicating appropriately with them, or in understanding what is 
appropriate in certain contexts of interaction. Because of the different cultures that parents 
have, they struggle in conveying the appropriate norms and values that their children need 
in certain contexts. According to Geer et. al. (2002) 'in conversation with children, parents 
make use of language in order to convey norms and rules governing both linguistic as well 
as social and cultural behaviour' (2002: 1782). For example, my cousin, who has two 
daughters with an English woman, swore at one of his daughters in Arabic. She asked him 
either to swear at her in English or to translate his swearing into English. When he asked 
her why; she said that she wanted to understand whether she needed to be sad, to cry, or to 
apologise. From the context, his daughter understood that her father was swearing at her, 
but she also wanted to understand what was said in order to react appropriately.
Similarly, Arabs in the west who meet with westerners, whether they are close friends or 
strangers, may experience misunderstanding or conflict in their linguistic use in certain 
contexts. For example, an Arab person, when first meeting a stranger, would expect to be
149 See chapter 5 for discussion.
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asked what job s/he does, about how much money s/he earns, his/her religion, his/her tribe. 
Such topics usually crop up in first meetings among Arab strangers. In a meeting of 
female Arabs, it is expected for one interactant to ask another whether she is married, how 
many children she has, and, if the addressee has none, even the reason for not having 
children. An Arab’s interpretation of the first meeting context with strangers differs from 
an English person’s, and topics such as the above, where interactants can discuss issues 
and compare financial situations, religious background or cultural difference, are always 
appreciated among Arabs, but may not be among English when meeting strangers.150 
However, I have established that understanding context in an interaction is a crucial issue 
in determining what is intended by an utterance. In the next section, I will discuss how 
such facts are not adequately considered in the core theories of politeness, and that an 
analytical approach that considers context more deeply is needed to understand politeness 
in cross-cultural interactions.
3.4.2.2 Politeness theories’ weakness in analysing context
As has already been discussed, problems in cross-cultural communication can be due to 
cultural differences, or different interpretations of the context of interaction. These two 
factors seem to be related, because culture influences how an interactant may interpret a 
context. As has already been shown, theorists of politeness claim that their models are 
universal, but in practice there are no clear explanations as to how these theories may work 
in analysing cross-cultural interaction.
Lakoff s rules of politeness do not explain how assessing the level or weight of politeness 
or a context is to be evaluated. Leech’s principles provide more consideration of the 
differences between cultures; but how context is understood cross culturally is not clearly 
stated.151 Leech’s principle and maxims of politeness analysis concentrate on the speaker. 
This means that politeness is considered only on the basis of what is said. Interpretation,
150 In Arabic, an older person in a classroom would expect to receive different treatment compared to other 
young students when her/his teacher is talking to her/him. This may even put pressure on the teacher to avoid 
discussing certain topics, or if necessary to discuss these topics in a different way when an older person is 
with other students in the classroom. Verbal interaction between interactants from different cultures is subject 
to the understanding o f the context. Brown and Levinson (1987) argue that ‘. . . the choice o f form determined 
primarily by the social characteristics o f participants and setting, and thus the form’s valence derives from 
the way in which it encapsulated those social determinants’ (1987:280).
151 Thomas (1995) states that ‘ Leech’s principle allows us, better than any other approach discussed here, to 
make specific cross-cultural comparisons and to explain cross-cultural differences in the prescription of 
politeness and the use of Politeness strategies’ (167-8). Although I agree with this view, I do not think that 
that is all we need to know in analysing cross-cultural interaction.
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or how the other interactant's culture may influence the context, is not considered. Thus, 
applying Lakoffs rules of politeness, Leech's principles of politeness or Brown and 
Levinson's strategies might be adequate if the goal is to analyse isolated speech acts and 
compare them across cultures, but not for cross-cultural data in which politeness is judged 
through different understandings of contextual and cultural factors that influence 
interaction.
Brown and Levinson give the mathematical formula (D + P + R) to assess the weight of a 
Face Threatening Act, and they claim that this is universal for evaluating the context of an 
interaction (See chapter 2). Although they agree that cultural and situational variations 
make a difference in working out Face Threatening Acts, they do not explain why. The 
cultural and contextual factors that influence what is considered to be appropriate or not in 
conversation are too broad to be included in a formula or specific strategies as Brown and 
Levinson attempt to do. Takano (2005) argues that
languaige is not only defined by the context but also helps define a context in which 
particular aspects of speaker-addressee relationships are foregrounded, and the 
distributions of power and rights/obligations are statistically negotiated or 
controlled by the speaker (2005:657).
This confirms that politeness cannot be analysed solely from individual utterances, and that 
we need a contextual pragmatic approach that considers the relationship between 
utterances in relation to their context, considering everything which might influence it. An 
utterance may sound appropriate in one context and not in another, and have different 
meanings in different contexts. As Mey (1993) argues, context is important in assigning 
proper values and also in dealing with pragmatic issues. Context determines what one can 
or cannot say and understand, and, in cross-cultural interaction, is influenced by more than 
one culture differently to the interactants. What a pragmatic approach may do, then, is 
help us to determine the intended meaning of what is said and what is communicated by 
interactants in relation to what influences the context.
3.5 A Pragmatic Approach
The aim of this chapter, which is part of the core concept of this thesis, is to justify the 
need for a more pragmatic approach to the analysis of politeness instead of the models of 
the core politeness theories which I have discussed in chapter 2. The following is a
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discussion of what a pragmatic approach might consider that has not been considered by 
the core politeness theories.152 Identifying similarities and differences across cultures 
might enable us to recognise whether certain utterances are considered polite or not in 
relation to certain cultures, and this is what the core theories of politeness might do in a 
cross-cultural context. But whether an utterance is appropriate or inappropriate and why in 
some contexts in cross-cultural interaction cannot be identified. The main theories of 
politeness have largely depended on such an approach, and most of their investigations are 
built on analysing certain speech acts and finding similarities and differences between 
cultures. This is one of my main criticisms of the theories of politeness, and a significant 
reason for searching for a more applicable pragmatic approach. Christie (2005) points out 
that
as well as an awareness of inter-cultural variations, debates that have stressed 
the range of intra-cultural variation in politeness norms have triggered a need 
for a more “bottom-up” approach to analyses of interactive behaviour’ ‘Such 
debates stress the need for more sensitive and nuanced approach to context 
and social identity, and place greater emphasis on the collection and analysis 
of naturally occurring linguistic phenomena (2005:3).
Mills (2003a) also calls for a greater consideration of the possibility of multiple 
interpretations for utterances and stretches of interaction. She posits:
rather than assuming that each participant knows exactly what is going on in 
an interaction, we can allow that perhaps there is ambiguity in all interaction, 
and that certainty over intentions and interpretation is precautious, and is achieved 
only fleetingly (2003:244).
Mills' view is also supported by Eckert and McConnel-Ginet (2003), who explain that 'like 
other features of conversational practice, politeness cannot be understood by looking at 
isolated individual moves or speech acts' (2003:138). Thus an analytical approach should 
see utterances as sets of conversational strategies, analysed in relation to one another and 
to the context of the interaction. By such analysis we are able to identify the reasons for 
any pragmatic failure between interactants, especially in cross-cultural interaction.
152 Silva (2000) argues that 'the pragmatic aspects of a language (be it LI, L2, or Ln) seem to be very 
susceptible to changes, motivated by a mixture of psychological and sociolinguistic factors. Language 
proficiency and intuition are directly influenced by the environment in which we live and by all languages 
and cultures we are in contact with. Thus, the way we feel and use languages is in continuous adaptation 
throughout our lives’ (2000:128).
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A pragmatic approach allows us to find out how a certain utterance may have more than 
one interpretation between interactants. It does not allocate definite meanings to what is 
said, or define meanings with any certainty. Thus, a speaker might feel they are appropriate 
but the hearer may believe that s/he is impolite. Christie (2000) points out that 'describing 
communication in terms of intentions and expectations is not the same thing as arguing that 
people are entirely in control of what their utterances signify' (2000:80). Pragmatics is 
dynamic, can analyse any cross-cultural context and consider its variables in relation to 
other interactional contexts.153 It provides new insights into linguistic investigation by 
understanding the relationship between culture and context.
However, pragmatics has received some criticisms, even from pragmaticists. According to 
Mey (1993) pragmatics has failed to account for the full role of context in interaction; for 
example, analysing discourse through speech acts is criticized in that it does not consider 
the role of context, a point with which, to some extent, this research agrees.154 MacMahon 
(1996) also mentions a criticism of pragmatics, namely that it ‘cannot deal with literature, 
or can only deal with it by marginalizing it, and therefore that there is something wrong 
with pragmatics' (1996:209). Similarly, Christie mentions the marginalisation of 
pragmatics in her book Gender and Language. She mentions three assumptions: 1) that 
pragmatics is unable to address either the social or cultural contexts of language use, (2) 
that pragmatics is predicated on a liberal-humanist conceptualization of the individual and 
(3) the obscurity of pragmatic terminology (2000:3). In response to these criticisms, 
Christie argues that ‘even though the first two objections might appear to have been 
partially valid in the past, they have never been entirely valid, and are even less so today’ 
(2000:23). The criticisms by Schiffrin (1994) that pragmatics draws on hypothetical 
contexts and not real language, and that the communicative meanings of utterances are 
derived through general assumptions, are not applicable now. It is clear that pragmatics 
analyses more areas in interaction than traditional methods. Christie (2000) maintains that
153 This claim is also taken as a weakness in pragmatics. It is claimed that pragmatics does not have a clear- 
cut focus like other fields o f linguistics; its principles are vague and fuzzy; it does not do any more than what 
semantics already covers. But in defending that, we can argue that analysing interaction to study the unsaid 
meaning or speech act has been introduced through pragmatics.
154 Mey argues that ‘one o f the main arguments has been that by focusing on single speech acts, it 
underestimates not only the role o f the situational and socio-cultural contexts as frames o f reference for 
interpreting speech, but also the role of context in shaping the talk or text that emerges on any given 
occasion’ (1993: 58).
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pragmatics has begun to theorise the relationship between language use and
the impact of socio-cultural factors on the different types of knowledge that
play a role in interlocutors’ attributions of meanings to utterances (2000:7).
In summation, treating culture as a defined term, without clearly defining it, is problematic. 
This is one of the main criticisms that Brown and Levinson’s model has received (See 
chapter 2; Watts, 2003). The other issue is that theories of politeness are culturally biased 
and context is not clearly considered. A pragmatic analysis may lead us to consider more 
cultural differences in analysing utterances. A more pragmatic analytical approach is 
needed because it provides a method of defining and analysing the structure of 
conversation, that is, understanding utterances in relation to each other. Non-native 
speakers of a language may not be aware of the reasons behind a misunderstanding with a 
native speaker. Pragmatic analysis allows us to determine these reasons and discover 
whether they are caused by linguistic, cultural or contextual difference. Pragmatics is seen
as the best method of analysis, especially for issues such as politeness 155 and
appropriateness in intercultural communication, where it is not always possible to 
understand the intended meaning through linguistic analysis.
3.6 Pragmatic failure and politeness
In this thesis, I argue that the core politeness theories do not provide analysis of pragmatic 
failures or misunderstanding in cross-cultural interaction, because they do not consider all 
of the interactants' cultures and their understanding of the context of interaction. Pragmatic 
failure cannot be fully investigated by analysing individual utterances in isolation. 
Analysing an utterance in relation to other utterances explains whether there is pragmatic 
failure or not between the interactants. Taleghani-Nikazam (2002) states that ‘by 
analysing isolated sentences, one cannot capture the interpersonal situation and the context 
in which pragmatic transfer and miscommunication occur’ (2002:1822). It is sometimes 
difficult to determine the intended meaning of an utterance, if the utterance is not analysed 
in relation to other utterances and their context.156 Valdes (1986) argues that ‘speech acts 
differ cross-culturally not only in the way they are realized but also in their distribution,
155 In pragmatics in general, politeness is seen as a set o f conversational strategies that a speaker can use to 
avoid a conflict with his/her addressees (Escandell-Vidal,1996). Escandell-Vidal’s definition is rational and 
maybe universal, but what is considered to be a set o f conversational strategies that help in avoiding conflict 
is usually something disagreed between the interactants in cross-cultural conversation.
156 Hua et. al. (1998) argues that 'much o f what is regarded as appropriate gift offer acceptance behaviour 
depends on the context o f its occurance, especially the occasion, the motive and interpersonal relationship 
between the gift offeror and the recipient' (1998:87)
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their frequency of occurrence, and in the functions they serve’ (1986:119). Ascertaining 
the reasons for misunderstandings might be more complicated than just recognizing the 
illocutionary force of a particular utterance, as different social knowledge and different 
linguistic strategies influence interaction and culture plays a role in constructing this
1 ^ 7knowledge and how it influences speech.
Regarding the complexities of social interaction and literary interpretation, Adegbite’s
(2005) view is that 'pragmatic failure is a case of misinterpretation of utterances in 
communicative interaction' (2005:1473), although he reasons also that pragmatic failure 
does not necessarily lead to breakdown in communication. Similarly, Thomas (1983) 
states 'pragmatic failure is conceived in the general sense as the "inability to understand 
what is meant by what is said" (1983:91). Considering pragmatic failure in a cross-cultural 
context, Kasper and Blum-Kulka point out that there are three major approaches to the 
study of pragmatic failure. One of these is contrastive pragmatics which ‘involves the 
cross-cultural and cross-linguistic comparison of speech act realization patterns throughout 
identifying similarities and differences between the pairs of group of languages studied’ 
(1993:12). Although they discuss different types of misunderstanding, they mainly 
concentrate on pragmatic failure at the pragmalinguistic158 and sociopragmatic159 level. 
Bialystok (1993) notes that ‘when listeners fail to understand the intention of their 
speakers, conversation and sometimes more than just conversation break down' (1993:43). 
Interactants may carry with them their past experiences, which may lead to different 
interpretations of what is intended.
Communication between strangers of different cultures may involve more difficult 
pragmatic failures.160 An utterance may cause embarrassment to one of the interlocutors 
which may lead to pragmatic failure. It can cause a breakdown or even conflict if both
157 Like Cole et al (1975) Platt and Platt (1975) argue that ‘an important factor in the communication between 
S (speakers) and R (hearers) participants is their role relationship. In some speech events, roles are fixed by 
the social status both participants hold in the community (e.g. the speaker may be judge, government minister 
or important business man -  the hearer may be a person o f lower social status, or vice versa) or the two 
participants could hold positions o f a different status in an employment situation (e.g. director-secretary, 
accountant-typist). However, there are also the indefinable indirect roles that people assume in everyday 
conversation’ (1975:17).
158 Pragmalinguistis refers to the more linguistic ‘end’ o f pragmatics.
159 Sociopragmatics studies the way conditions on language use derive from social situations.
160 Winder (2005) points out that ‘encounters between strangers, meanwhile, are rarely straightforward; the 
mingling o f peoples has always been accompanied by fear, suspicion and animosity. Migration has never, not 
for a thousand years, been easy. People have rarely been treated as well as they hoped or deserved, and roll- 
call o f names who have suffered the worst excess of bigotry is long' (2005: xiii)
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interactants presume that they are being appropriate in their production and 
interpretation.161 Pragmatic failures, because of contextual or cultural variability, can be 
observed in different types of speech act such as apology, compliment, agreement and 
greeting, among others. Here are some examples which emphasise that there are pragmatic 
failures in cross-cultural interaction because of cultural and contextual differences that the 
core theories of politeness cannot analyse or account for. These examples also confirm the 
need for another analytical approach.
3.6.1 Indirectness and pragmatic failure
The issue of indirectness is one of the main causes of pragmatic failure in interaction, 
whether cross-cultural or mono-cultural, and which Brown and Levinson link to politeness 
and impoliteness. Tsuda (1993) states that 'in conversational interaction, indirectness is 
realized in various ways such as avoidance of confrontation, joking, overstating, or 
understanding' (1993:11). Blum-Kulka (1987), criticising Brown and Levinson's view of 
indirectness, states that indirectness and politeness are not necessarily linked, as they 
suggest. She believes ‘politeness and indirectness are linked in the case of conventional
1A9indirectness, but not always in the case of non-conventional indirectness’ (1987:132). 
But this criticism does not mean that indirectness, if not linked to politeness, does not 
cause pragmatic failure. Every culture has its own understanding of what indirectness is 
and what its function is in an interaction. According to Wierzbicka (1985) ‘terms such as 
"directness" and "indirectness" are much too general, too vague to be really safe in cross- 
cultural studies’ (1985:175). Wierzbicka (1985) also argues that, although indirectness 
may mean politeness, different cultures may have different language structures and 
considerations for indirectness and politeness. She suggests that strategies such as 
spontaneity, directness, intimacy and affection as opposite to indirectness, distance, 
tolerance and anti-dogmaticism are differently interpreted across cultures. These issues are 
culture-specific, and it is not easy to decide whether a direct message may convey 
closeness. Yeung Lorrita (2000) explains that the Chinese are indirect because they are
161 Van Dijk (1997) argues that ‘languages around the world provide their speakers with alternative modes 
for the achievements o f communicative goals’ He goes on to argue that ‘in essence, research on the 
pragmatics of politeness aims at explaining contextual and cultural variability in linguistic action’ (1997:50).
162 Blum-Kulka describes conventional indirectness as any accepted practice in the use o f language that is 
inferred or understood from an utterance; and non-conventional indirectness is as inferring the utterance from 
the context where and when an utterance is performed.
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hierarchically-oriented, and recognize the differences between people, acting accordingly
I  £ -3to maintain social equilibrium. Jucker (1988) suggests
an indirect formulation, incurring additional processing effort for the 
addressee, might be more relevant in a given situation because it makes some 
face-threatening assumptions less manifest than a direct formulation would 
have done (1988:384).
Thus, to Jucker, indirectness is linked to politeness even when it requires more effort from 
the hearer to understand. Despite the risk that the addressee misunderstands, this risk 
seems less important than being accused of inappropriateness or impoliteness.164 The other 
problem about indirectness in cross-cultural interaction is that, even if the intended 
message is understood, the reason for being indirect may not be.165 The striking cultural 
differences, which affect both the conditions of the use of a formula and the interpretation 
associated with it, clearly demonstrate that there are different ways of being indirect but 
there is no guarantee that the intended message or politeness will be understood in cross- 
cultural interaction.166
3.6.2 Request across cultures
Requesting across cultures is differently produced and interpreted, and in some cultures it 
is performed as a command, but it is still considered polite. According to Blum-Kulka 
(1992) an Israeli woman of British origin would classify other Israelis as impolite, simply 
because she would not make a request in the way they request from each other.167 She 
emphasises the issue of cultural differences and says that such differences may lead to 
pragmatic failure between interactants. In Arabic, in some situations, if a speaker is direct 
in his/her request, and does not give the addressee the choice or freedom to reject the
163 This is also argued by Brown and Levinson (1987), but for a different reason. Brown and Levinson claim 
that there is a straightforward relationship between indirectness and politeness. They base their theory on two 
assumptions that people are typically caught between wanting to achieve their own goals and the desire to 
avoid infringing their partners’ rights, (see chapter 2)
164 According to Thomas (1995) ‘indirectness has three motives: the desire to be interesting; the desire to 
increase the force o f one’s message; and the recognition that the speaker has two (or more) competing goals - 
generally a clash between the speaker’s propositional goal and his or her interpersonal goal’ (1995:146)
65 Blum-Kulka et. al. (1985) emphasise the problems that cross-cultural interaction may involve, such as the 
different understandings o f indirectness.
166 Escandell-Vidal (1996) argues 'if the interpretation o f indirect illocutions is based on general, universal 
inference mechanisms, as claimed, then this would be a rather unexpected result. The degree o f variation 
shown by different cultures poses, therefore, a strong challenge to the universality hypothesis' (1996:631). ‘
167 Blum-Kulka (1992) states that ‘an Israeli woman o f British origin, having lived in Israel for 7 years, 
expressed her amazement at the kinds o f favours Israelis ask from each other, favours she would never ask’ 
(1992:274).
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invitation, then this is considered a sign of closeness, regardless of the relationship 
between the interactants. There are some conversational situations where speakers are 
expected to use bald-on-record requests with their addressees, even when they are 
complete strangers. For example, in Arabic, requesting to be served in governmental 
institutions is usually achieved using a direct strategy. According to Brown and Levinson, 
such strategies are FT As, as they do not involve any indirectness, and consequently are 
impolite.168 Arabs explicitly express their intention when they are requesting, which is 
different from the English choice of an interrogative form. Wierzbicka (1985) argues that
in English, if the speaker wants to get the addressee to do something and if 
s/he does not assume that s/he could force the addressee to do it, s/he would 
normally not use a bare imperative (1985:135).
Her argument concludes that interaction in cross-cultural settings is always complicated, 
and the heavy restrictions which English people place on the use of the imperative cannot 
be accepted as politeness in all cultures.169 However, across cultures, there are different 
strategies for making different speech acts, and the appropriate strategy depends on the 
context of the interaction.
3.6.3 Apology across cultures
Apologies are performed and interpreted differently across cultures. In some cultures, 
apology is not always overt. Spencer-Oatey states that the issue of spoken apologies 
across cultures provides good evidence for not seeing Brown and Levinson’s model as 
appropriate for analysing politeness, especially in cross-cultural interaction. Even if 
apology is defined in the same way across cultures, we still have to face the differences in 
the strategies used to deliver it, and the importance of it being understood by the listener. 
Al-Zumor (2003) argues that ‘the performance of Arab learners of English differs from 
their performance in their Arabic LI and from the way native speakers of British English
168 Wierzbicka (1985) argues that English, compared with Polish, places heavy restrictions on the use o f  the 
imperative and makes extensive use of interrogative and conditional forms. She argues that linguistic 
differences are associated with cultural differences. Her analysis shows that the English use indirect requests 
to ask people to do something and the imperative is mostly used in commands and in orders. Although this 
claim is not wholly accurate, English people generally tend, in requesting, to avoid the imperative or to 
combine it with interrogative and/or conditional forms, sometimes even when the addressee is a very close 
relative or friend.
169 Wierzbicka (1991) explains that in Polish and Russian, a formula like ‘Can you pass me the salt?’ would 
be understood as a genuine question, and not as a polite request, as it would be in English or Spanish. Poles 
and Russians find this question form strange because they assume that it is evident that they can pass the salt, 
and therefore they puzzle over the intended meaning.
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and American English realise an apology speech act' (2003:3).170 Tanaka et al (2000) also 
argue that Japanese and Westerners hold similar stereotypical conceptions of apologetic 
behaviour. But they still argue that the Japanese apologise more frequently than English
171people, and that apology, in Japanese, does not necessarily mean acknowledging a fault.
Similarly, clear apologies, which are expressed linguistically, between very close people, 
such as father and son, sound odd in Arabic. The closer the interactants, the less they 
expect to apologise to each other linguistically. Thus, native speakers, when interacting 
with non-native speakers, should consider that indirect use of language and implicit 
utterances might be differently interpreted in cross-cultural interaction. The analysis of its 
pragmatic aspects indicates that native speakers (when speaking with non-native speakers) 
need to consider indirect politeness, and how utterances might be interpreted.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter supports the overall argument of the thesis that the core theories of politeness 
do not provide us with an adequate analysis of what is considered polite or impolite in 
cross-cultural analysis. Thus, shifting from how culture and context are treated in the core 
politeness theories to a more pragmatic approach gives more flexibility in how we 
approach politeness analysis in cross-cultural interaction. A pragmatic politeness theory 
should consider issues such as the shared cognitive environment of the interaction. It 
should be built on what happens between interactants and explain the possible 
interpretations of what is said.
On a cross-cultural level, politeness should not only be studied by comparing similarities 
and differences between cultures; how interactants understand each other and what
170 Tanaka (1991/1999) uses a production questionnaire; Kotani (1997) uses in-depth interviews to 
investigate apology. Both o f them agree with Trosporg's (1987) view. He discusses apology strategies and 
then analyses native / non-native communicative behaviour in terms o f these strategies. He discusses the 
forms that apology may have and divides them into two types o f apology: direct apology and indirect 
apology. His main three different strategies are a) minimising the degree o f offence; b) acknowledging 
responsibility; and c) explaining. His study shows that for the selection o f direct apology, the influence o f  
dominance and social distance is not significant. In addition, his findings show that the parameters o f social 
distance and dominance do not result in an increase in the number of direct apology, nor in the 
intensifications o f these apologies (1987:152). According to him, ‘politeness as defined by Brown and 
Levinson has a Western ethnocentrism embedded within it. This becomes clear when one attempts to apply 
the model to Eastern cultures where the group or society may take precedence over the needs and wants of  
the individual' (1987:134).
171 Concentrating on apology, Trosborg (1987) argues that ‘appropriate social behaviour patterns are built on 
the norms which constitute polite behaviour and face-saving maxims are believed to lie at the heart o f face to 
face interaction’ (1987:147).
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influences the context of the interaction are also important, especially given that 
misunderstanding happens even between interactants from the same culture. In other 
words, a theory of politeness should be able to account for why and how participants 
classify certain linguistic structures as 'polite' and others as 'impolite'. It might be that the 
politeness of any structure is open to evaluation by the interactants in relation to their 
context and cultures (Watts, 2003).172
The next two chapters review research that has dealt with understanding/misunderstanding 
and politeness between interactants belonging to different cultures in relation to the 
argument of the thesis. The next chapter, in particular, focuses on the notions of politeness 
and misunderstanding and the role of context. It concentrates on misunderstandings 
between strangers, and in particular between interactants belonging to Arab and English 
cultures, and investigates the problem related to native and non-native speakers of English 
in understanding what is intended by performing an utterance in a certain context.
172 Relevance Theory (RT) is a cognitive theory that considers social factors when it investigates the reasons 
behind certain linguistic stories. Background or contextual information are considered in RT to a much 
greater extent than in other models, and it offers an analysis o f non-demonstrative inference processes, (see 
chapter 4) Sperber and Wilson (1997) state, as a theory o f communication, Relevance Theory analyses 
communication as an inferential process, and thus provides a more realistic model than the code model, 
which has been accepted explicitly or implicitly by most social scientists’ (1997:145).
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Chapter 4: Understanding and Misunderstanding Politeness
As I have already discussed, politeness is, first of all, a process of understanding what is 
intended by an utterance in relation to the context of interaction, and not only 
understanding what is literally said. Therefore, in this chapter, I will first review the 
relevant literature that deals with understanding and misunderstanding. I will then discuss 
analysing misunderstanding in cross-cultural interaction. Under this section, I will discuss 
explicatures and implicatures, and misunderstandings between Arabs and English people. 
In order to link understanding and politeness, I will discuss theories that investigate 
understanding in relation to the context of interaction such as Relevance Theory (Sperber 
and Wilson, 1993, 1995), and Integrational Linguistics (Toolan, 1996). The reason for 
discussing such theories is to develop a contextual, pragmatic approach to analysing 
politeness in cross-cultural interaction. I am arguing that using a theory of cognition such 
as Relevance Theory enables us to examine the process of understanding in cross-cultural 
interaction, especially between strangers, and establish a link between understanding and 
politeness. In particular, I will concentrate on investigating language misunderstanding and 
politeness between Arab speakers of English communicating with native speakers, and 
what influences production and interpretation of utterances. My aim is to establish what is 
needed to analyse politeness, showing that politeness is not only what the linguistic choices 
or strategies used may mean to the speaker, but also what the hearer understands in a 
particular context of interaction.
4.1 Understanding
As argued in the previous chapters, misunderstanding is likely to happen in interaction, 
whether cross-cultural or intracultural. Regardless of what happens in an interaction and 
however language is used, most conversations are built on the objective of mutual 
understanding, and, if interactants misunderstand each other, we need to find the reasons. 
The main reason for discussing understanding is that, as argued in chapter one, politeness 
is a process of understanding what is intended rather than just what a certain structure may 
mean. I argue that understanding politeness is too complex to be limited to simply 
understanding what certain structures or linguistic choices mean, and that in order to 
understand it in cross-cultural interaction, an approach that investigates the process of 
understanding is needed.
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There are different ways of investigating understanding between interactants. Thomas 
(1995) sees understanding between interactants on two levels. She distinguishes between 
“utterance meanings”, i.e. the literal level of the speaker’s words, and “the force of the 
utterance” i.e. what is actually meant, and argues that communication relies upon 
understanding both of them at the same time. 173 Thomas identifies potential for 
misunderstanding in the case of ‘a hearer who fails to establish the utterance meaning 
correctly or may fail to understand the force the speaker intended’ (1995:20). But the type of 
misunderstanding she considers unusual is when an interactant understands the force of what 
is said, but not the meaning. Grundy (2000) discusses 'entailment' and 'implicature' when 
investigating the issue of how we understand utterances. He posits that ‘in order to solve 
the problem of how we understand speakers to mean things that they don’t exactly say, we 
need first to draw a distinction between “natural” and “non-natural” meanings’ 174 
(2000:73). (See chapter 3)
Thus, in this section, I will discuss how an addressee chooses between different 
implications that an utterance might have, and how the different factors that influence the 
context of the interaction lead to different assumptions on the part of the interactants. First, 
I will discuss the understanding of literal and intended meaning. I will then discuss shared 
knowledge and understanding of the intended meaning, and how hearers infer the intended 
meaning, before moving on to discuss background knowledge and understanding. The 
main goal of this section is to show that understanding is a process of working out what is 
intended and communicated and not simply what is said.
4.1.1 Understanding literal and intended meaning
Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) discuss understanding beyond literal meaning. The 
difference between utterance and intention is the main concern of their Speech Act Theory. 
Their main point is ‘that language is used not to convey beliefs about the world, but to 
perform action, and that these actions must be described within a framework of social 
institutions’ (Blakemore, 1987:62). Similarly, Grice (1975) holds that what a word 'means' 
derives from what speakers intend by uttering it, and that hearers are expected to
173 Similarly Zaydan (1985) and Jahfar (2004) argue that interlocutors cannot understand the intended 
meaning if  they have not understood the literal meaning and can distingu ish between them.
174 Natural meaning is a meaning that is presented on every occasion when an expression occurs; non-natural 
meaning is variable on different occasions. It is only sometimes associated with a sentence from which it may 
be inferred. (Grundy 2000)
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understand this. (See chapter 2) The subtleties of intended meaning (or illocutionary force)
17Sare usually the cause of misinterpretation.
Wilson (1993) also discusses the issue of what is said and what is communicated. He holds 
that 'there is a gap between knowing what a sentence of English means and understanding 
all that a speaker intends to communicate by uttering it on any given occasion' (1993:336), 
and Christie (2000) points out that the goal of any communication is the hearer 
understanding what the speaker intended, not the hearer’s understanding of sentence 
meaning (2000:8). A hearer may not be able to distinguish between the intended and 
literal meanings, or may be unable to choose between two or more possible meanings. 
Thomas discusses the overlap between the two, and concludes:
when in interaction we have resolved all the ambiguities of sense, reference 
and structure -  when we have moved from abstract meaning (what a particular 
sentence could mean in theory) to what the speaker actually does mean by these 
words on this particular occasion -  we have arrived at contextual meaning or 
utterance meaning (1995:16).
Thomas seems to be suggesting that there is only one intended meaning of any utterance. 
This is not the case, as some have more than one implication in addition to their literal 
meanings.176 Thus, according to what Kecskes (2000/2004), what triggers literal meaning 
is vocabulary and grammar, whereas what triggers implied meaning is dynamic and 
changeable, meaning that there is no one fixed implicit meaning for an utterance.177 This 
means that even recognizing an implicit meaning may not be sufficient to recognize the 
intended meaning.
4.1.1.1 Shared knowledge and understanding the intended meaning
Gumperz (1995) suggests that Tack of shared background knowledge leads initially to 
misunderstandings’ (1995:120). This means that misunderstandings are not confined to 
interactants from different backgrounds; people from the same background or culture also
175 In relation to intended meaning and literal meaning, Verschueren (1999) suggests that ‘if  pragmatics looks 
at language as a form o f action anchored in a real-world context, or what is perceived as such, one o f the 
most immediate consequences is that it must pay attention to types o f meaning that go beyond what is 
“given” by the language form itself, or what is literally “said” (1999:25).
176 Fauconnier (1997) asserts the view that grammar reflects only a small number of general frames o f the 
meanings that an utterance may have (1997:190).
177 The importance o f the intended meaning as opposed to the literal, is discussed by Thomas (1995). She 
examines court sessions, where the judge depends more on the literal meaning o f certain words and 
expressions.
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experience problems if they have no shared knowledge about what is discussed. Scollon 
and Scollon (1995) introduce the notion of shared knowledge to analyse the understanding 
of intended meaning in conversations. They divide shared knowledge into two types: 
actions and situations; relationships and identities. For the first type, they believe that 
‘shared knowledge about these components of such communicative situations is the 
framework in which successful communicative action takes place’ (1995:18). Sperber and 
Wilson (1995) seem to challenge this view. To them, shared knowledge is what is relevant 
to the shared goal of the interaction. (See discussion of Sperber and Wilson later in this 
chapter) For the second type, Scollon and Scollon note that
participants make certain unmarked assumptions about their relationships and 
about the face they want to claim for themselves ... participants also 
undertake a certain amount of negotiation of their relationships as a natural 
process of change in human relationships (1995:35).
They aim to explain how shared knowledge works to reduce the ambiguity inherent in 
communication. Asking the question, ‘What is successful interdiscourse ... 
communication?’ (non-native speakers of English with native) they claim that, because of 
the ambiguous nature of language, which causes difficulties in interdiscourse, 
communication may not express the intended meaning of the participants. However, they 
state that this is not the case when the interactants share assumptions and/or knowledge 
about the world.
4.1.1.1.1 Hearer's inference and the intended meaning
As Adham (1993) and Saleh (2003) state, a person who wants to communicate, either 
verbally or nonverbally, assumes that what they want to communicate is of relevance to 
their audience and worthwhile for them to process (See section 2 in this chapter). But 
communication is not only about what the speaker intends by using an utterance. It is also
1 78about what the hearer understands. Blakemore argues that 'indeed, a hearer’s interest 
in what the speaker means will often lead him/her to ignore the fact that his/her words 
mean something else’ (1992:5). Blakemore (1992) points out that
178 Sperber and Wilson (1993), in their discussion o f relevance in interaction, and also Grice (1975) and 
Blakemore (1992), discuss the issue o f understanding from the angle o f discovering the meant meaning.
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what the speaker means is a set of propositions, one of which is expressed directly 
through the meaning of the words he uses and the others conveyed indirectly and 
derived through inference’ (1992:7).179
Blakemore assumes that it is the speaker’s responsibility to facilitate the hearer’s inference, 
and make it possible for the hearer to infer the intended message. But she also maintains 
that a hearer is responsible for discovering the intended message depending on their ability 
to supply contextual information. She rationalises that
the hearers use reasoning or inferring in recovering what is communicated. 
The inference of the hearer depends on contextual information, that is, 
information which is not derived from the meaning of the word uttered but 
from the knowledge of the word. In each case the inference the hearer makes 
appeals to the assumption that the speaker has met or has tried to meet certain 
standards (1992:12).
Blakemore’s position is that a hearer uses his/her relevant experience or observation to 
come to many interpretations of an utterance. Cushner and Brislin (1996) believe that 
‘more often than not, an unintended misinterpretation of events or a misunderstanding of 
the subjective meaning given to a particular behaviour is at the base of the problem’ 
(1996:13). However, inferring in cross-cultural interaction seems to be more problematic, a 
view held by Scollon and Scollon, who assume that understanding is a question of 
recognizing the uttered discourse system (1995:248). Thus, understanding of the intended 
meaning is as important as the syntactic or phonological meaning (see Coupland et. al, 
1991a). This view indicates that communication works better the more the participants 
share assumptions and knowledge that help them to infer what is relevant, a situation 
which is less likely to occur when interactants are strangers belonging to different cultures.
4.1.1.2 Background Knowledge and understanding
Understanding what is intended is usually influenced by the background knowledge that 
speakers and addressees bring from their own environments or cultures. Gumperz (1982) 
recognizes the importance of background knowledge and social meaning in avoiding 
misunderstanding. He provides a wide variety of examples of how diversity affects 
interpretation, pointing out that ‘socio-cultural conventions affect all levels of speech
179 See detailed discussion o f Relevance Theory in this chapter.
180 Davidson (2002) ties this in with cross-cultural contexts when he explains that 'the difficulty in conducting 
conversations through an interpreter is precisely the cumbersome process o f constructing reciprocity in cross- 
linguistic discourse' (2002:1298).
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production and interpretation’ and that ‘we must abandon the existing views of 
communication which draw a basic distinction between cultural or social knowledge on the 
one hand and linguistic signalling processes on the other’ (1982:186). Schifffin emphasises 
the issue of the different types of communicative knowledge that are required in 
understanding, and one of these is social knowledge (2003:67). She holds that
two aspects of communicative knowledge closely related to one another are 
expressive and social: the ability to use language to display personal and social 
identities, to convey attitudes and perform actions, and to negotiate 
relationships between self and other (2003:54).
When there are different parameters for interlocutors in evaluating the meaning of an 
utterance, there is scope for different interpretations. The search for what is meant might 
be fruitless. Mey (1993) declares that
When interlocutors come to the communicative event from different linguistic and 
cultural backgrounds, with possible mismatches in cultural and contextual 
presuppositions - as well as in the interpretive frameworks for the linguistic means 
of signalling pragmatic meanings - the chances for miscommunication abound. 
Such miscommunication in turn can lead to mutual negative stereotyping, and have 
grave social implications for further inter-group relations (1993:60).
Scollon and Scollon (1995) agree with the claim that interactants may interpret the same 
linguistic utterance differently when they do not share the same experience, and may not 
even be aware of this. According to them,
Where two people have very similar histories, background, and experience, their 
communication works fairly easily, because the inferences each makes about what1 o 1the other means will be based on common experience and knowledge (1995:11).
Thus, in cross-cultural communication, as in any interaction, meaning is a shared 
responsibility between speakers and hearers, but disagreement between intention and 
interpretation, caused by differing background knowledge, among other reasons, can be 
expected, and may affect understanding. As Yule (1996) states, 'two people growing up in 
the same geographical area, at the same time, may speak differently because of a number 
of social factors’ (1996:190). If interactants' background knowledge is different, then 
misunderstanding may be more likely because their production and interpretation of
181 It is not clear whether Scollon and Scollon mean people belonging to the same, or different cultures, as 
long as they share similar experiences of life.
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utterances are influenced differently, culturally and contextually. In the next section I will 
discuss misunderstanding and its relation with politeness.
4.2 Misunderstanding
In a similar manner to my discussion of understanding, I will discuss misunderstanding in 
order to establish that politeness is a process of understanding what is intended by the 
speaker, and simply understanding only the literal meaning might lead to 
misunderstanding. Misunderstanding what the speaker intends may lead the hearer to 
accuse the speaker of being impolite. In this section, I will first discuss misunderstanding 
because of linguistic inadequacy. I will then discuss misunderstanding through cultural and 
contextual variations. Finally, I will discuss politeness/impoliteness and misunderstanding.
Linguists and sociologists provide different interpretations of the term misunderstanding.
1 50Valdes (1986) assumes that misunderstood statements risk imposing on or annoying the 
hearer. This creates misunderstanding, such as when hearers feel as if they have been 
asked to believe something they already know, or do not agree with. However, this is not 
possible without a clear concept of understanding in language use which may be partially 
or totally deviant from what the speaker intended to communicate.
Hirst et. al. (1994) developed two models to address misunderstanding between 
participants. One covers situations where both conversants know of the referent, and the 
other where the speaker knows but the recipient does not. They claim that their model 
combines intentional and social accounts of discourse to support the negotiation of
1 5^meaning. They divide recognized misunderstanding into two types: self-
1 54  1 ormisunderstandings and other-misunderstandings. They argue that ‘other-
182 Bazzanella and Damiano (1999) point out that besides comprehension in general, misunderstanding 
involves a number o f different phenomena, such as: reference, the relation between lexical item and sentence; 
mutual knowledge, the background knowledge or shared knowledge; and misconception, that is, 
misunderstanding the intended meaning. In relation to misunderstanding because o f pragmatic level, they 
investigate illocutionary force and indirect speech acts, that is implicature, irony, metaphor, relevance, topics 
and plans. They distinguish between understanding, misunderstanding and non-understanding, and argue 
that, unlike understanding and misunderstanding, non-understanding means no comprehension between 
interactants. Eid (1994) also maintains that analysing authentic examples will give us insights into how 
misunderstanding occurs in interaction.
183 Hirst et. al. (1994) maintain that ‘people are, in general, quite successful in their use o f language. That is 
because they have strategies for coping with their linguistic limitations. If they cannot understand what is 
being said to them, they seek clarification and try to work things out’ (1994:214).
184 Self-misunderstandings are those that are both made and detected by the same participant.
185 Other-misunderstandings are those that are made by one participant but detected by another.
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misunderstandings occur when a participant recognizes that if one of his/her own acts had 
been interpreted differently the other’s utterance would have been the expected response to 
it’ (1994:215). However, neither Bazzanella and Damiano’s (1999) nor Hirst et al (1994)’s 
works consider misunderstandings where one interactant thinks that the other is impolite or 
acting inappropriately. They point out that although interactants are very good at noticing 
when a conversation has gone awry as a result of one party misunderstanding the other, 
they do not seem to distinguish between misunderstandings caused by language 
inadequacy, cultural or contextual differences.
4.2.1 Misunderstanding due to linguistic inadequacy
Generally, it is argued that cross-cultural misunderstanding can be due to either language 
misuse, or a lack of knowledge of the appropriate language. However, linguistic inadequacies 
are not always the cause of misunderstanding. According to Dittmar (1976) 
misunderstanding between cross-cultural interactants may happen because of the lack of 
language competence by one party. He states ‘the speech of non-native speakers is more 
limited in its competence than the speech of native speakers’ (1976:4). Dascal (1999) 
stresses that assumptions, especially if inaccurate, cause misunderstandings between 
interactants in cross-cultural interaction. He explains, in such situations, the hearer relies 
on inference, which may result in an incorrect interpretation.186 However, the intended 
meaning of a particular utterance is understood in relation to factors such as cultural 
variations, context, intentional cues, cultural assumptions and interactants’ experiences, 
and not only through understanding linguistic utterances. Investigating cultural and 
contextual variations leads to a better understanding of interaction, than only depending on
1 R7a linguistic analysis.
4.2.2 Misunderstanding due to cultural variation
Gumperz (1971), Eckert (2000) and Eid (1994) all emphasise that cultural factors are no 
less important than linguistic factors. Discussing communication problems between 
different cultures, Eid (1994) perceives that
cross-cultural communication problems can be observed not only between speakers 
of different languages or in conversation between native and non-native speakers.
186 A hearer relies more heavily on inference, even when processing the most direct utterances.
187 See chapter 5 for a discussion.
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Even within the same language, we find different cultural frames belonging to 
different varieties (1994:28).
Thus, miscommunication is similar to misunderstanding where one of the interactants does 
not understand what is meant, whether because of linguistic, contextual or cultural factors. 
Coates argues that ‘ (mis)communication across cultures must take into account the cultural 
fabric within which interaction takes place’ (1998:388).
Coupland et. al. (1991b: 11) identify levels of analysis whereby people make a different 
assumption about what is possible because of different understandings of the context. Two 
of these levels are because of cultural differences. They are as follows:
At the first level, miscommunication resides in group and cultural phenomena, and may be 
accountable in terms of code-based or other differences in behaviours, beliefs, or 
construals. They state that
culture is seen as having communicative consequences for participants. The salient 
dimensions of context in which interaction becomes miscommunicative are 
assumed to be status, one’s (and one’s group’s) relationship to a power base or 
structure, and affiliation’ (1991:15).
At the second level, miscommunication is seen from an ideological view, i.e. ‘what defines 
interaction sequences as "miscommunication" communicatively and sociolinguistically, is 
that they implicitly or explicitly disadvantage people or, more likely, groups, while 
proposing themselves as normal, desirable, and even morally correct’ (1991:15). Coupland 
et. al. anticipate the importance of intercultural differences in any type of interaction. They 
argue that not all miscommunication is disruptive, unless it is perceived to be so by one of 
the interactants.
The first level is crucial in cross-cultural interaction. The more interactants are strangers to 
each other, the more possibility there is for misunderstanding. Such misunderstanding 
starts with interactants from different groups and extends to interactants from different 
cultures. I see the second level raising the importance of culture and ideology in 
communication in general. As discussed already, when interactants have different cultural 
backgrounds, they may use different criteria in performing and interpreting utterances.
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They may also be restricted by different cultural and communicative factors, which may 
influence the production and interpretation of what is said.
4.2.3 Misunderstanding due to contextual variations
Linguists disagree about the process that speakers use to convey their messages accurately,
1 R Rand the means they exploit to infer the intended message. Bazzanella and Damiano 
(1999) discuss the levels at which misunderstandings may arise and suggest that they may 
be due to different understanding of the context, a mismatch also mentioned by Sperber 
and Wilson (1995:16). If they belong to different cultures, this may lead to different 
interpretations of the context. Eid (1994) also offers a distinction between means, 
(linguistic, visual, cognitive) and purpose, (action function, referential function, predicative 
function). She shows how misunderstanding can be due to problems in either or both 
distinctions. She argues that ‘the “cognitive means”, such as habits and inferential 
patterns, cannot be applied automatically, but are almost context-dependent presumptions 
which, when inappropriately applied, lead to misunderstanding’ (1994:19).
Discussing the role of context in interaction, Coupland et. al. (1991b) refer to contexts as a 
cause of misunderstanding. They too propose two levels caused by different 
understandings of the context: The first level is when miscommunication is taken to be 
pervasive, inherently constituted in the nature of symbolic meaning-exchange (1991:12). 
They justify that by the limited code and channel capacities of inferring context; the 
interplay between linguistic meaning and context; and the need for cognitive heuristics189 
in both encoding and decoding. The second level relates to the communicative adequacy 
in a particular interpersonal context (1991:14).190 In the first level, according to Coupland
188 Although culture is part o f the context o f the interaction, it is worth discussing this aspect and its influence 
separately from context, especially as in cross-cultural interaction it can be considered as a crucial influence
on context.189 "Cognitive heuristics" are replicable methods often discovered in the field o f complex problem solving or 
learning and provide a high efficiency in performance. Cognitive heuristics are what the strategies that 
reduces the complexity o f making probabilistic judgments, but sometimes they lead to a systematic errors.
190 The other two levels o f miscommunication that Coupland and Jaworski (1997) speak about are related to 
participants' awareness o f the imperfection and personal inadequacy in social environement. They are as 
follows: Level II. Participants may show some low-level awareness o f the imperfection and lack o f effort o f  
interaction, recognized to involve both management and compromise. They argue that ‘the primary goals o f  
interactants are not the creation of perfect performances, but rather performing so as to avoid undue 
ambiguity, unpleasantness, threat and confrontation’ . (pl4). Level III. Miscommunication takes on 
implications o f personal inadequacy and therefore, perhaps, blame. They see such levels involving different 
interactional and psychological communicative problems. According to them ‘whether poor communication 
skills, unwillingness to communicate, bad temper, personality problems, or some other individual difference 
is assumed, these attributes typically lead to down-graded evaluations o f misperforming participants’ (pi 4).
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et al, the interplay between linguistic meaning and context might be differently associated 
or perceived, because of the interactants’ different backgrounds. The second level would 
cause more confusion in cross-cultural communications, as it relates to interpersonal 
context where every interactant has his/her own understanding of the context influenced by 
his/her personality or experience.
Hence, analysing misunderstanding requires the recognition of all the factors mentioned 
above, such as context, culture, shared knowledge and the cultural backgrounds of the 
interactants, as well as personal feeling and intentions. Blakemore suggests that ‘the 
hearer’s knowledge of what the speaker’s words mean only provides a clue as to what the 
speakers mean, and they must build the speaker’s meaning from this clue together with 
their knowledge of the context’ (1992:6). This makes clear how a hearer may infer his/her 
speaker’s meaning, but it does not explain how this happens if interactants have different 
interpretations for the same context of interaction.
4.2.4 Politeness / impoliteness and misunderstanding
One of the aims of politeness is maintaining the equilibrium of the interpersonal 
relationship between the interactants. But what is considered as polite linguistic behaviour 
in one culture may not be in another. Linguistic behaviour should convey the intended 
message, and be recognized by the hearer. Hirst et. al. (1994) discuss whether a person 
misunderstands the other because of a failure to recognize the intended meaning, 
consequently thinking their interlocutor inappropriate or impolite. They argue that
participants in a dialogue bring to it different beliefs and goals. These differences 
can lead them to make different assumptions about one another’s action, construct 
different interpretations of discourse objects or produce utterances that are either 
too specific or too vague for others to interpret as intended. This may lead to non­
understanding or to misunderstanding (1994:215).
Similarly, Dascal (1999) maintains that there are situations where what is meant is implicit 
because a speaker thinks that it would be inappropriate to be explicit, and that too might 
lead to misunderstanding. For example, from my work experience as an interpreter in a 
medical setting, in Arabic, when a problem is of a sexual nature, the speaker usually tries 
to explain it to their doctor implicitly. The aim of such behaviour is mitigation of the 
shame of speaking about such matters frankly,- which in some contexts is considered as
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impolite. It also aims to show respect to the addressee by not mentioning sexual terms 
explicitly in front of him/her. Fraser (1980/1981) also sees the need to be implicit in order 
to mitigate or ease the awkwardness of the situation for the hearer. But he does not discuss 
whether this helps in avoiding misunderstanding or not.191 Eelen (2001), discussing the 
relationship between the speaker’s behaviour and politeness/impoliteness, explains that
It is true that the speaker can aim for politeness but miss because the hearer has a 
different understanding of what politeness is... But impoliteness is no longer 
confined to such cases of genuine misunderstanding, as the hearer’s evaluation can 
also be argumentatively inspired (2001:112).
As discussed in chapters 2 and 3, some linguists try to develop universal models of 
interaction to analyse misunderstanding and politeness. For example, Leech (1983) 
comments that ‘indirect Elocutions tend to be more polite (a) because they increase the 
options, and (b) because the more indirect an Elocution is, the more diminished and 
tentative its force tends to be’( 1983:108). Searle (1975) considers an utterance to be 
indirect when it has more than one possible interpretation, or more than one Elocutionary 
force. Coupland et. al. (1991b) stress that
because meaning resides in the interaction of linguistic form and social context, 
exchanges of meanings operate under inherent constraints and communicative acts 
are creative in compensating for the explicitness and indirectness of speech act and 
text (1991:5).
Both Levinson (1993) and Coupland et. al. (1991b), link indirectness with politeness and 
consider that not understanding the reason for being indirect between interactants might 
lead to misunderstanding, and possibly an accusation of impoliteness. In some cultures, the 
interpretation of an indirect utterance act seems to be closely tied to the degree and type of 
relationship between the interactants, and not every indirect utterance signifies politeness. 
However, this is not the only link between politeness and misunderstanding. As has been 
discussed, not inferring the intended meaning for any utterance, whether indirect or not, 
might lead to misunderstanding, and the accusation of impoliteness.
191 Although they have not openly discussed the relationship between politeness and misunderstanding, 
Goffman’s notion o f face (1967), Lakoffs rules o f politeness (1973), Leech’s maxim o f tact (1983), Brown 
and Levinson’s politeness theory and face-saving strategies (1987) all discuss how implicit or indirect 
utterances are sometimes preferred to mitigate or ease the situation to the hearer, or appear polite, (see 
chapter 2 for discussion) Sometimes, being polite or impolite and being implicit are inseparable in English, 
though they are not in other languages.
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4.3 Analysing Misunderstanding in Cross-cultural Interaction
Analysing politeness in cross-cultural interaction has always been a controversial issue to 
some scholars because of the misunderstanding of what is intended that might occur 
between interactants. Moeschler draws attention to erroneous evaluation of the 
communicator’s abilities and preferences by the addressee. He argues that ‘the nature of 
the intended meaning is the key to understanding pragmatic misunderstanding in general, 
and to intercultural understanding in particular’ (2004:10). Similarly, Testa (1988) 
discusses the issue of conversational rules between people from different communities. He 
believes that ‘conversational rules ... as organizational criteria followed by participants 
engaged in spontaneous interactive talk are intended to represent the basic form through 
which speakers from different speech communities interact in spontaneous verbal 
exchanges’ (1988:285-286). He suggests that using cultural differences as a source of 
identifying some of our interactional specifications is important in avoiding 
misunderstanding, and that
focus on cultural variations may lead to the classification of some interactional 
phenomena as culture-specific or as bearing different cultural values just because 
their occurrence is still too obvious and not clearly explained in one’s own 
culture’(1988:286).
He presents an analysis of the distribution and linguistic features of interruptions in British 
English and Italian conversation. He analyses the differences between these cultures- and 
how that affects communication, seeking possible answers to problems of 
misunderstanding in cross-cultural communication. Thus, how interactants are influenced 
by their cultures is different, which, in some contexts, would lead to misunderstandings. 
Cultural difference is a reason why interactants, in cross-cultural interaction, infer different 
explicatures and implicatures to utterances, which may lead to misunderstanding.192
4.3.1 Explicature / Implicature and misunderstanding
In producing or interpreting politeness, interactants depend on the principle of relevance, 
which would extend from understanding the explicature generated from an utterance to the 
possible implicatures that an utterance might give rise to in relation to the context of the 
interaction. For both interactants, there are weak and strong implicatures depending on
192 Coates and Cameron (1988) point out that ‘the heavy restrictions on its [language] use must therefore be 
attributed to culture rather than semantic factors’ (Coates 1988:27).
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what is communicated, and interactants' interpretation. Moeschler (2004) states that the 
distinction between weak and strong implicatures in an utterance is the main focus of his 
analysis of the examples he provides in his article 'Intercultural pragmatics: a cognitive 
approach'. To him, the strong implicature in an utterance is what is important for the 
addressee to arrive at a relevant meaning, and the explicature helps reach the intended
1 Q-Jmessage. Speakers are usually aware of the different meanings that their utterance may 
convey, but at the same time hope that their addressees will come only to the intended 
meaning. Giora (2003) refers to a different understanding that ‘speakers do not always 
intend addressees to look for a fully specified interpretation and that comprehension, on 
their part, is not always after a fully specified interpretation’ (2004:117).
Moeschler (2004)'s discussion of pragmatic misunderstandings is based on assumptions 
supported by Relevance Theory, namely the ostensive-inferential194 character of linguistic 
communication and the difference between explicature and implicature. He hypothesises 
that ‘misunderstandings are caused not by difficulty in drawing the intended implicature, 
but primarily by lack of access to the correct explicature of the utterance’ (2004:1). 
Moeschler concentrates on the importance of the hearer’s linguistic knowledge, but 
hypothesises thus:
the greater the audience’s mastery of the speaker’s language, the greater the risk of 
intercultural misunderstanding. The reason is that speakers tend to attribute to non­
native speakers cultural background which is in due proportion to their own mastery 
of language and therefore do not necessarily imply the right explicature of the 
utterance (2004:1).
Moeschler describes ‘the domain of intercultural pragmatics as those facts implied by the 
use of language that do not require access to mutually manifest knowledge, but to specific 
contextual knowledge necessary for understanding the speaker’s intention’ (2004:2). He 
refers to Sperber and Wilson (1995), who argue that, in intercultural communication, 
speakers make false choices on the explicature/implicature status of their intended meaning 
(2004:4). He restricts his discussion to ostensive-inferential communication to show how
193 Green (1998) suggests that weak implicatures become strong 'by an act o f will; they become strong 
through textualization' (1998:16).
194 According to Sperber and Wilson (1995) ostensive-inferential communication involves a) the informative 
intention (the intention to inform an audience o f something); and b) the communicative intention (the 
intention to inform the audience o f one's informative intention). Ostensive-inferential communication 
involves the production and interpretation of stimuli, and communicator intentionally provides evidence that 
s/he intends the audience to arrive at certain conclusion
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the Principle of Relevance plays a crucial role in the recovery of the speaker’s informative 
1intention.
However, not every semantic meaning is an explicature. It is only if it is intended to be 
communicated, i.e. in irony, the semantic meaning is not communicated as an implicature. 
To Sperber and Wilson (1995) an explicature of an utterance is when the hearer constructs 
an appropriate hypothesis about explicit contents, and an implicature is the assumption that 
the speaker tries to make manifest to the hearer without expressing it, and is recovered by 
inference.
An example of a failure to understand the intended implicature of an utterance can be seen 
in an interaction between an Arab, originally from Palestine, and a native speaker of 
English in a programme on Radio 4 (2002). The Arab, a journalist, had spent a long time 
in English speaking countries, and the English person was a broadcaster. When the 
broadcaster tried to interrupt, the Arab journalist kept on saying “you just listen”, “you just 
listen”. The broadcaster answered that he was not there only to listen (Radio 4, Sep 2002). 
It is clear that the English broadcaster failed to recognize the intended message because of 
different understanding of what the appropriate way of asking not to be interrupted while 
speaking. In Arabic, when someone says to his/her interlocutor who tries to 
interrupt/speak to him/her,
. fakat lee estamer
Only to me you listen 
You just listen to me.
This is equivalent to
“please, wait until I have finished, and then you may speak”
195 Moeschler’s empirical domains on intercultural pragmatics, to some extent, agree with Farch and Kasper 
(1983), Kasper and Blum-Kulka’s (1982), Blum-Kulka et. al. (1989) and Blum-Kulka and House's (1989) 
argument that pragmatics is not the same across cultures. They argue that learners, unaware o f the fact that 
the pragmatics o f their native tongue do not match that o f the target language, may transfer pragmatic 
strategies from their first to their second language; even when they are aware o f the differences, they may 
still formulate wrong hypotheses about the pragmatics o f the second language (1982: 57). Moeschler 
proposes a model for pragmatic misunderstanding based on the hierarchy o f levels o f comprehension and bn 
the Relevance Theory comprehension procedure. He discusses the basic explicature, high-level explicatures, 
implicated premises, strongly implicated conclusions, and weakly implicated conclusions.
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or
“please let me finish”
The pragmatic meaning does not seem to be understood by the broadcaster in the above 
example. According to Sperber and Wilson, hearers may stop at the first interpretation that 
satisfies their expectation of relevance. This means that 'a speaker who wants her/his 
utterance to be as easy as possible to understand should formulate it so that the first 
interpretation to satisfy the hearer's expectations of relevance is the one she intended to 
convey' (Sperber and Wilson, 1995). But what happens in this instance is that the speaker 
fails to formulate his utterance to convey what he intended as the first interpretation or the 
strongest implicature to his hearer. The culture of the speaker influenced his linguistic 
choices in this cross-cultural context. In Arabic, the utterance “you just listen to me” gives 
rise to the implicature "Please, let me finish" or "wait until I have finished" as the strongest 
implicature. The English broadcaster did not understand this intended meaning. Rather, he 
understood the literal sense (explicature), and therefore answered by saying “I am not here 
just to listen”, showing he did not understand the pragmatic meaning behind “you just 
listen, you just listen”. 196 What has happened in this interaction is that the hearer's 
understanding of the context is different from the speaker's, each being influenced by their 
own cultures about what is considered as appropriate in such a context of interaction. The 
hearer’s goal is to construct a hypothesis about the speaker's meaning that satisfies his 
understanding of the context, which is at the same time an appropriate hypothesis about the 
explicit content of the utterance; this is the explicature of the utterance.
However, interactants vary in the ways they interpret utterances, and different factors play 
a role depending on the Elocutionary forces of the utterance. A speaker may use a 
different language pattern to another interactant, or the addressee may infer a different 
implicature from the speaker’s utterance. How what is said leads listeners to define one
196 However, “you just listen” could give rise to various implicatures including “you just listen for the 
moment, until I have finished” or, “your role is just to listen and mine is to speak”. I think that there is an 
element o f pragmatic inferencing beyond the linguistic decoding on the part o f the speaker, but it seems that 
the broadcaster prefers to respond to the literal meaning o f the linguistic forms. In Arabic, it is acceptable to 
ask someone to give you the chance to complete in an imperative way such as in the above example. Of 
course there are some other strategies, but such an imperative strategy is culturally acceptable and would not 
lead to an answer such as the answer o f the broadcaster of the above example. However, the broadcaster’s 
reply ‘I am not only here to listen’ does not rule out the possibility that he has interpreted the journalist’s 
utterance correctly.
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implicature as weak and the other as strong is controversial, and might lead to 
misunderstanding or even conflict in cross-cultural interaction.
4.3.2 Misunderstanding between Arabs and Westerners
Misunderstanding between Arabs and Westerners can be of different orders and arise for 
different reasons. They can be caused by linguistic differences (word or strategy choice), 
cultural differences, different understandings of the context of interaction, or by the 
influence of stereotypes. In the following section, I will discuss misunderstanding in 
relation to these two different cultures and how the reasons detailed above might lead one 
interactant to consider another inappropriate.
4.3.2.1 Linguistic strategy and misunderstanding
As discussed in the previous chapters, a certain strategy might lead to misunderstanding 
between interactants because of the different meaning that it has to different interactants, 
for example, the strategies used when officials meet, or when citizens talk to their leaders. 
It seems to me that Cohen (1987) stereotypes Arabs when he asserts that ‘the Arab 
proclivity for exaggeration may not only offend, it may also lead to a serious loss of 
credibility, real warnings being overlooked as overblown rhetoric’ (1987:37-38). This is in
1 07some cases true, an obvious example occurring during the Israeli-Arab war in 1967. But
this is not the case in all types of interactional situations; political or military contexts may
require different strategies from social situations, which are also differently understood
between interactants. There are situations in which Arabs minimize what they are
expected to do in comparison to some other cultures. For example, in male/female
interactions, exaggeration or overstatement from any of the interactants may cause
misunderstanding that might be negatively interpreted; in these cases, interactants are more
likely to appear very specific in their interaction in order to minimize the risk of
misinterpretation of what is said as being a strategy to be closer to the other or convey a
108covert desire to start a relationship.
Cohen sees cultural differences changing according to context. He discusses social 
desirability as a factor that causes cross-cultural misunderstanding, explaining that ‘the
197 In the Arab world, Arab defeats are attributed to either the overstatements o f military leaders about the 
ability o f their forces, or to their failure to tell the truth to their chiefs and presidents, for fear o f admitting 
their failures.
198 See discussion in chapter 5.
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Arab dislike of giving offence and of disappointing his interlocutor may result in promises 
being given that cannot be kept and of statements being made of which the accuracy is in 
doubt’ (1987:38). However, misunderstanding the strategy used, or the reason for using 
this strategy, might lead to misunderstanding between Arabs and English people. I agree 
with Cohen that whereas an Arab considers giving promises is no more than hoping for the 
best and being nice to others by not disappointing them, some Americans see this as 
dishonesty and insincerity. Disappointing others when they make requests by saying “No” 
or “Sorry” in an all-Arab interaction may lead to the speaker being accused of not being 
co-operative. Misunderstanding of these strategies would lead to misunderstanding in 
cross-cultural interaction, because they are interpreted differently.199 Thus, there are 
reasons for using certain strategies which are sometimes culturally determined, and when 
these are not understood by all interactants, misunderstanding may occur.200
4.3.2.2 Misunderstanding and Indirectness
As discussed above, indirectness does not necessarily indicate politeness or conflict 
avoidance, as Brown and Levinson argue. Thomas (1995) argues that indirectness takes 
longer for the speaker to produce and for the hearer to process. But this is not always the 
case. Indirectness is contextual, which means that it might only take longer for one of the 
interactants to process or produce. What indirectness means is not always the same to the 
interactants, and does not mean the same across cultures. Because of this, indirectness may 
lead to misunderstanding in cross-cultural interaction. There are two reasons why 
indirectness may lead to misunderstanding: first, the hearer not understanding what the 
speaker means by his/her utterance; and the second, the hearer not understanding what the 
speaker means by being indirect. The two reasons may lead the hearer to consider the 
speaker impolite because of misunderstanding the reason behind the indirectness. 
MacMahon (1.996) holds that Sperber and Wilson's theory accounts for the ways in which 
different kinds of indirectness achieve their effect. She points out that
199 Generalization in Cohen’s article on the strategies of Arab interactants is not convincing. Offence and 
disappointment are situational and/or contextual issues, and even if  we agree that culture affects how and 
when people disappoint each other, and that it is a factor that usually hinders communication between 
interlocutors from different cultures, it is not always possible to generalize from one interactional situation to 
others. Thus, even if  there are clear differences between Arabs and Westerners, they might be a result o f  
certain contextual factors and cannot be generalized.
200 Moerman (1996) discusses how cultural strangers organise and make sense o f  their world. He argues that 
‘invoking a culture or a language cannot account for something being said. We must investigate the particular 
and peculiar circumstance that meshes with general rules and that requires our investigation’ (1996: 148).
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instead of seeing indirectness as a flouting of conversational principles, as in 
Grice's account, the interpretation of cases of indirectness, like that of other 
utterances, is said to follow a search for an interpretation consistent with the 
principle of relevance (1996:211).
Thus, by implication 'indirectness' is not a linear process, as Thomas suggests. In Arabic, 
for instance, there are different interpretations of indirectness and what is considered as 
impolite/polite. I consider the issue of indirectness to be more complicated than they are 
considered to be in Brown and Levinson's theory (1987), in which indirectness is judged 
on performance. In their interpretation of indirectness Brown and Levinson argue that the 
closer you are to your interactant the more direct you can be. In Arabic, for example, there 
are topics, such as marriage, which a son or daughter cannot discuss with their father 
directly. Some topics, even between close friends, need to be discussed indirectly, and the 
illocutionary forces of the utterance, whether apology, request, blame etc., must also be 
performed indirectly. In such situations indirectness is subject to the context, culture and 
the topic.
Van Dijk (1997) holds that cultures determine people’s linguistic strategies. For example, 
they differ in determining when and how one should be ‘indirect’ to others. We may be 
unsure about how an utterance will be understood by our addressee, and whether the 
intended meaning will be perceived when we deliberately use an indirect strategy for the 
purpose of appearing polite. Because an utterance is shaped by understanding of the 
context, sometimes interactants convey meanings indirectly, assuming that their 
interlocutors will grasp their meaning by inference rather than by explicit statements.201
4.3.2.3 Misunderstanding Politeness priority across cultures
Another misunderstanding because of cultural differences is how politeness is given 
priority over goals in certain context. On a political level, for example, Arabs seem to 
interact with Westerners in the same way as they do amongst themselves. They see the 
performance of rejection in an appropriate style as more important than achieving their 
goals. To Arabs, politeness is a higher priority than goals of a meeting with Westerners, 
and much of what is interpreted as irrelevant to Americans or Westerners seems to be 
important to Arabs. This is clear when Arab officials visit Westerners. Reporting such
201 Thomas argues that ‘there are times when people say (or write) exactly what they mean, but generally they 
are not totally explicit (1995:56). Words and sentences contribute to our understanding as well as other 
factors such as culture and context (see chapter 3 and 5 for discussion).
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visits, Arab media broadcasts speak explicitly about how a certain leader was received, and 
who received him, but what has been achieved is not given emphasis. Thus, to Arabs, the 
social aspects are of primary importance; what was discussed and whether the objectives of 
the visit were achieved are secondary. (If an Arab observer wants to understand what was 
discussed and what objectives were achieved, then s/he needs to listen to an independent or 
foreign broadcast such as BBC World, CNN, Aljazeera, etc.)202
This contradictory view of what is important makes cross-cultural political relations, or 
negotiations between Arabs and Westerners, problematic, regardless of who is visiting 
whom. This is clear in what takes place in the relationship between the Saudis and the 
Americans. The Saudi government believes that the American government will consider 
them as cooperative because of their conduct when they meet, and the Americans think 
that, regardless of what is said or done, as long as the objective of their relationship has not 
been achieved, the Saudis are uncooperative. An example of this is Prince Abdulla’s visit 
to USA in 2002. Whereas he thought that Saudi Arabia was doing well and coming into 
line with the Americans to beat terrorism, the Americans accused him of not doing enough, 
and asserted that the Saudi school curriculum was inspiring terrorism. The Saudi Arabian 
Broadcasting agencies spoke about how their prince was received and glorified, whereas 
channels such as BBC, CNN and Aljazeera spoke about the disagreement between the two 
parties. The views that the Arabs and Westerners have about receiving visitors and what is 
appropriate in a business visit, and what should be given priority is different, which might 
hinder the process of communication between these different cultural groups. In such a 
context, the Saudis, because of such treatment by the Americans, would consider them as 
not respecting them, and this might even be an obstacle for achieving future plans. 
Cohen is justified in assessing why Arab officials complain about how Westerners treat 
them. He states ‘Arabs give the priority to the type of congregation they receive, the time 
they are given, and the way their demands are met or rejected; whereas it is not the case 
with Westerners’ (1987:44). Even when Westerners feel that they have done everything
202 Arabic broadcasts are expected to be lenient when they talk to, or talk about an important person in the 
country, which is entirely different to Western broadcasting. For an Arab broadcaster it is not polite (and 
may be not acceptable) to ignore how a leader was received and by whom, or to speak about any political 
failures.
203 According to Cohen, ‘the Arab need for personal contact with his/her interlocutor is associated with an 
outlook that defines relationships in affective and familial, not instrumental terms’ (Cohen, 1987:41). Cohen 
also states that ‘when Arab representatives meet, whether as friends or rivals, they do so as brothers. They 
embrace, hold hands, acquire a strong physical sense o f the other’s presence’ (Cohen, 1987:41). This is 
generally what happens.
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possible to behave appropriately, Arab officials usually claim that Westerners do not know 
how to respect them. Arabs would expect to be received for as long as they want, with no 
time limit imposed, and they wish to hear praise and compliments. The different 
parameters that interlocutors depend upon in their interaction may lead to 
misunderstanding. Thus, Cohen’s argument that cultural differences usually hinder 
communication is important, and can be applied to what happens between Arabs and 
Westerners.204
4.3.2.4 Cultural norms and misunderstanding
Wierzbicka, in her article ‘Different cultures, different languages, different speech acts’, 
discusses how misunderstanding may happen because of differences in cultural norms. She 
holds that ‘cultural norms reflected in speech acts differ not only from one language to 
another, but also from one regional variety to another’ (1985:146). Similarly, Hammad et. 
al. (1999) point out that practices, behaviour and attitudes, while subject to common 
influences, are not universal (1999:2). They argue that the role of cultural norms cannot be 
ignored as they influence every component in an interaction and consequently allow for a 
variety of strategies according to what is culturally acceptable.
Various Arab scholars describe how Arabs are restricted by their own cultural norms when 
communicating with others. For example, Arab linguists such as Farghal (1992/1993), 
Farghal and Borini (1997) and Al-Saied (1995) remind us that an interaction in Arabic is 
highly influenced by Arab cultural norms which are built upon religious foundations. For 
example in the following expression:
•*
Yessarek Allah 
Help you God 
God help you
Arabs would use this expression when one person leaves another's company. It is similar 
to the expression “Goodbye”, “Take care” or “God Bless you” in English. But if such an
204 Although Cohen (1987) discusses the effect o f cross-cultural factors on international diplomacy, and how 
such factors hinder communication between the elites o f different nations, he also sheds light on the issue o f  
miscommunication between different cultures. Cohen explains what causes misunderstanding between 
interlocutors of different cultures, and how international relations reflect the issue of misunderstanding. He 
presents a comparison of two specific cultures at the level o f international relations and their respective 
notions o f appropriate behaviour.
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expression is said by an Arab to an English person, it would not be understood as 
“Goodbye”. To an English person, the expression “God help you” is likely to mean that the 
speaker assumes that s/he is suffering or is heading for disaster, e.g. ‘if you walk this street 
alone at night -  God help you’. In spite of such a difference, Arabs would still use such an 
expression in cross-cultural interaction.205
An Arab speaking in English may try to act as native English speakers do in certain 
situations, but, because of cultural constraints, not in others, even if this causes 
misunderstanding or is classified as inappropriate. For example, an Arab would not allow 
his/her daughter to talk with her friends as the English do, or swear, or invite her English 
friend to a pub just because they are in England or communicating in English. On the other
hand, an Arab would not mind greeting the English as they do and not in the Arabic
206way.
Valdes (1986) argues that ‘at the base of intercultural understanding is recognition of the 
ways in which two cultures resemble one another as well as ways in which they differ. 
Resemblances usually surface through an examination of the differences’ (1986:49). His 
argument is that we need general discussions and theories regarding cultural differences for 
consideration of how specific cultures relate to the target culture. Valdes also stresses the 
importance of considering behaviour and values when studying culture, and supports the 
claim that we need to find ways to compare cultures, and analyse misunderstandings 
because of cultural differences in cross-cultural communication.
4.4 Theories of understanding and cross-cultural interaction
As I have already discussed, politeness is not only performing a strategy or structure that if 
used, would convey politeness. Politeness might be implicitly performed and it is a matter 
of the hearer understanding what is said by the speaker as it is intended, and not merely 
understanding the literal meaning. Investigating the theories of understanding in relation 
to politeness is an important issue in analysing politeness in cross-cultural interaction. In 
chapter two, in order to provide an alternative approach to analysing politeness, I discussed
205 See discussion o f religion in chapter 5.
206 Levinson argues that ‘there are cross-situational constraints enjoining appropriate social decorum, while 
there are others appropriate just to specific interactional moments or specific kinds o f cultural events’ (1983: 
45). This means that culture constrains or influences communication in different ways; from what is 
appropriate for certain specific interactional situations, to what is general and left to interactants to decide 
how to be appropriate.
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the post-Brown and Levinson theories of politeness that concentrate on culture and 
context. I have also discussed Watts' use of Relevance Theory in analysing politeness. In 
this section, I will discuss theories of understanding in order to provide a better approach to 
analysing politeness in cross-cultural interaction, and I will concentrate on using Sperber 
and Wilson's Relevance Theory to analyse the link between politeness and understanding..
There are two different views, as discussed earlier in this chapter, that discuss the 
relationship between literal meaning and pragmatic meaning. One argues that analysing the 
literal meaning is necessary to understanding the pragmatic meaning, and the other that, 
given sufficient context, interactants can understand the pragmatic meaning without first 
understanding the literal. In this section, I discuss Toolan's integrational linguistic 
approach (1996) and Relevance Theory (1995) in order to reassess the current models used 
in analysing speakers' use of language and hearers' interpretations in performing politeness. 
The theories that I am discussing in this chapter hold that interaction depends heavily on 
both literal and pragmatic meanings, and that people select linguistic items in order to 
make it easier for the hearers to understand their intended meaning according to the 
context. They suggest that hearers depend on speakers’ linguistic choices and the context 
of the interaction in order to understand pragmatic meaning, a view which we need to build 
on to politeness in cross-cultural interaction more adequately.
4.4.1 Toolan's Integrational Linguistic Approach
Toolan tries to link linguistic and pragmatic issues in the discussion of the notion of 
understanding. He suggests that ‘the determination of an utterer’s meaning in using a 
particular sentence can be seen to rest, typically and heavily, on principles or phenomena 
that are in a sense both semantic and pragmatic’ (1996:29). I agree with this view, as, 
cross-culturally, misunderstanding is possible even if grammar or language structure is 
known to all participants.
*)(Y7Toolan (1996) introduces ‘an integrational linguistic approach’ to language, stating that 
‘language is one of the most essential and significant of human attributes, alongside and 
interwoven with memory, imagination, bodily experience, and mortality’ (1996:1). He 
introduces the theory of integrationalism, which does not accept that text and context, or
207 Integrational approach, in general terms, means that ‘language should be set in the context o f other forms 
o f human behaviour’ (Mills, 2003a:34)
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language and world, are distinct and stable categories. He calls for a radical change in 
contemporary theorising about language and communication, arguing that attention to a 
language’s inevitable contextual embeddedness can be of explanatory value.
Toolan holds that interaction and context include speakers’ and hearers’ shared knowledge. 
He emphasises Lyons’s view (1968) that the context of a spoken utterance includes ‘a 
particular spatiotemporal situation which includes the speaker and hearer, the action they 
are performing at the time and various external objects and events’ (Lyon, 1968, cited in 
Toolan, 1996:6). Toolan builds on Lyons’s argument, maintaining that ‘the context of an 
utterance must also include interactants’ shared knowledge of what has been said earlier. 
That is, the context of an utterance must include accumulated cotextually derived 
information’ (1996:6). He claims that there is nothing that can be literal, or free of context, 
and that 'free meaning' is in fact a reflection of social interests. He argues that,
Although a conceptualization of literal meaning as a basic, determinate, and 
context-free meaning of words and sentences is necessary for standard linguistic 
treatment of the semantics and pragmatics of a language, in practice no such 
domain of context-free meaning exists ... the literal meaning is itself a highly 
contextualised notion, that is a cultural and ideological construct very much 
designed to characterise some language practices as orderly, authorised, and 
authoritative (and others as not so); it is therefore well suited to and reflective of 
societal interests in literacy, order, and authority (Toolan 1996:25).
Toolan sees literal meaning as essential to any account of language, and some contrast 
between that and the speaker’s meaning is essential. He notes that the 'speaker’s meaning 
may include literal meaning but go beyond it, as in the case of direct speech, may depart 
from it, as in the case of metaphor, or may be the opposite of it, as in the case of irony’ 
(1996:25). To Toolan, the distinction between speaker and linguistic meaning is important 
for listeners to recognise in order to successfully accomplish appropriate speech. He 
considers the notion of literal meaning as essential in constructing the intended meaning in 
our communication, and crucial in reaching the illocutionary force of an utterance. He 
comments:
literal meaning might be the conventional meanings of words of a language and the 
meaning of sentences in that language where any sentence meaning is derived from 
a complex synthesis of the meaning of its composite words ... each speaker carries 
in memory a fluid field of probable and possible meaning of every word of which 
they have had some experience (Toolan, 1996:37).
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From a cross-cultural point of view, Toolan’s view that there is a specifiable literal 
meaning of certain words may be challenged to some extent. There are some words and 
expressions that are used differently across cultures. Toolan also argues that, in cross- 
cultural interaction, understanding depends on the knowledge of all interactants; language 
is interwoven with the imagination and experience of interactants, and language and world 
are not distinct and stable categories. Such views hold potential for different understanding 
and interpretations for speakers from different cultures.
The relationship between the speaker’s utterance and the intended meaning of an 
expression in a discourse is addressed in Toolan’s integrational approach. He emphasises 
the role of an individual’s meaning in understanding the whole meaning. His states:
likewise, for any discourse, the meaning of the individual sentences of the 
discourse can be combined to form the meaning of the discourse. Arguably, this 
program of semantic analysis can provide a reasonable account of the conveyed 
meaning (that is, what the listener understands upon hearing the sentences uttered 
in context) of many sentences in English (1996:3 8).209
The factors that participants depend on in cross-cultural communication may vary. Even if 
the same factors influence the context, such as religion, gender, stereotype, etc, these 
factors might give rise to different interpretations. In addition, there is no guarantee that 
the factors that have an influence on cross-cultural interaction would receive the same 
attention or prompt the same interpretation. To Toolan, the meaning of an utterance is 
defined in relation to speech situations, which is different from semantics, which is defined 
in relation to the literal meaning of the word not to the context.210
208 Toolan (1996) argues that 'there is a specifiable literal meaning o f words such as I, here, etc, and without 
this the derivations and determination o f a particular context-bound referents and values for these words, in 
actual utterances, would be impossible. Literal meaning, such as I, they, etc., is not affected by the particular 
reference o f an indexical or the truth or otherwise o f a particular statement in context: the truth conditions 
may vary, but the literal meaning cannot (1996:30).
209 This view is similar to the criticism o f Brown and Levinson’s theory in that it focuses on speakers and 
individual strategies. ‘...Thus, politeness should be seen as a set o f strategies or verbal habits which 
interlocutors set as a norm for themselves or which others judge as the norm for them, as well as being 
perceived as a socially constructed norm within particular communities o f practice’ (Mills 2003a: 109).
210 Toolan states that 'pragmatists hold that meaning can be fully determined only by adducing certain 
delimited aspects o f context for adequate and coherent determination, most word and sentence meanings 
themselves being determined in relation to aspects o f interaction that will emerge only from within the 
relevant speech encounter, rather than being given essentially by lexicon or grammar’(Toolan 1996:39).
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Thus, we may conclude that Toolan's integrational approach makes us rethink critically the 
current model of analysis of producing and interpreting politeness. He argues that 'the 
integrationist seeks above all an "inward" account of language, as opposed to a detached 
abstracted and idealized one' (1996:22). Interaction is influenced by the interactants' 
history in producing and interpreting utterances. An interactant's experience with 
individuals or groups influences interaction, but individuals' feelings of solidarity and 
reliance on what is stereotyped about certain groups of people influence interactants' 
production, interpretation and evaluation of the context. Toolan also considers 
intentionality as indispensable in the process of understanding what is meant by an 
utterance. Judging whether a word or an utterance is appropriate or inappropriate is 
contextual, because interactants usually try to make sense of what happens during 
interaction.
4.4.2 Relevance Theory and Communication
Sperber and Wilson's (1993) Relevance Theory sets out to explain how communication can 
be achieved. They argue that people, in a conversation, turn their attention to what is 
relevant to them, and can consistently distinguish relevant information from irrelevant or 
less relevant information. Interactants decide which is more relevant depending on their 
understanding of the context, and there is no way of controlling exactly which context
911someone will have in mind at a specific moment. To Sperber and Wilson (1993), 
communication is inferential in that the audience infers the communicator’s intention from
919evidence provided for this precise purpose. Sperber and Wilson (1993) point out that 
their model is a result of the Gricean approach to provide direct evidence for the 
information to be conveyed and of one’s intention in conveying it. But, they claim that 
Grice’s model does not discuss the notion of'shared information' or how it is exploited in 
communication, while its relevance and how it is achieved are also not clear. They suggest 
the term 'mutual knowledge' and state that 'a true communicative intention is not just an
211 See chapter 3 for more discussion of context
212 Sperber and Wilson (1986/93/95) discuss the code model, in which communication is achieved by 
encoding and decoding messages, and the inferential model, in which communication is achieved by 
producing and interpreting evidences. They debate the value of upgrading either o f the models. They explain 
that the code model and the inferential model are each adequate to a different mode o f communication. They 
argue that 'while assuming that the code model provides the framework for a general theory o f  
communication, and hence for a theory o f verbal communication, most pragmatists have described 
comprehension as an inferential process. Inferential and decoding processes are quite different. An inferential 
process starts from a set o f premises and results in a set o f conclusions which follow logically from, or are at 
least warranted by, the premises. A decoding process starts from a signal and results in the recovery o f a 
message which is associated to the signal by an underlying code. (1993:9).
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intention to inform the audience of the communicator’s informative intention, but an intention 
to make the informative intention mutually known to the communicator and the audience' 
(1993:31).213 They criticise Grice, seeing the process of cognition as being more complicated 
than just conveying intention from speaker to interlocutor; rather, the process of cognition 
involves consideration of all the factors that influence communication, whether contextual, 
cultural or personal. Sperber and Wilson also add to Grice’s implicature what they call 
ostensive or non-ostensive uses. They posit that
Ostensive-inferential communication provides evidence of one’s thoughts. It 
succeeds in doing so because it implies a guarantee of relevance. It implies 
such a guarantee because humans automatically turn their attention to what 
seems most relevant to them. That is, an act of ostension carries a guarantee of 
relevance (1993:50).
Thus, ostensive-inferential communication is the stimulus that a communicator produces to 
make meaning manifest to his/her interlocutor. Such ostensive-inferential view should be 
considered in cross-cultural communication, because it helps analysts to realize the 
relationship between what is said and what is understood in relation to interlocutors who 
might have been influenced differently by the context of interaction.
Like Toolan (1996), Sperber and Wilson (1993) consider communication as realizing the 
intended rather than the semantic meaning, and as successful only when hearers infer the 
speaker’s meaning. Thus, although I have stressed the importance of culture in interaction, 
we should not consider communication as a purely cultural issue. Utterances may lead to 
inferences being made by the hearer that are intended by the speaker.214 Sperber and Wilson 
discuss the gap between the semantic representations and the thoughts actually communicated 
by utterances as 'mutual knowledge’ and explore how this difference might lead to 
misunderstandings. In cross-cultural interaction, there is no guarantee that interactants will 
distinguish between the literal meanings of an utterance, and the intended meaning, if there is
213 Sperber and Wilson suggest the more precise term 'mutual manifest' as a solution to the notion of 
communicative intention, which disagrees with Strawson’s idea that communicative attention must be overt. 
They argue that 'to communicate by ostension is to produce a certain stimulus with the aim o f fulfilling an 
informative intention. Communicative intention: to make it mutually manifest to audience and communicator 
that the communicator has this informative intention' (1995:60).
214 Sperber and Wilson (1993) discuss Grice (1971) and Strawson’s (1971) usage of the term 'utterance' which 
refers ‘not just to linguistic utterances, or even to coded utterances, but to any modification o f the physical 
environment designed by a communicator to be perceived by an audience and used as an evidence o f the 
communicator’s intentions' (Sperber and Wilson 1993:29). Their argument is that communication should be 
distinguished from covert forms o f information transmission.
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a difference between them. In fact, there is not even a guarantee that the literal meaning will 
be understood similarly.
However, in spite of the argument that Relevance Theory is considered a cognitive 
approach to communication rather than a linguistic or sociological one, I believe that it is 
useful in the analysis of cross-cultural interaction, in that it considers whatever might 
influence the context of interaction, and explains the meaning of an utterance according to 
both interactants' understanding of the context. The issue of literal and intended meanings 
might be a problem in this matter if we depend on Grice’s Cooperative Principle, which 
seems to consider only one of the interlocutors (the speaker), or on the code model, which 
sees communication as signal-oriented rather than other-oriented. Unlike the 
Cooperative Principle, Relevance Theory accounts for cultural inference in terms of 
relevant encyclopaedic information by considering the roles of context and listener in 
interaction, which are crucial issues in understanding politeness, especially in cross- 
cultural interaction.
4.4.2.1 Relevance Theory and misunderstanding
Sperber and Wilson (1993, 1995) emphasise the role of background or contextual 
information in spontaneous inference, and offer an analysis of non-demonstrative inference 
processes. They recognise the fact that people speak different languages, and master 
different concepts. As a result, they construct different representations and make different 
inferences arguing that what they call cognitive environments (a set of facts that are 
manifest to an interlocutor) differ from one another. They say that 'an individual’s total 
cognitive environment is the set of all facts that he can perceive or infer: all the facts that 
are manifest to him' (1995:41). They argue that
at the heart of the human ability to perform spontaneous demonstrative
inference is a set of deductive rules: a set of computations which take account
215 Grice (1972) and Sperber and Wilson differ in their understanding o f interlocutors; according to Grice, 
interlocutors must know the norms o f communication, be able to detect an overt violation o f the norms, and 
understand implicature as a result; to Sperber and Wilson, interlocutors need to know the principles o f  
relevance to communicate.
216 Sperber and Wilson (1995) define an individual’s cognitive environment as 'the set o f all the facts that he 
can perceive or infer: all the facts that are manifest to him '...' in the shape o f assumptions that might be either 
true or false' (1995 1995:39). More specifically, they suggest that 'an individual’s total cognitive 
environment is a function of his physical environment and his cognitive abilities. It consists not only o f the 
facts that he is aware of, but also all the facts that he is capable o f becoming aware of, in his physical 
environment' (ibid.).
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of the semantic properties of assumptions only insofar as these are reflected in 
their form (1993:85).
However, this does not necessarily mean that Sperber and Wilson claim that 
communication operates independently of social factors, which are part of the context (See 
Jary, 1998b/1998a).
However, Relevance Theory has been criticised for providing inaccurate analysis of 
interaction by relying on stereotypes rather than using authentic data. Toolan, (1992) 
states that 'Sperber and Wilson's examples 'seem to rely more on stereotypes of behaviour 
than on a free-standing account of inference-based communication' (1992:150). Green 
(1997) also considers using Relevance Theory has problems in analysing certain contexts. 
He states that 'one of the main problems with relevance stylistics is the poor readings it 
seems to elicit' (1997:134). He also argues that 'Relevance Theory could not be used for 
the analysis of texts per se. Relevance Theory cannot tell us what a text means. It is a 
theory of communication not a discovery procedure1 (1997:134). Furthermore, 'it does not 
account for how readers differ in their interpretations' (1997:137). However, the main aim 
of Relevance Theory in the field of verbal communication is to explain how utterances are 
understood, and how verbal communication demands more than just the decoding of what 
is linguistically conveyed.
Another criticism is that Relevance Theory does not have sufficiently developed account of 
the social aspect. This criticism is defended by Christie (2007) who points out that Sperber 
and Wilson are aware that interlocutors also communicate information about their 
relationship with each other through their utterance, and that there is an evidence in their 
interaction that scholars can use to analyse politeness. Wilson and Sperber (2005) argue 
that they are considering the social aspects in analysing communication. They state that
although pragmatists generally see communication as both a cognitive and social 
process, they do not always devote their efforts equally to developing rich accounts 
of both the cognitive and the social factors. We see this as a difference in interests 
and research strategies rather than in theoretical commitments. In our own work, 
we have focused on cognitive factors, but we still assume that a comprehensive 
picture of communication should integrate both kinds of factors. (Wilson and 
Sperber (2005), cited in Christie 2007:..).
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Mey (2001) also believes that Sperber and Wilson's work is seriously flawed in that it does 
not consider authentic data in its analysis, making it difficult to analyse how social factors 
influence communication. Mey also claims that Sperber and Wilson's analysis is based on 
invented data. Mey (2001) argues that 'a serious problem lies in the fact that Relevance 
Theory, despite its pronounced commitment to communication, says very little about real 
communicative interaction as it happens in our society’ (2001:87). The argument against 
this view is that what Sperber and Wilson are really interested in is the inferencing process, 
and there is no way of empirically observing it, so ‘real’ data would not help. Mey (2003) 
also argues that the social dimension of language is not considered in Relevance Theory, 
which weakens its claims. Sperber and Wilson confess that it is true that they have used 
artificial examples to establish their claims; but they argue that even invented examples 
can provide evidence for theoretical claims. However, regardless of what type of data is 
used, their claim that the search for relevance is a constant factor in human communication 
seems valid, especially in cross-cultural communication where inferring, context, and what 
is manifest from them are important.
However, the goal of Relevance Theory is to explain how the hearer infers the meaning on 
the basis of what is provided by the speaker. In other words, it discusses what Grice’s 
theory, which ignores the hearer and does not explain how s/he infers what is intended by 
an utterance, fails to consider. Relevance Theory explains how the speaker’s expectations 
contribute to understanding, and why and how factors may be relevant in an interaction. 
Sperber and Wilson hold that interactants understand each other not because they are 
obeying Grice’s Cooperative Principle and its Maxims, but because the search for 
relevance is a feature of human communication. Understanding what is relevant is 
considered a crucial factor in judging whether or not a person's utterance is polite to his/her 
interactant. In the next section, I will discuss Relevance Theory in relation to politeness, 
and how recognising the intended meaning is part of judging politeness.
4.4.2.2 Relevance Theory and Politeness
Discussing the relationship between understanding what is intended and politeness is the 
main reason for linking Relevance Theory to the analysis of politeness. Christie picks up 
three key elements of Relevance Theory that distinguish Sperber and Wilson from Grice 
that can be used in analysing politeness. The first is that Relevance Theory is a theory 
about cognition, 'for the hearer to be sufficiently motivated to look for an interpretation of
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utterance, he must assume that the information conveyed by the utterance will be relevant 
to him' (Christie, 2007:284). The second is that in Relevance Theory contextualization is a 
dynamic process: 'a context is a psychological construct, consisting of any set of mutually 
manifest assumptions that interlocutors in the process of producing and interpreting 
utterances infer to be relevant to the meaning of that utterance' (Christie, 2007:285). The 
third is that Relevance Theory focuses on process: 'Sperber and Wilson develop a 
vocabulary that brings into view the processes involved. (Christie, 2007:.288). All these 
three key elements support the claim that there is a relationship between politeness and 
understanding and the use of Relevance Theory helps in realizing the relationship between 
understanding and politeness.
Jucker (1988) suggests that ‘Relevance Theory explains why some assumptions are made 
more or less manifest by a given utterance, but it does not make any claims as to whether 
polite or impolite behaviour is more likely’ (1988:275). In his article, ‘The relevance of 
politeness’, Jucker investigates Sperber and Wilson’s theory relative to the phenomenon of 
politeness, concluding that ‘Relevance Theory does not predict whether it is more likely 
that communicators are kind and polite towards each other, or whether they are more likely 
to be rude and uncaring about the joys or sorrows of the others’ (1988:382). Interactants 
may perceive the intended meaning but may not understand that their interactant was
717trying to be polite. Jucker suggests that ‘the theory of relevance can also account for 
instances of language usage for which Leech felt it necessary to set up his politeness 
principles, that is to say for language usage in which the maxims of Grice’s cooperative 
principle are flouted for reasons of social interaction’ (1988:376). Jucker believes
the principle of relevance is more general than the cooperative principle because it 
applies to all instances of communicative behaviour and, moreover, it accounts for 
the inferential process needed to establish what is explicitly said and not just - as 
does the cooperative principle -  for what is implicated’(1988:378).
His reasoning is that Relevance Theory does not tell interactants what to say and how to 
say it in order to be perceived as more or less polite. It explains what happens and offers 
possible interpretations, but it cannot explain why a less direct formulation may be more
217 Farghal and Borini (1997) argue that ‘sociopragmatic failures occur due to the lack o f knowledge o f  social 
conditions or conventions that govern conversation, including size o f imposition, social distance, etc. That is, 
sociopragmatic failures are caused by faulty cross-cultural perceptions o f appropriate linguistic behaviour’ 
(1997:78).
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relevant than a direct one. The question of whether Relevance Theory can be exploited in 
an account of politeness is complicated. As explained earlier, there are factors that this 
theory seems to ignore to some extent in analysing interaction. But this does not mean that 
it cannot be used as a method of analysing linguistic politeness. In my opinion, 
understanding whether a person is polite or not depends on understanding, in relation to the 
context of interaction, the intended message, which is the aim of Relevance Theory,
91 Rwhether explicit or implicit.
Relating relevance to politeness, Rudi and Dogan (2001) ask whether there are linguistic 
structures and strategies specific to the communication of politeness. Their real concern is 
to find out whether politeness can be communicated linguistically. They provide conditions 
for polite/impolite behaviour; for politeness (a) the speaker holds the hearer in higher 
regard than s/he had assumed was mutually manifest; (b) the speaker still holds the hearer 
in high regard, which is already mutually manifest; for impoliteness (c) the speaker holds 
the hearer in lower regard than s/he had assumed mutually manifest; (d) the speaker still 
holds the hearer in low regard, which is already mutually manifest. In relation to phatic 
communication, they state that
in acts of phatic communication two things are mutually manifest: (i) it is mutually 
manifest both to the speaker and hearer that the main relevance of the utterance lies 
with the act of ostension; (ii) the circumstances in which the proposition built on 
the linguistic meaning of the utterances would be highly relevant are also mutually 
manifest (2001:347).
Although we may agree that the former points are characteristics of polite and the latter 
points of impolite behaviour, this is not always the case. It is still the listener who 
determines, at least, what s/he understands depending on her/his understanding of the 
context. Across cultures, the way in which speakers make an impact on their listeners 
varies, and the linguistic units and strategies used to express that vary as well. These 
differences between cultures make Relevance Theory of use in analysing linguistic 
politeness. Ruhi and Dogan explain that:
218 Ruhi and Dogan (2001) analyse interactions between linguistic structure and contextual assumption 
concluding that ‘no matter how close the interlocutors are, their “esteem” is at risk most o f the time’ 
(2001:342). They define phatic communion as a type o f speech in which ties o f union are created by a mere 
exchange o f words. They believe there are different types o f utterance that we should distinguish; utterances 
that only tell about a certain state o f affairs without affecting the nature o f the relationship between the 
interlocutors, and utterances that particularly connect with the relationship between people.
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we believe that human being's concern about how other people regard them affects 
their self-esteem and any information that is related to one’s self-esteem would 
naturally modify mutual cognitive environments via politeness and/or impoliteness’ 
(2001:351).
They see Relevance Theory as an attempt to explain human communication in cognitive 
terms and their study to be dependent on the claim that the theory is able to account for 
social aspects of language in an inferential fashion. Such a theory might be more 
applicable in cross-cultural interaction, especially as the linguistic strategies used in 
expressing different kinds of politeness differ among cultures. Thus, a dependence upon 
what is meant to be manifest in relation to the context of the interaction provides a better 
chance of understanding whether interactants communicate appropriately or not.
4.5 Conclusion
Investigating the reasons behind misunderstanding, whether cultural, linguistic or 
contextual, may help in analysing cross-cultural communication. As Bargiela et. al. (2001) 
argue
whilst in intra-cultural encounters, norms are often assumed to be shared, and if 
they appear to be clashing they can be renegotiated relatively easily, in inter- 
cultural encounters, different tacit and often conflicting interactional norms and 
assumptions are usually at work, which speakers tend to take for granted until 
misunderstanding arises (2001:1).
Thus, in interaction, Relevance Theory helps in understanding not only the differences, but 
also whether these differences cause misunderstanding and why. As Scollon and Scollon 
suggest, ‘differences between ... participants would most likely be understood as arising 
from a history of socialisation to different groups and therefore a misunderstanding of 
contextualization cues in the actual situation of communicating with each other’ 
(2003:545). It seems that they believe that different interpretations of the context of the 
interaction, as a result of . different understandings of what influences it, may lead to 
communication breakdown.
Failure to understand intended meaning does not necessarily mean that speakers have 
failed to select the appropriate message for their hearers. Hearers may interpret the context 
of the interaction differently from speakers, because of cultural difference. In foreign 
language teaching and learning, as Stem (1992) points out, understanding the literal is as
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« 910important as understanding the intended meaning Therefore, it is important that an
9 9  aillocutionary act is recognized by the hearer. This is also argued by Toolan (1996) and 
Sperber and Wilson (1995), who conceptualise communication as a speaker trying to draw 
attention to an intended message. Speakers always seek to include or create a relevance in 
their messages that their addressee can exploit to infer the intended meaning. It means that 
the meaning of an utterance might be implicit; because of different factors that influence 
interaction, such as context, so the intended message can be implied rather than said 
overtly. Green (1997) states that 'one of Sperber and Wilson's most useful insights, that 
context is not fixed, but is a psychological subset of possibilities' also leads, again 
paradoxically, to a 'fixing' of the text' (1997:137). This is a very important view for this 
thesis, one of the main arguments of which is that interpretation of politeness is not 
dependent solely on linguistic uses.. Politeness is understood by interpreting these 
linguistic uses in relation to the context of the interaction. This view is also important for 
analysing my data, as I have argued that politeness or impoliteness does not need to be 
overt, as Brown and Levinson (1987) argue. Politeness might be implicit and recognised 
contextually rather than only linguistically.
Escandell-Vidal (1996) sees the possibility of a cognitive approach to politeness such as 
Relevance Theory. She views modem research on politeness as having been dominated by 
a strategic approach for several years, with politeness considered the result of the rational 
need for balanced interpersonal relations, its mechanisms universal. She argues that 
‘evidence against universality is no longer cmcial, and cultural differences regarding basic 
assumptions fit in quite naturally, so a new approach to the relationship between politeness 
and universality can be suggested’ (1996:633). She points out that
the investigations carried out on different cultures soon began to show that things 
were not that simple: cultures strongly differ not only in forms, but also on the 
social meanings associated with various strategies, in the internal structure of 
speech acts, or in the expectations concerning verbal behaviour (1996:633).
219 Hamza (1995) argues that £a successful communication does not mean that interactants can express 
themselves, but also understand other people’s underlying meanings when they perform language’ (1995:40).
220 Thomas maintains that ‘more often than not, we fail to notice ambiguities o f sense and reference at all, 
unless some misunderstanding occurs or unless, as in jokes or word-play, our attention is deliberately drawn 
to their existence’ (1995:16). Davis (2003) also discusses the problem o f understanding jokes between native 
and non-native speakers o f English.
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She concludes that politeness is a social matter, and hence culture-specific, and that this is 
the reason why politeness studies are placed between universality and culture-specificity. 
(See Watts, 2003, in chapter 2)
The communication process can be very complicated, and even more so cross-culturally. 
The distinction between what is said and what is communicated is a shared process 
between hearers and speakers; such a distinction should be considered in any approach to 
analysing interaction, especially in cross-cultural interaction. In interaction analysis, 
overlooking any factor that features in the communication process may result in an 
ineffective approach to analysis. The claim that Sperber and Wilson’s model lacks the 
social dimensions or cultural variables does not mean that it is not suitable for analysis of 
cross-cultural conversation, or linguistic politeness. MacMahon (1996) posits that 
'Relevance Theory, in its recognition of the possible disjunction between what is said and 
what is communicated, is a model which overcomes some of the inadequacies of earlier
991pragmatic approaches' (1996:209). Relevance Theory focuses on what is universal 
about human communication (and more generally human information-processing), but this 
does not mean that cultural influence is ruled out, since the model predicts that variation in 
individual context, cognitive environment and individual cultures is likely to have a 
significant influence on the interpretation of utterances and the analysis of politeness. I 
believe an inferential approach such as Relevance Theory is important in order to build up 
a contextual, pragmatic approach that can be used in analysing politeness in cross-cultural 
interaction.
221 MacMahon (1996) also claims that 'Relevance Theory offers an alternative to earlier assumptions in 
pragmatics (in particular those assumptions about relationship between what is said and what is 
communicated), as well as an attention to literary' questions and a scope for development which literary 
theorists are no longer justified in dismissing' (210).
138
Chapter 5: Analysing Cross-cultural Interaction
This chapter develops the argument that utterances are influenced by the interactants' 
cultures, and that, consequently, in cross-cultural interactions, an utterance may be 
interpreted differently by the listener from what the speaker intended. Thus, in this chapter, 
I investigate the relationship between language and culture in cross-cultural interaction. I 
examine the role of culture in the interpretation and performance of linguistic utterances, 
and also discuss the variables that determine linguistic strategies in cross-cultural 
interaction, such as power, distance, gender, religion, and stereotypes, etc. The main aim 
is to highlight the need for a broader approach to analysing politeness in cross-cultural 
analysis - one that considers all interactants' cultural differences.
5.1 Linguistic use and social meaning across cultures
All speakers are part of a community that influences their identity and is usually apparent 
in their production and interpretation of language. This community influence is described 
as social competence,222 which differs from one person to another. Richards and Schmidt
(1983) maintain that 'social competence is very important in reaching the pragmatic
99^meaning of an utterance’ (1983:7). For example, when an Arab interacts with a 
Westerner, historical, social, religious and political views influence utterance production 
and interpretation. Fraser points out that ‘each society has a particular set of social norms 
consisting of more or less explicit rules that prescribe a certain behaviour, a state of affairs, 
or a way of thinking in a context’ (1990:220) 224 Hirschon (2001) also discusses social 
meaning in relation to social norms and values and linguistic performance. He focuses on 
aspects of Greek politeness behaviour, as well as contrasting Greek and Turkish responses 
to insults. He views politeness codes as having a direct bearing on notions of honour and 
reputation and the social structure as based on the relationship between cultural values, 
social conduct and language use. He states 'linguistic expression may also reveal key 
elements in the social construction of reality of a particular community or society' 
(2001:18). He identifies links between verbal expressions, cultural context and prevalent
222 Generally, social competence is the possessing and using the ability to integrate thinking, feeling and 
behaviour to achieve social tasks and outcomes valued in the host context and culture. But social competence 
differs from one sitting to another, and from one group to another.
223 Wierzbicka (2003) argues that ‘it is o f course very important for the immigrant to know what the rules o f  
the different conversational game in the new country are, and how they differ from those prevailing in the old 
country’ (2003:147-148).
224 For more details see chapter 2.
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values and uses the Greek case to illustrate how to ‘make sense’ of cultural patterns 
characteristic of politeness, or its obverse -  rudeness.
Nydell believes that ‘Arabs talk a lot, repeat themselves, shout when excited, and make 
extensive use of gesture. They punctuate their conversations with oaths (such as “I swear 
by God”) or emphasise what they say, and they exaggerate for effect’ (2002:120). 
According to her, their cultures may differ from Western cultures non-verbally and 
linguistically in terms of what is considered to be appropriate. An example is that Arabs do 
not use the word ‘operation’ for compulsory medical operations because of religious 
beliefs such as circumcision. They use the word ‘operation’ only for serious medical 
illnesses. An Yemeni Arab cancelled the circumcision of his son in Britain because the 
doctor, via an interpreter, used the word ‘operation’ to refer to the procedure. The Arab 
person said that his son was well, and that what he came for did not require an operation. 
Thus, relationships between people from different backgrounds are influenced by cultural 
and societal differences, which reflect how they see the context.
Clifford (1997) emphasises understanding the differences as well as the similarities in 
terms of norms and patterns of meanings. He stresses that differences between different 
cultural groups may lead to misunderstanding in cross-cultural interaction. For example, 
Al-Issa (2003) explains the difference in understanding the concept of friendship between 
Arabs and Westerns. He states that:
In an Arab society, the concept of friendship, with its rights and duties, is quite 
different from that in Western society. In Arab society, friendship is 
inseparable from social obligation. For instance, part of a "healthy" friendship 
among Arabs is that a friend "must" feel indulged to fulfill certain obligations 
such as offering help and doing everything he/she can to comfort a friend. 
Furthermore, one is always expected to show admiration for his/her friends, 
and praise their goodness, preferably in their presence (2003:587).
Thus, in cross-cultural interaction, conflict may occur when one of the interactants violates’ 
the other’s linguistic and social norms. Sometimes, an interactant feels insulted because 
his/her norms or values have not been respected, even if the interactant is not aware of the 
appropriate norms or values of that particular cultural context. Tannen (1989) maintains
225 This incident took place in 2003 in Sheffield Children’s Hospital between an English doctor, an Iraqi 
interpreter and a Yemeni parent.
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that ‘cultural influences do not determine the form that a speaker’s discourse will take; 
instead, they provide a range from which an individual chooses strategies habitually used 
in expressing an individual style’ (1989:80). Tannen believes it is not cultural influences 
but the social context that determines the form or the way in which interactants 
communicate. In other words, culture provides choices, but the most appropriate choice is 
determined by the context of interaction.
5.2 The influence of culture in cross-cultural interaction
Foley maintains that variations in cultural practices are expected because of different 
factors. He points out that
in modem complex societies, with people in a specific interaction potentially 
drawn from different classes and ethnic backgrounds, the distribution of cultural 
practices and knowledge of their meaning can become extremely 
difficulty 997:23).
Such a distribution of different cultural practices can be a source of pragmatic failure in 
cross-cultural interaction.227 Although we may agree that culture is a shared set of beliefs, 
values, and patterns of linguistic behaviour common to a group of people, we cannot 
guarantee that different members of this group will be influenced by it in the same way in 
their language choices.
5.2.1 Cross-cultural analysis and politeness
Differences between cultures create misunderstanding between interactants in cross- 
cultural interactions. Thus, in analysing politeness, we need an approach that identifies 
such differences and assesses whether they lead to misunderstanding. Gudykunst (1998) 
emphasises that the importance of cross-cultural analysis is not just about understanding 
the differences and similarities in communication, but rather how and why these cultures
99Qdiffer, what such differences might lead to. Gudykunst's view is very important, 
especially for this research, which argues that understanding the reasons behind any
226 According to Tannen (1989:80) 'A discourse is a behavioural unit which has a pre-theoretical status in 
linguistics: it is a set o f utterances which constitute any recognizable speech event; e.g. conversation'
227 Van Dijk (1997) argues that' in different societies people not only speak different languages and dialects, 
they use them in radically different w ays.' (1997: 231). (See also Chapter 3 o f this thesis).
228 According to Van Dijk 'In some societies, normal conversations bristle with disagreement, voices are 
raised, emotions are conspicuously vented. In others, people studiously avoid contention, speak in mild and 
even tone, and guard against any exposure o f their inner selves. (1997: 231)
229 He holds 'it does not make any sense to say that 'Sakuraka communicates indirectly because she is a 
Japanese” or that “Kimberly communicates directly because she is from the United States' (1998:44).
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pragmatic failure is as important as understanding that there is misunderstanding. 
Understanding the reason behind linguistic choices is important in understanding whether a 
speaker intends politeness, and whether that is understood by his/her hearer (See chapter 
!)■
According to Blommaert and Verschueren (1991/1989) ‘any approach to intercultural and 
international communication should start from the amazing complexity and dynamics of 
crucial notions such as "culture", "nation", "society", "race" or even "group"’ (1989: 4). 
They emphasise that concentrating on one aspect to determine whether a particular 
behaviour is individual, group or universal is not an adequate method of understanding 
cross-cultural conflict. O'Driscoll (1996) holds that 'we can "understand" another culture 
only when we are able to enter into it and completely pass ourselves off as "insiders" ' 
(1996:3). We may ask, “which party is expected to master perfectly the linguistic system, 
the interactional rule, etc., of the other party?” In other words, as Alptekin and Alptekin
(1984) ask, which of the interactants is expected to perform the other’s culture? O’Driscoll 
seems to put the responsibility on the non-native speaker. Thus, if an interaction is 
between an Arab and an English person, in English, then the Arab non-native speaker is 
expected to master the linguistic system and cultural norms, and be aware of what is 
appropriate and how it should be performed in his/her addressee’s language.
However, societies have their own strategies for establishing and maintaining relationships 
in conversations, and these strategies may differ from one society to another (Leech 
1983).230 Leech maintains that ‘it is clear that the Cooperative Principle and the Politeness 
Principle operate variably in different cultures or language communities, in different social
9^  1situations, among different social classes’ (1983:10). Farghal and Borini (1997) stress 
that
the cultural problem becomes quite obvious in the case of Arabic politeness 
formulas that feature religious references. Such situations are experienced with 
students taught by a teacher from a different background. When students are 
not aware of the culture and the norms of their teacher, they usually
230 After a lesson in which I said to my British students that in Arab culture, Arabs say ‘nice hair-cut’ 
"Naeeman" (which means prosperity) to any person who has had his hair cut, most o f them said that to me, 
although they do not say that to each other. In fact, I was happy that my students said that to me, regardless 
o f what it means in English, because in Arabic, it means that they are telling me ‘we care about you’.
231 See chapter 2 for a discussion o f Cooperative Principle and Politeness principle.
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experience different situations of pragmatic failure with their teacher, and vice- 
versa (1997:81).
They point out that when Arabs are taught by non-Arabs, both may misinterpret each 
other’s verbal and non-verbal behaviour. Unless there is a clear agreement on what is 
appropriate, pragmatic failure is to be expected. They go on to explain that
speakers of standard English may use the strategy of interrogation to perform a 
highly conventionalized polite request, while speakers of Arabic may not use 
this. Thus, rendering an Arabic polite request into English or vice versa using 
the same strategy will often lead to pragmalinguistic failure (1997:78).
Thus, even if the pragmatic meaning of an utterance is understood, the polite strategies 
might not be.232 Similarly, Farghal and Borini maintain that ‘culturally, some situations 
may necessitate the use of polite expressions in Arabic, while the same situations in 
English may not call for politeness’ (1997:92)233 This is why an utterance might sound 
appropriate to one interactant and not to the other in a cross-cultural interaction.
5.2.1.1 Politeness / impoliteness and social relations
Social relations seem to be differently understood across cultures, and ignoring or 
respecting social considerations is linked to politeness/impoliteness in some cultures. For 
example, in Arabic, social relations are usually given priority in interactions over 
individual interests, because a person might be classified as impolite if he/she ignores 
them. For example, if someone visits another person without an appointment, or visits a 
friend who is busy, the friend is still obliged to receive them. Certain linguistic 
expressions may be used to imply that the person visited is busy, but if the visitor does not 
understand, or chooses not to, then the host has to postpone plans until the visitor leaves. 
In Western cultures, people tend to visit each other by appointment, and if someone is 
visited without one, they might then apologise to the visitor if s/he cannot receive them. 
For example, in contrast to English culture, it is normal in Arabic culture for a person to
232 Tanaka (1988) notices that Japanese do not use different politeness expressions as native speakers o f  
English do. (See chapter 4 for more details)
233 Once, a friend o f mine asked me to help him because an English person was visiting him to fill in some 
application forms. My friend does not speak English, and wanted me to be with him as an interpreter. When 
the English person entered the flat, he was holding a cup o f tea in a plastic cup, and started drinking his tea 
once he had sat down. This behaviour distressed my friend, who requested that I ask the person whether he 
had been told that my friend was mean or that he might not be offered anything to drink. I told the English 
person that it is not acceptable among Arabs to bring your tea or food with you when you are visiting others, 
and that doing so means you are insulting them or suggesting that they are mean.
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come without an appointment or later than his/her appointment and be received, regardless 
of the inconvenience that this would cause. A visited person usually leaves it to visitors to 
decide whether to stay or go, but may still use certain expressions which implicitly 
encourage the visitor to leave. For example, an Arab person, upon receiving a visit, might 
use an expression like
J  (J^XJULQ
adxol laken wa masgol enee m ar
come in but and busy I am with 
Although I am busy, you can come in
to apologise about reluctance in accepting a visitor who is late or has no appointment. 
Another way of apologising is for the visited person to explain that plans are having to be 
postponed in order to entertain his/her guest. There is, however, no explicit refusal to 
receive a visitor, or any direct reference to the visitor arriving without an appointment or to 
the visitor's late arrival. Thus, if an Arab is late or comes without an appointment, s/he may 
still expect to be received. There are expressions that a person might use to apologise for 
being late or coming without an appointment. An expression such as
( jC .  4 <—IlJUil
eradatee rn x a re j, aseef
my control of out , sorry 
Sorry, it was out of my control.
Or
w3' e i jo l Ul
taxart enne arreef anna
I am late that I know I
I know I am late, I am sorry
would give rise to the implicature "we still need to do what we have planned, in spite of
my being late". This is a strong implicature to both interactants because of what is
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culturally acceptable in this context. Comparatively, in such a case, while an English 
person may accept the apology, but not receive the late comer, an Arab may not accept the 
apology, but still receive the late comer.
There are cultural and linguistic habits that are characteristic of English people which 
Arabs adopt because they live in English society and want to appear polite. This is not 
always the case, however. As explained in chapter 4, section 4.3.2.4, an Arab speaking in 
English may try to speak as the English do in certain situations, but, because of cultural 
constraints, not in others, even if this causes misunderstanding,235 For example, Arabs 
speaking in English can adopt an English way of offering thanks; frequently apologizing 
even for mistakes for which you were not responsible, greeting with the fewest number of 
words, for example, ‘Hi’, not shaking hands or visiting only with an appointment. But 
there are other English habits that Arabs accept but cannot imitate, because they are 
unacceptable culturally. For example, if somebody has lost a relative, just saying "sorry" 
might be considered rude, as might everybody paying individually in a coffee shop or 
restaurant.
5.2.1.2 Individual differences and interaction
Individual differences, in Arab society, are influenced by culture. Religion, which is 
considered as the cornerstone of the Arabic language, influences almost every group or 
individual behaviour, which makes it difficult for an individual not to consider others in 
almost every linguistic behaviour. Wierzbicka argues that ‘we remain within a certain
234 1 do not deny that Arabic customs of visiting and being visited might not be very different from English in 
some contexts, especially in some social situations. Sometimes, similarly to Arabs, many English people 
would not explicitly refuse a guest because they are late or have not previously arranged their visit. But in 
Arabic, such customs o f visiting and being visited sometimes happen even when there are pressing 
circumstances, such as being late for work, due for a job interview or having a family emergency to attend to 
or a meeting with a supervisor. In a situation like this, an Arab person would still be obliged to accept their 
guest, and they might use the same implicit tactics that I have described to encourage the visitor to leave or to 
cut short their visith.
235 Levinson argues that ‘there are cross-situational constraints enjoining appropriate social decorum, while 
there are others appropriate just to specific interactional moments or specific kinds o f cultural events’ (1983: 
45). This means that culture constrains or influences communication in different ways; from what is 
appropriate for certain specific interactional situations, to what is general and left to interactants to decide 
how to be appropriate.
236 Arabs most o f the time say different expressions, including many linguistic units, when showing respect to 
a person or a relative when s/he has lost a relative such as a father. They usually mention religious 
expressions that are said in such contexts. For example such as "Only Allah lives forever". Also if  two Arabs 
or more decide to have something in a restaurant, then one of them is expected to pay. They usually agree 
who might pay, but if  not, then the first o f them who suggests to have something is expected to pay. If the 
first person pays only for her/himself, then this might be considered as strange or inappropriate behaviour.
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culture, and we are inevitably guided by certain principles and certain ideals which we 
know are not necessarily shared by the entire human race’ (2003:9). But in spite of this 
view, interactants may disagree on what is socially appropriate, as discussed by Scollon 
and Scollon (1995), who place emphasis on personal variations. Even if culture is shared 
by a group, personal variation and individual evaluation of context play a role in the way 
people speak and understand each other. Watts indicates that ‘European societies, despite 
the similarity in their behavioural codes, vary in terms of how politeness is structured’ 
(1992c:49). Hence, differences exist within a culture, just as similarities exist between 
different cultures. The case is the same in the Arab world; Arabs in different parts of the 
Arab world agree and disagree with each other in what is considered to be 
appropriate/inappropriate in certain interactional social contexts. This means that analysis 
of speech in interaction needs to include not only social and cultural differences but, in 
addition, individual differences between interactants.
5.2.1.3 Cultural differences and interaction
Different scholars agree that cross-cultural interaction may include more situations of 
misunderstanding than monocultural interaction. For example, Ervin-Tripp (1972) points 
out that 'the dangers are greater when we fail to appreciate how the terms in a new address 
system are related to one another (1972: 231). In Arabic, the use of a person’s first name 
does not necessarily indicate friendship or closeness, nor does the use of a person’s 
surname with or without a title indicate formality. Also, in Arabic, a male addressing a 
female by her name on its own conveys a different meaning than it does in English. 
According to Wardhaugh:
our choice of terms is usually determined by a variety of social factors: the 
particular occasion; the social status, or rank of the other sex; age; family 
relationship; occupational hierarchy; transactional status (i.e. a doctor-patient 
relationship); race or degree of intimacy’ (1990: 251).238
Thus, culture determines how factors such as age or gender should be considered in 
utterances. The pragmatic meaning may not be the same across cultures, and the
237 .This used to be the case in middle-class male circles in Britain.
238 AL-Khatib (2001) argues that 'previous research has shown that there is some evidence that the 
addressees, gender o f the addressee, age o f the addressee and number o f the addressees are all seen to be 
determining factors in code-selection' (2001:408) AL-Khatib, M (1995) also highlights the influence o f the 
interlocutor's sex on linguistic accommodation.
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misunderstandings in such cases might lead to one interactant being considered impolite 
towards his interactant.
5.2.1.4 Cultural differences and understanding context
As argued above, because cultural factors influence interaction, contexts of interaction 
might be understood differently by interactants. Discussing the reasons for 
misunderstanding, Cameron (2001) says ‘miscommunication can result not only from 
variation in the use of contextualization cues, but also from conflicting assumptions about 
the norms and conventions of particular speech events’ (2001:111). For example, an 
incident that happened between a Libyan student (B) and an English student (A) sharing a 
house in Swansea in 1993 demonstrates how cross-cultural interaction influences 
misunderstanding of intention:
1 A : tea?
2 B : thank you.
3 A : sugar?
4 B : no, no I do not want tea, thank you.
In this context the expression ‘thank you’ has a different meaning in response to A's (the 
native English speaker) invitation to B (the Libyan student) to have some tea. In 
Arabic, ( J j^ )  " soukran" (Thank you), the answer in 2B, means that B does not want tea. 
The English person interprets 2B as if B had said yes, and therefore asks B whether or not 
he wants sugar with his tea. In this example, the wording of the question in 1A and the 
answer in 2B are clear and exist in Arabic language as well as English, but the expression 
in 2B has a different pragmatic meaning across the two cultures in such contexts of 
interaction.
Levinson (1983) reflects:
there can be significant inter-ethnic misunderstandings due to different 
pragmatic analyses of utterances whose literal content is perfectly well 
understood; leading questions, probes, hints, etc, may well not be interpreted 
correctly (1983:377).
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What an utterance means in a particular context is usually negotiated between interactants, 
but cultural differences, and how they influence production and interpretation, often have 
the potential to cause pragmatic failure or even conflict. Schirato and Yell (2000) 
maintain that ‘there are strong connections between a person’s cultural trajectories, the 
kind of attitudes, values, and agendas they have, and their activities and behaviour’ 
(2000:51). Similarly, Sunderland (1994) and Coulthard (1977) see our talk as culturally 
constructed, such that conversations are structured and governed by cultural rules, norms 
and conventions. Thus conflict may arise because of differences in the ways people 
interpret the same sets of linguistic behaviour in certain interactional contexts.240
The ignorance of cultural differences has always been the most significant problem with 
different approaches to analysing politeness in cross-cultural interaction. Van Dijk (1997) 
points out that there is a danger if we understand others' cultures only through the prism of 
our own cultural-specific practises and concepts. He states that
if our metalanguage for cross-cultural comparison consists of terms like 
‘directness’, ‘deference’, ‘face’, ‘politeness’, hierarchy’, and so on, our analysis can 
easily slip into ethnocentrism because the relevant concepts are not found in the 
culture being described and usually cannot even be translated easily into the 
language involved (1997:235).
Mills (2004) discusses whether 'there might be different associations and evaluations of 
certain politeness forms which depend on how one locates oneself in relation to class, 
gender and race' (2004:171). These concepts, and others such as hierarchy, deference, or 
directness, have different meanings between cultures and often produce different 
interpretations. Thus, we cannot analyse cross-cultural interaction by considering one 
culture and overlooking what these utterances may mean cross-culturally. The 
concentration on speakers recommended by Brown and Levinson might lead to inadequacy 
in understanding whether the speaker was polite or not to his/her addressee, especially in 
cross-cultural interaction.
239 According to Wright and Taylor (1994) 'lack of understanding o f differences in an interaction may have 
adverse effects in two ways. First, we may have different cultural norms. One o f the interactants may 
misinterpret the other or inadvertently give offence. The other thing is that we may not realise that this has 
happened and need to take steps to rectify the situation, or if the offence is very great, there may be little we 
can do to rectify the situation' (1994: 162-163).
240 Scollon and Scollon (1995) point out that ‘each society has a particular set o f social norms consisting o f  
more or less explicit rules that prescribe a certain behaviour, a state o f affairs, or a way o f thinking in a 
context’ (1995:18).
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5.3 Cross-cultural interaction and discourse system
Different discourse systems,241 in an interaction, might lead interactants to misunderstand 
each other, or even accuse each other of being inappropriate. Scollon and Scollon discuss 
systems of communication from a cross-cultural view. They try to provide solutions for 
those who may need to communicate within cultures which are not their own. For them, 
‘the main concern is to see how the ideological positions of cultures or of discourse 
systems become a factor in the interpersonal communication of members of one group 
with members of the other group’ (1995:126). In such communication, people may not be 
able to avoid misunderstanding because of their different discourse systems. Such 
differences, which do not necessarily need to be clear in forms of speech acts, determine 
not only the linguistic structures and strategies, but also the interpretation and 
understanding of these structures.243 Shamir and Melnik (2002) point out that
cultures may differ with respect to the extent to which they are characterised 
by rigid or more permeable boundaries; namely, the extent to which the culture 
emphasizes boundary between people, positions, roles, activities, and spheres of 
life (2002:220).
Schirato and Yell (2000) also maintain that ‘meanings are not to be found or understood 
exclusively in terms of acts of communication, but are produced within specific cultural 
contexts’ (2000:1). They discuss the relationship between communication and culture, 
defining communication as 'the practice of producing meaning, and the way in which 
systems of meaning are negotiated by participants in a culture; and culture as the totality of 
communication practices and systems of meaning' (2000:l ).244 Moerman (1996) believes 
social rules and cultural values are learned, enforced, and manipulated. Ochs (1982, 
1988,1992) holds that children are affected by what surrounds them, including the social 
discourse system and relationships between members of society. She concludes that
241 Discourse system is defined as 'a unified and structured domain o f language use (and the activities 
associated with language use) that organizes and constrains what can be said, thought, or done around certain 
issues.' (Schiffrin 2004:205).
242 They argue ‘broad systems of discourse form a kind o f self-oriented system o f communication with a 
shared language or jargon, with particular ways in which people learn what they need to know to become 
members, with a particular ideological position, and quite specific forms o f interpersonal relationships among 
members o f these groups’ (Scollon and Scollon, 1995:95).
243 Spencer-Oatey and Jiang (2003) state: 'sociopragmatic interactional principles are 'socioculturally-based 
principles, scalar in nature, that guide or influence people's productive and interpretative use o f language' 
(2003:1635).
244 See chapter 1 for a definition o f culture.
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children learn by observation of their parents and older siblings, by explicit prompts, 
instructions, and explanations, and discussions on how to behave in communication to 
understand the discourse system of their environment. 245 Such process of learning 
discourse system might be a problem of children grown to parents from different cultures. 
Scollon and Scollon (1995) also note that that the cultural differences that arise from being 
a member of different gender or generational discourse systems are more problematic that 
other cultural differences such as those in professional contexts.246
Just as communication between members from the same culture can be impeded by the use 
of alien discourse systems, our analysis of cross-cultural misunderstanding must be 
informed by our awareness of the variety of ways in which the meaning of an utterance is 
encoded in different cultures. The above discussion explores the extent to which 
misunderstandings are rooted in the lack of equivalence between different discourse styles 
used by speaker and addressee. Such misunderstandings, in cross-cultural interaction, 
might arise because of other social factors such as using social deixis, honorifics, 
compliment or titles.
5.3.1 Social deixis and discourse system
The use of deixis is linked to the discourse system of cultures. Deixis involves aspects of 
verbal social behaviour.247 They are also sometimes called indexicals.248 Because deictics 
exist in every language, they play an important role in achieving pragmatic understanding 
between speakers and hearers. Hanks states that
245 Van Dijk (1997) in an analysis o f Malay, states that 'The main social dimensions determining discourse 
style are "ingroup" vs "outgroup" and status differences between interlocutors. In Malay society, the most 
important dimension is whether the individuals belong to the same household. In other places, clan, ethnicity, 
caste, or rank determine different discourse style' (1997:254).
246 In addition, they also provide a description o f salient differences which can be expected between speakers 
o f English who come from different cultural backgrounds. Scollon and Scollon argue that 'each o f us is 
simultaneously a member o f many different discourse systems. We are members o f a particular corporate 
group, a particular professional or occupational group, a generation, a gender, a region, and an ethnicity’ 
(1995:3). Scollon and Scollon focus on professional communication. Their purpose is to introduce 
professional communicators to the basic principles of discourse as they apply to communication between 
members o f different cultural groups.
247 Verschueren argues that 'one o f the phenomena that scientific consideration o f language use could not 
ignore was this ‘anchoring’ o f language in a real world, achieved by ‘pointing’ at variables along some o f its 
dimension. This phenomenon is called deixis, and the ‘pointers’ are indexical expression or indexicals 
(1999:18). Deixis are classified into; Person Deixis (me, you, etc.), Spatial Deixis (here, there, etc.), and 
Temporal Deixis .(now, then, etc). All o f these expressions depend on the speaker and hearer sharing the same 
context. Proximal terms are "this, here, now"; Distal terms are "that, there, then"; Social Deixis means the 
choice of one o f these forms (deictic expressions) rather than another.
248 This means pointing via language. When you see an unfamiliar thing and ask ‘what is that?’, you are 
using a deictic expression.
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A basic property of the indexical context of interaction is that it is dynamic. As 
interactants move through space, shift topics, exchange information, coordinate 
their respective orientations, and establish common ground as well as non­
commonalities, the indexical framework of reference changes. Patterns of deictic 
usage reflect these changes, and thereby provide us with a powerful tool for 
investigating them (1992:53).
But the question is “do differences in using deixis between cultures lead to 
misunderstanding?” According to Levinson (1983), ‘social deixis concerns the encoding 
of social distinctions that are relative to participants’ roles, particularly aspects of the social 
relationship holding between speaker and address(s) or speaker and some referent' 
(1983:63).249 Grundy holds that ‘it isn’t these propositional meanings that change when a 
deictic occurs, but the place or time picked out or referred to which shifts as the context 
changes -  hence the name ‘shifter’, which is sometimes applied to deictics’ (2000:33). For 
example, whereas the tag question is a very clear question in Arabic and requires an 
answer from the addressee, it sometimes just signals uncertainty or a request for 
confirmation in English.
According to Hanks (1992), the use of deixis is organized culturally and is accordingly 
affected by changes in culture and context. In Arabic, the use of the plural form "you are" 
( ), “antoum” instead of (you are) ( ^  ), “anta” implies respect and a degree of
distance and power between the interactants. Thus, if the plural "you are" is used to address 
a singular second person, then it means that the speaker has less power then the addressee 
and that he needs to be formal. They use of "you are" conveys whether interactants are 
close to each other, or from a different class, or even conveys something implicitly, which 
might be insulting. This means that if it is used by a person who is in a higher position or 
has more power to a person who in a lower position or has less power, then it might mean 
an insult from the speaker to his/her listener.
Deixis plays a central role in the routine use and understanding of appropriateness in using 
language. Hanks (1992) focuses on a more restricted class of referential usage of lexical 
deictics. The question he asks is “do components differ from utterance to utterance, context
249 Foley argues that one central way to enact social roles is through linguistic practices, and languages 
typically have various means to mark such social categories. This is called social deixis, and common 
 ^ illustrations are the presence o f formal and deferential second-person pronouns (1997:343).
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to context, language to language?” The use of the pronoun ‘you’ in Standard Arabic and 
English varies between the two languages, in both linguistic and social meanings. For 
example, there are more pronouns that represent the second person in Arabic than in 
English, and ‘you’ in Arabic may refer to you ( ^  ) "Anta" which is singular, you ) 
( "Antmaa" referring to two people, you ( ^  ) "Antom" referring to more than two males 
or you ( ) (Antouna) to more than two females. It is also possible to use you ( )
"Antom" (normally used for the second person plural), when speaking to an individual to
•  •  •  950indicate respect, particularly if the addressee is socially or culturally higher. 
Verschueren (1999) sees the interpretation of indexical expressions as dependent on 
context, speaker’s intention, the relative distances between the speaker and listener, and 
how their meaning is socially agreed. Ochs (1991/1992) states that some linguistic 
features have more than one social interpretation, and deixis is some of these. The 
differences in the number of pronouns and what they reflect in that deixis system may have 
different meanings across cultures, and depend on the context in which they are used.
5.3.2 Honorifics and discourse system
The use of honorifics also differs between languages and cultures because they reflect a 
social system. The titles ‘Mr’ and ‘Mrs’ in English, for instance, do not convey what ‘Mr’ 
and ‘Mrs’ ( ^  "Al-sayed or Al-sayedah") in Arabic denote in relation to respect, or 
politeness towards others. ‘Mr’ and ‘Mrs’ in Arabic are more likely to be used with the 
first name, and might be used with a close friend, a brother or a sister. Also, linguistically, 
it is not possible in Arabic to say ‘Mrs Ali’ ( )? “al-sayedah Ali”, if  the
addressee’s surname is “Ali”. In such a case, her first name would be mentioned before her 
surname. For example, we may, in Arabic, call a female whose surname is Ali ‘Mrs Fatma 
Ali’, to indicate to her and to anybody listening that we are addressing a female. In spite of 
the title ‘Mrs’, because, in Arabic, if ‘Mrs’ is used before a male name, this might be 
considered as an insult in some contexts of interaction.251 In her article “What is a name” 
Eid points out that
250 In Arabic, using a female pronoun for a male is an insult and vice versa.
251 Arabs who pretend that they are assimilated Westerners and adopt a western speech convention are rather 
considered by other Arabs negatively, whether in the way they address each other, or in using certain way o f  
greeting each other. Sometimes, some Arabs, even without realizing, use the masculine name after Mrs, 
which might be considered as an insult to those who do not know anything about Western Culture and how 
people there address themselves in a polite way. Such addressing is grammatically incorrect as Al-Sayedah )
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if other forms of reference such as title, honorifics, and other descriptors are to be 
included under ‘names’ (not to be confused with the subset “proper name”) and 
naming practices, even more support can be adduced for the non-arbitrariness of 
such practices and their effect on people’s perception of each other and of 
themselves (1994:81).
In cross-cultural interaction, certain expressions such as those refers to title, honorifics, 
etc., may cause problems because of inappropriateness, or may pass unnoticed because 
neither interactant is aware of the cultural appropriateness of the language.
Agreeing that all languages have indexicals and honorifics does not mean that they are 
used in the same way across cultures and does not guarantee that there will be no 
misunderstanding. Foley argues that
Asian languages like Japanese and Javanese have specially complex systems 
of social deixis, besides expressing solidarity or deference vis-a-vis the 
addressee, they also employ honorifics or humbling expressions to indicate 
the social rank relative to the speaker of participants in the utterance 
(1997:343).
Thus, cross-culturally, people interact differently, and the way in which they show respect 
to each other may not be understood. Failure to recognize honorific systems in the 
language of interaction is largely dependent upon misunderstanding the social system 
appropriate to the context of interaction. Appropriate honorific usage in some cultures 
such as Arab culture is linked to politeness, and not applying it, in certain contexts, may 
lead to accusations of impoliteness.
5.3.3 Compliments and discourse system
The use of compliments is differently understood across cultures. In some cultures they 
are widely used and are considered part of the social system, while in others they are not. 
Alymursy and Wilson (2001) distinguish between Egyptian and Western compliments.
( SiuJl(Mrs) refers to a female name, and if  a masculine name is used after it, then there would be no 
agreement between the title and the name.
252 They argue that 'modification o f politeness formats is required in order to explain the nature o f Egyptian 
complimenting behaviour' (2001:134). I agree with them that one model o f politeness might not provide a 
comprehensive solution to describe all cultures. They think that Brown and Levinson’s model cannot be 
universal for the speech act o f compliment, for example. ‘We should not be surprised, therefore, if  a model o f  
politeness based on ‘face’ and individual wants and desires, does not easily explain complimenting behaviour
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They disagree with Brown and Levinson’s model, which suggests that compliments are 
sometimes classified as insults. In Arabic, teachers, supervisors or managers expect verbal 
compliments from their students or employee, regardless of their performance, whereas in 
English culture, students might criticise their teachers if they have a different view. 
Another example occurs in local broadcasting stations in different parts of the Arab world. 
They are not expected to criticise the government; broadcasters in Libya, Saudi-Arabia, 
Egypt, etc., usually compliment their governments and do not broadcast any criticism of 
them. This is not the case in English broadcasting stations, such as BBC1, BBC2, ITV etc., 
which often broadcast severe criticism or even ironic sketches about the government. In 
Arabic, a compliment is sometimes considered a way of showing respect to your 
interactants, and not doing so may lead to accusations of inappropriate behaviour.
In Arab society, group needs are placed above individual needs. Therefore, a person might 
give a compliment to another person because of his/her father, friend, audience or relative, 
or even because of his/her gender. It may be necessary to analyse what influences the 
construction and performance of a compliment, including the interactants' relationship and 
their future relationship. Such differences in complimenting others may lead to pragmatic 
failure that may in turn result in misunderstanding, as what is considered to be a 
compliment is subject to the cultures of the interactants and their interpretation of the 
context.
5.4 Variables leading to different linguistic strategies across cultures
As I have shown above, certain variables that influence the production and interpretation of 
utterances are interpreted differently across cultures. Variables such as power, distance, 
gender, religion and stereotype influence interaction in every culture, but how these 
variables are interpreted across cultures is not the same. What constitutes power, distance, 
gender, etc., and how these factors influence production and interpretation, is not 
necessarily the same in Arabic as it is in English. Furthermore, the way in which 
interactants from different cultures stereotype others influences interaction, especially as
in those cultures where the needs o f a group are placed above the individual' (Alymursy and Wilson 
2001:134).
253 Farghal and Al-Kbaib (2001) state that 'the gender o f the speaker in Jordanian society seems to be a 
crucial parameter in the formulation and acceptance or rejection o f a compliment' (2001:1458). Kharraki 
(2002) also argues that 'men and women use different syntactic strategies in paying compliments, and that 
men, more than women, perceive complements as a token o f social distance rather an act o f solidarity' (2002: 
65)
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stereotypes have different causes, which might be historical or religious. In the following 
sections, in order to establish whether core politeness theories have considered cultural 
differences appropriately or not, I will discuss the variables that influence interaction and 
examine whether they might lead to misunderstanding in cross-cultural interaction.
5.4.1 Power
Harris (1995) holds that power is a significant determinant of strategic choice or lack of 
choice (1995:133). Brown and Levinson maintain that power is ‘the degree to which H 
can impose his own plans and his own self-evaluation (face) at the expense of S’s plans 
and self-evaluation’ (1987:77). Thomborrow (2002) considers power from a contextual 
view. She defines it as 'a set of resources and actions which are available to speakers and 
which can be used more or less successfully depending on who the speakers are and what 
kind of speech situation they are in' (2002:8).254 She argues that power is evaluated on 
structural and interactional levels. She distinguishes between power in ordinary 
conversation, and power in institutionally shaped interaction, arguing that power is more 
difficult to identify in ordinary conversation, where the relationship between the 
interactants is not established by the context. She points out that
in conversational interaction, where the social role of participants may not be 
so clearly contextually structured or institutionally defined, it becomes more 
difficult to make any analytical assumptions about what counts as powerful 
discursive action and what does not (2002:9)
To some extent, Sadiqi (2003) has a similar view to Thomborrow (2002), but in relation to 
feminism. She sees the relationship between language, gender, and identity as deeply 
related to power, and asks three questions: (i) Who controls language, in what way and to 
what extent? (ii) Does power in language derive from other kinds of power (physical, 
political, economic)? and (iii) Does linguistic power define reality, and thus, is it the key to 
all other forms of domination? (2003:277).
For example, to Arabs,'power is the influence that a person has over others, and the respect 
that s/he demands. Generally, this view of power may appear universal, but when it comes 
to actual practice, interactants sometimes disagree, regardless of their status. If you have
254 Thomborrow (2002) states 'Power means different things to different people; it is multi-faced, and can 
take many different forms. It is always seen as a quantifiable thing - some people have more o f it than others' 
(5)
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influence then you have power regardless of your position in the society. This influence is 
interpreted by how much respect you receive from others. This view is similar to Phillip's 
definition of power. He comments 'in earliest politicized work focusing on discourse, 
power was understood as something that some people have more of than others' 
(2001:190). In some parts of the Arab world, a leader of a tribe is more powerful than a 
president or a highly official person, because of his influence. A religious scholar may 
receive more respect than a highly qualified person, and people from certain tribes would
J C Cfeel that they have more power than others. Thus, power is differently interpreted cross- 
culturally.
5.4.1.1 Power and cross-cultural interaction
There are different ways of evaluating power depending on the context of the interaction. 
Fairclough (1989) argues that
power relations are not reducible to class relation. There are power relations 
between social groupings in institutions, and there are power relations between 
women and men, between ethnic groupings, between young and old, which 
are not specific to particular institutions (1989:35).
His point is that there are different levels of power, and relations between speakers are 
crucial in determining which of them is the more powerful, such that no one person is 
always .in power. Social relations may mean one person is in power in one interaction, and 
another person in another. Mercer (2000) comments that
it may seem obvious in conversation between lawyers and witnesses, police 
and suspects, employers and employees, teachers and students, that the first 
named of each pair will be the speakers who are the more powerful and so will 
inevitably control the structure, content and social consequences of the talk 
(2000:94).
However, Mercer (2000) also points out that powerful people do not necessarily control an 
interaction. How powerful people are respected and treated is not the same across cultures. 
The speaker may give the impression of practising power, but whether this is understood 
by the hearer or not is sometimes not clear. Thus, if the speaker is exercising power in
255 In different parts o f the Arab world, tribal leaders are often misunderstood when they come to cities or 
towns. They speak in the same way they do when they are in their villages, but they do not receive the same 
respect.
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speech and the addressee fails to understand that, then a situation of pragmatic failure
256occurs.
Discussing power and politeness, Dogancay-Aktuna et. al. (2001) argue that there is a link 
between them, but this link is understood differently cross-culturally. They suggest that 
power relations are expressed through different expressions and different strategies 
according to how people understand power in that particular society or group. They hold 
that it is not necessary for these expressions or strategies to be similar in all societies, even 
when the context of power appears to be universal across all cultures. For example, all 
cultures may agree that a supervisor has power over students in any part of the world, but 
how supervisors perform this power, and how students recognize it, is different from one 
culture to the other. A request or order from a teacher to students is a way of using power, 
but while Arab students would accept direct orders from their teachers, English students 
may still expect their teachers to use expressions such as ‘please’, ‘would you agree', 'if 
you could ...' although a request from a teacher to a student may, in actual fact, be an order. 
Koutsantoni (2004) states that
power and differences in status do not have the same connotations in all cultures, 
and there is variation in the strategies which are employed to deal with power 
inequalities by individuals in various discourse communities (2004:111).
Zeyrek (2001) comments that 'individuals from a high power distance culture257 consider 
power as a normal part of their social life, while low power distance cultures believe power 
should be used only when it is legitimate’ (2001:56). An Arab student would find it 
difficult to in criticize a teacher. This might be interpreted as an issue of power in some 
cultures, whereas it is a mixture between power and respect in Arabic.
256 Holmes (1995) has a different view o f power. He states that ‘relative power or hierarchical status is 
another important consideration in determining the appropriate degree o f linguistic politeness’ ‘...Power 
refers to the ability o f participants to influence one another’s circumstances’ (Holmes 1995:16-17). 
Generally, power mean the possibility o f one speaker to impose on his/her addressee or control their verbal 
and non-verbal behaviour in certain contexts.
257 According to Hofstede (1980) 'high power distance culture is when subordinates expect to be told what to 
do, bosses are expected to be benevolent, teachers are expected to take all initiatives in class, hierarchy in 
organizations is seen as reflecting natural differences, inequalities between people are expected and desired, 
children respect parents and parents expect obedience. A low power distance culture, however, is one in 
which subordinates expect to be consulted, bosses are expected to be resourceful democrats, teachers expect 
initiatives from students in class, hierarchy in organizations is seen as exploitative, inequalities between 
people should be minimized and parents and children treat each other as equals' (1980:67).
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Considering leadership styles and relationships usually holding between professors 
and students, it has been suggested that distance and power in these situations are 
generally not perceived as totally negative. This may ultimately manifest itself in 
the use of deferentials, leading, say, university students to address their professors 
with deferentials that carry a sense of affect (Zeyrek 2001:66).
A person in power is in a position to use any language strategy s/he thinks suitable, but is 
still governed by the norms and conventions that his/her culture obliges. The following 
example of power in cross-cultural interaction is from a conversation between an English 
teacher and her Libyan Arab students, at the University of Sebha in 1999:
1- Student : What is the meaning of the second word, teacher?
2- Teacher: Sorry?
3- Student: I want to know the meaning of the second word in the first
paragraph.
4- Teacher : Could you add please to your question when you ask others for help?
Line 1 implies that the student is making an order to his English language teacher rather 
than requesting help from her. In line 2, the teacher gives the impression that there is 
something wrong with his question. An English student would ask by using a structure 
like ‘What is the meaning of the second word please?’ or ‘Could you explain the meaning 
of th a t....?’ In line 3, the student repeats his question without realizing that the problem is 
with his way of requesting. In line 4, the teacher explains that the student needs to use 
appropriate language when talking to others and not give them orders. It is not clear 
whether the teacher felt that her student was giving her an order or whether she was trying 
to teach him a polite way of requesting others in English, but, to an English person in a 
position of power, the implicature that utterances 2 and 4 might give rise to is that "the way 
you have asked me is inappropriate and unacceptable", which is a weak implicature to the 
Arab non-native speaker of English.
However, as Lambert (1996) points out, we may conclude that there are variations in 
understanding power. Who controls the interaction, initiates it, and determines the topic or 
turn or end of an interaction cannot always be established, and neither can the criteria by 
which to judge which interactant is more powerful than the other. These criteria have 
different roles in conversations across cultures.
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In cross-cultural interaction, power seems to be highly contextual and influenced by 
cultural variables. I agree with Thomborrow (2002) that 'power relations in interaction are 
not necessarily fixed, predetermined states of affairs, but are constantly shifting and being 
redefined between participants on a very local level' (2002:134). As Blommaert and 
Verschueren explain, power can emanate from many factors (1989:336), such as age, tribe, 
relationship, and that every society may differently emphasise these factors. Thus, even 
if we agree on a definition of power, it is difficult to provide rules of how it works or how 
interactants negotiate it, especially in cross-cultural interaction. Every culture emphasises 
certain aspects concerning power, and agreement between interactants from different 
cultures is difficult to arrive at.
5.4.2 Distance
It seems that social distance and power are similar, and related in interaction. The concept 
of distance varies across cultures, as does that of power, and both are differently 
interpreted in cross-cultural interaction. Brown and Levinson (1987) and Holmes 
(1995/1990) believe that the amount of linguistic politeness that is needed between 
interactants depends on social distance. Thomas feels ‘it is sometimes difficult to 
distinguish between power and social distance and in fact some studies conflate the two’ 
(1995:128). Spencer-Oatey believes that this is not always the case in British and Chinese 
understanding of power and closeness in tutor-postgraduate student relations. She states 
‘for the British respondents, the greater the degree of power difference perceived between 
tutors and postgraduate students, the greater the degree of distance perceived, and vice 
versa’ (2000b:35). Spencer-Oatey sees the variables “power” and “distance” as being 
correlated.
Generally, social distance is the relationship between individuals or different groups of a 
society. It includes all differences such as tribal, religious or social class, status, 
race/ethnicity, etc. Wierzbicka (2003) points out that no-one seems to have a direct 
definition of what social distance means. She accepts that Brown and Levinson (1987)
258 Blommaert and Verschneren (1989:336) are not accurate when they claim that 'when power and age are in 
conflict, power tends to overrule age’. Although this might be accepted in a Western society, in the Arab
world, age is always a crucial factor, and if  not considered, the participants would be classified as impolite.
259 There are some other variables which influence linguistic strategies, such as education. People with 
different levels o f education have different views o f practising power, even within one society. A person who 
might be considered as less powerful because o f his/her linguistic strategies in one group is classified as a 
powerful person in another group or culture because o f his/her tribe, wealth or social class.
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discuss social distance, but treat it as if it were self-explanatory. Distance determines how 
interactants verbally behave with each other and what politeness strategies they use. In 
assessing social distance, Fukushima (2000) states that ‘there are some difficulties in 
assessing social distance. One of the difficulties is due to the fact that the relationships 
among speakers are dynamic and open to negotiation’ (2000:83). Holmes (1995) also 
points out that 'social distance is best seen as a composite of psychologically real factors 
(status, age, sex, degree of intimacy, etc.) which ‘together determine the overall degree of 
respectfulness’ within a given speech situation' (1995:128). Thus, this is a concept crucial 
to determining the relationship between interactants. However, it is difficult to measure 
because, like power, it is not fixed, and subject to the interactants' interpretations of the 
context. Van Dijk (1997) maintains that
people everywhere adjust their speech according to how they view those they 
are speaking with, and although some dimensions of social identity (such as 
gender and age) are of near-universal relevance, the social constructs involved 
vary enormously (1997:253).
Thus, social distance is influenced by different factors which are understood differently in 
society. Sometimes the social system is uncertain between the individuals of a society, and 
not as clear as the class system. The tribal system in different parts of the Arab world 
exemplifies that social distance is influenced differently across cultures.
5.4.2.1 Distance and cross-cultural interaction
The task of understanding social distance encounters more obstacles in cross-cultural 
interaction. In Arabic, as in any other language, the type of questions asked and the choice 
of utterances made reflect the distance between interactants. This element of interacting is 
difficult to measure in cross-cultural interaction, in which such measures might differ from 
one another, or be differently interpreted. Wierzbicka (2003) suggests that the types of 
language which reflect distance differ in different cultures:
in a sense, the infinitive directive functions as a distance-building device in 
Polish, just as an interrogative directive does in English. But in Anglo-Saxon 
culture, distance is a positive cultural value, associated with respect for the 
autonomy of the individual. By contrast, in Polish culture it is associated with 
hostility and alienation (2003:37).
260 Although the class system has started creeping into different parts o f the Arab world, the tribal system still 
prevails. (See footnote, 74, page 47)
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Thus, the meaning and interpretation of social distance differs from one culture to another. 
For Arabs, social distance is influenced by a number of factors, such as religion, tribe, race, 
and interpersonal interest.261 Mills (2003a) states that
social distance cannot be characterized as achieved or stable. ... Social distance, 
because it is, like power, not something which is ever discussed explicitly, but 
which is negotiated in each interaction, is a variable about which interactants might 
have different perception (2003a: 101)
Certain questions would be classified as strange between interactants in cross-cultural 
interaction. An English person would find it strange if s/he were asked 'What is your tribe?'
^ “ma heya kabeelatouk” by an Arab. As in any other language, greetings in 
Arabic tell us how a person is distancing himself/herself from his/her interactant, or to 
which tribe or class the speaker belongs. Such ways of greeting might not sound relevant to 
cross-cultural interactions, but if any of the interactants tries to evaluate the other 
according to his/her own culture, then misunderstanding may occur.
5.4.3 Gender
Gender is an important factor that influences interaction and may determine the linguistic 
choices of the speaker. A male-female interaction is different from a male-male or female- 
female interaction, and culture will influence its interactants. An Arab culture will view a 
female differently to an English culture, and this is usually apparent in people's speech. 
Ahmed (1992) and Ochs (1992) perceive the relationship between language and gender as 
being very complicated, and not a simple straightforward mapping of linguistic forms to 
the social meaning of gender. Ochs (1992) states that gender relationship is constituted 
and mediated by the relation of language to attitude, social acts, social activities, and other 
social constructs. Ahmed (1992) and Ochs (1992) maintain that scholars in gender and 
language have now advanced their research understanding to investigate the relationship
• 9 £9between gender and discourse.
261 According to religion, people are equal socially, and their social relations should be built on this 
assumption. Conventionally, this, in some situations, is not possible either because o f the race, tribe or sex.
262 Gender studies started from the feminist movements in the 1970s by scholars such as Lakoff (1973) to 
recently with scholars such as Coates (1986/1993), Holmes et. al. (1999), Holmes (1995), and Mills (2003a).
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Coates (2003) identifies two approaches to gender differences in language: the dominance 
and the difference approach. The dominance approach ‘sees women as an oppressed group 
and interprets linguistic differences in women’s and men’s speech in terms of men’s 
dominance and women’s subordination’ (2003:12). The difference approach ‘emphasises 
the idea that women and men belong to different subcultures’ (2003:13).263 Coates 
concentrates on linguistic differences or variations, but her analysis is based on describing 
the differences found in speech and relating them to the social roles assigned to women 
and men. This method of analysis investigates gender and language through isolated 
speech acts, and examines speech as discrete from other factors, such as context.
Sadiqi (2003) identifies four sets of factors for examining gender and language in 
Morocco: (i) the large power structures that constitute Moroccan culture: (ii) social 
variables: (iii) contextual variables: and (iv) identity variables (2003:1). With regards to 
social variables, she sees the geographical origin, class (tribe), level of education, job 
opportunities, language skills and marital status as important factors in examining gender 
interaction. But how such factors influence the interpretation of speech depends on what is 
considered acceptable and unacceptable in a society.264 An educated woman needs to 
consider whether her society will accept her if she speaks differently from what is thought 
to be appropriate when interacting with a male. According to Zeyrek (2001):
men's language reflects authority and dominance, women's language 
submissiveness and secondary status. Such sharp distinctions can blur the subtlety 
and complexity of gender-differentiated styles and obliterate the reasons why 
women's language developed the way it did (2001:57).265
Although, to some extent, how Coates distinguishes gender talk between men and women 
apply to Arab women's speech, there is often misunderstanding because of gender 
differences across cultures. Mills (2003a) moves beyond the assumption that women’s 
speech is always necessarily different from men’s speech, and examines gender when
263 Coates (2003) argues that ‘in different social contexts an individual will speak in different ways ... 
moreover, speakers who differ from each other in terms o f age, gender, social class, ethnic group, for 
example, will also differ in their speech, even in the same context’ (1993:4).
264 Highly educated females in the Arab world face more problems than males do. Generally, females in the 
Arab world need to be more cautious in their language. Their knowledge, education and social status should 
not make them forget that they are females, and that they need to observe this fact in their linguistic 
utterances.
265 Coates also argues that ‘control o f topics is normally shared equally between participants in a 
conversation. In a conversation between speakers from the same gender, this seems to be the pattern, but 
when one speaker is male and one female, male speakers tend to dominate’ (2003:113)
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analysed alongside other variables and stereotype forms. She argues that the analysis of 
women’s speech is based on a stereotypical language usage of a very small group of 
women and then generalized about all women. She contends:
What has to be considered is the simple binary division between female and male, 
and also the way that gender operates at the level of a system which has been 
institutionalised, and which operates in stereotypes and assumptions about context 
which have a material impact on groups as well as individuals, rather than as 
something which functions simply at the level of the individual (2003:174).
For example, discussing 'gossiping' in Arabic, Al-sheha (1998) explains that ‘men, in fact, 
gossip more than women, but the contexts in which men gossip are different from the 
contexts in which women gossip, and that men’s understanding of gossip is different from 
women’s understanding of gossip’ (1998:7). This may be a result of how men and 
women are seen in Arabic society. Much of what is argued about gender interaction is 
influenced by stereotypes (see discussion of stereotype in this chapter). Some of Coates’s 
claims cannot be applied to female-male interaction in Arabic. For example, she argues 
that ‘women are careful to respect each other’s turn and tend to apologise' (2003:189). This 
is not the case in Arabic female interaction. Females, in Arabic, usually speak 
simultaneously, and try to dominate conversation when interacting with other females, but 
do the opposite when interacting with males. Because of some religious teachings which 
are considered the cornerstone of Arab culture, and cultural conventions, Arab females' 
way of interacting is sometimes different. Arab females usually sound more respectful 
towards their male addressees, and try to talk less and apologise more often because of 
religious teachings in the Qur'an. Such cultural restrictions may lead to misunderstanding 
in cross-cultural interaction.
5.4.3.1 Gender and cross-cultural interaction
Cultures differ in how they allow people to interact in order for them to be considered 
polite. What is endorsed for an Arab female communicating with a male, by her culture, is 
different from what is endorsed for an English female communicating with a male. 
Although such difference is contextual and not fixed, female-male interactions are always 
different from male-male and female-female interactions. Coates (2003) suggests that 
across the majority of cultures, men's language is 'the language of the powerful' and
266 It is stereotyped in Arabic that women gossip, talk more politely then men, but also swear more than men.
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'women's language that of those "without access to power”' (2003:206). Coates, referring 
to Arabic speakers, argues that males are more dominant in interaction than females. She 
holds that
women are linguistically at a double disadvantage when entering the public 
domain: first, they are (normally) less skilful at using the adversarial, 
information-focused style expected in such contexts: second, the (more 
cooperative) discourse styles which they are fluent in are negatively valued in 
such contexts (1993:14).
Coates’ view is true to some extent. Perhaps dominant is not the right word, but we may 
argue that Arabs allow more freedom to males than to females in different interactional 
situations. A female’s speech is interpreted differently from what she may intend by her 
society if she has not used language acceptable to her society. If a female compliments a 
male colleague, for instance, then this may lead to misunderstanding from her male 
mteractant, because this is not permitted culturally. Sadiqi states that
it is not that women are nurturing while men are not; rather, it is the potential 
sources of social power that are not the same for men and women: they are 
associated with different social roles and social roles do not carry the same 
social power (2003:276).
She considers this as a reason why men and women use different linguistic strategies. 
Thus, the linguistic choices that are made by females, in female-male context of 
interaction, are expected to be different from the linguistic choices made in female-female 
interaction. For instance, a female to female interaction, in front of men, would include 
different utterances to when women interact with men. Also, female to male interaction 
between strangers is different from female to male interaction between relatives or those 
who belong to the same community of practice.
Kharraki (2001) discusses different strategies that Arab men and women use when 
bargaining. He states that
267 Compliments are also discussed by Holmes (1988). She argues that in English 'women use compliment to 
each other significantly more often than they do to men or men do to each other'' (1988:463).
268 Communities o f Practice are groups o f people engaged in a task. They do not emerge randomly, but are 
structured by the kinds o f situations that present themselves in different places in society. 'The community o f  
practice is the level o f social organization at which people experience the social order on a personal and day- 
to-day basis, and through which they jointly make sense o f that social order' (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet, 
2003:57-58).
164
women and men are found to adopt different strategies when bargaining. There are 
some strategies which tend to be widely used by men, such as depreciating the 
quality of the vendor’s goods - a way of bargaining that demands quite 
considerable talking and a certain amount of audacity’ (2001:629).
He also believes ‘women use more direct bargaining strategies then men, due to social 
factors’ (ibid: 629). Although Kharraki discusses bargaining, his conclusion suggests that 
some societies allow more freedom to women than to men in some contexts and less 
freedom in others. He suggests that
bargaining is a shared feature between men and women. What seems to provide a 
very interesting debate, in this context, is the way in which each gender engages in 
the activity of bargaining -  that is to say the distinctive strategies that each gender 
makes use of in an attempt to persuade vendors to reduce the prices quoted for 
commodities (2001:619).2
According to Alrafahi (1926), in most parts of the Arab world, interaction is governed by 
the Islamic teachings from the Quran or the Prophet Mohammed’s sayings. For example, 
any male/female interaction should be in an open place, and probably supervised by a third 
party, especially if they are strangers. A male may not be able to ask about certain subjects 
if he is answered by a female relative of the person he is visiting or phone calling. 
Compliments between males and females who are strangers are forbidden. This makes 
interactants more cautious in male/female interaction, and a male might be considered 
impolite if he is not cautious as to what he says when interacting with a female, especially 
in cross-cultural interaction.
Male/female, interaction in Arabic involves numerous variables that male/female 
interaction in English does not. In Arabic, females are stereotyped as talkative, but only 
when among themselves. They are more respected by their societies when they use short
269 The respect and the freedom that a society gives to its people reflect what is acceptable or unacceptable in 
that society. This freedom ranges from the choice o f the topic, the linguistic strategy, the intonation and the 
type o f interaction.
2 Generally, in Arabic, communication between male and female strangers is not acceptable, even if  they 
work in the same place and/or teach one another. Such behaviour may lead to conflict which may involve 
other members o f the families. Abu-Haidar (1995), in relation to male/female Arabic interaction, points out 
that ‘men and women do not sit separately, but it is usually men, or older women who have acquired status o f  
seniority in the cian, who initiate conversation’ (1995:184). Females interact depending on what role they are 
performing. In some situations females are considered more polite if  they answer by keeping silence. For 
example when an Arab female is asked, by her father, whether she agrees to be a wife for a particular male, 
then she usually keeps silence which means agreement and respect of the her father as well.
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utterances, and are very concise and specific in targeting the main points discussed and do
771not discuss topics related to sex. When interacting with females, males are more 
respected when they use only the least amount of words. For example, in answering a 
greeting, the answer from the hearer to the speaker, in male/female interaction should 
include either the same amount of words or fewer than the one used by the speaker. The 
situation is different when the greeting is from male to male or from female to female, 
where the hearer is expected to use more linguistic units than that which s/he has received 
in order to be considered as polite.
In her article “The effect of social class and ethnicity on the discursive of feminities in the 
talk of British Bangladeshi girls”, Pichler (2001) demonstrates how the socio-cultural 
backgrounds of these girls affect the discourse they position themselves in. She proves 
that the girls are affected by the dominant discourse of both cultures. The influence of 
social background in determining gendered behaviour in Arabic societies is also discussed 
by Baker (1986). She explains that
although there are many types of institutions where women and men meet and 
work together, the men’s society and the women’s society are still separate, 
and women are expected not to trespass on men’s grounds by doing men’s 
work or assuming roles and participating in functions that men are expected to 
perform (1986:6).
Baker is arguing that, regardless of what individuals think of the relationship between men 
and women, women are expected to do what is considered culturally appropriate and 
follow the norms of their societies. Fishman (1990) argues that 'women's conversational 
troubles reflect not their inferior social training but their inferior social position' 
(1990:240). On a political note, Christie (2003) comments:
the terms within which women are able to access and utilise the resources of 
public discourse such as parliamentary debate are strongly related to the 
meanings they are able to generate in that context. I would argue that 
differential access to and use of these recourses will affect the impact that women 
as a group are able to have on political decision-making (2000:3).
271Manhart et. al. (2000) state that 'social norms often exercise a negative influence in the form o f  a low 
social view o f condoms and deeply rooted taboos against discussing sex (2000:1380).
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Kharraki (2000) investigates how and why eastern Moroccan men and women mark 
politeness differently. In his cross-cultural study, he selected three different speech acts: 
apology, compliment and bargaining, in order to examine the different genders’ strategies 
and what their linguistic behaviours may reveal. He discusses social variations at two 
levels: in men’s and women’s speech at the linguistic form (lexicon, syntax, and 
phonology), and gender differences at the discourse level, concentrating on differences in 
politeness, beyond the sentence level. He maintains that 'women appear to be very careful 
to maximize the cost/benefit for their addressee to show solidarity and protect their good 
relationship; whereas men minimize it so as to maintain social distance' (2000:196).
Discussing women's speech and politeness, Antonopoulou (2001) believes that 'women are 
supposed to use, more often than men, speech that involves markers of politeness, tact,
979 • •hesitancy and uncertainty' (2001:252). He offers analysis of male-female interactions in 
terms of sociological factors. He divides them into three factors; the deficit model, which 
assumes that women are disadvantaged speakers because of their upbringing; the 
dominance model, which assumes that women are socially powerless in relation to men; 
and the cultural difference model, which draws a parallel between gender and other social
973variables like ethnicity (Antonopoulou 2001:252). He argues that when men interact 
with women, they sometimes sound patronizing in their jokes, treating them like children 
(Antonopoulou 2001:260). This is culturally specific. For example, in Arabic, it rarely 
happens that men make jokes to women in a public place regardless of their relationships. 
Men often try to show a higher degree of politeness to women, especially when there is a 
third party listening.
The above discussion establishes that there are differences between male-male/female- 
female and male-female interactions. I have also confirmed that examining male and 
female language against their cultural background in certain contexts is very important in 
analysing interactions. How gender differences are perceived across cultures is different, 
and how such differences influence the production and interpretation of speech is also 
different. It is important first to realise whether there are misunderstandings between
272 Holmes (1995:144) suggests that 'women are more positively polite than men and are consequently 
expected to use more devices expressing positive politeness, such as greeting, expressions o f gratitude, 
friendly address forms and leave-takings'. We may agree with Holmes that women are more positively polite 
than men, but this depends on the context and the addressee, and, probably, cultural factors.
273 Macaulay (2001) argues that 'female speakers are not so much powerless in speech as culturally distinct 
from male speakers' (2001:294)
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interactants because of cultural difference in understanding certain factors that influence 
interaction; and second whether either interactant considers the other to be impolite.
5.4.4 Religion
The influence of religion in communication differs from one society to another and from 
one person to another. In Arabic, as I have explained in previous chapters, religion 
influences the choice of the linguistic strategies in almost every context of interaction, even
o n  athe choice of the topic of discussion. According to Abu-Akel (2001) and Farghal (1995) 
terms that refer to sex are highly euphemized in Arabic. The Holy Quran, for instance, 
frequently refers to 'sexual intercourse' as 'touching' or generally as 'committing sin' 
(1995:372). To Arabs, religion is something that influences education, the legal system, 
and almost any aspect of life. Gully (1994) and Holt (1994) state that modem Arabic is 
influenced by religion. Holt (1994) argues that the Arabic language is influenced by 
religion because it is the language of the Holy Quran. Blommaert and Verschueren, 
(1989) agree that religion influences behaviour, but they argue that it has a different effect,
77 f \for example, between Eastern societies and Western societies. They state that
religion has lost much of its importance in present-day Western Europe in the 
interaction between religious and non-religious segments of the population (a 
contrast which was a dominant political parameter until recently), whereas it has 
assumed renewed vigour in defining relations between a Christian majority and 
Muslim minority (1989:1).277
Holt (1994) refers to the influence of Westerners in religious culture that was experienced 
by the Algerians during French occupation. He points out, for instance, that the French
274 Islam, to Arabs, is the foundation o f any cultural activity and verbal/nonverbal performance. It forms the 
basis o f complete social, economic and political plans to Muslims, amongst themselves and others. 
Therefore, it is the orientation that Muslims are guided by in their everyday life.
275 The language o f the Quran is understood by any speaker o f Arabic whose mother tongue is Arabic, even 
non-educated. There are some words and expressions which are not used by any or most o f the Arabic 
dialects these days, (see chapter 1 for discussion)
276 Harris and Moran (2000) define a religious system as 'the means for providing meaning and motivation 
beyond the material aspects o f life, that is the spiritual side o f a culture or its approach to the supernatural’ 
(2000:10). They argue that ‘possibly the most difficult classification is ascertaining the major belief themes 
of a people, and how this and other factors influence their attitude toward themselves, others, and what 
happens in other world’ (2000:7).
277 Arabs think that they are protecting Islam with their language, and that Islam is protecting their language, 
and also that they need to protect their language and society from any intrusion such as Western influence. 
Gully (1994) argues that 'a society founded on a revealed religion requires the mechanism to guarantee the 
validity o f those texts (Quran and its teachings) at all times' (1994:268).
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built their exclusion policy on language and religion when they colonized Algeria. Holt 
sees religion influencing the structure of societies more than race. Pointing to what he calls 
tribal and urban Islam, he explains that ‘the move to the town, coupled with the earlier 
pacification of the tribes, meant that the urban form of Islam came to dominate as 
elsewhere in the Middle East (1994:35).279
Eid (1994), trying to find an explanation for the avoidance of mentioning females’ names 
in certain public places, explains that some of her results point to religion. She argues that
in view of the results pointing to religion as a strong predictor of the variation 
and to differences in the way the Muslim and Christian populations react to 
change, can the practice of identifying women without their names be 
attributed to Islamic culture (1994:97).
This view of naming and its link to religion is also discussed by Gardner (1994), who 
views the influence of religion in naming as being clear in the culture of Sudan. She 
examines why the Sudanese do not accept the change towards naming new generations 
with non-religious names.280 She argues that ‘the concern among some Sudanese was not 
so much that traditional names were decreasing in popularity, but that this might somehow 
be a sign of declining religiosity among the people’ (1994:119).
Rarely do we find a conversation in Arabic, whether short or long, that does not include 
Allah or any of His known ninety-nine names. The use of Allah’s name is crucial in 
creating harmony between Arabic interactants. Omitting it where it should be used may 
lead to breakdown in civility and to accusations of a lack of appropriateness. In Arabic,
278 He points out that 'the French state had particularly defined the emerging Algerian nation as Muslim and 
Arab/Berber by a policy o f exclusion, which included exclusion from the economic benefits o f a modem 
state, exclusion ... This exclusion was ultimately based, not on race, as the differences ..., but on language 
and religion’ (1994:34).
279 Benrabah (2004) and Holt (1940) agree that religion and personal identity are different among Arabs, and 
that the way education and the modem world influence people makes for differences in understanding and 
practising Islam. This view is challenged by some modem Islamic scholars such as Alqaradawee (2002), AL- 
kemi (2001) who argue that there is nothing called old Islam and New Islam or any difference between rural 
and urban Islam.
280 Mills (2003b) sees naming as an area that women can negotiate a position for themselves (2003b: 103).281 This does not necessarily mean that the religious words or expressions are intended pragmatically. Arabs 
sometime say words and expressions without even understanding what they mean, but they use them only 
because they understand that such expressions should be used in such contexts. As argued by Piamenta 
(1979) 'religious Arabic formulas such as wishes, greetings, farewell expressions, condolences, etc. were 
originally non-ritual personal invocations for help, protection, and support. However, they were developed in
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interactants may be irritated if others do not use Allah’s name, or certain expressions that 
include Allah’s name, in certain contexts. For example, a speaker talking about future 
plans should follow their utterance with “God Willing”, u ' ) ‘Insa Allah’, and their
interactant is expected to repeat ‘Insa Allah’. Insa Allah can be said initially by either of 
the interactants and then repeated by the other.282 ‘Insha Allah’, or the phrase ‘if Allah 
wishes’, looms large in the thinking of the average Arab Muslim. Farghal and Borini
(1997) explain that ‘Jordanians often use some politeness formulas in order to save face for 
mentioning a stereotypically negative lexical item in conversation such as shoes, toilet, 
donkey, etc’ (1997:80). In fact, all Arabs use some polite expressions after mentioning
'yo'isome tabooed words, expressions or some animal names such as dogs or donkeys.
However, it seems that religion is variously considered as a factor that influences and 
determines linguistic behaviour. Whereas it is seen as a very important factor in 
maintaining good relationships in communication in one culture, it is considered as alien in 
another. Farghal and Borini (1997) argue that 'it is the area of belief where differences
* )QAbetween Arab and Western societies are greatest (1997:81). This religious cultural 
background is different from the West, where religion does not play the same role that
oor #Islam does in Arabic culture. Islam intervenes in male/female interaction, same sex 
interaction, conflict solution, understanding of appropriate behaviour in certain contexts, 
naming, and in addressing others. Thus, religion provides ways of maintaining a good 
relationship between interactants, regardless of whether they are religious people or not. 
Such a development is difficult to understand cross-culturally, and interpreting pragmatic 
meaning in a cross-cultural interaction is also difficult. All this reflects the importance of
everyday spoken Arabic and became idiomatic and stereotyped without losing their Islamic essence' 
(1979:1).
282 Another example o f the use o f Allah is when a person is waiting for results o f his/her exams, what s/he 
would expect from others is expressions like ^  Khayraa Insha Allah’ which means ‘good results
God Willing’ or ‘Mwafak Be-edn Allah’, which means ‘successful by the permission o f  Allah’.
283 Farghal and Borini (1997:87) argue that ‘a close examination o f the use o f the formula ‘al-hamdu li-llah 
(praise be to Allah’) and similar expressions reveals that they frequently occur in everyday Arabic 
conversation’
284 The Islamic culture has a far-reaching influence on the patterns o f thought and speech o f Arabic speakers, 
as belief is one o f the basic components o f culture.
285 Hammad et. al. (1999) point out that ‘in the current Western world view, religion and daily life tend to be 
viewed dichotomously, whereas the Semitic tradition o f Judaism and Islam both viewed all aspects o f life 
within the context o f religion’ (1999:14). Of course, how Islam restricts and controls the behaviour of  
Muslims cannot be seen to be the same for all Muslims.
286 It is important that despite all the above, not all norms in the Arab world come from Islamic or religious 
backgrounds. For example, in some parts of the Arab world, Arab Muslims still believe in culturally inherited 
beliefs rather than Islamic religious teachings.
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religion in communication in Arabic, and how it is an important factor which must be 
considered when analysing cross-cultural interaction.
5.4.5 Stereotypes
Stereotypes are generally defined as generalizations or assumptions that societies make 
about the characteristics of all individual members of a particular group, based on their 
perception of that group. Gudykunst (1998) defines stereotypes as ‘the pictures we have in 
our heads for the people we place in the various social categories we use’ (1998:122). 
Wodak and Reisigl (2003) hold stereotypes to be typically an element of common 
knowledge, shared to a high degree in a particular culture. They define stereotype as ‘the 
verbal expression of a certain conviction or belief directed toward a social group or an 
individual as a member of that social group' (2003:378). There are different factors such as 
the knowledge that a person has about others or share with them, the media, and what we 
read about others that influence people's production of interpretation of utterances. How 
often people are influenced by these factors is not consistent, and consequently their effect 
on each individual is different.
Drawing on Hewstone and Brown (1986), Gudykunst (1998) identifies three essential 
aspects of stereotype: (1) categorization based on easily identifiable characteristics; (2) 
assumptions that certain attributes apply to most or all of the people in the category, and 
that people in the category are different to people in other categories with respect to these 
attributes; and (3) assumptions that individual members of the category have the attributes 
associated with their groups (1998:123). These three aspects illustrate that stereotypes are 
not always accurate and are built on generalization rather than on actual facts. Gudykunst 
(1998) distinguishes between stereotypes in general and social stereotypes. He maintains 
that stereotypes are certain generalizations made by individuals, or the general cognitive 
process of categorization, whereas social stereotypes are the stereotypes shared with 
members of a group. Mills (2003a) recognizes the importance of stereotypes, pointing out 
that they play a role in the way people interact. At the same time, however, she argues that 
finding an agreement on their role in an interaction is difficult. While we cannot ignore 
stereotypes, we cannot fully depend on them to make generalisations. Gudykunst (1998) 
argues that there are many reasons that stereotypes might be inaccurate or false, and that 
positive and negative aspects of our views of others influence our speech. Attitudes such as
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prejudice, ethnocentrism, ageism and sexism may lead us to wrongly stereotype certain 
groups of people.
5.4.5.1 Stereotypes and cross-cultural interaction
Interactants from different cultures may communicate with each other, influenced by 
stereotypes which have been gained either from the others’ cultures or from the media. 
Arabs sometimes complain of being stereotyped, and sometimes misunderstand each other 
because of stereotyping. For example, Arabs are usually shocked when they come to live in 
Britain because they do not find it to be as they had expected. There are different reasons 
for cultural shocks, and one of these reasons is that they compare British cultural values 
with their own. Mills, discussing male/female interaction and stereotype, argues that ‘the 
hypothesised forms of stereotype are equally damaging to both males and females, since 
they consist of assumptions about us which often clash with our own perception of 
ourselves’ (2003a: 185).
Buda and Elsayed-Elkhouly (1998) discuss the differences between Americans and Arabs. 
They argue that 'the United States is categorized as an individualistic culture, whereas
?ooresponses from the Arab sample categorize it as a collectivistic culture’ (1998:487). 
Arabs interacting with British / American people interaction is one of these types of 
interactions which are usually influenced by stereotypes that are not necessarily true. For 
example, Arabs think that the British and Americans are notoriously selfish and care only
287 Presuppositions may be influenced by stereotypes. According to Mey (1993), speakers, not sentences, 
have presupposition. Fillmore (1971) explains that ‘we may identify the presuppositions o f a sentence as 
those conditions which must be satisfied before the sentence can be used in any o f the functions just 
mentioned’ (1971:380, cited in Verschueren, 2003:44). Grundy (2000) argues that 'when someone speaks to 
us, we typically make all sorts o f assumptions about the background to their utterance which we presume to 
be mutually known before the utterance ever occurred' (2000:120). The presupposition that we have about an 
utterance is influenced by the context in which the utterance is performed, by the semantic and pragmatic 
meaning o f the linguistic items used, by the experience that the interactant has with the person with whom 
she is interacting and the history that they have together, including how they speak. All these factors are
influenced by stereotypes which are not necessarily accurate.
288 Although it is not easy to classify members o f certain societies in these terms, Westerners are classified as 
individual-centred interactants, whereas Arabs are classified as situation-centred interactants. Having a 
reasonable experience in English and Arab cultures, I can argue that there are situations in which Arabs seem 
to be more individual-centred than Westerners. Lindgren and Tebcherani (1971) explain that Arabs usually 
assign to themselves traits o f high context culture, and claim strong emphasis on how one should appear to 
others. They also explain that Americans assign to themselves low context type, and emphasise individuality. 
From an interactional point o f view, the linguistic patterns that Arabs use sometimes reveal that they are 
individual and do not pay attention to how they appear before others. On the other hand, linguistic utterances 
that Westerners use sometimes reveal that they respect their addressee more than Arabs do. An English 
person may use the word “sorry” even when s/he has not done anything wrong; for example, if  s/he is pushed 
aside accidentally by a stranger, s/he may say “sorry”. Such linguistic behaviour, although it is not 
impossible, does not ordinarily happen among Arabs.
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about themselves. They are not helpful to strangers and pay very little attention to their 
children when they are over sixteen.289 In addition they have very weak family relations, 
and girls are given freedom from a very early age and, therefore, do not respect their 
parents properly. Arabs think that Americans are arrogant, and lazy in understanding 
others’ culture, whereas the British understand others’ cultures in order to govern or divide 
them. Looking at what is happening in English societies, as an example, from an Arab 
perspective, we may find that what Arabs classify as bad conduct is classified as good 
conduct by the English, and an Arab person who has lived with English people and 
understood their culture would come up with a different conclusion about them from that 
which is stereotyped.
However, as Huntington (2003) points out, people differ because of their religion, history, 
language and tradition, which makes them understand others differently from reality. What 
people presuppose about others influences their performance or interpretation, and may 
lead them to a different interpretation from what is intended by an utterance. For example, 
after 11th September 2001 or the 7th of July 2005, when Islamic groups attacked American 
and Britain, a Westerner may have a different interpretation of what an Arab Muslim 
intends when communicating.290 This is because Islam, according to the Western media, is 
linked to the cause of most of the current problems in the world. Hence, what is 
stereotyped, whether because of political or cultural background, may influence the
901production and interpretation of utterances. Generalization and stereotyping in relation 
to cross-cultural interaction are causes for misunderstandings in Westemer-Arab cross-
9Q9 •cultural interaction. In analysing Arab-English interaction, this factor should be 
considered, although we should be careful not to generalize.
289 Nydell (2002) points out that ‘Arab society is built around the extended family system. Individuals feel a 
strong affiliation with all o f their relatives - aunts, uncles, and cousins - not just with their immediate family. 
The degree to which all blood relationships are encompassed by a family unit varies among families, but 
most Arabs have over a hundred “fairly close” relatives’ (2002:91).
290 Weston (2002) discussesd how perceptions of Arabs in America are influenced by the local press. They 
state that ‘the local press tends to treat such groups as multifaceted members o f the community and that 
stereotyping and over-generalization increase as distance from the community increases’ (2002:8). They 
continue that ‘the implication o f stereotyping o f Arabs in domestic and international news coverage would 
appear to be exponentially greater in the post-September 11, 2001 ’ (Ibid:2002:23).
Yang (2002) explains that 'the speaker's sociocultural background and the communicative environment
inevitably affect the way people talk' (2002:69).
292 I do not think that Islam is being blamed by the Western media for every type o f problem that the world 
faces, but perhaps only what is called "terrorism".
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5.5 Conclusion
The chapter introduces a cultural concept that should be considered in theorizing for cross- 
cultural interaction. What we understand from the above is that communicative 
competence, the knowledge that underlies socially appropriate speech which Hymes 
(1972) introduced, is an important issue in theorizing in cross-cultural interaction. 
According to him, ‘analysis of miscommunication in intercultural research is concerned 
with degrees of communicative competence (in the sense of appropriate social skill), rather 
than as the achievement of competent relationships’ (1972:6). The above discussion also 
stresses Gudykunst’s (1983) argument about theorizing in cross-cultural communication. 
He argues that 'the initial goal of theory in cross-cultural communication is understanding 
rather than prediction or control’ (1983:15). In aiming to find an appropriate approach to 
analysing cross-cultural interaction, he suggests that cross-cultural communication is an 
important field that studies how people from different cultures interact successfully, but he 
holds that it needs to move from discussion on sensitising concepts toward consistent 
theoretical frameworks (1983:13). He addresses the question; “why is theory necessary in 
cross-cultural communication?” or “what is the function of theorizing in analysing cross- 
cultural communications?” These are important questions which need to be answered in 
order to understand the process of understanding in cross-cultural communication, and how 
the same factors that influence interaction are interpreted differently across cultures.
However, the above discussion addresses these issues and shows how interactants may 
have different understandings of certain phenomena because of their different cultural 
backgrounds, and consequently different understandings of the context. As Levinson et. al.
(1998) stress, understanding the reasons for such different interpretations is valuable in 
analysing cross-cultural interactions. They state that
in analysing and understanding cultural differences it is important to pay attention 
to how members of various cultures see i) the nature of people, ii) a person’s 
relationship to the external environment, iii) the person’s relationship to other 
people, iv) the primary mode of the activity, v) people’s orientation to space, 
and vi) the person’s temporal orientation (1998:1 -2).
The criticism that this chapter offers is that cultural factors are still not considered 
sufficiently in the applicable methods of analysing politeness that are used in cross-cultural
174
communication. Because of such arguments, Gudykunst stresses that there is a desperate 
need for conceptual frameworks that will give direction to the diverse research efforts 
taking place within it, and this is the aim of this chapter. To solve this problem, Okabe 
(1983) presents an alternative way of theorizing in cross-cultural communication. He calls 
it an 'Eastern way'. He suggests that
the Eastern way is a way of looking at human communication by analysing 
and categorizing cultural assumptions, values, and characteristics of 
communication and rhetoric as they are found in Japanese culture in 
comparison and contrast with those in the American counterpart (1983:21).
Okabe presents the cultural values in Japan and USA from different aspects and in a 
comparative way. He discusses definitions of certain concepts of communication such as 
rhetorical substance, which, he argues, enables the speaker to link his commitment to those 
of his listeners. Okabe holds that cross-cultural communication can be analysed in forms of 
structure, strategy and style and what influences them, which all create discourse problems 
between speakers who have different cultural backgrounds, as cultural values are different.
Motivations in each culture are different, and the cultural variables that influence 
interaction are different, with the interpretation of utterances being built on these 
differences. Simply identifying differences and similarities between cultures might not be 
sufficient to provide a framework of cross-cultural communication. If what is considered 
appropriate is a controversial issue within one culture, even between individuals, then 
cross-cultural interaction will create more discrepancies. Theorizing in such an 
environment is more complicated because of the different understanding of the variables 
that influence communication, as I have explained. A speaker, in cross-cultural situations, 
may sound impolite to his/her interactants because he/she does not use the same patterns 
that are expected to be used by his/her interactant in a particular situation, or because s/he 
understands a variable such as gender or power differently form his/her interactant. An 
analytical approach to cross-cultural interaction should explain why speakers from 
different cultures misunderstand each other.
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Chapter 6
Data Analysis and Discussion
6.1 Introduction
As discussed in previous chapters, cross-cultural interactions are influenced by a number 
of factors which can lead to misunderstandings. These factors can be linguistic, cultural, 
contextual or interpersonal. Because cross-cultural interaction is the focus of the current 
study, I concentrate on culture and its influence on how individuals understand context and 
how their cultural background shapes this, through the analysis of cross-cultural 
interaction. My aim has been to investigate whether core theorists of politeness such as 
Brown and Levinson (1987) and Leech (1983) have adequately considered cultural 
differences and potential misunderstandings arising from contextual and cultural issues in 
their analysis. I will conduct my analysis using what I suggest is a more pragmatic 
approach in analysing cross-cultural interaction. In this chapter, I will again argue that a 
contextual, pragmatic approach does not just analyse politeness in non-contextualised 
utterances that convey speech acts, such as "apology", "blame" and "thanks", as do most 
politeness theories. Instead, I argue that such an approach considers cultural and 
contextual variables, as well as personal differences between interactants, allowing an 
analysis of how these influence the construction and interpretation of utterances.
This chapter investigates the core questions and hypotheses of this thesis by examining 
data from interactions between native and non-native English speakers. I will focus on the 
examination of misunderstandings (as defined in Chapters 1 and 4) caused by differing 
interpretations of intentions, leading to interactants’ consideration of each other’s 
contributions as impolite. I also examine the strategies used to avoid potential conflict. 
Thus, after providing a summary of the aim of the thesis, I will discuss the method of the 
research and my analytical approach. Then I will discuss the data, before moving on to the 
discussion and findings of the data, where I will first discuss FTAs and indirectness in 
cross-cultural interaction. I then discuss context and culture, and finally context and 
understanding.
6.1.1 Summary of the aims of the thesis
As discussed in the aims and the research questions of this thesis in chapter 1, 
misunderstandings may occur between interactants in cross-cultural interaction.
293 In chapter 1 ,1 defined understanding/misunderstanding and politeness/impoliteness as discussed in this 
thesis. In chapter 2, 4 and 5 ,1 discussed different views o f misunderstanding.
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consequently, this misunderstanding may lead interactants to consider each other of being 
inappropriate or impolite. The aims of the thesis can be summarised as follows:
1) To analyse the extent to which linguistic utterances are influenced by different 
cultural, contextual and interpersonal factors. These factors have an effect not only 
on utterances but also on the way they are understood (see chapters 2 - 5).
2) To analyse the data in relation to Relevance Theory (1995) and the theories 
of politeness, in particular Brown and Levinson (1987) to find out how interactants 
understand each other and how politeness is understood across cultures. I also 
examine misunderstandings caused by different interpretations of what is 
considered to be polite by interactants. (See chapters 2 and 4)
3) To investigate the ways that culture and context are enmeshed, and how 
interactants try to negotiate an appropriate position for themselves from what they 
hypothesise as a cultural stand on a particular issue (See Chapter 1).
4) To show that misunderstandings between interlocutors from different cultures 
arise from their failure to understand the different politeness norms or the linguistic 
realisation of politeness in different cultures. I also aim to show that an approach to 
politeness that focuses on the pragmatics of interpretation is needed to explain 
where pragmatic failure occurs, and to isolate the cultural differences that lead to 
misunderstandings.
After describing my methodology, I will provide a description of my analytical approach. I 
will then analyse the data in relation to my main concerns.
6.2 Method of Research
6.2.1 Data Collection
My data comes from recordings of conversations between native and non-native English 
speakers. I chose this method rather than DCTs294 because the DCT is an instrument to
294 DCT stands for Discourse Completion Test. According to Billmyer and Varghese (2000) DCT was 
adopted in 1982 by Blum-Kulka (1982) for the purpose o f investigating speech acts. It is a questionnaire
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investigate speech acts and I, like many other researchers discussed in the theoretical 
chapters of the thesis, consider such analysis to be fundamentally flawed. Further, DCTs 
do not provide researchers with examples of authentic interaction. Analysing recordings of 
natural talk, on the other hand, gives examples of how language is performed and 
interpreted and what influences these processes. As Golato (2003) points out:
recording naturally occurring talk-in-interaction enables the researcher to study 
how language is organized and realized in natural settings, whereas 
responses from data elicitation procedures such as DCTs indirectly reflect the 
sum of prior experience with language (2003:90).
The data was gathered as follows:
A) 15 conversations were recorded between pairs of native and non-native English 
speakers. The 15 native speakers were all male or female post-graduates from different 
parts of England. The 15 non-natives were Arabs, again all post-graduates, male and 
female from Libya, who have lived in the United Kingdom for at least two years. All the 
non-native speakers learned the English language both in their own country’s school 
systems, and in the UK. They are fairly fluent with some awareness of British culture.
The discussions each lasted for about twenty five minutes. No specific topics were given. 
Consequently, there was a wide range of subjects: social, religious, and political, including 
the relationship between Arabs and the West. The participants were given a questionnaire 
in order to provide background information concerning their linguistic and cultural 
experiences with people of other cultures. Some were subsequently selected for follow-up 
interviews (See Appendix 2) to investigate the reasons behind their language choices, and 
certain implicatures that these language choices may have created in situations where
90Smisunderstandings occurred.
containing a set o f briefly described situations designed to elicit a particular speech act. Subjects read the 
situations and respond in writing to a prompt (2000:517).
295 After transcribing all o f the 15 conversations, I selected 8 extracts from 5 conversations because I found 
that the others were either similar or did not warrant detailed analysis.
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296B) TV and radio conversations were selected from British and American sources , 
between native speakers of English and non-native speakers from different parts of the 
world where Arabic is the mother tongue. The samples were selected from 20 recordings. 
The topics deal with political issues which are sensitive for both the interviewers and 
interviewees, and understood differently within each culture. I have chosen 7 extracts 
from 4 interviews to analyse. I decided to analyse casual conversation as well as TV and 
Radio interviews in order to include as many different conversational contexts as possible 
involving native speakers and Arab speakers of English.
6.2.2 Procedure
Some recordings were selected for analysis because explicit or implicit conflict, conflict 
avoidance or misunderstandings were apparent. These conversations were transcribed, and 
the linguistic strategies used within the situations of misunderstanding were analysed in 
relation to the theories of politeness and understanding discussed in the previous chapters. 
Having identified specific examples, the participants were asked to take part in a follow-up 
interview (See Appendix 2).
The main aim of the analysis is to investigate how cultural and contextual factors influence 
interaction and their roles in the delivery and interpretation of what is said. This is based 
on my argument that there are a number of theories that address the issue of 
misunderstanding and politeness, but their claims cannot always be upheld in cross-cultural 
interaction. Therefore, I concentrate on the interactants' meanings in relation to the context 
to see what has influenced their utterances. I examine how interactants infer each other’s 
intended meaning and how relevance determines whether interactants consider each other 
to be polite or impolite. Utterance meaning in cross-cultural interaction has more possible 
interpretations than in a monocultural interaction. How interactants communicate depends 
on inferring what is intended. Sperber and Wilson (1995) argue that
296 On the whole, the thesis is an investigation o f the speech o f Arabs with British speakers, but in several 
interactions I have included the speech o f Americans. I am aware o f the differences in American and British 
speech and this may have some impact on the way that the interactions play out especially in relation to 
politeness norms, but I hope that does not substantially change the nature o f the points that I have to make. 
As explained by Cohen (1987), Farghal and Borini (1997) and Farghal, M. (1993) Arabs use the word 
Westerners” to refer to Europeans and Americans. The terms “West” and “Westerners” are still used by 
Arabs to refer to Americans and Europeans, especially on a political level. For example, it is usually said (in 
different types o f media) that one Arab country has a good relationship with the West, which means with 
European countries and America. Arabs also refer to Americans and Europeans when they say that they Are 
invaded by Western cultures.
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inferential communication involves the application, not of special-purpose 
decoding rules, but of general-purpose inference rules, which apply to any 
conceptually represented information (1995:176)
As discussed in chapters 1 and 4, the notion of context is a central issue within Relevance 
Theory. It is the set of assumptions that a hearer uses in the interpretation of a particular 
utterance. Escandell-Vidal (1996) states 'the hearer, guided by the presumption of 
relevance, selects the context that will yield an optimally relevant interpretation: the 
context is not given, but chosen by the hearer' (1996:637). Furthermore, Sperber and 
Wilson state that 'the propositional form the hearer should be interested in recovering is the 
one that is consistent with the principle of relevance' (1995:184) Thus, identifying the 
propositional form of an utterance by the hearer is not a straightforward process in all types 
of interactions. It is related to the interpretation of what is relevant.
I examine cultural differences along with the different and sometimes conflicting 
understandings of context, which I believe theories of politeness do not adequately 
consider.
6.3 My Analytical approach
Whilst I do not claim that models of politeness are unable to analyse cross-cultural 
interaction, it is certainly the case that no one model seems to be able to provide an 
adequate analysis. Kallia (2004) posits that
if we consider that perceptions of politeness change through time and vary 
from culture to culture, then the complexity of the matter starts to become obvious 
... Politeness is not a matter of a form (presence of politeness markers in an 
utterance) but also a content (2004:147).
I propose a contextual, pragmatic approach to allow us to analyse politeness more 
adequately by considering variables such as context and culture, as well as linguistic and
907cognitive issues as considered in Relevance Theory and post-Brown and Levinson 
theory of politeness (See chapters 2 and 4). The following table illustrates the variables
297 Edstrom (2004) maintains that 'factors, such as professional training or personality, may also shape one's 
conversational style' (1499).
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influencing the analysis of politeness which are either not considered or not adequately
908considered by the core theories of politeness.
Table 1
Interactional factors
Comtext
linguistic Interpersonal culture
vocabulary, 
grammar, 
pronunciation, 
style, content
Attitude, motivation, interest, 
power, distance, degree of 
imposition, previous utterances, 
intentionality of understanding, 
time, place, audience, 
professional, personality, 
shared/available knowledge, 
previous utterances
Society, norms, conventions, values, 
habits, social relation, social pressure, 
gender, age, mother tongue, class, 
tribe, education, stereotypes and 
religion
The factors in table one are based upon my review of theories of politeness in chapter 2, 
and of theories of understanding in chapter 4. As discussed here, these factors influence 
interpretations of politeness which are either not analysed, or not considered adequately in 
the core theories of politeness dealing with cross-cultural interaction. Such factors 
influence utterances and their interpretation by interactants from different cultures, and 
some change according to the context of the interaction. Because of such factors, what the 
speaker means is sometimes misunderstood (intentionally or unintentionally) and so 
utterances may give rise to different implicatures than intended by the speaker. An 
utterance may also be intended to give rise to a strong implicature that the hearer interprets 
as weak, because of contextual or cultural factors. 299 (See chapter 4, section 4.3.1) As 
Escandell-Vidal (1996) states:
there is a crucial difference between implicature and explicature. Implicatures are 
the assumptions that the speaker tries to make manifest to the hearer without 
expressing them; implicatures are recovered by inference. Explicatures are the 
assumptions that the speaker explicitly communicates, i.e., the assumptions that can 
be directly developed from the logical form of the utterance (1996:637).
298 Some of the interactional variables are considered by the core theories o f politeness such as distance, 
power, language use, but not in relation to all interactants involved.
299 Also Kallia (2004) maintains 'implicatures are calculated by the hearer on the basis o f general knowledge 
shared with the speaker, knowledge of the particular situation, the semantic content o f the utterance produced 
and the assumption that the speaker is being cooperative' (2004:151).
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Understanding politeness depends on interactants' understanding of what is communicated, 
influenced by their cultural backgrounds and experiences. This includes understanding the 
link between what is said and how it is interpreted.
The following table summarises how interactants are influenced:
____________Table 2:Production of utterance____________
_______________________Speaker_______________________
Evaluation of the context 
Cultural factors 
Interpersonal factors 
Production of utterance/s
This table does not simply list what influences interaction, but explains what happens when 
someone speaks and why the factors influencing that speech are not stable. When a speaker 
produces an utterance, s/he first evaluates factors that influence interaction, whether 
contextual or cultural. Speakers are also influenced by their cultural background, but the 
pressure this puts on their evaluation of the context of the interaction includes the assumed 
intentions of the interactant. Interpersonal factors are also influential in evaluating context, 
and analysing how what is intended is interpreted because of the context.300
Table 3:Interpretation of utterance
 Hearer __________
Understanding explicature/s 
Evaluation of the context 
Cultural factors 
Interpersonal factors 
Interpretation of utterance
Understanding is also influenced by the hearer’s evaluation of the context as shown in 
table 2. The difference between table 2 and table 3 is that the context in table 3 includes 
the speaker's utterance, which means that the hearer is also influenced by what the speaker
- i n isays. How an utterance is, or is not, intended to be interpreted by the hearer in relation
300 The process o f producing an utterance changes according to the speaker's understanding o f the context, as 
Relevance Theory (1995) points out. Before using an utterance, the speaker evaluates the context o f the 
interaction in relation to her/his culture which includes his/her relationship with his/her addressee, plus 
personal interests. The outcome of this evaluation results in linguistic choices which reflect what s/he wants 
his/her interactant to understand.
301 The evaluation o f the speaker's utterance in relation to the context o f the interaction by the addressee when 
starting talking has an impact on the conversation because they explicitly or implicitly include the purpose o f  
the conversation.
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to his/her cultural and interpersonal factors is important in this contextual, pragmatic 
approach. The same utterance may produce different interpretations because of different 
understandings of its relevance. Identifying the speaker's meaning is one of the difficult 
communicative processes that interactants belonging to different cultures face, since they 
interpret the context of interaction differently. Sperber and Wilson (1995) state:
if comprehension is identified as a process of identifying the speaker's informative 
intention, linguistic decoding is not so much a part of the comprehension process as 
something that precedes that real work of understanding, something that merely 
provides an input to the main part of the comprehension process (1995:177)
The speaker's evaluation of context might be close to or very different from the hearer's. 
The speaker may intend an utterance to give rise to strong implicature, which the addressee 
might understand differently because of a different evaluation of the context.302 I therefore 
posit a different approach to analysis since an utterance usually offers more than one 
implicature in relation to the context of interaction. Brown and Levinson (1987) also 
consider implicature in their analysis, suggesting that certain implicatures are fixed within 
utterances analysed in relation to certain variables. (See chapter 2) I argue that this is not 
always the case, since the context of all interactions can not itself be fixed. This means that 
we cannot associate certain explicatures and implicatures with an utterance without 
considering the context of the interaction. In cross-cultural interaction, the context of 
interaction is not the same for all of the interactants. Thus, there would be no fixed 
interpretation for an utterance that all interactants would reach.
The contextual pragmatic approach that I propose posits that an utterance does not 
necessarily have a fixed meaning that is drawn from the linguistic choices and the strategy 
used. Sperber and Wilson (1995) state that
In Relevance Theory, there is no claim about a constant correlation between 
sentence types and illocutionary act types. Linguistic forms do not directly encode 
illocutionary forces, but merely serve as a guide for interpretation, i.e., as a
302 As discussed in chapter 4, understanding occurs when the content o f the message is filtered out from the 
utterance, then the information evaluated in relation to the context o f the interaction (See Watts, 2003 
chapter2, and Sperber and Wilson chapter 4). The context of the interaction provides the hearer with the 
relevant assumption (see Sperber and Wilson, 1993/95) depending sometimes upon previous discourse or 
encyclopaedic knowledge, if  the communication is successful (see Scollon and Scollon, 2005). Both the 
speaker and the addressee produce or interpret an utterance influenced by cultural background and the 
contexts o f their personal situations.
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constraint on relevance: they "make manifest the direction in which relevance is to 
be sought" (1986:254).
An utterance should be analysed in relation to the whole context. Green (1997) believes 
that in Relevance Theory an utterance should be analysed in relation to the meaning of the 
other utterances in the conversation or the background of the interactants which might give 
rise to different implicatures than those the speaker intended. As Watts (2003) states, 
interactants need to guess what is mutually manifest or available to one another, and 
cultural differences might result in them making bad guesses (2003:70).303
The core theories of politeness do not provide us with an adequate analysis of politeness, 
especially in cross-cultural interaction.304 Spencer-Oatey and Jiang (2003) argue that 
'people's use of language is influenced not only by immediate contextual factors, such as 
D, relative P and R, but also by underlying sociocultural principles or concerns' 
(2003:1645). Christie’s (2003) critique that 'the descriptive power of Brown and 
Levinson's model of politeness may be limited and therefore not be the most useful 
analytical tool in this context' (2003:26), is pertinent in suggesting another approach to 
analysis. I also take into account some critiques of politeness theories such as Eelen 
(2001), Mills (2003a), Watts (2003), Sperber and Wilson (1993/95) and Toolan (1996) in 
order to analyse more adequately the variables that influence interaction.305 The main goal 
is to consider the factors which might influence the production and interpretation of 
utterances through analysing what is understood and how it is relevant.
303 Sperber and Wilson (1993/95) discuss how shared knowledge is exploited in communication and argue 
that the cognitive environment of an individual is a set o f facts that are manifest to him/her, but not
necessarily to his/her interactant in cross-cultural interaction.304 Hernandez (1999) tries to establish a better cross-cultural theory o f politeness by considering the working 
o f some universal cognitive tools. He holds that Brown and Levinson do not provide adequate support in 
their claims o f universality. Meier (1995b) argues ‘it is time to critically re-examine Brown and Levinson's 
framework and its manifestations in the treatment o f so-called politeness phenomena' (1995:381). She argues 
for a broader view o f politeness, one which leads to the rejection o f equating politeness with specific speech 
acts, lexical items, or syntactic constructions. Fukushima and Iwata (1985) also insist that there is still much 
research to be done in the area o f politeness and how interactants understand and produce utterances, 
especially in cross-cultural interaction.
305 In order to show that analysing how politeness is managed in interaction is not adequately considered in 
the core theories I indicate some other theories o f politeness such as Spencer-Oatey (2000), Eelen (2001), 
Mills (2003a) and Watts (2003) which are more pragmatic in considering more variables in their analysis 
(See chapter 2). I also discuss some approaches, such as Sperber and Wilson (1993/95) and Toolan (1996), 
which examine the relationship between linguistic meaning and intended meaning (see chapter 4). In chapter 
3 , 1 discussed how context and culture are important factors in interaction and a theory o f analysing 
politeness should adequately analyse these factors and how they influence interaction.
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6.3.1 Procedure of analysis
My approach shows a clear link between analysing interaction in general and politeness in 
particular. As shown by the theorists drawn on in the different chapters of this thesis (see 
chapters 2, 3,. 4 and 5), interaction is influenced by cultural and contextual factors. In 
order to understand whether interactants are communicating appropriately or not in cross- 
cultural interaction, we need to consider the contextual factors that influence that 
interaction in relation to all interactants. Thus, drawing on the Relevance Theory and those 
theories of politeness that are critical of Brown and Levinson (1987) such as Spencer- 
Oatey (2000), Eelen (2001), Mills (2003) and Watts (2003) (See chapter 2), I have 
proceeded as follows:
a) I analyse utterances to set out the explicatures and implicatures that they might 
give rise to; (See Sperber and Wilson (1995))307
b) I examine which might be strong implicatures and whether there are agreements on 
these between the interactants in relation to the context of interaction;
c) I determine whether there are any misunderstandings between the interactants, and 
the reasons behind them. This includes analysing any factors that influence the 
context to identify whether there are different understandings of the context in 
cross-cultural interaction; (See chapter 2)
d) I analyse whether the strategy used by the speaker is or is not polite to the hearer, 
linguistically and pragmatically (Spencer-Oatey (2000), Mills (2003), Watts (2003)).
e) I investigate the reasons behind interactants' evaluation of each other's utterance (Eelen
306 For example Mills (2003a) argues that interaction can be influenced by culture and relationships o f the 
interactants or any other force that is part o f the interaction, and Arasaratnam and Doerfel (2005) also argue 
that the first step in developing a cultural model o f intercultural communicative competence (ICC) is to 
investigate the identity and nature of these variables that contribute towards ICC.(2005:138). (See chapter 2).
307 The analysis is focused on setting out the explicatures and implicatures that an utterance might give rise to 
because by spelling out the explicatures and implicatures that an utterance has we would be able to 
understand the meaning o f what is said and what goes beyond what is said in relation to all interactants, and 
whether there are misunderstanding between interactants. Through setting out an utterance's explicatures, we 
understand its direct meaning, that is the meaning connected to the semantic content o f the sentence. 
Consequently we can understand the explicit content o f an utterance, or what is directly conveyed. And, 
through setting out an utterance's implicatures, we understand its indirect meaning, where a speaker means 
one thing and conveys something else. By analysing the implicatures that an utterance might give rise to we 
can understand what is implicated and not said in cross-cultural context, and whether what is meant by the 
speakers is understood to the addressee through the explicatures that an utterance generates. This means that 
by using implicatures, we can understand what an utterance means, implies or suggests, irrespective o f  
whether that was part o f the sentence's meaning or dependent on the conversational context. (See chapter 2 
and 4)
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(2001).308
As viewed by Sperber and Wilson (1995) explicatures are a product of both linguistic 
decoding and pragmatic inference, whilst implicatures rely solely on inference. A single 
utterance may have more than one explicature and implicature. It yields a range of 
semantic representations. The utterance will lead to different explicatures and implicatures, 
their main difference being in how the content is derived. The main goal of the hearer is to 
identify the explicatures and implicatures communicated.
I conclude from reviewing the relevant literature (See chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5), that the 
contextual pragmatic approach I suggest is based on analysing contextual variables and is 
sensitive to a range of influences, allowing analysts to look at wider implicatures by 
analysing understanding of both speakers and hearers, and consider the meaning of 
utterances in better relation to the context. Christie (2007) states that 'the analysis of 
politeness would require an engagement with the way in which a word or phrase is 
functioning within the specific text' (Christie, 2007:292). Understanding whether an 
utterance is polite is a matter of analysing interactants' utterances in relation to each other, 
and the reasons behind their linguistic choices. Utterance meaning is worked out according 
to the context of interaction and its relation to other utterances in a conversation. 
Analysing an individual utterance may lead to an understanding that it is polite or impolite 
according to Brown and Levinson's model, but analysing it as a part of a discourse may 
lead to an alternative judgement.
Analysing politeness using my contextual pragmatic approach acknowledges that hearers 
too have responsibility for interpreting politeness. In order to understand politeness, we 
should therefore analyse how the hearer infers what is relevant in an utterance from the 
several interpretive possibilities that it might give rise to. As Sperber and Wilson assert, 
'every act of ostensive communication communicates the presumption of its own optimal 
relevance' (1995:260). According to them, the correct interpretation of an ostensive 
stimulus is the first accessible interpretation; and that 'the ostensive stimulus is the most 
relevant one compatible with the communicator's abilities and preferences' (1995: 275).
308. 1 am not claiming that I am using only what is offered by Relevance Theory in my approach o f analysis, 
although it appears to be more informed with Relevance Theory. I have used, along with what Relevance 
Theory offers, other post-Brown and Levinson views to develop my contextual pragmatic approach o f the 
analysis in order to combine social views and views o f cognition to analyse politeness.
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The hearer's interpretation of the relevance of an utterance is crucial in determining what is 
communicated. Even if the speaker aims to be polite, the hearer may misunderstand 
intentionally or unintentionally.309 Thus, my approach broadly investigates politeness, 
examining any factor that might influence the interaction and considering politeness as a 
discursive phenomenon, working at a discourse rather than at a sentential level.
6.4 Data
6.4.1 Tape-Recorded casual conversations and TV / Radio conversations
I decided to analyse both casual conversation as well as TV and Radio conversation, in 
order to include different types of cross-cultural contexts. This is because, in this thesis, I 
am arguing that politeness should be analysed culturally and contextually, since utterances 
are judged in relation to the variables that influence the context of the interaction. The 
context of casual conversations is different from TV and Radio conversations. In the 
casual conversations I analysed interactants who a) do not have clear prearranged plans 
and goals for their conversations; b) who have no previous ideas about their interactants in 
person; i.e. all they know about each other is that they are not from the same culture, and 
have a different mother tongue; and c) conversations usually taking place outside of 
specific institutional settings. In the TV and Radio interviews, a) interactants have 
prearranged plans and goals for their conversations (for example, the interviewer knows 
the interviewee's attitude and interest in a political discussion, and also knows the 
interviewee's name); b) either one or both of the interactants have some knowledge of their 
interactants and their goals in the interaction, and c) they usually take place within specific 
institutions.
Hutchby (2006) states that 'utilizing what we know about how humans communicate on the 
interpersonal level can reveal much about how communication occurs at a 'mass' level, at 
least in the context of radio and television' (2006:17). There are factors that influence
O 1 Atelevision and radio interviews that are not present in every day conversation. Scannell 
(1991) states that the main audience for any broadcasting talk differs not only physically
309 Badawi (1996) argues that analysing an utterance involves the hearer in the same way that it involves the 
speaker. They argue that there is no communication unless the listener has understood what the speaker has 
meant. Sperber and Wilson (1993) argue that communication includes the stimulus that an interactant 
produces to make meaning manifest to his/her interlocutor.
310 Cameron (2002) states 'the broadcast media may seem like a very convenient source for all kinds o f  
spoken data, but they should be approached with some caution. Broadcast talk has special characteristics 
which arise from the nature o f the medium and the relationship it produces between speakers and (different 
sets of) addressees' (2002:26)
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but culturally and temporally. Hutchby (2006) summarizes the differences between 
ordinary conversation and broadcasting conversation:
Broadcast talk adopts elements of everyday conversation as part of its overarching 
communicative ethos; broadcast talk is nevertheless different from ordinary 
conversation by virtue of being an institutional form of discourse that exists at the 
interface between public and private domain of life (e.g. the studio setting in which 
the talk is produced and the domestic setting in which it is received); broadcast talk 
is a specific type of institutional discourse because it is directed at an 'overhearing' 
audience separated from the talk's site of production by space and also, frequently, 
by time (2006:18).311
However, the difference is more complicated when the media context includes different 
cultures. Factors that influence broadcast conversations are sometimes evaluated 
differently between interactants from different cultures and by their audiences, for example 
in relation to the topic of the conversation. Thomborrow (2002) believes that 'participant 
status and identity can in some cases shape the kind of talk that is produced within the 
context of an interview' (2002:87)312 Al-Khatib (2001) states that 'style shift is determined 
by a number of such sociological factors as topic, situation and addressee; and in order to 
design a speech style, the speaker should be aware of these factors in relation to the 
audience involved' (2001:393). An utterance in a face-to-face interaction might not 
provide the same implicatures in a radio or TV interaction. What might only be considered 
an annoying or inappropriate utterance by a speaker in a casual conversation might be 
considered as an insult or an impolite speaker in a radio or TV conversation.
This difference in contextual or cultural factors within an interaction may lead to 
misunderstandings between speakers. For example, in TV and radio conversations, there 
may be a gender difference between interviewer and interviewee. This makes for a greater 
the possibility of cross-cultural misunderstanding. Macaulay (2001), in the analysis of 
indirectness in male and female interviewers in topical and political interviews on radio 
and television, states that:
311 In an earlier edition discussing media talk, Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998) point out that it is important to 
study interaction in institutional settings because 'we listen to an enormous amount o f talk that has been 
produced within the institutional and organizational context o f television and radio studios' (1998:145).
312 However, Thomborrow (2002) discusses different issues in news interviews and explains the difference 
between turn structure, formulation of the data, institution neutrality, controlling o f the agenda, getting the 
sense, arguing and striking back, etc. These issues distinguish media conversation from ordinary 
conversation.
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while...male interviewers favour indirect forms that foster attunement, the female 
interviewers favour indirect forms that engage their interviewees analytically. The 
female interviewers employ indirect requests for information to ask "tough" 
questions, maintain a line of questioning, and maintain their position as speakers 
who have power (2001:293).
Arab males interact differently when their interviewee is a female. Because most of the 
rules in male-female interaction in Arab cultures are drawn from religion, male-female 
interactions are bound by certain contextually-based 'rules' that should not be breached. If 
they are breached, they do not only affect the interactants, but their relatives as well. 
Macaulay (1996/2001) adds that the level of familiarity between the interviewer and the 
interviewee is also crucial. He argues that 'the relationship between the speaker and the 
hearer is central to the activity and is being constantly monitored, negotiated and adjusted 
in the course of conversation' (2001:298).313
Thus, as explained in earlier chapters, politeness is too complex to be understood simply 
through the analysis of individual utterances, as the core theories of politeness suggest (see 
Christie, 2000, 2003, Watts, 2003). Other views of politeness and understanding should be 
considered as shown in chapters 2, 3 and 4, in order to provide a more pragmatic way of 
analysis that considers more variables than the core theories of politeness. Issues such as 
the cultural values associated with directness or indirectness, explicit or implicit meaning, 
topic choice, appropriateness or inappropriateness, face, establishing common ground, 
stereotypes, presuppositions, power, distance, gender and religion are understood 
differently through influences on the context of the interaction.
6.5 Analysis
This analysis deals with recordings of face-to-face casual conversations and TV and Radio 
conversations. These were selected in order to include different types of contexts that 
enable broad exploration as to how politeness is understood in cross-cultural interaction. 
The following sections will analyse the data in relation to my arguments in the previous 
chapters, with the objective of justifying the need for a broader contextual, pragmatic 
analytical approach of politeness that explains how politeness is understood in cross- 
cultural interaction.
313 Johnstone et. al. (1992) indicate that in their data female interviewers were challenged by their male 
interviewees more frequently.
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In the following sections, I will analyse the data in order to discover how politeness and 
impoliteness are performed and understood in cross-cultural interaction. I will discuss 
these under a number of headings. In section one I will critique the universality of Brown 
and Levinson's (1987) model in relation to the notion of face and indirectness. One of the 
main thrusts of this research is to demonstrate the limitations of their model as a method of 
analysing politeness in cross-cultural interaction and their claim of the universality of the 
notion of face. In section two, I will investigate how context plays an important role in 
understanding and producing speech. I will argue that whatever influences the context of 
the interaction should be considered in the analysis of it, especially cross-culturally, 
because context influences understanding and consequently whether an utterance is 
considered to be polite or impolite. I will divide this section into two subsections; the first 
discusses cultural differences and the second discusses what is considered to be relevant 
between interactants in cross-cultural interaction because of the influence of the context. 
In both subsections I argue that the variables that influence interaction are sometimes 
differently interpreted and this may consequently lead to different understanding. Finally, 
I will conclude that all these factors influence the process of understanding, and in order to 
analyse what is meant and understood in producing an utterance in cross-cultural 
interaction, we need to analyse all these factors to understand how the implicit meaning is 
generated and what influences it, and whether the hearer understands his/her addressee's 
intended meaning.
6.5.1 Universality of Brown and Levinson in cross-cultural interaction
6.5.1.1 FT As (Face threatening acts) in Cross-cultural Interaction
As discussed in chapter 2, Brown and Levinson (1987) state that interactants must maintain 
each other’s face in order to establish a good relationship. They claim that they do this 
through situations that take into account 'negative face' and 'positive face', which they see 
as universal. In this section, I argue that FTAs are differently interpreted across cultures 
and different contexts, and that this will yield different sets of implicatures and 
interpretations of an utterance. This may lead to some misunderstanding in cross-cultural 
interaction. How an interactant interprets what an utterance gives rise to (a decision 
influenced by context), is crucial in determining whether or not an FTA has been 
committed. I will therefore also investigate FTAs in cross-cultural interaction and whether 
they can be identified by Brown and Levinson's model.
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6.5.1.1.1 FTAs and Asking questions 
Extract 2 (Casual Conversation)
This conversation took place in Bristol in late 2003 between a British native speaker and a 
Libyan non-native speaker. The native speaker is a 43 year old married male who had no 
real experience in interacting with Arabs. The non-native speaker is a 41 year old 
postgraduate student studying pharmacy. He has lived for more than 4 years in England 
whilst studying for a PhD. The recording took place at the University of Bristol.
H = Non-native speaker of English 
I = Native speaker of English
1H 
21
3H 
41
5H
61
7H 
81
9H
101
11H
121 
13H
141
15H
161
In Arabic, utterance (3) and utterances (8 - 11) in this extract would usually be interpreted 
as an FTA. Utterances (3) and then (9 and 11) in this extract would usually constitute a
: you got children? =
: = not yet, no
[: ah, not yet, ((not clear)) new married =
: = about
18 months =.
= OH nice
(0:2)
yeh, we’re thinking about it but we’d like to try 
and get a house first if possible =
= yeh sure =
= who knows (0:5) how long
have you been married =
: = now, er, (0:6) more than four years but not five
years 
(hhh)
: four and a half
(hhh)
: yeh, four and a half and two children
(hhh)
: tiring =
= umm
(0:2)
is, is, are the children tiring ((not clear))
tyeh
[
do they wear you out ?
(hhh)
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FTA if both interactants were Arabs. In Arabic, as probably in all cultures, a person does 
not ask the reason for not having children, directly or indirectly to a stranger, and if s/he 
asks, as in the utterances (1 and 3) in this extract, then s/he knows that it is embarrassing to 
his/her interactant, which might give rise to different implicatures. In such a context, 
utterance (3) is likely to give rise to a number of implicatures. One of the implicatures is 
that the non-native speaker tells the native speaker of English that "there must be a 
problem with you if you are not newly married". In Arabic, this interpretation would be 
considered as a strong implicature of the utterance, and also as impolite, because, as 
explained in chapter 5, in Libya the main reason for getting married is to have children. 
Therefore, if a couple has no children after a period of time, then there might be a problem, 
which it would be embarrassing to ask about.
Utterance (11) 'I have been married less than 5 years, but I have two children', emphasises 
that there is a different understanding of being married between the interactants, and a 
problem if a person has married and has no children in Libya. In Arabic, any other 
meaning would be a weak implicature in such a context because of what is culturally 
acceptable. If the native speaker of English were an Arab, he would consider the non­
native speaker in the above extract to be either impolite or inappropriate Al-Khatib (1995). 
Thus, although in Arabic, the explicature o f " ah, not yet?, ((not clear)) new married?" "?
^1" "Eelaa al'aan?, motazaweej hadeth?" would generate an implicature 
that could threaten the face of the hearer, there is no sign that the non-native speaker 
understands that he might have threatened the face of his interactant or caused any 
discomfort.
In the follow-up interview, I asked the non-native speaker about the reason for asking such 
a question, despite the fact that he would probably not do this with a stranger from his own 
culture. He said he would not ask this of a person from his culture because this is not 
acceptable in such a context, but he wanted to show his interactant that children are very 
important in his culture. I asked him whether he thought that his utterance would be 
classified as inappropriate had he been interacting with an Arab; he said that his interactant 
was English, so he thought that he was appropriate with him.314 I then asked him why he
314 The detailed answer from the non-native speaker in utterances (9) and (11) extract 4 to his interactant 
indicates that in his understanding, children are important when someone is married. In utterance (11) the 
non-native speaker tells his interactant that he has had two children in less than five years o f his marriage.
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spoke about his children to someone who said that he has no children despite this being 
unacceptable in Arabic. He said he might have not done so had his interactant been an 
Arab (follow-up interview with the non-native speaker; extract 2, See Appendix 2).
I would classify such questions as misunderstandings due to different interpretations of the 
context of the interaction. Such a question might arise because of stereotypes that Arab 
speakers have about Western culture. The non-native speaker of English might think that 
Westerners would not be offended when talking about not having children. However, when 
asking the native speaker whether he felt any discomfort about utterance (3) or (11) he said 
that he did not but that it was a rather strange question, (follow-up interview; extract 2, See 
Appendix 2).
As Sperber and Wilson argue, context involves different types of factors such as cultural 
knowledge of others. Thus, although the non-native speaker knew that such types of 
questioning as in utterances (3) or (11) might be embarrassing to his interactant and might 
threaten his face, he still asked him, building on a wrong assumption about his interactant, 
with no intention of threatening his face. If we ask why the non-native speaker asked such 
a question despite knowing that it would cause an FTA had his interactant been an Arab, 
we find the non-native speaker, in this extract, draws on the context and his knowledge of 
the culture of his interactant. The way the non-native speaker selected the context of the 
interaction, together with his cultural knowledge, led to different interpretations of what 
this linguistic strategy might mean. (See chapter 2 and 4)
6.5.1.1.2 FTAs and Redress Strategy
Another type of FTA, according to Brown and Levinson, is when the speaker directly asks 
questions of the hearer. In such situations, the speaker needs to use a face-redress strategy 
in order to avoid any FTA. Utterance (32) in the following extract from the native speaker 
is an FTA to the non-native speaker according to Brown and Levinson (1987), in that it is a 
direct question and requires an answer o f ‘yes’ or ‘no’.
Extract 1 B (Casual conversation)
This comparative answer would have been insulting had his co-interactant been an Arab. It is also impolite to 
speak about children if  you already know that your interactant is married and does not have children.
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This conversation took place in 2003 between a British native speaker and Libyan non­
native speaker of English. The native speaker is a 31 year old married male and had no 
real experience in interacting with Arabs. The non-native speaker is 36 years old, has lived 
for more than two years in England and is studying for an MSc course in Information 
Technology. This conversation took place at the University of Bristol, and the interactants 
did not know each other beforehand
A = Native speaker of English 
B = Non-native speaker
3IB : = in here er I mean citizen student (,) they take er
(,) a low low grant, I mean it is not expensive I mean (0:3) like foreign 
students (0:2) in EU as an example er (,) they take £1,500 yes and from 
citizen ((not clear)) they take £6,500 =
32A : = who is paying the fees? (,) who is
paying? are you paying that? =
33B : = no no for me I have someone to pay (,) my
government I mean I’ve got a grant but here it is not a lot of money 
£1,500 =
34A = no
(0:2)
35B so here don’t know how how much in Bristol University
According to Brown and Levinson, direct questions such as in utterance (32) should 
happen between close interactants, but not between strangers in a casual conversation. The 
explicature of such an utterance is "tell me who pays your tuition fee". The implicature that 
might arise to an Arab in such a context of interaction, where he criticises his interactant's 
country treatment of overseas students, is that "as long as you do not pay, you should not 
say what you have said". However, from the progress of the interaction, in the extract, the 
native speaker did not feel that he had threatened his interactant's face, nor did the non­
native speaker consider that his face was threatened by the nature of the question. This 
does not rule out the fact that the non-native speaker did not like the way he was asked, but 
yet he still answered his interactant's question.315
What happens in this conversation is that the non-native understanding of the context, and 
what it involves, excludes any implicature that his interactant is imposing on him or is
315 The native speaker does not command his interactant, but this does not rule out that the structure and the 
context o f the question might cause an FTA to the hearer.
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trying to challenge him with, in spite of the fact that the explicature "who pays your fee" 
would give rise to a challenging implicature in the non-native speaker's culture. Although 
the non-native speaker understands, from the explicature of the utterance, that the strong 
implicature is that the native speaker is telling him that "as he does not pay, he should not 
complain", and he does not like the native speaker’s insistence on him to answer, he said in 
the follow-up interview that he did not feel discomfort with the question. The explicature 
"tell me who pays your tuition fee" ? uLjL^ia <> < " Akhbemi, man
yadfah masarif derasatic?" is a direct order from the native to the non-native speaker, and 
implies a challenge from the native to the non-native speaker because of his question in 
utterance (31). Asking the non-native speaker whether he felt that his interactant was 
inappropriate in questioning him in utterance (32), he said that he did not like the way he 
was asked, but did not think of whether it was appropriate or not (follow-up interview 
with the non-native speaker, extract IB, See Appendix 2).
This means, as Sperber and Wilson point out, that understanding context is a significant 
element of utterance interpretation, which means that there is disagreement on what is 
considered as FTA. (See chapter 2 and 4) This also means, as Spencer-Oatey (2000) says, 
that not every annoying utterance causes an FTA, and the context and influences such as 
cultural difference can have an effect on interpretation of utterances.
6.5.1.1.3 FTAs and Interactant's goals
Attention to each other's face between interactants seems to be less important in media talk 
than in casual conversation, especially in political media talks. This means that not only 
power, distance, and degree of imposition determine the strategy of the interactant, but it is 
more complicated and is subject to more factors that influence the context of the 
interaction.316 •
Extract 7 A (TV interaction)
This recording is from CNN TV channel, in late 2004, from a programme called 'CNN 
Live Today'. It is between an American native speaker of English (the interviewer), and a 
Palestinian male representative of the PLO living in America
316 Mullany (2003) argues that 'in political broadcast interviews, it is not in the interests o f participants to 
mutually pay attention to each others' face needs, and failure to do so does not result in conversational 
breakdown' (2003:5).
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1 Interviewer
2 Interviewee
3 Interviewer
4 Interviewee
5 Interviewer
6 Interviewee
7 Interviewer
8 Interviewee
9 Interviewer
10 Interviewee
11 Interviewer
you are, you are seriously saying that there has been no attempt on the 
part of Palestinian authority to collect and distribute these sort of 
things 
[absolutely not 
[do you like them doing 
[absolutely absolutely listen Tony I am 
gonna tell you this (0:2) listen you take what the Israeli tell you for 
granted absolutely you never question what the Israeli
[I’ve just questioned
them
[no because that you are repeating to me what the Israeli intelligence 
telling 
[I am repeating what you told me =
= yeh yeh
[what you should 
do rather than insulting me is to is to answer
[
no I am not insulting you what I am
telling is 
[of course you are
Interactants do not always pay attention to each other’s face, contrary to Brown and 
Levinson’s (1987) claim. Face is sometimes not considered between interactants in such 
conversations as in the above extract, and interactants do not attempt to mitigate any 
potential threat of face if it occurs. Utterances (1) and (6) in this extract are examples of 
how interactants do not really pay attention to each other's face in certain contexts. For 
example, although the explicature of utterance (1) is that the interviewer is asking a 
confirmation of a statement from his interviewee, the implicature that utterance (1) may 
give rise to is "you're intentionally saying that I said something which I have not said", 
which is an accusation from the interviewee to the interviewer and is understood from the 
following utterances. The reason for this way of talking is due to the context of the 
interaction, where the interviewer and the interviewee have their own goals and consider 
their audiences differently, which I have posited as a factor that influences interactants 
differently when they are from different cultures (see chapters 1 and 5). Although the
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explicature of utterance (6) is a clear statement from the interviewee to his interviewer that 
he is repeating what is said to him, in Arabic, this utterance would give rise to an 
implicature that directly accuses the interviewer of inappropriateness: "you are with the 
Isrealis" ^  ", “anta maha alesraeleyeen” which, in utterance (9), the
interviewer considers as an insult. However, in Arabic, such a way of talking does not 
mean that the interviewee is trying to insult his interviewer, but it might mean that he does 
not care if his interactant's face was threatened because of what he says.
As argued by Sperber and Wilson (1993), distinguishing what is made explicit by certain 
linguistic choices from what is really implied because of the context is an issue that might 
lead to misunderstanding in cross-cultural interaction. The goal of an interaction which is 
being observed by another person, and how important that person is to either of the 
interactants, results in certain implicatures in an utterance being interpreted as a strong 
implicature to one, but not to the other. Thus, the context of the interaction is differently 
selected and understood by each speaker (see Thomborrow (2002) and Hutchby (1998 /
o  i  <72006)). Direct attacks and direct retaliation between the interactants implies that
<11 ointeractants in the above extracts do not pay attention to each other’s face. Therefore, 
although there is an FTA, it is because of the interactants' goals in carrying out the 
interview. They rather seem to need to score points, or perhaps one or both of them does 
not wish to continue with the conversation. In Arabic, in such types of interaction, 
interactants usually pay attention to the audience more than their interactant's face, which 
might not be the case in this situation with the Arab speaker towards his interviewee.
6.5.1.1.4 FTAs and Irony
Another type of FTA that Brown and Levinson's model does not seem to analyse is when 
the speaker discusses a provocative subject or asks a challenging question.319 An example 
is utterance (9) in the following extract where the interviewer asks about a controversial 
subject about which the interviewee seems to have a different view to the interviewer, and 
answers in an ironic way.
317 We rarely find such confrontational attitudes in casual conversation, especially between strangers or 
people from different cultures. What usually happens in casual conversation between strangers, is that 
interactants give each other chances to repair or perhaps change what they have said or understood.
318 In Arabic broadcasting, such a way o f interacting is not expected, although it is not impossible. When it 
happens, this means that either the interactants have prepared for such conflict or they do not like each other.
319 In Arabic, provoking a person in front o f others is far worse than provoking him/her when no-one is 
listening. Provoking someone in front o f another may lead to high stages o f conflict, or even to fighting.
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Extract 6 A (TV interaction)
This recording is from Fox News TV channel, recorded in late 2004 from a programme 
called 'On the Record'. It is between a male American native English speaker (the 
interviewer) and a Palestinian bom Lebanese, non -  native American citizen.
1 Interviewer
2 Interviewee
3 Interviewer
4 Interviewee
5 Interviewer
6 Interviewee
7 Interviewer
8 Interviewee
9 Interviewer
10 Interviewee
: what is the goal of (AR)320 Hizboullah
(0:2)
: why do not we consider it in
this way Israel is causing problems for a lot of its Arab neighbours 
((not clear))
[: right let’s have what you think ((not clear)) what is (AR)
Hizboullah’s major’s goal =
= well there is a lot of rage in the Arab 
world as well as in Lebanon and the party of God is under pressure 
to try to do something ((not clear))
[
: the party of god is the English translation
((not clear)) of (AR) Hizboullah
0
: right correct and there is a lot of
interest in Lebanon in the part of not only the fundamentalist of the 
party of God but others too (,) to try to force the Israelis who still 
persisting occupying the piece of Lebanese territories with the 
viewers do not know if that Israel does only had a problem with the 
Palestinians but many with the Arabs who live under its occupation 
((not clear))
[but let me put another question professor why is it 
why is it that the Lebanese are upset about the Syrian occupation of 
Lebanon, some people would call it an occupation which has gone 
on for decades.
(0.2)
well maybe because they do not subscribe ((not 
clear)) whole they view the Israelis as occupiers and that is 
why 
[
but why could you explain professor I do not have a point of 
view I am just asking you to explain why is it the Syrian army 
has been in in place ((not clear)) in Lebanon for 
for decades now correct me if I am wrong =
= they do not hold the 
same grouch against the Syrians as they do against the Israelis 
because
320 (AR) means the word next to it is either an Arab name or an Arab word.
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[
11 Interviewer why =
12 Interviewee = I am telling you because Israel has not occupied the
Arab land for the last fifty years has not brutalized the 
Palestinians the Syrians and the Lebanese and has not 
dehumanized all Arabs in this method of terrorist ((not clear))
[
13 Interviewer now Syrians said not mistreated the
Lebanese Palestinians 
[14 Interviewee yes they have =
15 Interviewer = in a way
Utterance (12) in the above extract can be considered to be a direct answer to the question 
“why” in utterance (11). Although the interviewee's answer is an ironic way of answering 
by an Arab, such irony is not intended to threaten the face or insult the native speaker, 
rather to imply that the answer is obvious and the question is unjustified. The explicature 
of utterance (12) is that "Israel has not occupied the Arab land for the last fifty years and 
has not brutalized the Palestinians, etc," but the presumed context of the interaction gives 
rise to the implicature of "how could you ask such a question when you know that the
Israelis have occupied, brutalized and dehumanized", "  O' ‘■Aj*3 JluiJ uL£
" kayefa tasal hatha asoual wa anta taheraf ana alesraelyeen fahalou ”,
which seems to be a strong implicature for both interactants,. Again, because of the context 
of the interaction (where interactants do not want to be ironic of each other), such a 
message can be interpreted as blaming, which does not necessarily mean an FTA, but 
rather allotting blame for asking such a question. In a different context, in Arabic, such a 
message might be considered to be insulting. For example, in a social event where the 
interaction is between male and female, if an utterance such as (11) is said from a female to 
a male, then it is considered to be ironic and insulting, as females in such contexts of 
interaction are expected to talk directly. In such a context, a male speaker might feel his 
face is threatened in front of his audience. What is understood as ironic is therefore
icontextual in relation to whether an utterance constitutes an FTA. According to 
Relevance Theory, the meaning of an utterance has a contextual implication. This means 
that by analysing the influence of contextual factors, an explicature of utterance to an Arab 
would generate an implicature that would not cause an FTA regardless of the linguistics
321 Early in extract 7 A, the interactants argued without a clear reason, accusing each other directly and 
indirectly, using provocative ways o f speaking, and understanding and answering according to what saved 
their faces in front o f their audiences. After utterance (10) extract 7 A, interactants started to listen to each 
other more respectfully and tried to establish a common ground so that no confrontation occured.
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used or the strategy adopted. This argument emphasises Sperber and Wilson's point, that 
in analysing politeness, there is no fixed link between what is said and what is intended, 
and that what is said might cause an FTA or be considered as an insult in one context and 
not in another.
6.5.1.1.5 Conclusion of section 6.5.1.1 FTAs in Cross-cultural Interaction
What counts as politeness / impoliteness or what threaten an interactant's face is not only 
the way in which a speaker expresses his/her wants, but also in how a hearer understands a 
contribution in relation to the context of the interaction and in the interactant’s 
interpretation of the factors that influence their acceptance of the politeness or impoliteness 
of what has been said. Therefore, even if we agree that the goals of the interaction may 
make one of the interactants adopt a certain strategy which might threaten their own face 
or that of the interactant, understanding of what constitutes an FTA is not always reflected 
by the linguistic choices or the strategy adopted. An explicature of an utterance might 
generate different implicatures to the interactants because of their cultures or their 
understanding of the context of interaction. As argued in chapters, 1, 2 and 3, and the 
discussion in the above section, Brown and Levinson (1987) cannot identify or analyse all 
types of FTA. The strategy or the linguistic choices that they consider as an FTA do not 
apply in all types of interaction. As explained by Wierzbicka (1985 / 2003), Meier (1997), 
Ide (1998) and Hiraga and Turner (1996) FTAs are not the same across cultures and 
therefore Brown and Levinson's model cannot be universal. Brown and Levinson's view, as 
discussed in chapter 2, does not address the listener's understanding and what influences 
his/her interpretations in their analysis, which is important in understanding how an 
utterance is perceived. It is also evident from analysing the above extracts that threatening 
an interactant's face or mitigating any potential FTA in cross-cultural interaction is cultural 
and contextual. Regardless of how an utterance is said, what is intended by that utterance 
is judged contextually, and the implicatures that an utterance gives rise to, as a result of 
certain explicatures, are influenced by the context, and not only by the possibilities that the 
linguistic choices might generate. It can also be seen that, in cross-cultural interaction, 
what is considered to be an FTA and the circumstances in which interactants need to 
mitigate differ from one interactant to another because of cultural differences.322
322 Blum-Kulka (1992) considers mitigation as a cultural style; although it appears as an individual aspect, it 
is evaluated culturally. She adopts a constructivist position in regard to politeness, arguing that systems o f  
politeness manifest a culturally filtered interpretation o f the interaction between four essential parameters:
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6.5.1.2 Indirectness / Directness in cross-cultural interaction
It is difficult to speak about directness / indirectness without speaking about FTAs, so this 
is in effect an extension of the previous section about FTAs. It therefore concentrates on 
another issue which Brown and Levinson link to politeness, and about which they claim 
universality. Thus, although I am using their categories by selecting certain speech acts, I 
aim to explain that these issues are not subject to certain linguistic choices. Because they 
are differently performed and interpreted across cultures, and a specific culture influences 
how interactants infer what an utterance might mean, this impacts upon whether a speech 
act is performed implicitly or explicitly.
As explained in chapter 2, Brown and Levinson observe that if an interactant challenges 
someone's face, s/he will challenge him/her back. Although, as stated in chapter 3 ,1 agree 
with Brown and Levinson that indirectness and politeness are sometimes linked, I also see 
it realized in different ways across cultures, and neither indirectness nor the reasons for it 
are universal across cultures. I argue that in a cross-cultural interaction, the reason for 
indirectness might be misinterpreted, because of different understandings of what 
indirectness means, and different understandings of indirectness and the reason for it may 
lead to pragmatic failure.
6.5.1.2.1 Indirectness and provocative utterance
Brown and Levinson (1987) assume that indirectness is universally polite. Yet, an indirect 
strategy might not be interpreted as such by the hearer because of different understandings 
of the context of interaction. A provocative question, for example, may still be understood 
as such even when performed indirectly. In addition, the context of the interaction 
determines whether an indirect utterance becomes less provocative because the speaker is 
indirect.
Extract 8 A (Radio conversation)
This recording is from CNN Radio, in early 2004 from a programme called 'CNN Radio, 
Newscaster’. It is between a female American broadcaster, a native speaker of English,
social motivation, expressive modes, social differentials and social meanings. Cultural notions interfere in 
determining the distinctive features of each o f the four parameters and as a result, significantly affect the 
social understanding o f “politeness” across societies in the world (1992:270).
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and a Palestinian non-native speaker of English. He is an active member of an anti-Israeli 
movement in Palestine, considered a terrorist group by the interviewer.
Interviewer 1
Interviewee 2
Interviewer 3
Interviewee 4
Interviewer 5
has an organization has an organization taken responsibility for the bus 
bombing suicide bombing today
(0:6)
ah (,) I am not pretty sure who is 
responsible at this moment because there are two organizations by their 
own military wings are aha taking responsibility but aha the situation 
that in Jenin is terrible and the Israelis damaged a lot of houses and a 
lot of infrastructure and killed so many people =
= an I’ll get to that but 
let me first let me I am talking a little bit first about the suicide 
bombing your organization has taken responsibility for the bus 
massacre which led to this latest incursion by the Israelis so is that 
not true
(0:2)
ah let me aha tell you something the aha what you call 
suicide operation is called martyrdom operations, ah second ah ah
[
well let
me let me to make sure that to make sure that
Utterance (1) in the above extract is a direct question from the interviewer, but the 
pragmatic meaning of the utterance is indirect. The explicature of utterance (1) does not 
imply directly that the interviewer is provoking her interviewee, but the hearer's 
interpretation in this context suggests he sees that in utterance (1) the interviewer is 
indirectly provoking her interviewee, because the interviewee is a member of one of the 
organizations that claims responsibility about the suicide bombing. The interviewee knows 
that the interviewer already knows the answer to the question she is asking, and that she 
wanted to embarrass him rather than just seek information.324 Such an indirect way of 
accusing is disliked in Arab culture in such contexts of interaction. In such a context, 
where both interactants know each other's attitude towards each other, the strongest 
implicature that utterance (1) would give rise to is “are you asking me or telling me that 
my organization has carried out the attack",".... ^  ^  J  <Jj£ tdsl <*1
323 It is an indirect FTA because the interviewee knows that his interviewer is telling him indirectly that his 
organization carried out the attack. This is clear from some following utterances in the same conversation, 
and also because o f the Palestinian groups which carry out the attacks in Israel.
324 In utterance (1) extract 8 A the interviewer asks a direct question. This question does not appear to be 
provocative to the interviewee, but when we realise, from the context, that the interviewer is pro-Israel, and 
that this interviewee is a person who belongs to an anti-Israeli organizations that might be responsible for 
such an attack, it can be considered provocative.
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^ “hal  anta tasalouni am anaka takoul lee in monathamatee heya man kama 
behtha alhjoum”. In Arabic, such a way of indirectness, as in utterance (1), enhances the 
possibility of provocation by the interviewee to having a challenging attitude towards his
325interviewer.
Thus, even if we agree with Brown and Levinson (1987) that indirectness mitigates FTAs 
from the speaker to the hearer, we see that it is sometimes used to provoke, which means 
that, in analysing interaction, more consideration to the context is needed. An utterance's 
effect is contextual and pragmatic, as argued by Sperber and Wilson, and if the pragmatic 
meaning of the utterance is provocative, then the strategy adopted may not always mitigate 
an FTA. In utterance (1), the strategy’s direct meaning is a question that would not 
provoke the interviewee, but, because of the context of the interaction, the utterance gives 
rise to the implicature that "you are, indirectly, telling me that my organization has carried 
out the attack", which is the strongest implicature to the interviewee. The context of 
hostility between Israel and Palestine, and the fact that the interviewee is a Palestinian and 
the interviewer is pro-Israel would lead to a provocative implicature rather than just a 
direct question. Thus, in such a context, indirectness does not mitigate or help in avoiding 
conflict. This way of talking may lead to misunderstanding because of what is mutually 
manifest and relevant to the interactants in relation to the context. In Arabic, such 
indirectness may also lead the interviewee to infer that his face is being threatened in front 
of his audience and to consequently accuse his interactant of being impolite towards him. 
What an utterance means is therefore subject to how the hearer infers it, rather than how 
s/he decodes what certain linguistic choices mean.
6.5.1.2.2 Indirectness / apology and request
Extract 1 B (Casual conversation) (See pages 193-140 for details of interactants)
A = Native speaker of English 
B = Non-native speaker
40A : = they
can make they can make more money out of foreign students
t
325 The interviewer, in utterance (3) extract 8 A, prefers to discuss the suicide bombing, which is a less 
important topic for her interactant, especially as they do not agree about the terms that they use to describe 
the attack.
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(hhhh)
41B yes (hhh) =
42A it's very very lucrative
(0:4)
43B : I study study you know very nice but when a man
become bigger and bigger it's very very very (0:3) difficult to (0:2) I mean to 
manage yourself to study again =
44A = yes =
45B = yep I got a very very very difficult
time last three months =
46A : -  you have to learn to be disciplined again don’t you =
47B yeah student again you stay in class again examination again assignments
again
Culturally, utterances (43 and 45) in the above extract, would, in Arabic, be a polite, 
indirect request from the non-native speaker to his addressee to ask him about his 
problems. The explicature of the utterance is a statement about his study and his feelings 
and the difficulties that he had, but these utterances give rise to the implicature that "I have 
problems, and I want to explain them if you ask me about them". This type of indirect 
request is common in Arabic. Instead of saying “I have this type of problem and I find it 
difficult to do this”, " 6* V “Endee hathehee
almoshkellah, walaken la astateeh an ahmal”, the speaker complains and leaves it to his/her 
interactant to ask about it specifically. It is an indirect way of ‘requesting to be asked’. In 
Arabic, general complaints in front of another person function as a request that their 
interactant ask for more details about that complaint. For example, mentioning that one's 
children are not well means the speaker is hoping to be asked to provide details about the 
problem. The native speaker's answers, in utterances (44 and 46), do not seem to reflect an 
understanding of the non-native speaker’s intentions in utterances (43 and 45) because of 
cultural differences in the meaning of the complaint strategy. Understanding the intention 
behind saying something differs between the two interactants' cultures. The core politeness 
theories claim that indirectness can take different linguistic forms. However, they fail to 
adequately explain the occasions when the utterance's explicature does not suggest any 
indirectness, but the intended meaning is indirect. In such contexts, the speaker usually 
complains indirectly in order to be asked to provide details. If not asked, s/he might accuse 
his/her interactant of being inappropriate, not paying attention to him/her or not 
understanding him/her.
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Although, as Brown and Levinson (1987) argue, indirectness may be a strategy for 
avoiding loss of face, in this type of indirectness, the speaker does not want to speak about 
his problems without being asked. The non-native speaker implies that he wants to be 
asked indirectly by using certain strategies of requesting, perhaps in order not to be 
inappropriate by speaking about himself and his problems without being asked, but he was 
misunderstood by his interactant. Again, this means that indirectness does not always 
function as conflict avoidance or the mitigation of FTAs, and it might not be realized 
because of cultural differences.
Extract 6 B (TV conversation)
This recording is from Fox News TV channel in late 2004 from a programme called 'On 
the Record'. It is between a male American native speaker of English (the interviewer) and 
a male Lebanese American non-native English speaker originally from Palestine.
16 Interviewee
17 Interviewer
18 Interviewee
19 Interviewer
20 Interviewee
21 Interviewer
22 Interviewee
23 Interviewer
yes they have yes they have you see yes I am sure you would love 
that the Lebanese and Arabs have the same atrocity as they do to the 
Syrian?
twhy should I love that professor professor why should I
[
because
[ why should I
love anybody having antipathy antipathy for anybody else I do not 
want people to hate each other no professor
[
you clearly you clearly are unhappy 
that the Lebanese are not as anti Syrian as they are anti Israeli 
((not clear))
[professor let’s hold right here professor I am not unhappy about 
anything with regards to Lebanese I am just asking you to 
explain the situation I do not understand why one occupier is hated 
more than one occupier that’s all I am asking I don’t take pleasure in 
anybody hating anybody else believe me ((not clear))
[right right one wishes there is no hate in the Middle 
East whatsoever but there is and hate is spread by occupation and 
brutalization as we seeing in the West Bank it is very easy now to 
predict that hate against Israel and the United States is going to 
increase on the bases of the hundred of civilians have been 
killed by the Israeli occupation
[right professor let me get back and let me see if I could get a
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straight answer from you here
Although there is no direct or indirect request for an apology, in Arabic, utterances (19) 
and (21) in the above extract are likely to be received as indirect requests from the 
interviewer to his interviewee for an apology. In Arabic, in certain contexts, if you 
condemn an accusation as in utterances (19) and (21), then this means indirectly asking for 
an apology, which does not necessarily need to be a direct apology. However, the way the 
Arab interviewee responds in utterance (22) is likely to be considered an indirect apology 
by him326, but it does not seem that the interviewer has understood it as an apology. In 
Arabic, utterance (22), in such an unfriendly context, means a withdrawal by the 
interviewee of his accusation of his interviewer, which would be considered an indirect 
apology to his interviewer Thus, the use of “one wishes” may give rise to the implicature 
of "I trust that you don’t like hatred to spread among people", “ uiau V dlj| U1
”5 “ana ousadekouka anaka la toheeb an tantashera alkaraheya bayna 
alnas”, which the interviewer said in the previous utterance. This way of apologising may 
lead to misunderstandings if not interpreted similarly by the interactants, and the addressee 
might claim that no apology has been made. An Arab would usually consider an utterance 
such as (22) as an apology when it comes after arguing, as in utterance (21). Culturally, an 
explicit apology such as "I am sorry", or "I apologise" in such contexts is usually not 
requested and not given if requested even implicitly, as in the extract 6 B utterance (21). 
The context of interaction determines whether an apology is performed implicitly or 
explicitly, but again this is a subject of disagreement in cross-cultural interaction.
Such ways of requesting or apologizing cannot be analysed by Brown and Levinson's 
model of politeness, because such processes are not universal and also cannot be 
understood by merely analysing what the explicature of an utterance might give rise to 
without considering the context of the interaction and what it involves. Arabs do not ask 
directly for an apology in such unfriendly situations because they know that it will not be 
given and would also lead to loss of face. Thus, in such contexts, an interactant may prefer 
to accuse his/hwe interactant of being inappropriate which, indirectly, means requesting an 
apology. As we explained, the Arab interviewee response in utterance (22) is likely to be 
considered an indirect apology by him to his interactant.
326 Whether the interviewer requests an apology or not in utterances (19) and (21), the interviewee, in such 
contexts, would understands that he is requested to apologise, and that the context o f the interaction suggests 
an accusation, and requires him to apologise to his interviewer.
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Again, the reasoning behind such ways of apologizing is also not considered by Brown and 
Levinson's model of analysis in such a cross-cultural context. The interviewee 
considered utterances (19) and (21) an implicit requests for an apology and he apologized 
implicitly because in Arabic, when interactants argue in a challenging type of interaction 
and one of them feels insulted, it is not possible to ask for a clear apology -  all they can do 
is explain the disagreement and dissatisfaction and leave it to the other to apologise. On the 
other hand, in Arabic, the person who intentionally or unintentionally accuses his/her 
interactant of wrongdoing in a provocative atmosphere finds it difficult to apologise 
directly, as it might mean acknowledgment of wrongdoing, especially on the TV / radio 
where the factor of an audience plays a role. Such cultural differences and different 
understanding of the context would lead to different interpretations, and could be analysed 
only contextually, as they are not realized linguistically. Thus, as argued by Sperber and 
Wilson (1995), it is only after the process of inferential enrichment that a hearer can infer 
the proposition that it is expressing. The context and the interviewee's linguistic choice 
together enrich the implicit rather than the explicit meaning. Such interpretation meets the 
expectations of the interviewer and relevance in relation to utterance (21) and utterance 
(23). In the second part of utterance (22), the interviewee gives the impression that he does 
not want to accuse his interactant any more, while the interviewer tries to avoid any more
329accusations.
Deciding whether a speaker is really asking for an apology or just wants to accuse his 
interactant of being impolite towards him is not always clear but, as Relevance Theory 
argues, hearers may stop at the first interpretation that satisfies their expectation of 
relevance in relation to their understanding of the context. Utterance (23) constructs an 
appropriate interpretation that both interactants do not want to carry on accusing each
327 In Arabic, in some contexts, this use o f apology after an accusation is face saving to the speaker. For 
example, if  the speaker has power over his/her interactant, or if s/he is too arrogant to apologise openly, or 
even because o f the speaker's social status such as his/her position, tribe or attitude towards the background 
o f his/her interactants, or his/her interactant's gender (a man apologizing to a woman). Thus, it is not possible 
to analyse apology by only analysing the explicit meaning in such a context o f interaction.
328 Inferential enrichment is what contributes to truth-conditional semantics, to the explicatures rather than 
the implicatures o f utterances.
329 1 would assume that utterance (22) has been interpreted by the interviewer as an utterance that puts an end 
to the conflict between them, because in utterance (23) the interviewer explains, indirectly, that the problem 
o f not understanding each other is because his interviewee does not provide straight answers when he is 
asked.
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other. However, utterance (23) also suggests that the interviewee has not been answering 
honestly, as the interviewer sees it, by not providing straight answers to his questions.
6.5.1.2.3 Indirectness and sensitive questions
Indirectness in the above interaction is different from that in utterance (56) in the following 
extract.
Extract 1 C (Casual conversation) (See page 193 for details of interactants)
A = Native speaker of English 
B = Non-native speaker
48B : yeh it's only one year’s course =
49A : = then after that do you go back or do you want
to stay ((not clear))
[50B : er (,) no no I go back sure yeah (,) I’ve got my job =
51A =yes =
52B = already
my car my job my house (hhh) everything is there so no (,) it's a short period of 
time I’m coming here =
53A = yeah =
54B = to do something and come back to my job
again (0:2) so there be for me (0:2) to come back not to stay here (hhh)
[55A yeh
(0:4)
56B what
about study here if you want to study (0:1) I mean your monthly payment here. 
It's er (0:2) becomes (0:2) ((not clear) how I can explain it (,) they give you 
monthly er 
[57A no
[58B I mean your job I mean how you can manage study with your job
(0:2)
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The way it's gonna work for me individually (,) is that urn 
(0:2) I’m going to be doing I work as a technician so. I make all the 
equipment and keep it running for the research and the academic who is 
trying to get me the money to do that er is based in Manchester now so what 
will happen is if it all works I will be getting a salary to do his technical 
support work and I’ll be registered with Manchester to do a higher degree (,) 
and I’ll have to do the degree in my own time yes so I work and I do my 
degree as well =
= ah ha =
= but the degree is spread over three years so it's it's not 
cramming everything into a single year =
= hum hum
The above extract indicates that indirectness is used for sensitive questions such as salaries, 
as Brown and Levinson (1987) point out, but this still leaves the question of whether 
interactants use indirectness to avoid asking direct sensitive questions that do not threaten 
other’s faces, or whether there might be any other reasons. Utterances (56) and (58) from 
the non-native speaker indirectly ask the native speaker how much he will be paid when he 
starts his course. Instead of answering, the native speaker provides a description of what he 
is expected to do and does not provide a direct answer. However, such indirectness does 
not mean that the interactants have the same feelings in asking about salary, and that they 
aim to avoid any FTA by being indirect. Although the strongest implicature of the indirect 
questions in utterances (56) and (58) is "how much money do you earn a month?"," ^
1 ", " Kam takbeed Shahreyan", and the strongest implicature of the answer to
utterances (56) and (58) in utterance (59) is "I do not want to say how much money I earn”, 
life uua.1 jjjIV “la aoureed an oujeeb hatha assoual”, neither of the interactants 
seem to feel that their behaviour might be interpreted as inappropriate, or that face is 
threatened because of this indirectness. In Arabic, asking about salaries is done directly, 
and not receiving an answer may not threaten the face of any of the interactants. This 
means that although there is no answer for the non-native speaker's question, he (in 
utterance (60)) seems to accept this, and the conversation continues on the same topic. In 
addition, the context of the interaction is understood differently. Questions about salary in 
Arabic do not cause FTAs or discomfort, and do not even need to be asked indirectly, as a 
lack of an answer does not cause any FTA to the interactants. In English, questions about 
salary can sometimes cause discomfort. Such a view is also discussed by Sperber and
330 It is not clear to me, as a native Arabic speaker, why the non-native speaker o f English has asked his 
interactant about salary in this indirect way. As explained, in Arabic, questions about earning in any type o f  
business is asked directly, but I would refer this to the influence o f the context.
59 A
60B
61A
62B
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Wilson in what they term "cognitive environment" which they consider as a set of all the 
facts that are manifest to individuals, including their understanding and knowledge of 
others. What is understood from asking a question about salary is not the same across 
cultures. Whereas it is interpreted as a sensitive question and might lead to threatening face 
in one culture, it is understood as a normal question, even when it is asked implicitly, in 
another.
6.5.1.2.4 Indirectness and Disagreement
There are situations where a speaker wants to disagree with the interactant but wishes to do 
so indirectly in order to avoid threatening another's face.
Extract 3 A (casual conversation)
This conversation took place in late 2003 between a British native speaker of English and a 
Libyan non-native speaker. The non-native speaker is from Southern Libya. He is a 39 
year old married male with two children, studying for a PhD in dental studies and writing 
up his thesis. He has lived for more than 5 years in London. The native speaker is British 
and has no real experience of interacting with Arabs. This conversation took place at the 
University of London.
J = Native speaker of English 
K = Non-native speaker of English
1J : do you have to go very deep to sink a well =
2K : = no I mean, something like its
very amazing I mean when you dig around ah one metre you find (0:0)
beautiful water =
3 J : = how extraordinary =
4K : = yeh
G)
5J : does does this originate from
mountains nearby or
[6K : no, when (0:2) people er our scientists I mean claim that this water
(,) I mean I was told from thousands and thousands of years during the Ice
Age. (,) ((not clear))
(0:2)
7J : the trouble about that if it’s true, is that it’s a finite
resource (,) it’s not a resource that is being replenished continuously.
[8K : ahhh
[
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do you think 
[ ah well some aaa
researcher they said hh they might er (0:2) er be (0:3) something like er 
rivers =
= subterranean =
= er ka hh well the Nile river is not very far from the 
desert, you know what I mean, it's just 1000 or 2000kms =
= (hhh) that seems
to me a long way (hhh)
tno but I mean er because the result you can imagine it's like this 
so I mean Nile river is just on the edge of er of the desert you know what 
you call the Sahara
The native speaker in utterance (3) in the above extract does not seem to accept what is 
said and his utterance, to an Arab, seems to give rise to the implicature 'what you say is 
impossible, or rather stupid', '< j-^  V jl J jVmn ' “ma takoulhou mostaheel aw la
yousadeek”. This is insulting to the non-native speaker in terms of what is culturally 
acceptable. In Arabic, utterance (3) is considered an indirect way of doubting what is said, 
which is usually insulting if the speakers are strangers to one another. Thus, although the 
explicature of utterance (3) is explaining that what is said is odd, its strongest implicature 
in such a context in Arab culture is "I cannot accept what you say", " O' V U1 
tb-fc ", “ ana la astateeh an akbala ma takoul”. Such cultural difference would override any 
mitigation that the native speaker intends through his indirectness towards the non-native, 
because this is how Arabs say "what you say is not true" when they are strangers.
Again utterance (7) where the native speaker indirectly explains his suspicions by saying 
“This is, If it is true, ....”," . . . .  ^  dJA", "hath, etha kana thalka saheeh, ... ",
would be interpreted differently by the non-native speaker in such a context. To the non­
native speaker, such an utterance would give rise to the implicature that "what you say is 
not true", " &*** jp  U “matakoulaho kayro saheeh”. In Arabic, disagreement 
between strangers (especially complete strangers) in such a way on the first meeting might 
give rise to different implicatures that might lead to the discomfort of the non-native 
speaker. For example, in Arabic it may mean, as a strong implicature "I do not trust you", 
" V U! "5 “ana la ousadeekak”, or "I do not like talking to you because of a personal 
attitude towards your race or gender, etc.”, " ^  J  V ", “la
aoureed al thahdotha maheek wa thaleeka besabab oumour shakhseeyah”. Culturally, in
9J : 
10K :
11J : 
12K:
13J : 
14K :
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such contexts of interaction, Arabs, on the first meeting, do not usually disagree, directly or 
indirectly, even when they are not convinced of what their interactant is saying. The non­
native speaker, in the above extract, seems either not to understand any of these 
implicatures or pretends that there is nothing to suggest such a meaning. In utterance (12), 
the non-native speaker tries to offer his own interpretation of what scientists say, which 
indicates that he felt discomfort.
Again, it seems that what the non-native speaker says in the utterance (12) is not 
convincing, as the native speaker in utterance (13) again disagrees with the non-native 
speaker more indirectly. More importantly, the non-native speaker does not bring to the 
fore the implicature that the water may run out in the distant future. In Arabic an utterance 
like (13)
tawieel tarieek lee yabdow had
long way to me it seems this
that seems to me a long way
gives rise to the implicature that "I do not believe what you say"," <Jj& ^  V U! "3”ana 
la ousadeek ma takoul”, which would be considered as an unacceptable disagreement by an 
Arab in such a context. Thus, because of different understanding of the appropriate way of 
disagreeing in certain contexts, even being indirect does not guarantee that what one says 
indirectly will mitigate any FTA, or be interpreted as an appropriate strategy. When the 
non-native speaker was asked whether he felt that he was called a liar because of what the 
native speaker's utterances seemed to suggest, he said that he did not think that his 
interactant thought that he was not telling the truth. However, he also said that he did not 
like the way he was asked (follow-up interview; extract 3 A, Appendix 2)331. Although this 
sounds like a weak implicature (that the native speaker thinks that the non-native speaker is 
a liar or exaggerating), how the rest of the conversation proceeds confirms that there is 
misunderstanding between the mteractants. However, judging what is appropriate is a 
contextual rather than a linguistic issue. How cultural differences in cross-cultural
331 In Arabic, this way o f talking means that the person talking is either being ironic or is calling their 
interactant a liar.
332 This means that indirectness /  directness is not only connected to the interactant being afraid o f  
threatening the face o f the other, but also it may mean that the speaker has felt a Face Threatening Act from 
his/her interactant because o f the way a question is asked.
212
interaction influence the interpretation of certain linguistic uses differs, which might lead 
to some misunderstanding or even an accusation of being impolite.
6.5.1.2.5 Indirectness and threat 
Extract 9 (Radio conversation)
1 Interviewer Sharon has said that Israel will not pull back until Palestinian
militias are crushed what does that mean to you for future.
(0:4)
2 Interviewee Sharon
just playing games with all of his promises Sharon intention is to 
continue his occupation Sharon plan is to ahh get rid of all 
Palestinians out of their country this the transfer in his mind so he 
plans to transfer all the Palestinian whether to death or to any place
other than Palestine and their home land so I don’t believe
Sharon
[3 Interviewer Eshmael Eshmael
t
4 Interviewee started his career with massacre in 1948 yes
Again, utterance (1) in the above extract is a provocative question by the interviewer. 
Although the explicature of the utterance is a clear statement of what Sharon has said, the 
first (and strongest) implicature that the utterance might give rise to is that the interviewer 
is warning and threatening the interviewee that their activities might lead to more violence 
on his side. The reason for such an implicature is that this way of speaking in such a 
context, to an Arab from a person known to him as pro-enemy, is a very direct threat 
regardless of how this threat is expressed, directly or indirectly. The other implicature is 
that she is trying to make him aware of the consequences, and the weakest implicature is 
that she really wants to know his opinion about the issue discussed.333 However, it does 
not seem that the interviewee thinks of any of the above implicatures in his answer to the 
question. Even his answer in utterance (2) does not seem to be relevant to the question. 
There is a possibility that the interviewee has misunderstood what is meant by utterance
(1), but also there is a possibility that he does not want to answer what he is expected to 
answer and prefers to say what he feels is important.
Again in the above extract, utterance (1) is interpreted as an indirect threat by the 
interviewer. But, in Arabic, such a threat (especially when it is from a female to a male) if
333 The first implicature is more likely to be the strongest to an Arab from a Westerner in such context, 
because firstly, the interviewer uses a threat strategy in front o f an audience, and secondly, because the 
interviewer is a person who is known to the interviewee as pro-Israeli.
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it is indirectly performed, usually causes hearers to pretend to pay no attention to the 
threat, or to treat the utterance as nonsense because they do not want to be labelled as 
fearing their enemy, even if they do. In Arabic, such a way of answering means that the 
interactant understands the utterance as a threat but does not want to recognise it as such. 
This would not happen if the interviewer was a male Arab. As I discussed in chapter 4, 
what is communicated depends on what is manifest to the hearer, which may not 
necessarily be conveyed linguistically. There is no guarantee that the hearer will infer the 
same meaning that the speaker intends by an utterance. Because of the influence of the 
context, the implicature that an Arab might understand from utterance (1) is that "if you 
resist you will be crushed" or "you are too weak to resist, you should surrender". Whether 
that is what is intended by the interviewer or not, this way of talking with an Arab would 
lead to a threatening implicature, which would also lead to more conflict between the 
interactants. To an Arab, to talk in such a way is to threaten the interviewee in front of his 
audience, and it is an indirect challenge by the interviewer.
6.5.1.2.6 Directness and Naming strategy
In the next radio conversation, the interviewer sounds appropriate by calling her interactant 
by his first name in utterance (11), but the second part of the utterance is asking the same 
question that she has asked in utterance (8) in an imperative way, which provokes her 
interviewee. In this context, it seems that the reason for arguing is the imposing manner of 
the interviewer; the imposition by a female to a male in a media programme might be 
considered insulting in some contexts, not necessarily only by the hearer, but also by his 
audience. In such contexts, calling by first name will not override the imposing strategy 
from a female to male.
Extract 9 (Radio Conversation)
This recording is from CNN Radio, in early 2004 from a programme called 'CNN Radio 
Newscaster'. It is between a female American native English speaker (the interviewer) and 
a male Palestinian non-native speaker, an active member of an anti Israeli movement in 
Palestine considered a terrorist group by the interviewer.
6 Interviewee aha as far as the Palestinians are not
recognized I mean are not having this recognition from the 
Israelis, I will not give it to the Israelis until they recognize our right 
to exist
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7 Interviewer
8 Interviewee
9 Interviewer
10 Interviewee
11 Interviewer
12 Interviewee
13 Interviewer
14 Interviewee
15 Interviewer
G)Eshmael um if Arafat calls a cease fire will your 
organization (AR) Hamas stop the suicide bombing or will you act 
independent of what Arafat says or does
(0:4)
when Arafat asks for
a cease fire look at the situation the Israeli tanks do they move a 
leave Palestinians live a life a alone? do the tanks and the Israeli 
soldiers withdraw? if they are not withdrawing so the Palestinian 
situation are facing Israeli military forces with tanks with closure 
so they have to resist they have to defend themselfe if there is no 
Israeli soldiers Palestinians are not interested in attacking
t
does it 
[Israeli or
resisting any 
[Eshmael I am unclear I am unclear Eshmael let me ask it 
again, if Arafat calls a cease fire says stop the suicide bombing 
will your organization (AR) Hamas stop the suicide bombing 
YES or NO
(0:3)
ah it’s not like this you know yes or no I am not 
in a court but let me tell you the truth, the Israelis occupation is 
continued military forces is are I mean are abusing our people and 
causing suffering when we resist this it is not a cease fire it is this 
cease fire aha expression is not ahaha
[I take it
tacceptable
o
I take that you
won’t answer the question whether not you will stop if Arafat give a 
signalled that he thinks what should be stopped and let me move on 
to another question am (,) to you and that's are you funded in 
anyway way by Sadam Hussan
The first part of utterance (11), although she is calling him by his first name, may give rise 
to two different implicatures: 1) is that the interviewer tells the interviewee, indirectly, that 
what he has said is irrelevant to her question, and this is clear in the previous utterances in 
the conversation. 2) is that the interviewer tells him that he does not want to answer her 
question, and maybe she needs to ask a different question or the same question in a 
different way, which she has done in the last part of the same utterance. Although, 
linguistically, in utterance (11) the interviewer asks her interviewee to answer her question, 
the context of interaction where every speaker has their own goals to achieve plus their
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own understanding of each other would lead to such implicatures. In addition, the using of 
terms such as "Hamas stop the suicide bombing", and the use of "YES or NO" by the 
interviewer in such an unfriendly context would imply that the interviewer is more 
concerned with what she wants to say rather than whether or not this is an appropriate way 
of asking questions. Thus, setting the same question that was asked in utterance (8), and 
then ordering him to answer "Yes or No" suggests that the interviewer knows that the 
interviewee will not provide her with the answer she wants and that this is the only way to 
show her audience that he is not answering her questions, especially since in utterance (15) 
when she clearly accuses him of not answering her question.334
Utterance (11) is an example of the influence of context in inferring what is meant, as 
argued by Sperber and Wilson (1995). In spite of the interviewer calling her interactant by 
his first name, considered by the interviewer to be an inclusive way of talking, so that the 
interviewer is telling her interactant "we are not in a situation of arguing because I am 
calling you by your first name", the utterance should be considered a direct attack by the 
interviewer. Culturally, in Arabic, the "Yes or No" question in front of an audience in such 
a context of interaction, and being ordered by a female, would often override any strategy 
considered as conflict-avoiding, which might be intended by the interviewer when she 
called her interviewee by his first name.
6.5.1.2.7 Conclusion to the section 6.5.1.2 Indirectness / Directness in cross-cultural 
interaction
Indirectness and how it is understood in cross-cultural interaction can be a main cause of 
pragmatic failure and misunderstanding as argued in chapters 2 and 3. As has been argued 
in the above section, directness and indirectness are not always necessarily linked to 
politeness or impoliteness as Brown and Levinson (1987) argue. Directness and 
indirectness are differently interpreted in cross-cultural interaction (Coupland et. al. 1991b, 
and Levinson 1983).
From my analysis it is clear that there are different reasons for being indirect, and that 
these are contextual, as Van Dijk (1997), MacMahon (1996), Sperber and Wilson (1993)
334 However, we find that, in different situations o f my data, indirectness might be understood as an 
introductory part o f an utterance, where the intention is either to prepare the addressee for a difficult question 
or to mitigate anger caused by a question. Indirectness is sometimes used to avoid disagreeing directly 
because interactants consider each other's face.
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and Christie (2000) illustrate. This means that directness and indirectness cannot be 
limited to negative and positive orientation as Meier (1995a) suggests. Mills (2003a) and 
Thomas (1995) believe directness/indirectness depend on understanding the intended 
meaning and have different meanings in different contexts (see chapters 2 and 4). One of 
my arguments is that directness and indirectness are influenced by cultural and contextual 
factors, and cannot be limited to certain interpretations. Thus, Brown and Levinson’s 
(1987) argument that indirectness or off-record is considered more polite than on-record or 
direct speech is not applicable in cross-cultural interaction, as we have seen in the above 
interactions. Interactants were influenced by the context of the interaction and their cultural 
background to produce or interpret what was said, rather than by only the strategy and the 
linguistic choices.
If the structure of the question is indirect, then this does not necessarily correspond that the 
intended meaning does not cause a Face Threatening Act, or that the FTA (if there is one) 
is mitigated, as Brown and Levinson claim. In extract 1, there are direct strategies 
between strangers that do not cause FTA. In utterance (32) in extract 1 B (See pages 139- 
140 for details of the extract) the native speaker asks his interactant about who is paying 
his tuition fee. This means that it is not only the relationship between the interactants that 
determines whether directness creates FTAs, but rather the content as well as the type of 
questions in relation to the context. Thus, it is the context of the utterance and not its 
structure which determines whether direct or indirect utterances are interpreted as impolite 
or not.
From understanding the implicatures that the utterances might give rise to in relation to the 
interactants and their understanding of the context, we can conclude that an utterance can 
cause an FTA to the other interactant. Mills (2003a) and Eelen (2001) argue that in Brown 
and Levinson (1987) the focus is on the speaker's utterance. However, as discussed in 
chapter 2 (see Spencer-Oatey 2000a, Mills 2003a), what threatens face differs from one 
culture to another and one context to another. Thus, the use of solely linguistic analysis to 
assess FTAs is not adequate analytically in cross-cultural contexts.
335 This means that being direct or not using expressions such as "please ..." "Could you ..." or " (pardon, 
rfwan" ) or "if you allow, Law Samaht" ( )  etc. is not always interpreted as giving commands, 
and also that using them does not means that the person is indirect.
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6.5.2 Understanding context in cross-cultural interaction
6.5.2.1 Context and Culture
As explained in chapters 3, 4 and 5, context involves different factors that influence the 
production and interpretation of utterances. These include; conventions, values, habits, 
topics of discussion, age, class, ethnicity, education, gender, audience, stereotypes and 
religion which are differently interpreted from one culture to another (see chapter 5). 
Sperber and Wilson (1995) argue that a "cognitive environment" does not only include 
what is understood from the linguistic use of the utterance, but also all of what might be 
inferred and might influence interaction, including interactants' beliefs and knowledge 
about the world. The following factors might lead to misunderstanding in cross-cultural 
interaction.
6.5.2.1.1 Topic choice
Extract 1 C (Casual Conversation) (Casual conversation) (See pages 193-140 for 
details of interactants)
61A : = but the degree is spread over three years so it's it's not cramming
everything into a single year =
62B = hum hum =
= but that’s the only way I can
63 A manage it I can’t afford to not have a job um so (0:2) yeh my wife works as
well ((not clear)) which will make it easier (hhh) but we’re trying to get 
enough money to buy a house and if I just don’t have a salary coming in we 
wont be able to do that but, hopefully what will happen is er there (,) will be 
some money er put on my grant to pay my fees so I don’t have to pay my fees
[64B yeh, yeh
[65A but all
that’s being negotiated
(hhh)
(0:2)
66B : right so you can do it yeah (,) in this way you
can 
[67A : you can do it if you’re in the right place at the right time =
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= sure (hhh) nice to 
meet someone married here in this country you know as you
[it's getting rarer
isn’t is 
[yeh: (hhh) very rare (h) (0:2) but, but there is there is er I met a lot not a lot 
but some people who is married I respect him I respect who one ones who is 
going to to this way I mean yes ones the marrying way (,) you know here I 
don’t know why nobody like (hhh) to marry =
= I think we’ve become a very
secular (,) society
To an Arab, utterance (68) may give rise to the following implicatures: a) in Britain, 
people prefer not to marry which is a bad thing, consequently I would consider them bad 
people; b) people in this country prefer to live with each other without being officially
' l ' l *7married; and c) the non-native speaker considers a married person better than an 
unmarried person. Utterance (70), although praising the native speaker because he is a 
married person, could be interpreted as patronizingly insulting. What makes me suspect 
that there is a misunderstanding here is that the non-native speaker did not think of his 
interactant's feelings about his own culture. He only focused on his own beliefs and 
cultural knowledge to evaluate this context. However, the strongest implicature to both 
might be that "you are among the few who have a legal relationship in your society", which 
could be considered an indirect criticism of British culture.
Linguistically, utterance (71) explains that the native speaker is not happy with what the 
non-native speaker thinks of unmarried people, by using the pronoun ‘we’, which implies 
that he is a member of the society of people who can choose not to marry. Utterance (71) 
also explains that there is difference in understanding the reasons behind remaining
336 Although marriage is considered important by many in Western societies, Arab societies are different 
because any type o f relationship between male and female is frowned upon unless they are officially married,
337 Arabs think that the terms the Westerners use to describe couples who are living together and unmarried 
such as 'boy/girl friend' or 'partners' are terms that are polite. Using these terms helps them to avoid any FTA 
when addressing people collectively; for example if  there is a group o f couples, some o f whom are married 
and some who may not be, another party may say 'Will you all come here with your partners' which would 
mean both married and unmarried couples. However, an English priest told me that he has had to change his 
own views on this matter. He said he now regularly comes across couples who are practising Christians with 
children but who have not married. The difference is that, without exception, they intend to marry sooner or 
later, and he also has conducted marriages for several couples in the past few years that have been together 
for several years. He said to me that many native speakers o f English with no religious faith seem to think 
that people who live together but do not marry must have a secular outlook which, he thinks, is not the case. 
He says that there are Christians who disagree with the morality o f living together without marrying.
68B
69A
70B
71A
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unmarried. 338 Whereas the non-native speaker describes an unmarried person as 
questionable due to them preferring to live with a partner without marrying them (a 
religiously based view), the native speaker simply says that in a secular society one lives 
by different principles which are of equal value, implicitly criticising religious-based 
views. Thus, the meaning of an utterance is differently interpreted.
6.5.2.1.2 Cultural Conventions and disagreement
As argued in chapters 2, 3 and 4, what is considered to be a polite strategy is not always 
the same across cultures; the process of inferring what is intended is culturally and 
contextually influenced, which might lead to disagreement about what is appropriate. As 
already discussed, Sperber and Wilson argue that what is said is never simply the product 
of an encoding process.
Extract 3 B (casual conversation) (Casual conversation) (See page 210 for details of 
interactants)
J = Native speaker of English 
K = Non-native speaker of English
21K : yes I think it's the biggest artificial river because the pipes are around 4m
diameter and running for more than 4000kms =
22J : = that’s amazing where does the
water come from? ((not clear))
(0:2)
23K : well ((not clear)) (0:2) we are living in a
big river I mean ah (0:2) it has been said that the water can (0:2) er can run in 
these pipes for more than 50 years I think it's 50 years more than 50 years
[24J : yes but the the
4000k away the source of these pipes =
25K : = ah yeh
[26J : what is that water is that where does it
come from =
27K : = well the wells which will
[28J : ah these are wells =
29K : = yeh the wells in the
338 It is strange to Arabs that the decision to live with a partner with or without marriage is not necessarily a 
religious decision. For Arabs, it is difficult to accept that there are many people in society who believe in 
marriage although they have no particular religious affiliation, or that some Christians start as an unmarried 
couple with the expectation that they will marry eventually, or that a clergy perform weddings in a church 
when the couple already have one or more children, which in Arab culture means the couple have been living 
in sin and decided to repent. However, Western cultures do not have the same religious focus as Arab 
cultures, and freedom o f choice is much more highly valued.
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desert which is the source of the water and there will be big er lakes 
something like you can say to gather water from these er (,) wells, ah after 
that er from these lakes will other pipes will go to different cities in the 
northern part ((not clear))
[30J : I see so this is a distribution from the best source of
groundwater =
3IK : = yeh yeah
032J : very interesting.
(0:2)
33K : so you haven’t been living
in the desert climate?
Utterance (22) in the following extract is a question that the native speaker has asked the 
non-native speaker. The native speaker here is suspicious of what the non-native speaker 
says in utterance (21). His utterance does not seem as if it is only a question. In Arabic, 
"?SUa1! 3^13 £j! <> i (Ja±a life "5 "Hatha moudhesh”, men ayna tatee almeyah, " that’s 
amazing where does the water come from?” in such context of interaction is considered as 
an accusation that the interactant is not telling the truth. This causes discomfort to the 
non-native speaker in the above extract. As discussed in the section on FTAs (FTAs and 
asking questions), this kind of questioning between strangers is sometimes classified as 
inappropriate in Arabic. It is usually used to reflect power (that is either by a powerful 
person over a less powerful one, such as employer to employee, or a person wanting to 
embarrass his/her interactant in a general conversation in front of other people), which is 
considered to be impolite. In such a context, where the conversation is between complete 
strangers, utterance (22) raises an implicature that "there can be no pipes for such a long 
distance". Although his question is answered several times, the native speaker continues to 
ask the same question or talk about the same topic. As discussed earlier, utterance (22) 
may also imply for the non-native speaker "what you say is difficult to believe", "
^^ *^ 3 "5 " ma takoulho saab atasdeek" or "how is this possible?", "
" kayfa yakoun hatha momkeen", because in Arabic, in a first meeting between 
strangers, expressions that give the possibility that what is being said is not true are not 
used. When I asked the non-native speaker whether he was comfortable with the native 
speaker insisting on him answering certain questions, he said that he did not feel that he 
was challenging him, but he would not expect this type of behaviour from a stranger. He 
also said that, in his opinion, English people generally build their impressions about
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another person without asking too many questions (follow-up interview; extract 3 B, 
Appendix 2).
The non-native speaker in extract 3 B had the impression that his interactant was causing 
him discomfort. The explicature of utterance (22) extract 3 B is that the native speaker 
asks "where the water comes from", but in Arabic, such an explicature may even give rise 
to the implicature that "you are a liar". This lack of understanding of what might be 
appropriate culturally between the interactant, and what might cause an FTA in certain 
contexts, are grounds for potential misunderstanding. Thus, in utterance (22), regardless of 
the intention of the speaker, his way of talking was not appreciated by his Arab interactant 
due to his culture and the particular context. An interactant's reaction to what is considered 
to be an FTA in his own culture does not necessarily reflect whether he felt that his face 
was threatened in cross-cultural interaction. Because of the influence of the context, a 
person may decide not to respond as if his face was threatened, although he would consider 
that his face had been threatened.
Extract 8 B (Radio conversation)
This recording is from CNN Radio, in early 2004 from a programme called 'CNN Radio, 
Newscaster’. It is between a female American broadcaster, a native speaker of English, 
and a male Palestinian non-native speaker of English. He is an active member of an anti- 
Israeli movement in Palestine, considered a terrorist group by the interviewer.
9 Interviewer to make sure that I am plain Sir did your organization
[10 Interviewee OK=
11 Interviewer =
did your organization send someone in with a bomb strapped to his 
body into that bus over celebration
(0:5)
12 Interviewee aha it aha needs that to tell
you what is the Palestinian situation and then this is a Palestinian 
reaction against Israeli mass massacre against Palestinians so we are 
in a war time and Israelis are killing us with the F I6 Fighters which 
comes from the United States and the Palestinians are poor and have 
nothing except to sacrifice their lives, so this is the situation if you 
want to compare it this way
G)13 Interviewer what is your view on suicide bombers
Sir
(0:2)14 Interviewee ah our view of this kind of resistance we are defending ourself
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against Israeli attacks it’s as simple as this the Palestinians are under 
Israeli occupation more than thirty five years Israelis are killing 
Palestinians all the time until this moment
Utterance (11) includes consideration of the interviewee's face-wants, in that she has not 
used the expression "suicide bombing" as she did in utterance (3) in extract 8 A (see page 
201 for details of the interaction), In view of the context and the interviewee's culture, 
utterance (11) may lead the interviewee to assume that his interviewer is being ironic 
towards him in front of his audience because he refuses to answer the same question in 
utterance (3), and now she is asking the same thing in a different way. So, what he is 
implying is that “even changing the linguistic units that might consider my belief or the 
strategy, I will not change my attitude towards the question, because it is still provoking”.
In Arabic, this question in utterance (11), because of the previous utterance (3) in extract 8 
A, would not be considered insulting had it been taken out of the context of the interaction 
and not interpreted in relation to any previous utterance. But asking the same question 
again, as in utterance (11) in the same context from the same interviewer to the same 
interviewee, would give rise to different implicatures to the interviewee, such as "you still 
accuse us of carrying out suicide bombing", or " you insist that we send suicide bombers". 
The interviewer might implicitly want to say to his interviewee "you do not want to answer 
because you are the person who carried out the attack". This is why the interviewee's 
answer in utterance (12) reveals that he feels as though he was provoked, which might not 
have been the interviewer’s intention. Thus, understanding what an utterance might mean 
in relation to what has already been said, or for what it means to the hearer, is crucial -  
especially when interactants' interpretations are influenced by what is acceptable 
linguistically or strategically in the interactants' cultures.
6.5.2.1.3 Solidarity
Using a supportive strategy is considered to be a polite way of interacting. If this is not 
understood, then a misunderstanding may arise, leading to accusations that one of the 
interactants is being inappropriate. In Arabic, utterance (2) in the following extract is a 
supportive utterance, despite stopping the speaker from completing what s/he intends to
339 Utterance (11) extract 8 B might be considered an indirect request to the interviewee to answer the 
interviewer’s question, in spite o f the disagreement that exists between the interactants. This does not 
necessarily mean that this is what is understood by the interviewee. It might mean that the interviewer poses 
her question again in a different way in order to get a different answer.
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say. This way of taking turns in a conversation is not interpreted in the same way across 
cultures.
Extract 5 (casual conversation)
This conversation took place in 2003 between a native British speaker and a postgraduate 
non-native speaker of English. The native speaker is a 31 year old married male with no 
experience of interacting with Arabs. He is doing research at the University of Bristol. The 
non-native speaker is 36 years old, has lived more than two years in England and is doing 
an MSc course. This conversation took place near the University of Bristol.
R = Native speaker of English of English 
T = Non-native speaker of English
1R : LoLondon London was just too expensive to stay
(0:2)
2T : I stayed there last year
(0:2) for two months
(0:2)
3R : where abouts? =
4T : = in the centre (,) city er near
Oxford Street 
[5R Oxford Street yeh =
6T = £400 a week =.
7R : = For just a room =
8T : = er (,) two-room flat
my family and me one bedroom one sitting room small kitchen small 
bathroom that's it 
[9R : that’s pretty good =.
In Arabic, utterance (2) is a strategy for establishing common ground and not an attempt to 
stop the speaker from carrying on. It is not possible to analyse this by merely analysing the
vexplicature that an utterance might give. It involves what is culturally acceptable. In 
Arabic, utterance (2) gives rise to the implicature "I agree because I had a similar 
experience, carry on"," ‘<^1 jalj! Ul ", “ana awafeek leeanie marartou
benafs alshaye, istamer ”, and such way of supporting is classified as a polite strategy. In 
Arabic, such as utterance would be interpreted as evidence of active listening.
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Utterance (1) sounds like an introductory part to something that the native speaker intends 
to speak about. Utterance (2) sounds as if the interviewee does not give him the chance to 
carry on talking. An English person might think that the non-native speaker's intervention 
is inappropriate, but in fact his utterance can be considered an agreement to what has been 
said about London, and a request to his interactant to carry on. Asked why he did not 
allow his interactant to carry on, he said that all he wanted was to say that R was right in 
what he said about London because T had experienced a similar situation (follow-up 
interview extract 5, Appendix 2).
Hence, as argued by Bargiela et. al. (2001), solidarity might not be understood between 
interactants (See chapter 5). Also, as Arndt and Janney (1985) point out, what constitutes a 
supportive utterance or shows solidarity is not fixed, especially in cross-cultural 
interaction. The pragmatic meaning of turn-taking in a conversation before the first speaker 
has finished what s/he intends to say may be considered inappropriate. However, the 
reason for taking the turn in speech in utterance (2) before the native speaker has 
completed is not understood by the native speaker. In Arabic, as explained, it is a sign of 
agreement and respect for what has been said. The strongest implicature of utterance (2) 
might give rise to an Arab in such context as saying "I agree; that is true, carry on." It is 
clear from the flow of the utterances that the native speaker did not understand utterance
(2) as being supportive, which may have led to the misunderstanding. This type of 
solidarity is not understood similarly in the two cultures of the interactants, and also cannot 
be analysed or explained through using Brown and Levinson's strategic model, Lakoff s 
(1973) rules or Leech's (1983) principle of politeness, as the pragmatic meaning is implicit 
and contextually interpreted340 (see chapters 2, 4 and 5). The way that the context of an 
interaction is influenced by what is culturally accepted is different between the native and 
non-native speakers.
6.5.2.1.4 Stereotypes
Sometimes, an interactant's answer is influenced by stereotyping, rather than what the 
explictures of certain utterances might lead to, even if the answer appears to be relevant.
340 As explained, such turn taking is different from the other types o f turn taking where there is an agreement 
between the interactants when the hearer is expected to take the turn in the conversation. In utterance (2) 
extract 5, the non-native provides a complete statement about his experience, but to support the speaker's 
view, he asks him to carry on (see chapter 5, gender across cultures).
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: yeh it's only one year’s course =
: = then after that do you go back or do you want
to stay ((not clear))
[: er (,) no no I go back sure yeah (,) I’ve got my job =
= yes =
= already
my car my job my house (hhh) everything is there so no (,) it's a short period of 
time I’m coming here =
= yeah =
= to do something and come back to my job 
again (0:2) so there be for me (0:2) to come back not to stay here (hhh)
The native speaker's question in utterance (49) appears to be relevant to what is being 
discussed. The non-native speaker’s answer does not seem to say anything directly that 
may make the question in utterance (49) sound inappropriate. The implicature that the 
question in utterance (49) might give rise to is "will you stay here to work and earn money 
or go back home?", an implicature which seems to trigger not only the non-native's answer 
to this question, but also his answer in utterances (52 and 54) in the same extract where the 
non-native speaker tells the native speaker that he has all this in his own country. The non­
native speaker infers what is meant depending on how he culturally stereotypes the reason 
for being asked such question, and not merely on the explicature of the utterance and what 
it might generate. Thus, because of what is stereotyped culturally, utterances (52 and 54) 
give rise to an impression that the non-native speaker inferred more than what was 
intended by utterance (49), which might imply that the non-native speaker does not want to 
stay in the native speaker's country, because he does not need to. Even if the non-native 
speaker has no intention of saying this to the native speaker, providing reasons for not 
staying means that the native speaker's question raises problematic implicatures for the 
non-native speaker.
Arabs think that if they stay in England, they are seen by the English as taking their jobs. 
Even Arabs think that anyone who chooses to live there does so because of money and 
nothing else (see chapter 5, stereotypes). When I asked the non-native speaker about why 
he mentioned his reasons for not staying in the UK after completing his study despite not 
being asked to, he explained that he said that because he was sure that English people think 
that others come to their country to work and earn money only. He said he wanted to tell
48B
49A
5 OB 
51A 
52B
53A
54B
his interactant that he is not like them. He also said that he had been asked such a question 
by more than ten English people before (follow-up interview, extract 1 C, Appendix 2).
It is quite common for an interactant to give more information than asked for, but this 
might be built on different assumptions in cross-cultural communication.341 Wodak and 
Reisigle (2003) state that stereotypes are shared culturally and influence interpretation and 
performance (See chapter 5). As discussed in chapter 2, Mills (2003a) also links 
appropriateness with stereotypes and says that they are built on different presumptions 
which influence interaction. Toolan (1996) and Gudykunst (1998) also point out that 
stereotypes influence interaction, although they might not be accurate or true (see chapters 
4 and 5). Thus, because of how interactants stereotype each other and the topic of 
discussion, what is inferred from a question in certain contexts of interaction might be 
different between the interactants, which might lead to not inferring what is intended by 
the speaker.
6.5.2.1.5 Religion
Understanding certain expressions and strategies is sometimes differently interpreted 
because of the influence of factors such as religion, which does not receive the same 
interpretation in cross-cultural interaction, as argued in chapter 5.
Extract 8 A (Radio conversation) (See page 201 for details of the interactants)
Interviewer 3 = an I’ll get to that but
let me first let me I am talking a little bit first about the suicide 
bombing your organization has taken responsibility for the bus 
massacre which led to this latest incursion by the Israelis so is that 
not true
(0:2)
Interviewee 4 ah let me aha tell you something the aha what you call
suicide operation is called martyrdom operations, ah second ah ah
The question in utterance 3 is a challenging question because of two reasons. Firstly, the 
utterance includes expressions like "suicide bombing", " csjLaujl ", " enteharee"
341 For example, stereotypes may influence interaction. The non-native speaker in utterances (1 and 3) in 
extract 4, might have asked the interviewer the two questions about children because o f what is stereotyped 
about English people, namely that they are not embarrassed if  they are asked about having children (see 
discussion in section 6.5.3.1 in this chapter). Utterances (3 and 5) in extract 3 explain that it is an answer built 
more on a stereotypical view than on what the question actually means. The answer in utterance (3) in extract 
3 can be considered an answer built on an implicature that utterance (2) may give rise to. It also provides 
more information than the question may require.
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"responsibility for the bus massacre", " £p> J "9 " masoul han
amaleeyat alhaffela aldamaweeyah " "led to the incursion by the Israeli" " c> JS cjj!
"9 " adat ella alehtelal men esraeel”. Secondly, he felt that his interviewer was 
ordering him to provide a certain answer. Both reasons are not accepted by the interviewee 
because of the influence of religious values in such contexts. Females in Arabic are not
4expected to speak to males in this way in a media context because of religious values (see 
chapter 5). Again, because of the interviewee's religious beliefs, he disagrees with the 
interviewer about the use of the expression 'suicide bombing'. The interviewee, in utterance 
(4) prefers to correct his interviewer about what the expression 'suicide bombing' means to 
him. The way he corrects his interviewer corresponds with his religious beliefs, which is 
his main justification to defend such a type of attack. The difference in understanding the 
meaning of "suicide bombing" is religiously triggered. An implicature of utterance (4) is 
that the interviewee wants to tell his interviewer that "they have an entirely different 
understanding of what she calls "suicide operations" " "5 “amaleeya
entehareeya. Thus, the explicature of the utterance generates different implicatures to the 
interactants of the interaction because of the influence of culture and the selection of the 
context. Because of the different understanding of the context, in utterance (3) in extract 8 
A, the interviewee considers religion to be an important factor shaping his interpretation of 
what is said, whereas the interviewer considers the political factor as important in her 
linguistic choices, and probably considers what she calls 'suicide bombers' as evil people, 
which is not the case for her interviewee.
6.5.2.1.8 Conclusion to section 6.5.3 Context and Culture
Building on Levinson's (1983) work on the potential for pragmatic failure arising from 
cultural differences, I have investigated and discussed in this section the misunderstandings 
that are attributable to cultural differences which influence the context of an interaction. 
For example, the way that requests are differently performed and interpreted across 
cultures (Blum-Kulka 1992); the effect of culture on assumptions (Coupland et al 1991); 
and the relationship between cultural differences and context causing misinterpretation 
between hearers and speaker (Janney and Arndt 1992, Caffi and Janney 1994).
As argued earlier in chapters (4 and 5) , cultural differences may lead to different 
understandings and misinterpretations of the strategy used by the interactant leading to the 
wrong assessment of politeness. My analyses confirm the need for a more analytical
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approach that considers all interactants and their cultures and how they influence context. 
As Escandell-Vidal (1996) and Valde (1986) posit, we need theories regarding cultural 
differences, how specific cultures relate to the target culture, and to identify subsequent 
misunderstandings. Van Dijk (1997) emphasises that ignorance of cultural difference in 
cross-cultural interaction has always been a problem with different approaches to analysing 
politeness. Thus, cultural factors should be considered in relation to all interactants, and 
analysed in terms of how each individual interprets these factors in relation to their 
understanding of the context.
6.5.2.2 Context and understanding
As I pointed out in chapter 4, how a speaker uses an utterance and how s/he intends to be 
understood is influenced by their understanding of the context of the interaction and what 
influences it. Relevance Theory has discussed this and has argued that understanding 
relevance is a crucial issue in understanding what an utterance might mean, and 
consequently whether it is considered as polite or not. It considers context as a 
psychological construct. Thus, factors such as background knowledge, encyclopaedic 
entry, background experience, attitude, intentionality, motivation, interest, power, distance, 
personality, shared/available knowledge, etc., all influence the production and 
interpretation of an utterance, and should be considered in any type of analysis (see 
chapters 2 and 4). Because of the influence of contextual factors, there is no guarantee that 
the listener will infer the intention of his/her speaker and respond relevantly in cross- 
cultural interaction. As Christie (2000) argues, seeing context as a fixed a priori element of 
an utterance is highly problematic. Interactants might have a different interpretation of the 
context of an interaction because of the influence of such factors.
6.5.2.2.1 Background knowledge
Background knowledge about certain aspects or certain types of people cannot be realized 
before those aspects are discussed, and sometimes may not be realized at all even if  they 
cause discomfort for one party in an interaction.
Extract 4 (Casual Conversation)
This conversation took place in early 2004 between a British native speaker and a Libyan 
non-native speaker of English. The native speaker was originally from Ireland, a 37 years 
old married male with no real experience of interacting with Arabs. The non-native
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speaker is 43 years old, has lived more than three years in England and is doing research in 
accounting. This conversation took place in Sheffield Hallam University.
N = Native speaker of English 
Q = Non-native speaker of English
IN : it's true and was Libya a French colony no it's like Morocco and Algeria =
2Q : = no it wasn't is there any chance that you are Scottish =
3N : = no close
I’m Irish =
4Q : = mm Oh ra oh you’re Irish OK ((not clear)) =
5N . = yeah I am
impressed I am very impressed yeah =
6Q : = er (0:2) er it was colonised by the
Italians =
7N = by the Italians OKt
8Q er 19 (,) ah 11 first world war and then up to the
beginning of the ‘30’s 1932 ’42 sorry ((not clear)) yeah 
[9N 42 OK so during er the second world war
[10Q yeh well it was mostly
Italy and then when the Italians left the country it was colonised by the 
British and the er (,) and the er (,) French aha so it's a period before the 
independence =
1 IN = yeh =
12Q = so it's but the British didn’t I mean did stay for so
long like they did in Egypt or
[
13N and and most other places
[14Q most other places yeh (hhh) so we were more
like an Italian colony
(.)15N ahah when did it get independence =
16Q = Er 40 hh 45
ah 47 ’47 yeh. I’m not very good with history you can tell
(hhh)
G)17N no, it's
Always really embarrassing whenever anyone asks me about Irish history 
as well I’m like well I think we got independence in ’22 give or (hhh) take 
5 years I don’t know.
[18Q (hhh) especially if you are having some Guinness (hhh)
[19N yeah
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Guinness, yeh you gotta love the Guinness. Have you ever tasted 
Guinness
In utterance (1), the native speaker asks the non-native speaker about whether his country 
was a French Colony. Sometimes Arabs dislike such a question, especially when 
historically uninformed Westerners raise it.342 The explicatures of utterance (2) are that the 
non-native speaker is answering the question in utterance (1) and also asking his 
interactant. These two explicatures generate implicatures that the non-native speaker is 
uncomfortable with answering the question about colonialism because he tries to change 
the subject. What led to such an interpretation is the background knowledge of the non­
native speaker about such questions that involve colonialism. Asking the non-native 
speaker why he did not fully answer the question in utterance (1), he said that he did not 
like the question, and he would have preferred it if he was first asked whether Libya was 
colonized or not (follow-up interview, extract 4, Appendix 2). The strongest implicature, 
because of the non-native background knowledge, is "this is not an appropriate question in 
such a context".
Thus, the non-native speaker's answer in utterance (2) extract 4 can give an implicature 
that he is not happy discussing this topic. Rather than providing an answer to the native 
speaker's question, he prefers to shift to asking the person another question. Asking the 
native speaker why he did not realize that the non-native speaker was not happy with his 
choice of topic because of his answer in utterance (2), he said that the non-native's answer 
to him was fine and that he answered the question later (follow-up interview, extract 4, 
Appendix 2). His comments in the follow up interviews do not agree with the utterance 
(17), where the native speaker explains that he finds it highly embarrassing to be 
discussing history, but not for the same reasons as the non-native speaker, though 
ostensibly he is suggesting that they were both embarrassed because they forgot dates.343 
What influences the non-native speaker in interpreting utterance (2) is different from what 
influences his interactant because of the different background knowledge that they have
342 Arabs think that one o f the reasons why they are very much behind the rest o f the world and disunited is 
because of Western colonization, and usually are annoyed when discussing colonization with Westerners 
who often view colonization uncritically (see chapter 1).
343 1 think the second part o f utterance (17) extract 4 does not agree with what he said in the follow-up 
interview when asked (See Appendix 2). It is a redressive utterance from the native speaker to the non-native 
speaker. It is a polite way o f repairing any face damage that the non-native have felt from asking him about 
who colonized his country. He is trying to say that we are in the same situation in that we were both 
colonized by the British.
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about the topic or question, especially when the question is from a person belonging to a 
group whom the non-native speaker, historically, considers to have colonized them.
6.5.2.2.2 Background experience
As argued in chapter 4 in discussing Relevance Theory, relevance is a crucial issue in 
understanding what an utterance might mean, and whether it is considered to be polite or 
not. In the same way, as I have argued in the above section, how a speaker uses an 
utterance, and what s/he intends to be understood from that utterance, is influenced by the 
speaker's understanding of the context in relation to background experience. That is the 
interactant's experience in relation to what s/he is asked. Because of the influence of such 
factors, there is no guarantee that the listener will understand the intended meaning or 
respond relevantly.
Extract 1 A (Casual Conversation)
15A : one year =
16B =yeh =
17A = so you are studying?, =
18B = yeh
019A in the
University?, =
20B : = Er yeh in the University but in UWE344 =
21A : = UWE (,)
22B UWE yeah
[23A ah
right do you prefer it there?
In utterance (19) in the above extract, the native speaker asks whether the non-native 
speaker is a student in the University. In utterance (20), the non-native speaker answers by 
saying "yes", but then follows his answer by saying 'but' in UWE’. The non-native speaker 
provides more information than is required (See Grice in chapter 2).345 This is, again, 
influenced by the interactant's experience of discussing or answering such questions.
344 UWE means the University o f West o f England (UWE)
345 According to Brown and Levinson's model, utterance (23) would be classified as an indirect way o f asking 
for an explanation. Utterance (21) in extract 1 A appears to be a result o f an implicature that the use o f "but" 
in utterance (20) has given rise to. This becomes clearer in utterance (23) when the native speaker asks the 
non-native speaker whether this was his choice. The native speaker understands that the use o f ‘but’ in 
utterance (20) is irrelevant, and prefers to ask him about being in the UWE University.
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However, when I discussed the interactants' use and understanding of 'but' in one of the 
follow-up interviews, I found that the non-native speaker considered the use of ‘but’ as 
relevant to answering his interactant's question. He said that he thought it was important to 
explain that he was in the UWE University and not in Bristol University because his 
interactant would think that he was in Bristol University if he did not say (follow-up 
interview, extract 1 A, Appendix 2).
According to Brown and Levinson, providing an irrelevant answer for a question may 
threaten the hearer's and speaker's face. The reason for such an answer, which might sound 
irrelevant to his interactant, is that among Arabs, if you do not make it clear that you are 
not studying in the main University, then you would be classified as not telling the truth by 
others. We usually emphasise the name of the University when we are not in the main 
University, usually by saying "a student but in The native speaker thinks that the use 
of ‘but’ is irrelevant to his question. However, it is relevant to the whole conversation, 
although it is not important for the native speaker to know at which University he is 
studying, as he said in the follow-up interview (follow-up interview, extract 1 A, Appendix 
2). Thus, although the intention of using 'but' is understood differently, the conversation 
may continue and interactants consider each other relevant.
6.5.2.2.3 Encyclopaedic entries
Extract 5 (casual conversation) (See page 224 for details about the interactants
4T : = in the centre (,) city er near
Oxford Street 
[
5R Oxford Street yeh =
6T = £400 a week =.
7R : = For just a room =
8T : = er (,) two-room flat
my family and me one bedroom one sitting room small kitchen small 
bathroom that's it 
[9R : that’s pretty good =.
10T : = (hhh) for £400 a week =
11R : = oh for week =
12T : = a
week yeh £400 a week so its cost £1,600 a month two months it cost me 
£3,200 for two months.
13R [
(hhh)
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Utterance (10) in the above extract has more than one implicature to the native speaker; the 
first is that ‘it seems that you have not understood what I mean’; the second is that he is 
telling the native speaker that he is wrong; the third implicature is that the non-native asks 
the native speaker to review what he has said and consider whether he has paid a lot of 
money.346 In addition, the way that the non-native speaker has described the flat in 
utterance (8) gives the native speaker the impression that he is expected to realise that the 
non-native has paid a lot, but that the accommodation is not expensive, which might be the 
strongest implicature to the native speaker.347 Thus, the reason for the misunderstanding in 
utterances (8), (9) and (10) is because of different encyclopaedic entries that they associate 
with the word 'expensive' due to living in different parts of the world where what is 
expensive to one is cheap to the other. In Arabic, disagreeing about such an issue might 
lead to arguing, or even mutual accusations of ignorance349 (see chapter 5).
Watts (2003) points out that most individuals know when an utterance structure is open to 
different interpretations. From the above discussion, we find that individuals have their 
own understanding of what is said, what is polite and what is relevant (see Watts 2003, 
chapter 2). Although we might agree that the production and the interpretation of any 
utterance is subject to the principle of relevance, we may add that this relevance is 
influenced by the interactants' encyclopaedic experiences as well as their cultural 
backgrounds. This means that interactants would use and understand language in relation 
to the context, influenced by what is available to them. As Christie (2000) stresses, two 
people sharing a cognitive environment do not make the same assumptions. Individuals 
build their understanding depending on their encyclopaedic knowledge which is influenced 
by different factors. That is, the interactants' understanding of the context in relation to
346 In Arabic, a question in a statement structure is usually a request from your interactant to review what you 
have just said and say the opposite. It is also an accusation that the addressee is not listening, as in utterance 
(10). Although that is what is understood by the native speaker, it is because o f a different understanding o f  
the word expensive due to different cultural backgrounds. Also, the use o f ‘That’s pretty good’ could be
ironic rather than being interpreted as seeing it as cheap, especially if  he is not familiar with London prices.347 The reason for such different understanding is because of where the interactants came from. £400 in 
Libya is a lot o f money. It is two month’s worth o f salary for a Libyan lecturer at a University.
348 Rather than discussing their differences, the native speaker in utterance (11) extract 5 prefers to withdraw 
what he thought first in utterance (9) and agree with the non-native speaker that 400 pounds a week for that 
flat is a lot o f money.
349 The differences between interactants in understanding certain terms or expression because o f different 
background knowledge or culture, usually leads to pragmatic failure in interactions. What the non-native 
speaker tries to say in utterance (8) extract 5 is that what he has paid is a lot o f money, but what the native 
speaker seems to understand is the opposite, as evidenced in utterance (9) extract 5.
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what they think is socially appropriate (see chapter 2). Moeschler (2004) also points out 
that misunderstanding is caused by lack of access to the correct implicature of the 
utterance.350 Thus, as Sperber and Wilson explain, relevance plays a role in the recovery 
of the speaker's intention, and understanding means inferring what is relevant to the 
context of the interaction.
6.5.2.2.4 Intentionality
Sometimes, what a hearer infers is not necessarily what his/her speaker intends. The reason 
for such inferring might not be that the hearer has misunderstood the speaker, but because 
of the hearer's intentions.
9 Interviewer what you should
do rather than insulting me is to is to answer
[
10 Interviewee no I am not insulting you what I am
telling is 
[11 Interviewer of course you are
For example, because there is no clear direct insult in utterance (9) extract 7 A (see pages 
195-196 for details of the extract), the interviewer prefers to understand insulting him as 
the strongest implicature and the interviewee rejects the accusation. The explicature of 
utterance (9) extract 7 A is 'you are insulting me', “ ^  To the interviewee,
utterance (4) in extract 7 A :
4 Interviewee absolutely absolutely listen Tony I am
gonna tell you this (0:2) listen you take what the Israeli tell you for 
granted absolutely you never question what the Israeli
does not give rise to an implicature that insults the interviewer as the interviewer claims in 
utterance (9). In utterance (10) in the same extract, the interviewee refutes the accusation 
that he has insulted his interviewer. In Arabic, utterance (9) gives rise to different 
implicatures; it might mean that the interviewer is telling the interviewee that 'he is being 
impolite towards him' or that 'he does not know what to say', or maybe that 'he cannot
350 Adham (1993) and Salah (1999) state that the relationship between what is said and its meaning has a 
strong effect on constructing and understanding the pragmatic meaning.
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convince others'. To the interviewee, utterance (9) would generate an implicature such as 
'you are insulting me', which can be considered to be the explicature of the utterance as 
well, especially because in Arabic, 'you are insulting me' in such contexts means 'you are 
impolite'.351 Such understanding might be a result of the interactants' intentions towards 
each other. The interviewer may even wish to embarrass his interviewee in front of the 
audience by saying to him indirectly that "you are impolite, because you are insulting 
another".352
6.5.2.2.5 Conclusion of section 6.5.2.2 Context and understanding
Relevance is defined as the relationship between a given assumption and a given context 
(see Sperber and Wilson 1995). This section has analysed the relationship between 
misunderstanding and politeness, examining the process of understanding in cross-cultural 
interaction, and judging that politeness initially depends on interactants' understanding of 
what is relevant within the context of the interaction. Understanding what factors influence 
a context and whether they receive a similar interpretation from interactants is crucial in 
deciding whether there are misunderstandings. Understanding how factors influence 
interaction in relation to all interactants can be done through the contextual pragmatic 
approach, which I therefore propose as an approach for analysis. As explained here and set 
out throughout this thesis, what is relevant may differ from speaker to addressee, and from 
one context to another (See Watts 2003, chapter 2). From the explicatures of what is said, 
hearers usually make more than one assumption, and exclude certain assumptions because 
of the new contextual effects that they infer.
As I have shown, the main aim of Relevance Theory is to explain how utterances are 
understood by establishing their relevance in a wide range of implicatures generated 
because of certain explicatures. As proposed in my approach, through investigating the 
explicatures and then the implicatures that utterances of both interactants may give rise to 
in relation to their context, we can understand whether interactants are relevant in their
351 In Arabic, accusing someone o f insulting you means that you are indirectly telling her/him that s/he is 
impolite. " " " Antah tohenani "It also means that you want to escalate the situation and want to
retaliate because you have been insulted. Or it might mean that the speaker is insulting his/her interactant by
telling him indirectly that s/he is impolite.352 In Arabic, an utterance such as (9) reflects power, and indicates that the interviewer has the greater power 
because he can interpret what he wants as the strongest implicature in spite o f  
of his interactant's denial.
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understanding of each other, consequently determining where there is misunderstanding. 
Such a way of analysing will also help in deciding whether this misunderstanding is open 
to interpretation as politeness or impoliteness. However, how I analyse what is relevant 
emphasises what Christie (2000), Watts (2003), Mills (2003) point out, that politeness is 
far too complex to be limited to simply a face threatening act.
Sperber and Wilson (1995) assume that people have intuitions about relevance, and can 
consistently distinguish relevant from irrelevant (or less relevant) information. They see 
intuitions about relevance as related to context, and show that there is no way of 
controlling exactly which context someone will invoke at a specific moment. Therefore, as 
set out in the theoretical chapters, the influence of background knowledge or experience, 
encyclopaedic entries, interactants' knowledge of each other, attitude, interests, 
intentionality, stereotypes, and understanding of audience and gender, may (if understood 
differently between interactants) lead to different inferences from those intended. My 
suggested approach posits that the stimulus that an interactant produces to make meaning 
manifest to his/her interactant is seldom understood in the same way across cultures.
6.6 Conclusion
We may conclude that there is a problem in applying Brown and Levinson's (1987) 
politeness theory, especially in cross-cultural interactions. Brown and Levinson's FTA 
strategies are not universal and cannot be applied in all cross-cultural contexts, not only 
because there are situations of FTAs that occur but which are not classified by their model, 
but also because there are situations that, according to their model of analysis, cause FTAs, 
when in fact they do not. The reason for such problems with Brown and Levison’s model 
is that politeness and politeness are not always explained linguistically, and that they are 
sometimes inferred contextually.
The follow-up interviews confirm the need for a new approach of analysis. They explain 
that what is going on between interactants and how they communicate does not necessarily 
reflect what they really think of each other's utterance; that what is communicated does not 
necessarily mean what is understood. We also observe that interactants sometimes 
misunderstand each other, which might cause an FTA, but they prefer not to communicate 
this overtly. In addition, when an explicature of an utterance gives rise to an implicature 
that might be heard as inappropriate, this is sometimes because of different understanding
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of the context of the interaction. Thus, although there are different implicatures which can 
be drawn from the utterances because of cultural and contextual variables that might be 
considered as inappropriate to one of the interactants, interactants mostly seem to choose 
one that does not indicate they have felt discomfort.
Degree of politeness/imposition and distance are sometimes subject to individual 
interpretations and negotiation rather than by agreement between interactants, or being 
determined by culture or using certain strategies. Mitigating strategies and utterances of 
directness/indirectness are not interpreted in the same way, because what threatens face is 
not similarly understood in cross-cultural interaction. Like degree of imposition or 
distance, power or an interactants' opinion of the other is not just subject to agreement 
between interactants from the beginning, but changeable throughout the conversation. 
Power and distance in the above interactions are inconsistent, even within one 
conversation, and are not always realized by certain linguistic choices such as the use of 
'titles' or 'first names', as Brown and Levinson (1987) argue. In casual conversations, 
speakers seem cautious to show their interactants that they are in a better position or show 
any distance because of the context.
In the data, native and non-native speakers of English chose topics for discussion, asked 
questions that intentionally or unintentionally embarrassed their interactants, and answered 
questions, including providing indirect and irrelevant answers or simply not answering at 
all. In the TV/Radio conversations, power seems to be understood differently between the 
interactants. For example, in Arabic TV/Radio, interviewers have more power than 
interviewees and are usually not challenged. It seems that the Arab interviewees do not 
interpret power in this way in the TV / Radio conversations of this research. They 
sometimes accuse their interviewers and do not provide direct apologies.
In the radio conversations analysed in this research, the interviewee in extracts 8 and 9 
seems to be influenced by religion and culture when interacting with his female 
interviewer. To Arabs, his reaction towards her when she asked him provocative questions 
is considered polite compared to what would have happened had his interactant been male. 
His answers or objections would then have been more challenging. Thus, interactants' 
interpretations or answers are sometimes the subject of different understandings of the 
context of interaction.
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The data also shows that accusing an interactant of being inappropriate is sometimes 
related to misunderstanding, but misunderstanding does not always mean impoliteness, as 
discussed in the casual conversations and TV or Radio interviews.353 The data shows that 
there are reasons behind being polite, and these are sometimes different across cultures, 
which may lead to misunderstandings. For example, turn-taking is sometimes differently 
interpreted across cultures. As we have seen, an interruption or taking of a turn might be a 
supportive strategy and a polite way of talking, regardless of its length, but interactants 
might not realize this in cross-cultural interaction. Analysing such reasons for 
misunderstanding is important in understanding the meaning of a certain strategy during an 
utterance.
As stated earlier, what influences interactants’ decisions in using or interpreting an 
utterance is crucial, and cannot be realized from analysing individual utterances out of 
context. It is obvious in almost all of the conversations studied that the meanings of the 
utterances are subject to understanding other factors that influence the conversation as a 
whole. My approach shows that misunderstanding is sometimes not realized by the 
interactants in cross-cultural interaction because the strategy used is understood as a polite 
strategy only by the speaker. Thus, the addressee might not infer that his interactant aims 
to be polite. It also shows that a strategic theory of politeness such as Brown and 
Levinson’s model may not always classify how politeness is performed or understood in 
cross-cultural analysis.
Using explicatures of utterances and what implicatures they generate to both interactants in 
a conversation is a key factor in my approach in which I analyse what they involve and 
why what is a relevant answer to one interactant is not to the other. The analysis of 
implicatures helps in understanding whether interactants provide relevant answers and 
consider each other's face, and whether or not they behave appropriately. Interactants with 
entirely different beliefs might have a more or less volatile attitude towards certain issues 
or certain ways of communicating. The implicatures that an utterance might give rise to in 
a mono-cultural communication context might be different to those in a cross-cultural
353 We have argued that misunderstandings between interactants from different cultures may lead to 
impoliteness, but this not always the case because what is considered politeness in one culture might not be 
so in another.
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context. This means that what might be a strong implicature in one context might not be 
the same in another. 354
Thus, from analysing the data, we may agree with Werkhofer (1992) that an utterance 
might be appropriate but the intended meaning might not be (see Watts (2003) chapter 2). 
Politeness is context-based, and it involves different factors such as interpersonal issues, 
which includes the interactants' interests and their intentionality in determining what to 
communicate as Mills (2003) notes. Politeness is also related to understanding the intended 
meaning as discussed by Spencer-Oatey (2000a), Neydell (2002), Dittmar (1976) and 
Dascal (1999), and also to-understanding linguistic and social issues of the language of 
interaction as described by Hymes (1972) and Eelen (2001), and Scollon and Scollon 
(1995) who show that interaction works better when participants know each other's 
cultures.
One of the main conclusions in this chapter is that politeness is ‘a discursive concept 
arising out of interactants’ perceptions and judgements of their own and others’ verbal 
behaviour in relation to the context of the interaction’ (Locher and Watts, 2005:10) (see 
Eelen, 2001). Disagreement on whether an utterance is relevant or appropriate is 
sometimes related to the culture and background knowledge of the interactants. An 
utterance, whether it is direct/indirect, relevant/irrelevant, appropriate/inappropriate or 
polite/impolite, might be judged from analysing the linguistic structure. But such an 
analysis cannot include all that influences the context of the interaction. Thus, the approach 
I propose in this chapter includes analysing linguistic choices in relation to the context, 
which includes the cultural differences of the interactants, their intentions or attitudes 
towards each other, stereotypes and personal interests (see chapter 4, Sperber and Wilson 
(1995)). A speaker might consider himself/herself appropriate while his/her utterance 
sounds irrelevant to the addressee because the intention is different from that of his/her 
interactant.
As explained, the implicatures of what is said in relation to the cultures of the interactants 
and their backgrounds provide us with what might lead to conflict or misunderstanding 
between interactants and consequently determine whether interactants are polite or
354 An utterance may have two contradictory implicatures, but a hearer determines what to understand 
regardless o f the effort o f the speaker to make his / her utterance appropriate (See Sperber and Wilson 1996).
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impolite. 355 The sequences of the interactants' utterances in the conversations are 
organized, and there is always an understood implicature of what is said. Interactants 
work to maintain politeness in their conversation even if they have behaved in a way they 
would not with a person from the same culture.
It seems that interactants usually communicate drawing on what we may call "positive
'ic nimplicature" rather than the strongest implicature, or one may argue that the most 
positive implicature is the strongest implicature to the interactants in the above 
conversations. The data shows that every context of interaction has its own parameters 
defining what an FTA is. Thus, it is not only a matter of what the speaker may mean or 
what the culture of the speaker considers to be appropriate, it is also a matter of the 
listener's understanding and his/her selection of the context of an utterance which involves 
both interactants' culture and their interpersonal interests in cross-cultural context. The 
data shows that what is regarded as negative and positive face is not universal, and that 
FTAs are not only related to the type of speech act and strategy used. It is a matter of 
understanding the context of the utterance in relation to the context of the interaction and 
the intention of the interactants towards each other. Listeners' interpretations are crucial in 
analysing politeness.
The data shows that in cross-cultural interaction, background knowledge is usually 
influential in providing a different implicature to the one that the speaker intended, whether 
that was in constructing or interpreting the language. The data also shows that previous 
experience and stereotypes influence interaction. Particularly in the TV and Radio 
conversations, it is perhaps inevitable that a hearer might accept or reject an interactant
355 Moeschler (2004) discusses pragmatic misunderstandings. His reasoning is based on some 
assumptions supported by Relevance Theory, namely the ostensive-inferential character o f  
linguistic communication and the difference between explicature and implicature. He 
hypothesises that ‘misunderstandings are caused not by difficulty in drawing the intended 
implicature, but primarily by lack o f access to the correct explicature o f the utterance’
(2004:1). He restricts his discussion to ostensive-inferential communication to show how the Principle o f  
Relevance plays a crucial role in the recovery o f the speaker’s informative intention.
356 Have (2002) maintains that ‘the idea o f “sequence” refers to the common experience that ‘one thing can 
lead to another” . He argues that ‘utterances in interactional talk are sequentially organized’ (2002:113).
357 Positive implicature is one o f the implicatures that an utterance may give rise to that the addressee decides 
to select to communicate with his interactant. It does not need to be the strongest implicature or the weakest 
implicature. It might be any implicature that either helps to mitigate or avoid any type o f disagreement or 
conflict.
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because of what is stereotypical or previously known.358 The topic choice in most of the 
conversations is not controlled by one party, and uncomfortable topics or utterances can 
come from any of the interactants influenced by what is stereotyped, from background 
knowledge or previous experience.
To sum up, in this chapter I have demonstrated that analysing politeness and impoliteness 
is too complex to be judged through analysing individual utterances and certain linguistic 
choices alone. I have also proved my argument in the theoretical chapters that judging 
whether an utterance is polite or not is contextual, rather than being linked only to certain 
speech acts performed by using certain strategies. I demonstrated that we need Relevance 
Theory in analysing politeness because it provides us with the link that we need in 
understanding how interactants understand each others' utterances in relation to what 
influences the context of the interaction. In this chapter I have also demonstrated that to 
analyse politeness we need to analyse understanding, which my contextual pragmatic 
approach does by considering interactants' understanding of all the variables that influence 
interaction, whether they are contextual, cultural or interpersonal. My contextual pragmatic 
approach analyses the explicatures/implicatures of utterances, examines understanding, and 
determines whether there are any misunderstandings that might lead to impoliteness and 
the reasons behind them. It considers the factors that influence the context in relation to the 
interactants, and analyses whether the strategy used by a speaker is considered as polite by 
the hearer both linguistically and pragmatically.
358 Barraja-Rohan (2003) states that interactants sometimes interact with others drawing on previous 
experiences or how they stereotype them and also on their attitudes towards them, as in the data o f the TV 
and Radio interaction.
Chapter 7: Conclusion
7.1 Conclusion
I conclude this research by providing a summary of my main objectives. Firstly, I cover 
the aims and the theoretical framework of this thesis. Secondly, I give a summary of the 
main findings, finally, noting the implications, and recommendations for future work.
7.1.1 Aims
This study has investigated the understanding of linguistic politeness between the cultures 
of Arabic and native English speakers and the relationship between language use, context 
and culture. Although focussing on these particular cultures, the main aim of the research 
has been to explore cultural and contextual differences that influence interaction when 
analysing politeness/impoliteness, in any cultural exchange situation. One of the main 
goals has been to call for a new approach in analysing politeness in cross-cultural 
interaction as an alternative to the principle, rule or strategic models, (see chapter 2).
Throughout, I have criticised the core theories of politeness, Brown and Levinson in 
particular, and their claims to universality in politeness strategy across cultures. I have 
argued that there are problems with the core theories of politeness that prevent them from 
analysing politeness adequately, whether in mono or cross-cultural interaction, in that they 
do not consider all the factors that influence interaction, and their judgement of politeness 
is not based on all the influences in the context of interaction.
I have also posited that Brown and Levinson's model of analysis does not adequately 
distinguish between contextual and cultural differences, nor acknowledge how politeness is 
understood and interpreted in cross-cultural contexts. Further, their model does not 
question misunderstandings and the reasons behind them, especially at a cultural level, and 
their theory ignores the listener's role, an important element in constructing and 
interpreting utterances.
7.1.2 Theoretical Framework
In chapter 2, after discussing the core politeness theory, I provided details of a range of 
theories that give different ways of defining and analysing politeness. These theories do 
not completely reject Brown and Levinson's theory, rather, they try to provide different
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understandings of what is considered to be politeness/impoliteness by considering more 
factors than do politeness theories, consequently either criticising, modifying or providing 
their own models of analysing politeness. The chapter also introduces other methods of 
analysis which can be used to provide an adequate approach for analysing politeness in 
cross-cultural interaction.
In chapter 3, I emphasised the contextual and cultural variables that influence interaction 
that have not been considered or adequately analysed by the core theories of politeness. 
This chapter shows that the core theories of politeness do not engage sufficiently in 
considering cultural differences, and the dynamics of context selection in interaction. It 
also establishes the need for a more contextual pragmatic approach in analysing politeness, 
and confirms the argument that adopting one theory to analyse politeness, especially in a 
cross-cultural setting, might not always be possible if that model depends solely on 
analysing individual utterances or tries to distinguish what is or is not polite by analysing 
only in relation to the speaker, speech acts out of context.
Chapter 4 discussed alternative approaches to the politeness models. It showed that 
analysing understanding and misunderstanding and the causes of any pragmatic failure is 
very important in any model or approach to analysis, and that we need a theory of 
cognition such as Relevance Theory in order to analyse politeness contextually.
Chapter 5 showed that interactants from different cultural backgrounds sometimes 
misunderstand or challenge each other because they do not know what is culturally 
appropriate in certain contexts, and because they have different understandings of the 
cultural variables that influence the production and interpretation of utterances.
7.1.3 Contribution of the research
This study contributes to cross-cultural interaction literature on politeness by updating our 
understanding of influences on interactions in cross-cultural contexts. Reducing 
dependency upon the core theories of politeness, I have suggested an approach to analysing 
politeness that can be widely used in cross-cultural interaction, as it includes the 
multicultural representation of all respondents and what influences context. By analysing 
native and non-native speakers of English, I have shown the complexity of understanding 
politeness in a cross-cultural context and also shown how different influences on cross-
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cultural interactions lead to different interpretations. I have shown the importance of 
cultural knowledge and context in inferring what is meant by what is said, because what is 
said is never a product of an encoding process. (See Christie 2000)
In chapter 6, I have shown that misunderstanding between interlocutors from different 
cultures arise from the failure of interactants to understand the politeness norms of other 
cultures. I have also shown that, in cross-cultural interaction, interactants sometimes fail to 
recognize the way that politeness is realized because of different understanding of the 
context. In this chapter I have also set out to prove what I have argued in the theoretical 
chapters, that in order to recognize any pragmatic failure that might occur in cross-cultural 
interaction we need a contextual pragmatic approach that considers adequately any factors 
that influence interaction in relation to the interactants. Therefore, in chapter 6 I have 
introduced an approach to analysing the data which shows a clear link between analysing 
interaction in general and analysing politeness in particular. It links analysing politeness to 
cultural and contextual factors that might influence the context of interaction and considers 
how interactants differ in their interpretations of the same utterance because of their 
different cultural backgrounds. It emphasises the argument that selecting a context plays an 
important part in working out what the speaker means by an utterance, and that a context is
'X 5Qnecessary in explaining how an addressee comes to an understanding of an utterance.
I have called my approach a contextual pragmatic approach. It proves the arguments that 
have been highlighted in the previous chapters, and also shows that adopting any of the 
core theories models including Brown and Levinson's does not solve the problem of 
analysing politeness in cross-cultural interaction, as argued in the theoretical chapters. 
(See chapters 2 and 3). I have argued that variables that influence interaction are 
interpreted differently across cultures, as set out in chapters 4 and 5. The data of this thesis 
shows that Brown and Levinson's theory cannot analyse how politeness is understood or 
performed, and that broader understanding, cultural, and contextual views are needed in 
analysing politeness (See chapter 4). In my approach, I have considered how politeness is 
perceived between interactants in cross-cultural situations and explored the situations 
leading to misunderstandings caused by different interpretations of what is polite. The
359 Referring to Speber and Wilson (1993), Christie explains that 'Contextual assumptions are inferred in the 
process o f interpreting utterances and that they play a part in the hearer's assessment o f what a communicator 
has said, and in the assessment o f what the communicator means by what she has said' (2002:180)
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proposed approach has proved that politeness cannot be analysed through principles, rules, 
a strategic model, or a model built on speech act theory, nor by understanding and 
analysing only semantic meaning.360
7.1.4 Findings
The criticism of the core politeness theories including Brown and Levinson's model, 
theoretically and empirically, shows that politeness is a complex issue that cannot be 
judged by analysing only issues such as the notion of face, considered an important factor 
in Brown and Levinson's theory. I have shown that the notion of face in their model 
cannot be universal, but is differently realized in cross-cultural interaction. The analysis 
confirms what I have argued in the literature chapters: that what is considered as an FTA in 
one culture might not be so in another. Certain speech acts in some contexts might be 
considered appropriate, or might cause discomfort to only one interactant, but cause an 
FTA to another in cross-cultural interaction.
As Spencer-Oatey (2000a) points out, the fact that we feel offended, uncomfortable, 
annoyed or angry; does not necessarily imply feeling a loss of face, nor does loss of face 
necessarily mean that a person made an impolite utterance. Even accepting that there are 
FTAs in all cultures, we need to point out that not all conversational contexts, as Brown 
and Levinson believe, are indicative of FTAs (See chapter 2). What is an FTA and 
impoliteness is not the same for all interactants, and what needs redress strategy is not the 
same across cultures.
Another important finding is that directness and indirectness are not always interpreted the 
same across cultures, neither are the contexts for being indirect. The relationship between 
interactants is not the only factor which determines the degree of indirectness between 
them; rather understanding the context and what influences it. Indirectness does not 
always mean conflict avoidance or mitigating of an FTA. Variables such as power, 
distance and degree of imposition determine the strategy that an interactant may adopt, but 
these are understood differently across cultures. They are also not the only factors that
360 Perry (2003) Jr. (2002) states that understanding what speakers imply in context demands pragmatic 
information and not just specific or semantic knowledge.
361 Spencer-Oatey (2000) argues that 'sometimes, though, people’s treatment o f us may not simply irritate or 
annoy us; it may go a step further and make us feel as though we have lost credibility or have been personally 
devalued in some way. When this happens we talk of ‘losing face'. (2000:16).
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determine the linguistic choices and the strategies used. Variables and factors that 
influence interaction are not fixed because contexts of interactions are not fixed.
Another finding is of the different understanding and interpretation of what certain aspects 
mean because of cultural differences between interactants. Across cultures, there are 
different ways of showing respect to others. For example, as seen, there are certain 
contexts for naming strategies to be considered as appropriate, and they are sometimes 
differently interpreted. In addition, appropriate topics for discussion are understood 
differently, and what is considered as an appropriate question is also different.
Another cultural problem that this research highlights is the different understanding of 
certain speech acts. For example, irony, request and apology are not understood similarly. 
They are usually contextual and judged by the utterance's pragmatic meaning. In Arabic, 
in certain contexts, apology and request are sometimes performed implicitly by the .speaker 
and accepted by the addressee, but that is not the case in English. There are different 
strategies used to show solidarity such as turn taking or interruption, which are usually 
implicit and understood by only one of the interactants.
I also found that there are no correct or incorrect interpretations for utterances without 
considering their contexts. This finding emphasises that the way hearers come to 
agreement with their speakers and distinguish literal from intended meanings is very 
complicated in cross-cultural interaction. It shows there are different reasons for 
misunderstandings between interactants and conflicts happen because of these differences. 
The generated explicatures and implicatures from utterances in cross-cultural interaction 
are not the same, or rather what is considered as a strong implicature of an utterance is not 
the same because of cultural and contextual differences between the interactants. Cultural 
and contextual factors such as gender, religion, power, distance, background experience, 
background knowledge, encyclopaedic entries, etc., are differently interpreted in cross- 
cultural interaction, consequently influence inferences as to what is relevant.
For example, a factor such as religion differently influences Arab speakers' and 
Westerners’ cultures. Because of such influence interactants may misunderstand the 
intended meaning of an utterance. The data also has shown that in spite of such differences 
in interpreting what influences interaction, and what might lead to misunderstanding,
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interactants usually draw on what we may call "positive implicature". In spite of 
provocative topics and questions in relation to interactants' cultures, interactants, most of 
the time, prefer to avoid being inappropriate, which means politeness is always assumed to 
be intended even in situations where one feels discomfort because of topic choice, 
question, or linguistic strategy.
7.1.5 Implications
Because my approach is to investigate the factors that influence the production and 
interpretation of politeness in relation to speakers and addressees, this research might have 
implications in other fields where communication is analysed. For example, this study can 
be seen as an attempt to examine Brown and Levinson critically and emphasise the need 
for a new model of analysis, especially in cross-cultural interaction. My approach of 
analysis does not completely reject Brown and Levinson's model as a model of analysis, 
but calls for more research to modify this. It encourages the link between theories of 
understanding- and theories of politeness in order to provide a more pragmatic model of 
analysis. My approach enables analysts to explain how addressees derive the implicatures 
they do, it accounts for how other implicatures might be derived, and it supports the fact 
that because of cultural differences and different understanding of the contexts of 
interaction, addressee might infer different implicatures of what his/her speaker intended.
The contextual pragmatic approach I have suggested supports further studies in the field 
not only to compare similar or different kinds of linguistic behaviour across cultures; 
rather, it encourages the understanding of the factors that are behind such similarities and 
differences and how they influence interactants. It also explores the importance of 
investigating politeness on organizational levels in cross-cultural interaction such as 
foreign language teaching and learning because politeness involves linguistic along with 
social, cultural and contextual factors. Another crucial point is that this research might 
be considered as a basis for creating a theory that mitigates any potential conflict or 
breakdown in conversation, whether in mono or cross-cultural interaction. For example, in 
the data of this research, I find that most of the utterances have positive implicatures that
362 Adegbite (2005) argues that ‘an understanding of the various means o f expressing politeness or breaches 
of politeness in English is crucial for ESL' (2005:1477). And Bou-Franch and Garces-Conejos (2003) also 
argue that 'Linguistic politeness constitutes the most suitable tool with which to approach the teaching o f L2 
sociopragmatic in the classroom context' (2003:19). As Tallman (2002) argues 'teaching is a fundamental 
pedagogical engagement before it is an instructional one, containing immediate social, cultural, moral, and 
political dimension' (2002:368)
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interactants preferred to build on when communicating in order to carry on communicating 
and avoid conflict or breakdown. If we could provide interactants, especially in cross- 
cultural contexts, with strategies to communicate building on 'positive implicatures' of 
what is said rather than 'strongest implicatures', then we might solve or reduce the problem 
of conflict, or interactants accusing each other of being impolite.
Thus, this thesis has shown that analysing politeness does not only depend on analysing 
certain utterances. It is a process that involves the analysis of utterances as part of longer 
stretches of speech, the analysis of what is said in relation to the interactants' cultures, and 
the analysis of the interactants' understanding of what influences the context of the 
interaction in relation to what is said. The theoretical and empirical chapters of this thesis 
can be considered as a source for further research in the fields of linguistics, 
sociolinguistics and pragmatics or investigations into interculturalism or multiculturalism.
This thesis contributes to the development of cross-cultural research that aims to move 
beyond the analysis of literal meaning of what is said. It is research that helps in 
understanding what cross-cultural interactants think of each other when interacting because 
of different understandings of what influences the context of the interaction. As such, it 
contributes to a growing body of research which while questioning Brown and Levinson's 
model, modifies it so that it can more adequately analyse complex cross-cultural 
interactions. It is clear from this research that a more pragmatic focus, drawing on 
Relevance Theory, can help in our understanding of misunderstanding of politeness.
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Appendix 1 (Data analyzed in the thesis)
1 - Tape-Recorded Conversation 
Extract 1 A
This conversation took place in 2003 between a British native speaker of English and 
Libyan non-native speaker of English. The native speaker is 31 years old married male 
and had no real experience in interacting with Arabs. The non-native speaker is 36 years 
old, has lived more than two years in England and doing an MSc course in IT. They 
were not asked to discuss particular topics. It was left to them to discuss whatever they 
liked. This conversation tool place between the interactants in Bristol near the 
University of Bristol, and interactants did not know each other before the conversation 
took place.
A = Native speaker of English 
B = Non-native speaker
1A : is it starting (04) OK=
2B : = yup
(0:2)
3A : I’ll tell you my name again shall I
(0:2)
4B : er (,)
my name is F  =
5A : = is F.........=
6B : = yup
07A : I’m D...
(0:2)
8B : D... ((not clear)) =
9A : = that’s it =
10B :
yeh (,) nice to meet you =
11A : = and you (,) hh er where do you come from? =
12B : = I’m
from Libya =
13A : = Libya
[14B : Um, now about one year =
15A : = One year =
16B =yeh =
17A = so you are
studying?, =
18B = yeh
G)19A in the University?, =
20B : = er yeh in the University but in
UE =
21A : = UE (,)
22B EU yeah
i
Extract 1 B (Casual conversation)
A = Native speaker of English 
B = Non-native speaker
: (hhh)
24A so what’s the course? =
25B : = MSc (,) er IT =
26A : = IT
: [27B Information technology yeah =
28A : = ah
I’m thinking of doing an MSc in, um, geophysical information systems =
29B = ah
nice nice one
(0:2)
30A but Er it depends on the grants and it depends on whether
they can get me the money =
3IB : = in here er I mean citizen student (,) they take er
(,) a low low grant, I mean it is not expensive I mean (0:3) like foreign 
students (0:2) in EU as an example er (,) they take £1,500 yes and from 
citizen ((not clear)) they take £6,500 -  
32A : = who is paying the fees? (,) who is
paying? are you paying that? =
33B : = no no for me I have someone to pay (,) my
government I mean I’ve got a grant but here it is not a lot of money 
£1,500 =
34A = no
(0:2)
35B so here don’t know how how much in Bristol University
G)36A : er
(0:2) well the one I’m looking at is based in Manchester is I think for 3 years 
£3,800 =
37B : = A-ha a part-time one =
38A : = part- time yes =
39B : = ah nice nice one =.
40A : = they can
make they can make more money out of foreign students
[(hhh)
41B yes (hhh)
42A it's very very
lucrative
(0:4)
43B : I study study you know very nice but when a man become
bigger and bigger it's very very very (0:3) difficult to (0:2) I mean to manage 
yourself to study again =
= yes =
44A = yeap I got a very very very difficult time last
45B three months =
46A : = you have to learn to be disciplined again, don’t you =
47B : = yeah
student again, you stay in class again, examination again, assignments again
iii
Extract 1 C
A = Native speaker of English 
B = Non-native speaker
48B
49A
5 OB 
51A 
52B
53A
54B
55A
56B
57A
58B
59A
60B
61A
62B
63A
64B
65A
• yeh it's only one year’s course =
: = then after that do you go back or do you want
to stay ((not clear))t: er (,) no no I go back sure yeah. (0:0) I’ve got my job =
= yes =
= already
my car my job my house (hhh) everything is there so no (,) it's a short period of 
time I’m coming here =
= yeah =
= to do something and come back to my job 
again (,) so there be for me (0:2) to come back not to stay here (hhh)
[yeh
(0:4)
what
about study here if you want to study (,) I mean your monthly payment here it's 
er (0:2) becomes (0:2) ((not clear)) how I can explain it (0:1) they give you 
monthly er (0:1)
[no
[I mean your job I mean, how you can manage study with your job
(0:2)
: the
way it's gonna work for me individually (,) is that um (0:2) I’m going to be 
doing I work as a technician so I make all the equipment and keep it running 
for the research and the academic who is trying to get me the money to do 
that er is based in Manchester now so what will happen is if it all works I will 
be getting a salary to do his technical support work and I’ll be registered with 
Manchester to do a higher degree (,) and I’ll have to do the degree in my own 
time yes so I work and I do my degree as well =
= ah ha =
= but the degree is
spread over three years so it's it's not cramming everything into a single year 
= hum hum =
= but that’s the only way I can manage it I can’t afford to not have 
a job um so (0:2) yeh my wife works as well ((not clear)) which will make it 
easier (hhh) but we’re trying to get enough money to buy a house and if I just 
don’t have a salary coming in we wont be able to do that but hopefully what 
will happen is er there (,) will be some money er put on my grant to pay my 
fees so I don’t have to pay my fees
[yeh yehtbut all that’s being negotiated
66B
67A
68B
69A
70B
71A
(hhh)
(0:2)
right so
you can do it yeah (0:0) in this way you can
[you can do it if you’re in the right
place at the right time =.
= sure (hhh) nice to meet someone married here in this 
country you know as you 
[it's getting rarer isn’t is 
[yeh (hhh) very rare (hhh) (0:2) but but 
there is there is er I met a lot not a lot but some people who is married I 
respect him I respect who one ones who is going to to this way I mean yes 
ones the marrying way (,) you know, here I don’t know why nobody like 
(hhh) to marry =
= I think we’ve become a very secular (,) society
v
Extract 2 (Casual Conversation)
This conversation took place in late 2003 between British native speaker and Libyan 
non-native speakers. The native speaker is 43 years old married male and had no real 
experience in interacting with Arabs. The non-native speaker is a 41 years old, 
postgraduate student studying pharmacy. He has lived more than 4 years in England 
doing a PhD. The recording took place in the University of Bristol.
H = Non-native speaker of English 
I = Native speaker of English
1H : you got children? =
21 : = not yet, no
[3H : ah, not yet, ((not clear)) new married =
41 : = about
18 months =.
5H = OH nice
(0:2)
61 yeh, we’re thinking about it but we’d like to try
and get a house first if possible =
7H = yeh sure =
81 = who knows (0:5) how long
have you been married =
9H : = now, er, (0:6) more than four years but not five
years 
(hhh)
101 : four and a half
(hhh)
11H : yeh, four and a half and two children
(hhh)
121 : tiring =
13H = umm
(0:2)
141 is, is, are the children tiring ((not clear)),
[15H yeh
[161 do they wear you out ?
(hhh)
17H : yeh
you know children is children nice but more more more (,) they need 
more more time and more (0:3) an I mean look after them to look after the 
children you have to (0:2) do a lot of things =
181 and H = ((not clear))
(0:3)
191 : my wife is
a primary school teacher =
vi
20H
211
22H
231
24H
251
26H
271
28H
291 
3 OH 
311
= ooh she know abouttshe knows what to do
(hhh)
(0:2)
it make her job very easy yeh (hhh) maybe she hate children, that’s why
[at the moment she can
give them back at the end of the day but when we’ve got our own you 
can’t do that can you
(0:2)
she know about children yeh so now she prepare
herself to welcome 
[she’s she’s trying to get used to the idea ((not clear))
(hhh)
Q she is
trying to (laugh) prepare everything yeh nice nice yeh (0:3) children is 
very very nice in this world very very nice =.
= best decision you made is it
= yeh sure (,) if you see your son grow and make like what we our fathers 
our family in our society I mean (0:2) respecting fathers respecting family 
father and mother is very, (,) very big. (0:2) yeah may be its finished yeah 
that one ((not clear)) so is very big things to leave your family or to not 
take care for your family for your father and mother .... so that is the 
meaning of children nnno not a big meaning but when you becomes a big 
man have someone look after you visit you give you a lift
(hhh)
yeh (hhh)
[visit you
and has children coming and visit you =
= yeah (,) my family is similar we
have er part of my family is Italian
vii
Extract 3 A (casual conversation)
This conversation took place in late 2003 between a British native speaker of English 
and a Libyan non-native speaker. The non-native speaker is from Southern Libya. He is 
a 39 year old married male with two children, doing a PhD in dental studies and writing 
up his thesis. He has lived more than 5 years in London. The native speaker is British 
and has no real experience of interacting with Arabs. This conversation took place in the 
University of London.
J = Native speaker of English 
K = Non-native speaker of English
1J : do you have to go very deep to sink a well =
2K : = no I mean, something like its
very amazing I mean when you dig around ah one metre you find (0:0) 
beautiful water =
3 J : = how extraordinary =
4K : = yeh
o5J : does does this originate from
mountains nearby or 
[
6K : no, when (0:2) people er our scientists I mean claim that this water
(0:0) I mean I was told from thousands and thousands of years during the Ice 
Age. (,) ((not clear))
(0:2)
7J : the trouble about that if it’s true, is that it’s a finite
resource (,) it’s not a resource that is being replenished continuously.
[8K : ahhh
[9 J : do you think
[10K : ah well some aaa
researcher they said hh they might er (0:2) er be (0:3) something like er 
rivers =
11J : = subterranean =
12K: = er ka hh well the nile river is not very far from the
desert, you know what I mean, it's just 1000 or 2000kms =
13 J : = (hhh) that seems
to me a long way (hhh)
[14K : no but I mean er because the result you can imagine if s like this
so I mean Nile river is just on the edge of er of the desert you know what
you call the Sahara ~
[15J : yes ((not clear))
[
16K :
17J : 
18K :
19J
20K
this is the the desert ((not clear))
[yes =
= but er ahh today I cannot
consider myself as desert man I mean
[no well you are a ((not clear))
cosmopolitan man =
= yeah my city is a big city at the moment.
ix
Extract 3 B (casual conversation)
J = Native speaker of English of English 
K = Non-native speaker of English
21K : yes I think it's the biggest artificial river because the pipes are around 4m
diameter and running for more than 4000kms =
22J : = that’s amazing where does the
water come from? ((not clear))
(0:2)
23K : well ((not clear)) (0:2) we are living in a
big river I mean ah (0:2) it has been said that the water can (0:2) er can run in 
these pipes for more than 50 years I think it's 50 years more than 50 years
[24J : yes but the the
4000k away the source of these pipes =
25K : =ahyeh
t26J : . what is that water is that where does it
come from =
27K : = well the wells which will
[28J : ah these are wells =
29K : = yeh the wells in the
desert which is the source of the water and there will be big er lakes 
something like you can say to gather water from these er (,) wells, ah after 
that er from these lakes will other pipes will go to different cities in the 
northern part ((not clear))
[30J : I see so this is a distribution from the best source of
groundwater =
3 IK : = yeh yeah
o
32J : very interesting.
(0:2)
33K : so you haven’t been living
in the desert climate?
x
Extract 4 (Casual Conversation)
This conversation took place in early 2004 between a British native speaker and Libyan 
non-native speaker of English. The native speaker was originally from Ireland, a 37 
years old married male with no real experience in interacting with Arabs. The non­
native speaker is 43 years old, has lived more than three years in England and doing 
research in accounting. This conversation took place in Sheffield Hallam
N = Native speaker of English of English 
Q = Non-native speaker of English
I N  : it's true an d  w as L ibya a  French colony no it's like M orocco an d  A lgeria,
no it wasn't =
2Q : = is there any chance that you are Scottish =
3N : = no close
I’m Irish =
4Q : = mm Oh ra oh you’re Irish OK ((not clear)) =
5N = yeah I am
impressed I am very impressed yeah =
6Q : = er (0:2) er it was colonised by the
Italians =
7N = by the Italians OK
[
8Q er 19 (,) ah 11 first world war and then up to the
beginning of the ‘30’s 1932 ’42 sorry ((not clear)) yeah 
[9N 42 OK so during er the second world war
[10Q yeh well it was mostly
Italy and then when the Italians left the country it was colonised by the 
British and the er (,) and the er (,) French aha so it’s a period before the 
independence =
1 IN = yeh =
12Q = so it's but the British didn’t I mean did stay for so
long like they did in Egypt or
[13N . and and most other places
[14Q most other places yeh (hhh) so we were more
like an Italian colony0
15N ahah when did it get independence =
16Q = Er 40 hh 45
ah 47 ’47 yeh. I’m not very good with history you can tell
(hhh)o17N no, it's
Always really embarrassing whenever anyone asks me about Irish history
xi
18Q
19N
20Q
21N
22Q
23N
as well I’m like well I think we got independence in ’22 give or (hhh) take 
5 years I don’t know.
[(hhh) especially if you are having some Guinness (hhh)
[yeah
Guinness, yeh you gotta love the Guinness. Have you ever tasted 
Guinnesstno I don’t drink =
= strict Moslemtyeah (0:2) but people in my country do drink I
mean er 
[ah that’s something I was really surprised in Morocco lots lots of people 
drank there and mean it's very well (,) a strict Moslem society well it's 
(,) quite liberal but you know everyone (,) you know lots of the women 
wear burkas and er yeah (,) but lots of people drink beer as well.
xii
Extract 5 (casual conversation)
This conversation took place in 2003 between a British native speaker and postgraduate 
non-native speaker of English. The native speaker is a 31 year old married male with no 
experience of interacting with Arabs. He is doing research at the University of Bristol. 
The non-native speaker is 36 years old, has lived more than two years in England and 
doing an MSc course. This conversation took place near the University of Bristol.
R = Native speaker of English of English 
T = Non-native speaker of English
1R : LoLondon London was just too expensive to stay
(0:2)
2T : I stayed there last year
(0:2) for two months
(0 :2)
3R : where abouts? =
4T : = in the centre (,) city er near
Oxford Street 
[5R Oxford Street yeh =
6T = £400 a week =.
7R : =Forjustaroom  =
8T : = er (,) two-room flat
my family and me one bedroom one sitting room small kitchen small 
bathroom that's it 
[9R : that’s pretty good =.
10T : = (hhh) for £400 a week =
11R : = oh for week =
12T : = a
week yeh £400 a week so its cost £1,600 a month two months it cost me 
£3,200 for two months.
13R [
(hhh)
xiii
TV conversation 
Extract 6 A
This recording is from Fox News TV channel, recorded in late 2004 from a programme 
called "On the Record". In is between an American Native Speaker of English who is 
the interviewer and a Lebanese, American citizen who is the interviewee. The 
interviewer is a male broadcaster on this channel. The interviewee is a male non-native 
speaker of English originally from Palestine.
Interviewer 1 
Interviewee 2
Interviewer 3 
Interviewee 4
Interviewer 5 
Interviewee 6
Interviewer 7
Interviewee 8
Interviewer 9
Interviewee 10
Interviewer 11 
Interviewee 12
: what is the goal of (AR) Hizboullah
(0:2)
: why do not we consider it in
this way Israel is causing problems for a lot of its Arab neighbours 
((not clear))
[: right let’s have what you think ((not clear)) what is (AR)
Hizboullah’s major’s goal =
= well there is a lot of rage in the Arab 
world as well as in Lebanon and the party of God is under pressure to 
try to do something ((not clear))
[: the party of god is the English translation ((not
clear)) of (AR) Hizboullah
o
: right correct and there is a lot of interest
in Lebanon in the part of not only the fundamentalist of the party of 
God but others too (,) to try to force the Israelis who still persisting 
occupying the piece of Lebanese territories with the viewers do not 
know if that Israel does only had a problem with the Palestinians 
but many with the Arabs who live under its occupation ((not clear
[but let me
put another question ((not clear)) professor why is it, why is it that 
the Lebanese are upset about the Syrian occupation of Lebanon 
some people would call it an occupation which is gone on for 
decades.
(0.2)
Well Maybe because they do not subscribe ((not 
clear)) whole they view the Israelis as occupiers and that is 
why ((not clear))
[but why ((not clear)) could you explain professor, I do 
not have a point of view I am just asking you to explain why is it 
the Syrian army has been in in place ((not clear)) in Lebanon for 
for decades now correct me if I am wrong =
= they do not hold the 
same grouch against the Syrians as they do against the Israelis 
because ((not clear))
[why =
= I am telling you because Israel has not occupied the Arab 
land for the last fifty years has not brutalized the Palestinians the
xiv
Interviewer 13
Interviewee 14 
Interviewer 15
Syrians and the Lebanese and has not dehumanized all Arabs in 
this method of terrorist ((not clear))
[now Syrians Syrians said not mistreated the 
Lebanese Palestinians 
[
yes they have =
= in a way
xv
Extract 6 B (TV convesation)
This recording is from Fox News TV channel in late 2004 from a programme called 
"On the Record". It is again between a male American native speaker of English (the 
interviewer) and a male Lebanese American non-native English speaker originally from 
Palestine.
Interviewee 16
Interviewer 17 
Interviewee 18 
Interviewer 19
Interviewee 20 
Interviewer 21
Interviewee 22
Interviewer 23
Interviewee 24 
Interviewer 25
Interviewee 26
Interviewer 27
yes they have yes they have you see yes I am sure you would love 
that the Lebanese and Arabs have the same atrocity as they do to the 
Syrian ((Not clear))?
twhy should I love that Professor Professor why should I
[because ((not clear))
[love ((not clear)) 
why should I love anybody having antipathy antipathy for anybody 
else I do not want people to hate each other no ((not clear))
[you clearly you clearly are unhappy that the 
Lebanese are not as anti Syrian as they are anti Israelis ((not clear))
[professor let’s hold 
right here professor I am not unhappy about anything with regards to 
Lebanese (not clear) I am just asking you to explain the situation I do 
not understand why one occupier is hated more than one occupier 
that’s all I am asking I don’t take pleasure in anybody hating anybody 
else believe me ((not clear))
[
right right one wishes there is no hate in the Middle 
East whatsoever but there is and hate is spread by occupation and 
brutalization as we seeing in the West bank it is very easy now to 
predicate that hate against Israel and the United states is going to 
increase on the bases of the hundred of Civilians have been killed 
by the Israeli occupation 
[right professor let me get back and let me see if I could get a straight 
answer from you here =
= right =
= why is it one occupier Israel is hated 
more than another occupier Syria by the Lebanese
G)because because 
the Israeli (not clear) blood is longer and heavier perhaps
(0:2)
that’s
fine that’s that’s a good that’s the answer I was looking for just kind 
of answer here now other people have said that beside Syria Iran has 
played a very important part for the culture of Lebanon right now
xvi
Interviewee 28
Interviewer 29 
Interviewee 30
Interviewer 31
Interviewee 32
Interviewer 33 
Interviewee 34
because they put a lot of money into (AR) Hizboullah, (AR) 
Hizboullah is a part of Lebanese legislator as well who is taking 
more influence now? is Syria more influential in Lebanese politics 
than Iran.
[((not clear))
[or the other way around =
= no, you’re right Syria has 
a VERY influential role in to stay within Lebanon it does control a 
lot of ((not clear)) power within the government. Iran did try to 
capitalize in Lebanon did try to exploit Lebanese internal politics in 
the nineteen eighties, but they were not widely received. The 
Iranians are very different culturally from the Lebanese and it was 
made very clear that the Lebanese do not wish any ((not clear)) big 
influence in Lebanon so they are become very marginal, they tried 
to become a big player but they did not succeed =
= now rofessor((not 
clear)) you are an expert in Lebanon you’ve written book about it 
you know it very well it was a beautiful country before civil war 
starting to rib a part a part it was known as the Paris of the Middle 
East for those who don’t know it but then you got the Israeli 
incursion the Syrians in there causing trouble you have just 
mentioned Iranians (,) what do the Lebanese people think? 
what do they want? =
= Well at this point, they very much would like 
a resolution of the Palestinian problem because there are three 
hundred thousand Palestinians who live in Lebanon refugee camps 
and they are very unhappy to what happened to their ((not clear)) 
occupied territories and I come of the area of South Lebanon part of 
it is still under the occupation of Israel and the Lebanese would like 
to get rid of too =
= all right ((not clear)) from the University of 
California believe me professor, nobody would like hatred in the 
Middle East, we thank you for coming on =
= Thank you.
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Extract 7 A (TV interaction)
This recording is from CNN TV channel, in late 2004, from a programme called "CNN 
Live Today". It is between an American native speaker of English (the interviewer), and 
a Palestinian male representative of the PLO living in America
Interviewer 1
Interviewee 2 
Interviewer 3 
Interviewee 4
Interviewer 5 
Interviewee 6
Interviewer 7 
Interviewee 8
Interviewer 9
Interviewee 10
Interviewer 11
you are, you are seriously saying that there has been no attempt on the 
part of Palestinian authority to collect and distribute these sort of 
things 
[absolutely not 
[
do you like them ((not clear))
[absolutely absolutely listen Tony I am 
gonna tell you this (0:2) listen you take what the Israeli tell you for 
granted absolutely you never question what the Israeli
[I’ve just questioned
((not clear)
[no because that you are repeating to me what the Israeli intelligence 
((not clear))
[I am repeating what you told me =
= yeh yeh 
[
what ((not clear)) you should 
do rather than insulting me is to ((not clear)) to answer
rno I am not insulting you what I am
telling is 
[of course you are
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Extract 7 B
Interviewe 12
Interviewee 13
Interviewer 14 
Interviewee 15
Interviewer 16 
Interviewee 17
Interviewer 18 
Interviewee 19
Interviewer 20
Interviewee 21 
Interviewer 22
Interviewee 23 
Interviewer 24
Interviewee 25
Rahman, I want to propose something that is being discussed and 
debated on area of their land which’s a possibility to trying to come to 
the table maybe under American hostesses ((not clear)) American’s 
Arab allies a peace proposal I know like that discussed in Taba ((not 
clear)) Mr Rahman you have said that there is something that probably 
acceptable to the Palestinian side do you think therefore what suppose 
that the United States ((not clear)) and Prince Abdulla and maybe 
king Abdulla, and maybe president Mobark to put their stamp on it 
would your government or the Palestinian authority be going to the 
table today ((not clear)) straight to the point =
= immediately uh (,) first of 
all we have to get the Israelis out of the cities and that’s(( not clear)) 
people can 
[stables and security concerns =
= yeh yeh we have no problem with the 
Israeli security concern but that does not mean that they have to occupy 
every single Palestinian house they have to imprison every single 
Palestinian they have to kill any one ((not clear))
[Ok OK we getting back to the ((not
clear))
t
I am saying it is (,) and this is a challenge to be put the to the Israelis 
and it can ((not clear)) call C P today (,) we are ready on the basis (,) 
of the peace initiative the Saudi peace initiative that was endorsed by 
the Arab League that calls for Israel that we recognize the right of 
Israel to exist in peace and security within the nineteen 1967 
boundaries and that the Palestinian state would be created on the West 
bank and Gaza next to Israel we are ready on the basis of this to sit 
down now and negotiate 
[Ok =
= and end of Israeli occupation and a peace
treaty with Israel =
= you answered a slightly different question of what
I asked 
[what
[mine has to deal with subsequent talks that they were already 
taken ((not clear)) representative and Palestinian authority and the 
Israeli government =
= yes =
= are you still willing to acknowledge those 
rather than simply taking the Saudi proposal? =
= yes we we made a 
great ((not clear)) we start on the basis of those negotiations that we 
reached with Israel in Taba we want the
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Interviewer 26
Israeli government to say yes they are coming to continue the 
negotiations from were they took off in Taba =
= ((not clear)) I know 
that there is a different government you’ve got to look at this is a 
labour government, there are differences BUT let’s suppose first that 
there are no bombings for a while and there is ((not clear)) and peace 
and for them all Israel therefore fells comfortable to withdraw from 
the West bank but that be the kind of mixed up ((not clear)) would 
that be a possible next step
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Radio Conversation
Extract 8 A (Radio conversation)
This recording is from CNN Radio, in early 2004 from a programme called "CNN 
Radio, Newscaster". It is between a female American broadcaster, a native speaker of 
English, and a Palestinian non-native speaker of English. He is an active member of an 
anti-Israeli movement in Palestine, considered a terrorist group by the interviewer.
Interviewer 1
Interviewee 2
Interviewer 3
Interviewee 4
Interviewer 5
has an organization has an organization taken responsibility for the bus 
bombing suicide bombing today
(0:6)
ah (,) I am not pretty sure who is 
responsible at this moment because there are two organizations by their 
own military wings are aha taking responsibility but aha the situation 
that in Jenin is terrible and the Israelis damaged a lot of houses and a 
lot of infrastructure and killed so many people =
= an I’ll get to that but 
let me first let me I am talking a little bit first about the suicide 
bombing your organization has taken responsibility for the bus 
massacre which led to this latest incursion by the Israelis so is that 
not true
(0:2)
ah let me aha tell you something the aha what you call 
suicide operation is called martyrdom operations, ah second ah ah
twell let
me let me to make sure that to make sure that
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Extract 8 B
Interviewee 6
Interviewer 7
Interviewee 8
Interviewer 9
Interviewee 10 
Interviewer 11
Interviewee 12
Interviewer 13 
Interviewee 14
ah the operations against Israelis yes?
(0:2)
to make sure that I am
plain =
= yeh
(0:2)
to make sure that I am plain Sir did your rganization
[OK=
did your organization send someone in with a bomb strapped to his 
body into that bus over celebration
(0:5)
aha it aha needs that to tell 
you what is the Palestinian situation and then this is a Palestinian 
reaction against Israeli mass massacre against Palestinians so we are 
in a war time and Israelis are killing us with the FI 6 Fighters which 
comes from the United States and the Palestinians are poor and have 
nothing except to sacrifice their lives, so this is the situation if you 
want to compare it this way
Q what is your view on suicide bombers
Sir
(0:2)
ah our view of this kind of resistance we are defending 
ourself against Israeli attacks it’s as simple as this the Palestinians 
are under Israeli occupation more than thirty five years Israelis are 
killing Palestinians all the time until this moment
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Extract 9 (Radio Conversation)
This recording is from CNN Radio, in early 2004 from a programme called "CNN 
Radio Newscaster". It is between a female American native English speaker (the 
interviewer) and a Palestinian non-native speaker, an active member of an anti Israeli 
movement in Palestine considered a terrorist group by the interviewer.
Interviewee 6
Interviewer 7
Interviewee 8
Interviewer 9 
Interviewee 10
Interviewer 11
Interviewee 12
Interviewer 13 
Interviewee 14 
Interviewer 15
aha as far as the Palestinians are not 
recognized I mean are not having this recognition from the 
Israelis, I will not give it to the Israelis until they recognize our right 
to exist
G)
Eshmael um if Arafat calls a cease fire will your 
organization (AR) Hamas stop the suicide bombing or will you act 
independent of what Arafat says or does
(0:4)
when Arafat asks for 
a cease fire look at the situation the Israeli tanks do they move a 
leave Palestinians live a life a alone? do the tanks and the Israeli 
soldiers withdraw? if they are not withdrawing so the Palestinian 
situation are facing Israeli military forces with tanks with closure 
so they have to resist they have to defend themselfe if there is no 
Israeli soldiers Palestinians are not interested in attacking
[does it 
[
Israeli or
resisting any
tEshmael I am unclear I am unclear Eshmael let me ask it 
again, if Arafat calls a cease fire says stop the suicide bombing 
will your organization (AR) Hamas stop the suicide bombing 
YES or NO
(0:3)
ah it’s not like this you know Yes or no I am not 
in a court but let me tell you the truth, the Israelis occupation is 
continued military forces is are I mean are abusing our people and 
causing suffering when we resist this it is not a cease fire it is this 
cease fire aha expression is not ahaha
[I take it 
[acceptable
G)I take that you
won’t answer the question whether not you will stop if Arafat give a 
signalled that he thinks what should be stopped and let me move on 
to another question am (,) to you and that's are you funded in 
anyway way by Sadam Hussan 
(0:4)
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Interviewee 16
Interviewer 17
Interviewee 18 
Interviewer 19
interviewee 20 
interviewer 21 
interviewee 22
aha, Sadam Hussan aha is aha leader for 
his people we are not aha interfering with any internal ef fairs with 
any other counties we are concerned about our own struggle againstt
do you get money from him, do you get
[Isreal =
= but
the question is do you get money from him 
[no no (not clear)
[do you get arms from him
(0:3)
no no we are
self supported we do not get money from any aha formal regime or 
any aha aha or organizations like this we are self suppurating and 
we we support each other.
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Appendix 2 (Follow-up interview questions)
1- Questions asked to all the selected interactants native and non-native:-
a- Did you find it interesting and easy to communicate and understand your 
interactant?
b- Do you think he was polite in the way he was talking to you?
c- Do you think that he asked you question that you did not like, or you did not think 
that he would ask you?
d- Did you think that you were considered as a polite person by your interactant?
2- Questions asked to the selected interactants in relation to certain aspects in their 
conversations such as topic, questions.
Interaction 1 A
a- Do you think that using the word "but" and telling in which University you are 
studying in this utterance is relevant to your interactant's question? (utterance 20)
Native speaker
a- Did you think that your interactant was relevant in telling you about his place 
of study in this way as an answer to your question? (Utterance 20)
Interaction 1 B
Non-native speaker
a- Did you feel that your interactant was inappropriate in asking you in this way? 
(Utterance 23)
b- Did you feel that your interactant was inappropriate in talking to you in this 
way; like ordering you to answer in a specific way in certain sensitive issue.
Interaction 1 C
Non-native speaker
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a- Why did you ask him about his Salaryin this way? You could have asked him 
directly. To me you sound strange. (Utterance 58)
b- Why did you mention reasons why you are not staying here as an answer? You 
could just say that you are going back. (Utterance 50 and 52).
Native speaker
a- What did you feel when a stranger asks you about your income like that? 
(Utterance 58)
b- Why did you not answer him?
Interaction 2
Non-native speaker
a- Would you ask this question if your interactant was an Arab? (Utterance 1)
b- Did you think that you were considered as a polite person by your interactant 
by asking this question?
c- Why did you ask your interactant whether he has children or not?
d- Why did you speak about your children to some who said to you that he has not 
children and did not ask you? This is impolite or inappropriate in Arabic, 
(utterance 11)
Native speaker
a- Did you feel any discomfort when you were asked about children, and when you 
were told about children? (Utterances 3 and 11)
Interaction 3 A
Non-native speaker
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a- Did you fee that you were indirectly called a liar from your interactant? 
(utterances 3,
7,13)
Interaction 3 B
Non-native speaker
a- Did you like the native speaker insisting on you to answer certain questions? 
(utterance 22)
b- Why is that you feel that? (for all utterances 3, 7,13, 22)
Interaction 4
Non-native Speaker
a- Why did you not answer your interactant's question in the first time? (Utterance 2)
b- Did you realize that your interactant did not like your question about who 
colonized Libya? (utterance 1)
Interaction 5
Non-native speaker
a - Why did not you allow your interactant to carry on talking about London? 
(Uttemance 2)
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A- Follow-up Interviews included in the thesis
Follow-up interviews 1
Follow-up Interview questions 
Part one: Question 1 interaction 1
This part is presented in 4 'yes or no' questions. It is meant to have general idea of what 
interactants think of each other. Interactants, in this part of the interview, are not 
expected to mention the reasons. They were asked straight after the interactants had 
finished their conversation.
non-native speaker of English native speaker of English
a- Yes a- Yes
b-Yes b- Yes
c- Yes c- Yes
d- Yes d- Yes
Part two: Question 2 interaction 1
This part is presented in questions in relation to certain answers and questions 
interactants performed in their conversations. It is meant to have a view of how 
interactants interpret certain utterances and why. It also aims to understand the reasons 
why an interactants asked certain questions. These questioned took place after I had 
listen to the conversation and decided what to ask about.
Question 2 interaction 1 A
Non-native Speaker Part two: Question 2 interaction 1 A_______________________
a- Do you think that using the word "but" and telling in which University you are 
studying in this utterance is relevant to your interactant's question? (utterance 20)
I think it is important to explain that I am in the UE University and not in the 
main University because he would think that I am in the main University if I 
do not say th a t. (follow-up interview, interaction 1 A)
Native Speaker Part two: Question 2 interaction 1 A
a- Did you think that your interactant was relevant in telling you about his place 
of study in this way as an answer to your question? (Utterance 20)
I did not ask about the University he was in. Perhaps it was not an answer to 
my question, but I would consider it as relevant to the conversation. My 
question tohim whether it was his choice to study in the EU was because I 
felt, from his answer, that he needs me to ask him. ((follow-up interview, 
interaction 1 A)
Question 2 interaction 1 B
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Non-native Speaker Part two: Question 2 interaction 1 B
a- Did you feel that your interactant was inappropriate in asking you in this way? 
(Utterance 23)
'I did not like the question or the way he asked me, but I have not thought of 
whether
he is appropriate or not. I have not felt that he was inappropriate in any part of the 
long interaction we had' (follow-up interview with the non-native, interaction IB)
b- Did you feel that your interactant was inappropriate in talking to you in this 
way; like ordering you to answer in a specific way in certain sensitive issue.
I do not know, but I do not think so. He was normal
Native Speaker Part two: Question 2 interaction 1 B
Question 2 interaction 1 C
Non-native Speaker Part two: Question 2 interaction 1 C________________________
a- Why did you ask him about his Salary in this way? You could have asked him 
directly. To me you sound strange. (Utterance 58)
Yes, I asked him indirectly, but he did not answer my question. I just wanted 
to compare between my allowance and his allowance, (follow-up interview, 
interaction 1 C)
b- Why did you mention reasons why you are not staying here as an answer? You 
could just say that you are going back. (Utterance 50 and 52).
English people think that we come here to work and we stay here for money; I 
am not so. I gave him all this long answer to tell him that I am not like those 
whom he thinks like this country. I have been asked the same question by more 
than ten English people before, (follow-up interview, interaction 1 C)
Native Speaker Part two: Question 2 interaction 1 C
a- What did you feel when a stranger asks you about your income like that? 
(Utterance 58)
I usually do not answer this question when I am asked by a stranger. I think 
my answer was relevant and I told him about what he wanted him to know 
(follow
-up interview, interaction 1 C)
b- Why did you not answer him?
I think I have answered him.
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Follow-up interviews 2
Follow-up Interview questions 
Part one: Question 1 interaction 2
This part is presented in 4 'yes or no' questions. It is meant to have general idea of what 
interactants think of each other. Interactants, in this part of the interview, are not 
expected to mention the reasons. They were asked straight after the interactants had 
finished their conversation.
non-native speaker of English native speaker of English
a- Yes a- Yes
b- Yes b- Yes
c- Yes c- Yes
d- Yes d- Yes
Part two: Question 2 interaction 2
This part is presented in questions in relation to certain answers and questions 
interactants performed in their conversations. It is meant to have a view of how 
interactants interpret certain utterances and why. It also aims to understand the reasons 
why an interactants asked certain questions. These questioned took place after I had 
listen to the conversation and decided what to ask about.
Question 2 interaction 2
Non-native Speaker Question 2 interaction 2___________________________________
a- Would you ask this question if your interactant was an Arab? (Utterance 1)
No, I would not if I do not want him, or if he is a relative.
b- Did you think that you were considered as a polite person by your interactant 
by asking this question?
Yes, even if he was as Arab, I am still polite
c- Why did you ask your interactant whether he has children or not?
I know my interactant is not an Arab, and English people in particular do not 
mind to be asked such a question. Such question are normal in English 
societies,but I would ask in the same way if I speak to an Arab, (follow-up 
interview, interaction 2)
d- Why did you speak about your children to some who said to you that he has not 
children and did not ask you? This is impolite or inappropriate in Arabic.
(utterance 11)
Now, I do not think so. I wanted to say that children are very important.
Native Speaker Question 2 interaction 2
a- Did you feel any discomfort when you were asked about children, and when you 
were told about children? (Utterances 3 and 11)
Yes, I felt that he was asking something that I might have not asked to him..
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Follow-up interviews 3
Follow-up Interview questions 
Part one: Question 1 interaction 3
This part is presented in 4 'yes or no' questions. It is meant to have general idea of what 
interactants think of each other. Interactants, in this part of the interview, are not 
expected to mention the reasons. They were asked straight after the interactants had 
finished their conversation.
non-native speaker of English native speaker of English
a- Yes a- Yes
b- Yes b- Yes
c- Yes c- Yes
d- Yes d- Yes
Part two: Question 2 interaction 3
This part is presented in questions in relation to certain answers and questions 
interactants performed in their conversations. It is meant to have a view of how 
interactants interpret certain utterances and why. It also aims to understand the reasons 
why an interactants asked certain questions. These questioned took place after I had 
listen to the conversation and decided what to ask about.
Question 2 interaction 3 A
Non-native Speaker Question 2 interaction 3 A_______________________________ __
a- Did you fee that you were indirectly called a liar from your interactant?
(utterances 3,
7,13)
. I do not think that he thought I am a liar, but he suspected what I have said.
He was polite in the way he spoke. Yes, we do not like this way of talking in 
Arabic,because it means that the person talks to you is either ironic or calling 
his/her interactant a liar, but he was not like this with me. (follow-up 
interview;interaction 3A)
Native Speaker Question 2 interaction 3 A
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Question 2 interaction 3 B
Non-native Speaker Question 2 interaction 3 B_________________________________
a- Did you like the native speaker insisting on you to answer certain questions? 
(utterance 22)
to me, the way he was talking was polite and does not say that he is 
challenging me, but I would not expect this from a person that I have not met 
before, especially that he is English, (follow-up interview; interaction 3 B)
b- Why is that you feel that? (for all utterances 3, 7, 13, 22)
English people usually build their impression without asking too many 
question. He was more serious than I was in discussing the topics that we have 
discussed' (follow-up interview; interaction 3 B)
Native Speaker Question 2 interaction 3 B
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Follow-up interviews 4
Follow-up Interview questions 
Part one: Question 1 interaction 4
This part is presented in 4 'yes or no' questions. It is meant to have general idea of what 
interactants think of each other. Interactants, in this part of the interview, are not 
expected to mention the reasons. They were asked straight after the interactants had 
finished their conversation.
non-native speaker of English native speaker of English
a- Yes a- Yes
b- Yes b- Yes
c- Yes c- Yes
d- Yes d- Yes
Part two: Question 2 interaction 4
This part is presented in questions in relation to certain answers and questions 
interactants performed in their conversations. It is meant to have a view of how 
interactants interpret certain utterances and why. It also aims to understand the reasons 
why an interactants asked certain questions. These questioned took place after I had 
listen to the conversation and decided what to ask about.
Question 2 interaction 4
Non-native Speaker Question 2 interaction 4___________________________________
a- Why did you not answer your interactant's question in the first time? (Utterance 2)
I did not like the question. I did not like even the way he asked the question. 
He could first ask me whether Libya was colonized or not. But he was talking 
in a friendly way. (follow-up interview, interaction 4)
Native Speaker Question 2 interaction 4 ___________________________________
b- Did you realize that your interactant did not like your question about who 
colonized Libya? (utterance 1)
Not at all. I think his answer was fine. He answered the question later on. I 
think my question was fine to him. (follow-up interview, interaction 4)
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Follow-up interviews 5
Follow-up Interview questions 
Part one: Question 1 interaction 5
This part is presented in 4 'yes or no' questions. It is meant to have general idea of what 
interactants think of each other. Interactants, in this part of the interview, are not 
expected to mention the reasons. They were asked straight after the interactants had 
finished their conversation.
non-native speaker of English native speaker of English
a- Yes a- Yes
b-Yes b- Yes
c- Yes c- Yes
d- Yes d- Yes
Part two: Question 2 interaction 5
This part is presented in questions in relation to certain answers and questions 
interactants performed in their conversations. It is meant to have a view of how 
interactants interpret certain utterances and why. It also aims to understand the reasons 
why an interactants asked certain questions. These questioned took place after I had 
listen to the conversation and decided what to ask about.
Question 2 interaction 5
Non-native Speaker Question 2 interaction 5___________________________________
a - Why did not you allow your interactant to carry on talking about London? 
(Uttemance 2)
No, no, no, I did not want to interrupt him, but all I wanted is to say that you 
are right because. I have experienced a similar situation (follow-up interview 
interaction 5)
Native Speaker Question 2 interaction 5
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B- Follow-up Interviews not included in the thesis
Follow-up interviews 6
Follow-up Interview questions 
Part one: Question 1 interaction 6
This part is presented in 4 'yes or no' questions. It is meant to have general idea of what 
interactants think of each other. Interactants, in this part of the interview, are not 
expected to mention the reasons. They were asked straight after the interactants had 
finished their conversation.
non-native speaker of English native speaker of English
a- Yes a- Yes
b- Yes b- Yes
c- Yes c- Yes
d- Yes d- Yes
Part two: Question 2 interaction 6
This part is presented in questions in relation to certain answers and questions 
interactants performed in their conversations. It is meant to have a view of how 
interactants interpret certain utterances and why. It also aims to understand the reasons 
why an interactants asked certain questions. These questioned took place after I had 
listen to the conversation and decided what to ask about.
Question 2 interaction 6
Non-native Speaker Part two: Question 2 interaction 6___________________________
a- Your conversation went fine. It seemed that you were communicating very well. What, 
do you think, the reason is.
b- Was there any question that you did not like?
c- Why did you come to discuss religion?
Native Speaker Part two: Question 2 interaction 6
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Follow-up interviews 7
Follow-up Interview questions 
Part one: Question 1 interaction 7
This part is presented in 4 'yes or no' questions. It is meant to have general idea of what 
interactants think of each other. Interactants, in this part of the interview, are not 
expected to mention the reasons. They were asked straight after the interactants had 
finished their conversation.
non-native speaker of English native speaker of English
a- Yes a- Yes
b- Yes b- Yes
c- Yes c- Yes
d- Yes d- Yes
Part two: Question 2 interaction 7
This part is presented in questions in relation to certain answers and questions 
interactants performed in their conversations. It is meant to have a view of how 
interactants interpret certain utterances and why. It also aims to understand the reasons 
why an interactants asked certain questions. These questioned took place after I had 
listen to the conversation and decided what to ask about.
Question 2 interaction 7
Non-native Speaker Part two: Question 2 interaction 7_________________________
a- Was it a good start from the native speaker? what do you think?
b- What did you feel when he was talking about the places that you want to avoid in 
Sheffield? He almost named the places where Muslim live?
c- Do you think that you have understood everything to you?
d- Where there questions that you did not like?
Native Speaker Part two: Question 2 interaction 7
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Follow-up interviews 8
Follow-up Interview questions 
Part one: Question 1 interaction 8
This part is presented in 4 'yes of no' questions. It is meant to have general idea of what 
interactants think of each other. Interactants, in this part of the interview, are not 
expected to mention the reasons. They were asked straight after the interactants had 
finished their conversation.
non-native speaker of English native .speaker of English
a- Yes a- Yes
b-Yes b- Yes
c- Yes c- Yes
d- Yes d- Yes
Part two: Question 2 interaction 8
This part is presented in questions in relation to certain answers and questions 
interactants performed in their conversations. It is meant to have a view of how 
interactants interpret certain utterances and why. It also aims to understand the reasons 
why an interactants asked certain questions. These questioned took place after I had 
listen to the conversation and decided what to ask about.
Question 2 interaction 8
Non-native Speaker Part two: Question 2 interaction 8_________________________
a- How did you find it talking to a female?
b- You discussed what I would call as safe-topics, was this right? Why?
Native Speaker Part two: Question 2 interaction 8
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Follow-up interviews 9
Follow-up Interview questions 
Part one: Question 1 interaction 9
This part is presented in 4 'yes or no' questions. It is meant to have general idea of what 
interactants think of each other. Interactants, in this part of the interview, are not 
expected to mention the reasons. They were asked straight after the interactants had 
finished their conversation.
non-native speaker of English native speaker of English
a- Yes a- Yes
b- Yes b- Yes
c- Yes c- Yes
d- Yes d- Yes
Part two: Question 2 interaction 9
This part is presented in questions in relation to certain answers and questions 
interactants performed in their conversations. It is meant to have a view of how 
interactants interpret certain utterances and why. It also aims to understand the reasons 
why an interactants asked certain questions. These questioned took place after I had 
listen to the conversation and decided what to ask about.
Question 2 interaction 9
Non-native Speaker Part two: Question 2 interaction 9_________________________
Native Speaker Part two: Question 2 interaction 9
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Follow-up interviews 10
Follow-up Interview questions 
Part one: Question 1 interaction 10
This part is presented in 4 'yes or no' questions. It is meant to have general idea of what 
interactants think of each other. Interactants, in this part of the interview, are not 
expected to mention the reasons. They were asked straight after the interactants had 
finished their conversation.
non-native speaker of English native speaker of English
a- Yes a- Yes
b- Yes b- Yes
c- Yes c- Yes
d- Yes d- Yes
Part two: Question 2 interaction 10
This part is presented in questions in relation to certain answers and questions 
interactants performed in their conversations. It is meant to have a view of how 
interactants interpret certain utterances and why. It also aims to understand the reasons 
why an interactants asked certain questions. These questioned took place after I had 
listen to the conversation and decided what to ask about.
Question 2 interaction 10
Non-native Speaker Part two: Question 2 interaction 10________________________
Native Speaker Part two: Question 2 interaction 10
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Follow-up interviews 11
Follow-up Interview questions 
Part one: Question 1 interaction 11
This part is presented in 4 'yes or no' questions. It is meant to have general idea of what 
interactants think of each other. Interactants, in this part of the interview, are not 
expected to mention the reasons. They were asked straight after the interactants had 
finished their conversation.
non-native speaker of English native speaker of English
a- Yes a- Yes
b- Yes b- Yes
c- Yes c- Yes
d- Yes d- Yes
Part two: Question 2 interaction 11
This part is presented in questions in relation to certain answers and questions 
interactants performed in their conversations. It is meant to have a view of how 
interactants interpret certain utterances and why. It also aims to understand the reasons 
why an .interactants asked certain questions. These questioned took place after I had 
listen to the conversation and decided what to ask about.
Question 2 interaction 11
Non-native Speaker Part two: Question 2 interaction 11________________________
Native Speaker Part two: Question 2 interaction 11
xli
Follow-up interviews 12
Follow-up Interview questions 
Part one: Question 1 interaction 12
This part is presented in 4 'yes or no' questions. It is meant to have general idea of what 
interactants think of each other. Interactants, in this part of the interview, are not 
expected to mention the reasons. They were asked straight after the interactants had 
finished their conversation.
non-native speaker of English native speaker of English
a- Yes a- Yes
b- Yes b- Yes
c- Yes c- Yes
d- Yes d- Yes
Part two: Question 2 interaction 12
This part is presented in questions in relation to certain answers and questions 
interactants performed in their conversations. It is meant to have a view of how 
interactants interpret certain utterances and why. It also aims to understand the reasons 
why an interactants asked certain questions. These questioned took place after I had 
listen to the conversation and decided what to ask about.
Question 2 interaction 12
Non-native Speaker Part two: Question 2 interaction 12________________________
Native Speaker Part two: Question 2 interaction 12
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Follow-up interviews 13
Follow-up Interview questions 
Part one: Question 1 interaction 13
This part is presented in 4 'yes or no' questions. It is meant to have general idea of what 
interactants think of each other. Interactants, in this part of the interview, are not 
expected to mention the reasons. They were asked straight after the interactants had 
finished their conversation.
non-native speaker of English native speaker of English
a- Yes a- Yes
b- Yes b- Yes
c- Yes c- Yes
d-Yes d- Yes
Part two: Question 2 interaction 13
This part is presented in questions in relation to certain answers and questions 
interactants performed in their conversations. It is meant to have a view of how 
interactants interpret certain utterances and why. It also aims to understand the reasons 
why an interactants asked certain questions. These questioned took place after I had 
listen to the conversation and decided what to ask about.
Question 2 interaction 13
Non-native Speaker Part two: Question 2 interaction 13________________________
Native Speaker Part two: Question 2 interaction 13
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Appendix 3 (Questionnaires)
Questionnaires I
To non-native speakers of English
Because the aim of this research project is to investigate talk between native and non­
native speakers of English, you are kindly requested to; first, fill in the questionnaire 
with the relevant details; second, interact with your addressee as naturally as possible (I 
recognise that this is a rather artificial situation)
1-Personal details
a- Name...................... ..............................................................
b- Nationality ....................................... ......................
c- Age ..............................................................
d-Occupation  ' ................... ..............................
e- Education (Level) .............................................................
f- Telephone / E-mail address ............. @...........................................
2-English language background details
a- How long have you studied English?
I- one year ( ) II- more than one year ( )  III- more than two years
b- How long have you lived in an English speaking country?
I- No ( ) II- Yes ( ) (For how long ................................
c- Have you lived with native speakers of English during your stay in an English
speaking country?
I- No ( ) II- Yes ( ) (for how long ......................)
d- How often do you have communicated with native speakers of English?
I- once a month ( ) II- once a week ( )
III- twice a week ( ) IV- almost every day ( )
Thank you for your co-operation
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Questionnaire II
To native speakers of English
Because the aim of this research project is to investigate talk between native and non­
native speakers of English, you are kindly requested to; first, fill in the questionnaire 
with the relevant details; second, interact with your addressee as naturally as possible (I 
recognise that this is a rather artificial situation)
1-Personal details
a- Name...................... ..............................................................
b- Nationality ..............................................................
c- Age ..............................................................
d-Occupation .............................................................
e- Education (Level) .............................................................
f- Telephone / E-mail address ............. @............................................
2-foreign language background details
a- Do you speak a foreign language?
I- No ( )
II- Yes ( ) What is your level? Basic ( ) Fair ( ) Good ( ) Fluent ( )
b- Have you ever studied or taught a foreign Language?
I- No ( )
II- Yes ( ) If yes, for how long: one year ( ) more than one year ( )
c- Have you ever lived with foreign people?
I Yes ( )
IINo ( )
d- Have you ever lived in a non-English speaking country?
I- No ( )
II- Yes ( ) (for how long ........................ )
e- How often do you communicate with non-native speakers of English?
I- once a month ( ) II- once a week ( ) III- twice a week ( )
IV- almost every day ( ) V- other. Please specify  ...............................
Thank you for your co-operation
Appendix 4
Ethics
Ethics Guidelines for Tape Recording Conversation
If researchers are planning to record conversations within the School of Cultural 
Studies, they need to first discuss the parameters of the recording sessions with the 
Head of Department and also the uses to which the data will be put
All participants in conversations which are to be recorded must first be notified by the 
researcher and their permission given. Recording without notifying the participants is 
ethically suspect.
If the data is to be transcribed and appended to or analysed within a piece of published 
work, all participants must sign a consent form, following these lines.
Consent Form for the Use of Recorded Material
D ate:...............................................
I ........................................................(name)
Address............................................................
give my consent t o  .........................................(name)
to transcribe, and use the data which has been recorded by him/her 
Signature..................................................... ........
C:\admin\ethics.doc
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Appendix 5 (Other data)
This section includes part of the data I collected. Parts of the data analysed are selected 
from this data. There are no detailed description of this part because I have provided 
detailed description only to the extracts in included in the analysis.
Conversation (1)
Fathi = Non-native Speaker 
Darryl = Native Speaker
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Is it starting?
Yup
Ok, I’ll tell you my name again shall I?
Er, my name is Fathi
Fathi
Yup
Right, I’m Darryl 
Darryl
Darryl, that’s it 
Yeh, nice to meet you.
And you; so, er, where do you come from?
I’m from Libya
Libya (yeh) Oh right. How long have you been here for?
Um, now about one year.
One year (yeh) so you are studying (yeh) in the University 
Er, yeh, in the University but in UE.
UE (yeh) Ah right, do you prefer it there?
Um, not actually, but, er, I don’t know, how can I - 1 go there, come here, just to 
put papers, er, they give me, er, acceptance very soon. (Right) so that’s why I’m 
going there (oh, I see) it's very, very limit time; I put my papers in September 
so it's the time for beginning, you know (yes) here maybe it take long time to do 
them (things in here do take a long time, yes) yeh, but they are, just I, er, um, 
I’m lucky that they, er, only made vice-dean (say that again) the dean of the 
faculty (oh the dean, yes) not the dean, the (head of department?) no, vice 
president or vice-dean or (oh yes, the, is it the chancellor, I don }t know, second 
in charge) yes, second one, just speak to me, see my papers OK just to sign. 
Pm lucky ‘cos I got, er, appointment in that day I mean, so they prepare a letter 
and that’s it (ohm that’s good) here take a long time, that’s why I prefer the one 
(oh, this place) I go through the course, that’s it, (hhhhh)
So what’s the course?
MSc IT 
IT
Information technology, yeh
I’m thinking of doing an MSc in, um, geophysical information systems (ah, nice 
one) but it depends on the grants and it depends on whether they can get me the 
money.
Here, I mean, citizen students, they take er, a low grant, I mean, it is not 
expensive like foreign students. As an example, er, they take £1,500 and from 
citizen students they take £6,500.
Who is paying the fees, who is paying, are you paying that?
@ No. no. for me I have someone to pay, my government I mean. I’ve got a
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grant, but here it’s not a lot of money £1,500 (no) so here I don’t know how 
much, in Bristol University.
: Er well, the one I’m looking at is based in Manchester, but that’s, I think for 3 
years, £3,800.
: @ A-ha, a part-time one?
: Part- time, yes.
: Ah, nice one.
: They can make more money out of foreign students, (hhhhh yes) it's very 
lucrative.
: Study you know very nice, but when a man become bigger and bigger, it's very, 
very, very difficult to, I mean, to manage yourself, to study again, (yes, yeh) I got 
a very, very, very difficult time last three months.
: You have to learn to be disciplined again, don’t you.
: @ Yeeeeah, student again, you stay in class again, examination again, 
assignments again.
: Less money.
: Less money, of course (hhhhh) and with, you know, your family, children, you 
know, the life so it's v-v-very difficult to manage your time between study and 
your family.
: Did you have to leave your family behind.
: No, no (they ’re here) with me here as well, yeh, so children, nurseries, schools, 
blah, blah, blah, a lot of problems, big problem, long period of time studying.
: Yep, yep, so it's just a year’s course though?
: Yeh, it's only one year’s course.
: Then after that, do you go back or do you want to stay.
: Er, no, no I go back, sure, yes. I’ve got my job (yes) already, my car, my house, 
everything is there so no, it's a short period of time I’m coming here (yrs) to do 
something and come back to my job again, so there be for me to come back, not 
to stay here. (Yeh) Whats about study here, if you want to study, I mean your 
monthly payment here. It's er, becomes, I don’t know how I can explain it. They 
give you monthly, er (no) I mean your job I mean, how you can manage study 
with your job?
: The way it's gonna work for me individually is that um, I’m going to be doing - 1 
work as a technician so I make all the equipment and keep it running for the 
research and the academic who is trying to get me the money to do that js based 
in Manchester now so what will happen is, if it all works, I will be getting a 
salary to do his technical support work and I’ll be registered with Manchester to 
do a higher degree and I’ll have to do the degree in my own time (yes) so I work 
and I do my degree as well (ah ha)but the degree is spread over three years so it's 
not cramming everything into a single year (hum) but that’s the only way I can 
manage it, I can’t afford to not have a job um, so, yeh my wife works as well 
which will make it easier but we’re trying to get enough money to buy a house 
and if I just don’t have a salary coming in, we wont be able to do that but, 
hopefully, what will happen is there will be some money put on my grant to pay 
my fees so I don’t have to pay my fees (yeh, yeh) but all that’s being negotiated 
(yeh, sure).
: So you can do it in this way.
: You can do it if you’re in the right place at the right time.
: Sure, (hhhhh). Nice to meet someone married here in this country, you know, as 
you (it's getting rarer, isn’t is?) Yeh, (hhhhh), very rare but there is a bit, a lot, 
not a lot but some people who is married, I respect them, I respect ones who are 
going this way I mean, ones the marrying way you know. Here, I don’t know
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why, nobody like to marry.
: I think we’ve become a very secular society 
: Yes, (hhhhh). You got children?
: Not yet, no
: Ah, not yet, new married?
: About 18 months. (Oh nice) Yeh, we’re thinking about it but we’d like to try 
and get a house first if possible, (yeh sure) who knows. How long have you been 
married?
: Now, er, more than four years but not five years, (hhhhh)
: (hhhhh), four and a half 
: Yeh, four and a half and two children
: Tiring, (umm) is, is, are the children tiring, (yeh) do they wear you out?
: (Hhhhh) sure, yeh, no, children is children, nice but more, more, more they need 
more time and more, I mean, look after them, to look after the, children, you 
have to do a lot of things. (Yeh, yeh)
: My wife is a primary school teacher (ooh, she know about) she knows what to 
do, (hhhhh)
: It make her job very easy, yeh, (hhhhh), maybe she hate children, that’s why 
: At the moment she can give them back at the end of the day but when we’ve got 
our own you can’t do that can you?
: She know about children, yeh, so now she prepare herself to / she’s (she’s trying 
to get used to the idea ) trying to / prepare everything, yeh, nice, nice, yeh. 
Children is very, very nice in this world, very, very nice.
: Best decision you made is it?
: Yeh, sure. If you see your son grow and make like what we - our fathers, our 
family. In our society, I mean, respecting fathers, respecting family, father and 
mother is very, very big. So is very big things to leave your family or to not take 
care for your family, for your father and mother. They are becomes big, 
becomes old, they was elder, you have to look after them, help them, visit them; 
maybe they are living with you in the same house so that is the meaning of 
children. Not a big meaning but when you becomes a big man, have someone 
look after you, visit you, give you a lift (yeh, hhhhh) visit you and has children 
coming and visit you.
: Yeh, my family is similar; we have, er, part of my family is Italian (ah ha) and 
we’ve got a very similar approach.
: Yes, yes, south European like our, yeh, like our, yeh, I see.
: My grandmother, my Italian grandmother lives just around the comer, um, we’re 
gonna be living with my parents for a while and you know, you all look after 
each other.
: Nice, very nice things, yeh, that’s what, that’s very, very nice decision and when 
you are young it's like your friend, you know, sharing ideas, you know, it's very 
nice.
: Yes, it's nice as you um, as you grow older to be able to talk to your father and 
mother as a friend. (Yeh, sure) You grow into that, (hhhhh)
: You complet your study in this university or, I mean graduate study.
: Yes, I did my degree in London, I did geology, but that was ten years ago now.
: Oh, so my age, sure 
: How old are you?
: I’m 37.
: I’m 32, well, 32 on Monday. Yeh, so, yeh, I started out as a geologist and er, 
ended up being a technician, so a varied career. London was just too expensive 
to stay.
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: I stayed there last year for two months.
: Whereabouts?
: In the centre, er near Oxford Street,, (Oxford Street, yeh)£400 a week.
: For just a room?
: Er, two-room flat, my family and me. One bedroom, one sitting room, small 
kitchen, small bathroom.
: That’s pretty good.
: For £400 a week.
: Oh, a week.
: A week, yeh, £400 a week, so its cost £1,600 a month, two months it cost me 
£3,200 for two months. I’m looking for -  I’m coming from my country, stay 
there in London, looking for some city nice so I take one day, go and coming 
here to Bristol, lot of cities I mean and then I got the decision to come here, but 
take from me £3,200 two months in London, only for accommodation I mean 
{that’s...). Very, very, very expensive. Here also it's expensive but not like, here 
two bedroom flat, £450 a but month, that is including bills though.
: You’d hope so, wouldn’t you. {Yeh) I come from London originally, so we’ve ’ 
got some family still in London.
: Your family originally stayed in London.
: The English side are Londoners and the prices of houses are just unbelievable. 
We were looking at houses and they wanted a quarter of a million just for a flat 
and we couldn’t possibly afford that. Mind you, it's getting just as bad up here.
: For quarter of a million you can get a nice, nice nice, house here.
: Yes, it's just getting quarter of a million isn’t it.
: When you get above £100 here, £100,000 I mean, you get a nice house but, er, 
under that, you can’t. In the north, Manchester, I mean, buy £20,000, £30,000 
you can get a nice, nice, nice house, {yeh) also in Sheffield or Liverpool or many 
towns north, Birmingham, but here in this side of the country, south, all south is 
expensive.
: So is it cheaper to live in your country?
: Yeh, sure, my country is very cheap. We don’t have, er, this kind of life, you
know. My country petrol are very cheap, insurance very cheap, I mean on the
cars OK, parking free everywhere, er, food is very, very, very, very cheap, bread, . 
sugar, er, a lot of things, I mean, very cheap and er, houses depending on your 
choice, you know. Small flats like here {like here, yeh) big house here is like 
small house there {hhh, right) so you can get nice flat within from £5000 to 
£15000 you can find a nice flat. House is dependent on from £50,000 you can 
take very big house, 400m sq. and something like that.
: How’s that -  how are the wages then, are they, um -  when I, if I’m earning my, 
what is it, say £17,000 odd a year here the thought of buying a £90,000 odd 
house seems very big, expensive. Um, so for someone in your country looking 
at a £5000 house, how is that in respect to how much they would, on average, 
earn?
: Um, average earn dependent on, umm, from £12,000 to £24,000.
: That’s for average wage?
: Yeehhh, yearly, so comparing with houses, hot like here, no. Maybe more less 
‘cos here, you know, salaries very high but here, you got salary from here, you 
pay it from here. {Yeh) We don’t have, er, any council tax, TV licence, water, 
da, da, da, blah, blah, blah, electricity very cheap, gas very cheap, maybe every, 
er, any family, big. family, er, they pay maybe £2 a month for gas, £10 for 
electricity. {Right) Here you have to pay (pay everything) a lot, a lot amount of 
money so it's very expensive. Three months telephone there, I think it's maybe
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£50, here, er, £200 or £300 every three months you have to pay here, telephone 
only.
: So people earn about the same as us and they pay a lot less.
: Er, no, they pay less, they pay nothing comparing with here, (right) but they earn 
less, sure, sure, sure they earn less, but comparing with here, I mean, the rent, 
there is no rent, everybody have his house, if he have some rent it is very, very, 
very cheap. {Right) £100, £200 you have, you can rent house, not like, not here, a 
big house I mean, a huge one.
: I’ll move out there I think
: But, food and whole life is very quiet and very nice, er, schools are free, er, 
hospitals and medicine are free, er, as I said no taxes at all, no 17.5% VAT, no 
VAT (hhhhh). So, but the salary, more less, yeh.
(long pause)
Dependent every country have, yeh, // something nice, something, here you have 
everything but you have to pay for it. (Yes) If you don’t have money you can’t 
live, can stay very quiet. What about the life here, I mean, everybody is happy?
: You mean in society?
: Nooo, with the salary I mean, with this amount of paying I mean. (I don't think) 
society sure, everybody’s life because there is a big area of freedom.
: Yeh, no I don’t think anyone’s happy with the housing situation because the 
housing prices have far out-stripped the ability to // so the house we are renting 
at the moment I know is gonna be sold and I know it's value is about £140,000. 
Even if we could put down a 10% deposit, er, we’d still have to find a mortgage 
for over £115,000 um, which is beyond what I can get anyway so whatever way 
you look at it, you can’t buy a house and no-one’s happy, er, so you go to rent 
and you’re looking for, I’ve seen bedsits going in Bristol for £650 a month, em, 
which compared to London, that’s all right, but if you’re trying to save the 
money to buy a house you can’t pay that, you can’t pay the rent and save to get, 
er, your deposit and all your fees to pay so it is a very difficult situation, em, so 
we’re going, ‘cos our house we’re living in at the moment is being sold we’re 
going to go back to live with my parents who have a bigger house, em, and, er, I 
hope that the market crashes (hhhhh) so everyone else is unhappy but we are 
happy ‘cos we can buy their house (hhhhh) so (it will crash) it’ll crash, so, yeh, I 
think people are pretty unhappy with the cost of living but, er, we still live.
: I mean here if anybody, er, you earn two thousand, your wife one thousand, three 
thousand a month, it's good for living? You can save or, how much I mean, the 
main paying for me, I mean, now, I pay sometimes from £1,300 to £1,500 a 
month, here in this country. What about English families, same situation or they 
are spending more than us, less than, maybe we, we don’t know about situation 
here, just we are playing //
: How would it work for us, we, in my situation, in the present situation of renting 
this house, em, over half my salary a month goes into paying, er, the rent, which, 
and the, er, council tax and all the bills, em, how much do I earn a month. Yeh, I 
would say all of my salary will go towards paying bills basically and that would 
include having to pay the insurance on the car, em, and, er, road tax, servicing 
the car, things like that, em, so if you were to combine my wife’s salary as well; 
she also has to pay off student debts from training to be a teacher, em, and from 
getting a degree, so we’ve still got debts coming on from educating ourselves, so, 
er, yeh, we’re probably spending about £1500 to £1600 a month on the bills of 
the house, the running of two cars, em, and odds and ends. I would say that we 
save £400 a month, em, and, er, sometimes a bit more, sometimes a bit less, so I 
would say you’re probably averaging out about the same as me (same situation)
li
so the only way in which we could save more money is to not pay a rent so by 
going back home, em, we can split -  because my parents have had the house for 
so much longer, their mortgage repayments are so, are very small. So even if we 
split the bills three ways, my parents, myself and my wife, we’ll be paying 
probably £150 a month so we can -  huge amount more saving, (hhhhh) // (huge 
amount of saving, big decision though, huh?) It is, yeh. Fortunately my parents 
are very easy to get on with (hhhhh).
Fathi : But what about your wife, she is happy with this decision.
Darryl : Oh yes, yes, she gets on very well with my, she, she handles my father
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Conversation (2)
Ibrahim = Non-native Speaker
Antony = Native Speaker
Antony : Right, Ibrahim, I’ve never lived in a desert, I’ve, I have lived in a dry part of 
the world for a bit, Denver, Colorado, (yeh) but never in a desert and I was 
wondering what the situation is. Is, is your, is your town on an oasis?
Ibrahim : Er, yes, you can say, yeh, I  mean, er, my town now is you can say a small 
city with a population o f  about 100,000people. In Debas, I  mean, people 
. they used to habiate just close to the source o f  water and there used to be 
something like oasis and if  you go out o f my city, say for 30k or 40k, I  
mean, you will find some oasis with some lakes, very beautiful lakes.
Antony : Yes, yes, if you can combine water with high temperatures you get a // very 
good.
Ibrahim : Yes, actually it is, temperature is very high in the summer but in the winter 
it is very, very cold, sometimes the temperature is minus 1 or minus 2 
degrees and getting maybe 40, 45 degrees in the summer.
Antony : That winter temperature, is that a ground frost or is it an air temperature,
minus 2?
Ibrahim : What do you mean?
Antony : Would that be just at ground level or would it be true in a column of air?
We always
Ibrahim : Yeh, yeh, I think, er, because where I live is, er, we are living at, er, er, you 
know - the latitude (yes) 23.5, called, er, the track of Capricorn, no, no, not 
Capricorn, the one in er, yeh, yeh, Capricorn (Capricorn is the northern 
one and Cancer is the south) yes, Capricorn actually just passes by my city.
Antony : I see, so you are in the Tropics.
Ibrahim : Yes, that’s why it’s very, very hot actually.
Antony :Yes. The, em, the water comes from ground water does it? (yeh) there are 
no rivers.
Ibrahim : You can say we are living in a lake of drinking water.
Antony : You can say that? (yeh) Do you have to go very deep to sink a well?
Ibrahim : No, I mean, something like, its amazing, I mean, when you dig around one 
metre you find beautiful water.
Antony : How extraordinary (yes) Does this originate from mountains nearby or?
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Ibrahim : No, when people, er, our scientists, I mean, claim that this water, I mean I 
was told from thousands and thousands of years during the Ice Age. //
Antony : The trouble about that, if it’s true, is that it’s a finite resource. It’s not a 
resource that is being replenished continuously, do you think?
Ibrahim : Ah well, some researcher, they say that there might er, er, be something
like, er, rivers (subterranean) er, well the Nile river is not very far from the 
desert, you know what I mean, it's just 1000 or 2000k.
Antony : That seems to me a long way.
Ibrahim : No, but I mean, er, because, the result you can imagine, it's like this, so, I 
mean, Nile river is just on the edge of er, of the desert, you know, what you 
call the Sahara (yes) this is the desert, (yes) but, er, today I cannot consider 
myself as desert man, I mean (no, well you are a cosmopolitan man) my 
city is a big city at the moment.
Antony : So the city now, obviously it's not based on agriculture around an oasis, it's 
based on oil ( now it's based on agriculture) it is based on agriculture?
Ibrahim :Yes, agriculture, I mean, all people they work their farms. In Debas, I mean, 
life in Debas based on agriculture, but it was primitive life, you can say.
Antony : Yes, so the present agriculture is watered by groundwater that’s extracted 
(yeh, yeh) so the question of how this is refilled is very important for the 
long term.
Ibrahim : Yeh, now the government is establishing, er, what you call it, a great
artificial river which runs from the south of the country to, er, feed, I mean, 
the northern parts of the country.
Antony : So this is an aqueduct.
Ibrahim : Yes, I think it's the biggest artificial river because the pipes are around 4m 
diameter and running for more than 4000k.
Antony : That’s amazing, where does the water come from?
Ibrahim : Well, we are living in a big river; I mean, it has been said that the water can 
er, can run in these pipes for more than 50 years, I think it's 50 years.
Antony : Yes, but the 4000k away, the source of these pipes, (ah, yeh) what is that 
water, is that, where does it come from?
Ibrahim : Well, the wells which will ( ah, these are wells) yeh, the wells in the desert 
which is the source of the water and there will be big, er, lakes, something 
like, you can say to gather water from these, er, wells. After that er, from 
these lakes will, other pipes will go to different cities in the northern part.
Antony : I see, so this is a distribution from the best source of groundwater (yeh) very
liv
interesting.
Ibrahim : So you haven’t been living in the desert climate?
Antony : I’ve never been in a desert, the nearest I’ve been to a desert is in parts of the 
Western United States because I lived in Denver, Colorado for a year and 
I’ve been back many times since, (yeh) and we did travel into, well that is a 
semi-desert area. The water there, of course, comes from snow melt in the 
mountains, primarily.
Ibrahim : So there should be some rivers running.
Antony : Yes, there are, there are, and I’ve been in South Africa in quite a dry part in 
the dry season.
Ibrahim : There is a question, I mean, I want an answer, but I men, people in the 
British Islands (in the British Islands? British Isles) yeh, Britain you can 
say, I mean, 1000 years ago what was their food?
Antony : A thousand years ago things were not hugely different, the climate was very 
similar.
Ibrahim : Yeh, but I mean you, I mean, you find all these different kind of vegetables?
Antony : I see what you mean, probably not, no but there were, there were vegetables 
grown and, of course, there were cereals grown, cattle were raised, livestock 
were used for providing power as well as meat and milk, em, there was a lot 
of wild game available.
Ibrahim : What about wheat and say?
Antony :Oh yes, wheat has been grown here, I can’t tell you exactly how long but it 
came from the fertile crescent of course, not very far from where you live, 
(yes) in what is now Iraq.
Ibrahim : Well, I mean you can say (bread is very old) bread is very old, yes.
Antony : Yes, and you’ll find the word bread in most European languages is very
similar because it's such an old common thing; (yeh, yeh) em, and of course 
we’ve grown barley and oats as well. (Oats, yeh, we don’t have oats.) In 
Scotland (you will not find it in the Middle East or Northern African 
countries) no. What cereals do you grow, wheat presumably?
Ibrahim :Yes, barley and wheat and you can also find, er, what do you call it?
Antony :In the southern half of Africa millet was, I think, an important cereal, but 
now everybody grows maize (maize, yes, yes, maize) or sweetcom, but of 
course that came from America originally.
Ibrahim : Yes, but it's also grown in my area, we’ve had it for a long, long time.
Antony : Because I think it was grown by the Amerindians in the southern part of the
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middle of the United States and over into Mexico, (yeh) that’s where it 
originally came from (the maize) yes.
Ibrahim : Well, it is very common now in central Africa (oh yes, I know) III mean, 
using the flour of maize for making bread and those kind of foods.
Antony : Yes, but I think it only came out of the Americas in the 16 century, at the 
very, probably via the Spaniards. We take for granted some of these things 
that originated from completely different areas (yeh) and then rapidly 
expand (yeh, yeh) through world agriculture.
Ibrahim : Now the world has becomes like small village, even in terms of food; you 
find now pasta everywhere, fish and chips wherever you go, pizza, pizza? 
(pizza, yes) and I think people they start changing from their, er, they used 
to depend on wheat, flour and barley but now they move to rice because the 
main dish (do you grow rice?) no (because you need a lot of water, don’t 
you) yes, lots of water and you will find rice grown either beside rivers or if 
. there is, I mean, continuous raining.
Antony : Um, we buy rice, most of it comes from the southern United States,
although some of it probably comes from (China) India, (yeh, Pakistan) 
China and Indo-China. Yes, in this country, there is a small move not away 
from the wide source of foods from the rest of the world, but, em, in a way a 
compensatory interest in locally produced food; people are now interested in 
where things come from within this country and we still have specialised 
locally produced foods. For instance, there is a cheese you may know of 
called Stilton (Cheddar) well Cheddar is produce almost worldwide but 
Stilton is only allowed to be sold as Stilton if it's produced in the parish of 
Stilton in Leicestershire. (Yeh) It's strange isn’t it?
Ibrahim : Monopoly, you call it?
Antony : I don’t think so, no, it think there are several small producers; I suppose 
your source of meat, when agriculture was based on your own 
environment, your own area, would that have been mainly mutton or lamb.
Ibrahim : Yes, Lamb, beef and camel meat as well (oh yeh) camel is very, very 
common.
Antony : What’s it like to eat? Is it good?
Ibrahim : It is very good if it is a small camel {before they get too tough) yeh; I have 
a rule in my life, I mean, the smaller the animal, the more tasty you’ll get 
so I prefer er (you don’t eat mice though) (hhhhh) but I prefer chicken 
which for me is more tasty than lamb, lamb is more tasty than beef, beef is 
more tasty than camel.
Antony : The camel is a marvellous animal isn’t it?
Ibrahim :Yeh, it's very patient animal.
Antony : It's patient, it's incredibly robust physiologically, a quite extraordinary
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animal.
Ibrahim : It can travel the desert, probably, 5 or 6 days without drinking, (without 
water) maybe more, 10 days, it's amazing.
Antony : It's almost as if it was designed (yeh, yeh) for people living in deserts.
Ibrahim : Exactly, yeh, people two thousand years ago. I mean, people used to, while 
they are travelling in the desert, they used to make warm in the body of the 
camel.
Antony : I’ve heard this, that you can actually remove meat from the live camel.
Ibrahim : No, just use the blood I mean (oh it's only blood) but I mean now nobody
is doing this any more. You know that blood can ................... after it comes
out.
Antony : I think that’s still true in parts of Africa, is it, I think it's the Masai who eat 
cattle blood. As long as you take it carefully from the animal, it's, it's fine.
Ibrahim : Well, I think, medically, it shouldn’t be a good source of (well, it’s very 
high in potassium, I suppose) yes, but I mean in terms of transmitting 
disease, I mean, a blood transfusion from man to man is accepted, I mean, 
but once it's exposed to air it should not be used.
Antony : No, em, obviously you’re right that if it's carrying a viral infection or some 
such thing, it could be very dangerous, (yeh, but) but if it's cooked, em, the 
Germans use blood a lot for making blood sausage and black pudding but 
it's all cooked.
Ibrahim : Yeh, but nowadays we know that blood itself is a very good medium for 
growing bacteria, viruses, (oh yeh) etc. (yes) so I mean if you just leave
blood just half an hour you willse, after coagulation and you will see how it
becomes. I mean, nowadays, I don’t thik so, at least in my area, I mean, 
you will find no-one will use the blood of a camel. (No but, on the other 
hand, if you are) This is partly because of religion as well I mean, you 
cannot use the blood, I mean, the blood is out of the body it is something 
dirty, you should not (oh really) yes, you should wash yourself before you 
pray.
Antony : Yes, but supposing, if somebody was trapped and it was either a matter of 
eating blood or dying of starvation, what would the situation be then?
Ibrahim : Well, that is necessity, I mean.
Antony : But the Koran accepts that?
Ibrahim : Yeh, you know, I mean, ham is forbidden in Islam but if you don’t have,
you are starving and you need to save your life, you eat it of course. Wine, 
as well, is forbidden but usually it is said in, in our teachings that if you, if 
something block your throat and you only save your life by drinking glass
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of wine (you do that) yeh, if it is the only available, so necessity usually er, 
make forbidden thing unforbidden.
Antony : Yeh, so it's a common sense approach, (yeh) I went to a talk in London, er, 
three weeks ago and Michael Palin, I don’t know whether you saw his 
programme, but he travelled. I didn’t see his programme but I did go to his 
talk because it was actually in support of a charity that has it's headquarters 
in our home near here, called Motivation. This charity makes wheelchairs 
in the developing world (yeh) and sets up units all over the world for 
making wheelchairs for disabled people and Michael Palin was giving his 
talk as a means of supporting this charity and the talk was very, very 
interesting. He made quite a long journey through North Africa, much of it 
actually in the Sahara. Did you see the programme at all.
IBrahim : But, let me ask, I mean, if, if, if this charity specialises in providing
wheelchair, I’m sure. I mean, wheelchair cannot, would be useless in some 
area where there is no er, I mean, roads and streets like back here.
Antony : Well, yes that’s possibly (you cannot use wheelchair on sand) you can if 
you design it properly and what Motivation do is they go out to, I mean, 
they’ve been all over the world, pretty well and they go out to a place, 
there’s a very big enterprise at the moment in Sri Lanka being done by 
them and they’ve just finished in Uganda and they, they find out what the 
environment is that the wheelchairs users need to able to deal with and then 
they design a wheelchair that is first of all, feasible to make in that 
environment with, as far as possible, materials available there (wide wheels, 
yeh) and then they design it for the terrain and they design it, often, for 
individuals.
Ibrahim :It must be cheap as well.
Antony : It must be cheap; none of them are motorised, they are all self propelled by 
the patient, the subject. They’ve done a fantastic job, they’ve made, I think, 
about 10,000 wheelchairs now and (it's good) they are either customised to 
individuals or made to fit an environment where there are lots of people 
suffering from the same problems, in the same kind of environment and 
they’ve done a tremendous job. It was founded by a most interesting man 
who is a quadriplegic himself, from a diving accident, (yeh) when he was a 
young man he broke his neck and he’s made the most extraordinary remark. 
He says that the experience of setting up Motivation has been such a 
dramatic thing for him, that he wouldn’t actually wish to replay his life and 
avoid the initial injury, it's remarkable and he wouldn’t say that if wasn’t 
true because he’s a very straightforward person. So anyway, the talk was 
very interesting, of course, the talk was nothing to do with wheelchairs, the 
talk was given at the Royal Geographical Society just for an audience who 
paid for tickets and the money goes to Motivation.
Ibrahim : Do you er, do you watch boxing?
Antony : Never.
Ibrahim : Never (no) Do you support this kind of sport?
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Antony : No
Ibrahim : Why
Antony : Well, I’m not interested in it; at school I was made to box, I didn’t enjoy it 
and I didn’t actually do very much. Em, it's not a sport that appeals to me 
and I think that the damage that it can do, very easily em, makes it difficult 
to defend.
Ibrahim : Yes, actually, I mean, this is my personal belief, I mean, this sport should be 
banned, should be stopped, because it's based on damaging the other, I 
mean it's not like football or volleyball or any other kind of sport but this, 
this special sport, I mean, depends only on damaging the opponent, (the 
opponent, yeh) That’s why I don’t support it.
Antony :You don’t support it either? I don’t know, it's one thing not to support
something, it's another to then ban it so that no-one else can do it. That’s 
quite a big step I think because then you are imposing your own view on 
other people, not personally because you yourself haven’t got the power 
(yeh) to ban it yourself but I’m doubtful about this. We’ve had this 
problem.
Ibrahim : Do you know that in my country it is banned, I mean (is it) there is no 
boxing since 1980 or 1978, about 25 years.
Antony : Did people box before?
Ibrahim :Yes, now it's, I mean, they said this is an animal sport, not human being 
sport.
Antony : Does the Koran have anything to say about this type of sport?
Ibrahim : No, but in Islam, I mean, you can practice some kind of sport, I mean,
without harming the opponent, (yeh) any kind of sport that don’t harm the 
opponent. Wrestling is OK as long as you don’t (as long as the aim is not 
to damage your opponent) ye, I mean, you could wrestle and just put me 
know, that’s it, but to break something in my body or to cause damage, this 
is forbidden.
Antony : That’s very interesting, yeh, we’ve had this argument, I’m sure you realise, 
recently here, not about a sport that damages other people but about 
hunting (hunting, yeh) with horses and dogs.
Ibrahim : I don’t know what was the last decision or resolution, is it banned now?
Antony : No, it's not yet banned in England but it is in Scotland (still) yeh and the, 
the, it's a difficult one I think because there are certainly two sides to it, if 
not more.
Ibrahim : So what is the view of these people who wants {who want it banned?) yes.
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Antony : Well, they reckon that it's cruel, that to chase an animal until it's caught or 
exhausted, as a sport, is cruel and it's not necessary.
Ibrahim : But what is done now in Spain is more (what, bullfighting?) yes, it's 
horrible death, that one.
Antony : Well, bullfighting would never now be allowed in this country, it would 
never happen in this country. I don’t know that it's actually legally 
excluded but nobody would want to do it.
Ibrahim : I don’t know how human beings just enjoying themselves by killing an 
animal.
Antony : I quite agree, but I don’t think that’s all that’s in it. The really high quality 
bullfights in Spain, and I’ve never watched this, but I understand there’s a 
lot of skill on the part of the matador and that the whole technique of how 
the bull is bypassed, you know, how you get the bull to charge and just at 
the last moment you withdraw, there are various stylised ways of doing 
this. This is nearly an art form according to many Spaniards.
Ibrahim : But the animal is killed in stages, I mean just when one goes {it's not killed 
outright) so it's very painful actually.
Antony : Yes, of course the historical perspective is interesting. Is it finished?
Ibrahim : Not yet, but (have we done half an hour, whatever it was you wanted?) er, 
I think now it's OK.
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Conversation (3)
Meghrawi = Non-ative Speaker
Simon = Native Speaker
Simon : OK, so if English isn’t your first language, what is your first language?
Meghrawi: My first language is Arabic.
Simon : Arabic? Where are you from?
Meghrawi: I’m from Libya.
Simon : Libya (yes) well, well, well, I don’t think I’ve met a Libyan before. 
Whereabouts are you from, are you from Tripoli?
Meghrawi : No, I’m from Bengaza, Tripoli is in the, er, west part of Libya, off the 
coast and I come from Bengaza which is 1000k to the east.
Simon : It's a big country.
Meghrawi: It's a huge country, yes, in terms of, em, I mean, size but in terms of 
people, it's very small.
Simon : Yeh, I was in Morocco last year (yes it's a huge countr) I was just amazed at
the scale, you know, you’re just completely looking at the map, you think 
OK, yes, there’s just a country there, but it was just enormous to get around, 
all the way down the coast, it just stretches and stretches.
Meghrawi: When, when was that?
Simon : It was last Christmas so just over a year ago I went for Christmas, it was 
really nice.
Meghrawi: Where, where, which, which, areas did you visit?
Simon : We just went to Marrakech (Marrakech, I ’ve been there for just 4 days) 
yeh,probably enough I’d say, 4 days in Marrakech, it's not a huge city.
Meghrawi: It was a conference so (oh really, oh great) so it was only a few hours in 
the evening.
Simon : Wondering the souk, it's a nice place. What’s Libya like?
Meghrawi : It is less populated unlike Morocco which is heavily populated, em, well 
the cities and, em, people more or less the same as Morocco. Well, it's, 
it's mostly deserts, 90% is deserts, or maybe less, 85% and then the main 
populated area is the coast, the cities on the coast but then, unlike here 
where you have a village or a city every couple of miles lyes, it's just 
empty and then lots of people and then empty again) yes.
Simon : Oh, I see
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Meghrawi : So you need to travel long distances with car, I mean, with your coach or 
something. It's, er, the weather is much, much warmer (hhhhh).
Simon : Yeh, 85% desert, it's gotta be, gotta be that much warmer, yeh.
Meghrawi: Yeh, well, you get sometimes colder than Bristol.
Simon : Yeh, cold at night.
Meghrawi :Yeh, I mean, no, I’m not talking about the desert, the cities on the coast, 
they get actually sometimes colder even, I mean, not very cold but, I mean 
Bristol is very, very er, mild.
Simon : Yeh, yeh, it is quite mild, yeh, never gets freezing, (no) it's true and was
Libya a French colony.
Meghrawi: No, it's like Morocco and Algeria, no it wasn’t. Is there any chance that 
you are Scottish?
Simon : No, close, I’m Irish.
Meghrawi: Oh, you’re Irish, OK.
Simon : I’m impressed, I’m very impressed, (hhhhh)
Meghrawi :Er, it was colonised by the Italians /  by the Italains OK/  er, 1911 first of 
all, and then up to the beginning of the ‘30’s, 1932, ’42, sorry.
Simon : ‘42, OK so during the second world war.
Meghrawi : Yeh, well, it was mostly Italy and then when the Italians left the country it 
was colonised by the British and the er, and the French. So it's a period 
before the independence, (yeh) but the British didn’t stay for so long like 
they did in Egypt / and most other places / most other places, yeh, so we 
were more like an Italian colony.
Simon : When did it get independence?
Meghrawi: Er ‘45, ’47, ’47 yeh. I’m not very good with history, you can tell.
(hhhhh)
Simon : No, it's always really embarrassing whenever anyone asks me about Irish 
history as well. I’m like, well, I think we got independence in ’22 give or 
take 5 years. I don’t know.
Meghrawi: Especially if you are having some Guinness. ( hhhhh)
Simon : Guinness, yeh, you gotta love the Guinness. Have you ever tasted Guinness.
Meghrawi: No, I don’t drink, (strict Moslem, yeh) but people in my country do drink.
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Simon : That’s something I was really surprised, in Morocco lots of people drank,
you know, and, I mean, it's very, well, a strict Moslem society, well, it's
quite liberal, but, you know, everyone, you know, lots of the women wear 
burkas and, er, // but lots of people drink beer as well.
Meghrawi: Oh yeh, yeh, in my country too they drink all sorts of things, drinks
locally made and imported. I remember when I was examined in 4th year, 
er, 5th year medical school, surgery, we had a couple of external 
examiners from this country and the case I got was liver sclerosis and, er, 
the patient was Libyan and the examiner asked me what he was drinking 
and I said it's a local made stuff, it's a palm wine and he said, oh, is that 
nice? (hhhhh). Could we have some, please, (hhhhh) I said no, give me 
the marks and let’s see what I do about it.
Simon : I think it's meant to work the other way round you know (hhhhh). You are
meant to give them the palm wine and then they give you the marks, (hhhhh).
Meghrawi: Yeh, so yeh
Simon : How long have you been living in Bristol?
Meghrawi: Quite long now, em, about in total about 7 years.
Simon : Your English is excellent, I was expecting, you know, maybe someone who 
didn’t speak very good English at all but it's just like having a chat with 
someone who is fluent in English.
Megrawi : I’d like to think so. (hhhhh) No I’m not that fluent, to be honest, I get, yeh, 
it's sometimes difficult to express yourself. {Sure) Once you start dreaming 
in the language, then you are probably mastering the language, that’s what 
I’ve been told.
Simon : Yeh, are you dreaming in English yet? (hhhhh)
Meghrawi: No, never (hhhhh)
Simon : Oh, OK. I used to live in France and it's very true, once you start dreaming 
in French, you know you can speak in French.
Meghrawi: You speak French as well?
Simon : Em, well, I mean, it was a couple of years ago now so I’m a bit rusty you 
know. If I practice I’m OK.
Meghrawi: OK, good, excellent. So is there any other language you speak?
Simon : Er, well, we have to study Irish at school but it's a very difficult language to 
speak. Only about 50,000 people still speak it as their first language and, 
em, it's an ancient language, it's about ten thousand years old so it's very
Simon : kind of primitive, the structure of the language, the grammar and it makes it 
really difficult to learn if you are used to Latin based languages. You know, 
French isn’t that different from English or, and Spanish is very similar to
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French and so on but Irish is just like, phew, it’s maybe like Turkish or 
something.
Meghrawi : It doesn’t contain like a verb and a subject and proverb and these sort of 
things?
Simon : m, there’s verbs and nouns but it's, the thing is there’s no regular verbs so, 
for example, in French, you know, there’s a set of rules for every verb and 
. you can say the I, You, He, She, We, according to the rules.
Meghrawi: Yeh, there are certain suffixes or prefixes.
Simon : Yeh, exactly, or the ending of the word. In Irish there are more irregular 
verbs than regular verbs.
Meghrawi: Right, do you just learn each by heart, so it takes ages.
Simon : Yes, ages and ages and ages and there are lots of strange little rules like
sometimes you put an ‘n’ in front of this letter and, oh, you know, it's a real 
pain, we hated it. I think it's taught very badly as well (oh, I see) and you 
have to start learning it when you are 5 years old.
Meghrawi: Probably also it didn’t er, er, like it didn’t progress, I mean it didn’t 
evolve (exactly) just maintaining the same old, er, presuso, I mean.
Simon : Well exactly, it's, it's, I suppose the reason it hasn’t evolved is because it 
wouldn’t be Irish, it would be English if it had evolved or French or 
something. It's similar to Welsh and to Scottish and also to an ancient 
French language as well, so it's Celtic.
Meghrawi: Oh, Celti, Celtic language, right. I know that Turkish language for
example, is just, er, you go on adding suffixes and prefixes; you don’t 
have, er, well I suppose you should have, I never understand, I was, I 
discussed this with a Turkish guy for half an hour or more and I ended up 
saying OK.
Simon : Well, we’ve only got 25 minutes, (hhhhh)
Meghrawi: Yej, it's er, er, I noticed that your accent is not very strong.
Simon : No, well, two reasons, my parents aren’t from Dublin, er, I was brought up in 
Dublin but my parents are from Belfast. Belfast has a very distinctive accent, 
it's probably the typical accent that you hear on TV a lot because there’s lots 
of political problems in the region as well, em, but they lived in Dublin for 
20 years before they had me so there accents had really become very 
moderate and then I’ve lived in England for 7 years now as well so I suppose 
I’ve lost my Irish accent a little bit. I was at home this weekend and as soon
Simon : as I go back into the country, it's back, (yeh, yeh) you know, completely 
normal Dublin accent.
Meghrawi : Yeh, I understand that, yeh. It's quite similar to my case because where I 
come from the east part of Libya but I lived most of my life in the West
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so people all the time say that I don’t have an eastern accent but once I go 
there it just clicks.
Simon : Yeh, exactly, you just go back into the mode.
Meghrawi :Yeh, yeh, otherwise you’d be, everybody, er, talking funny (hhhhh).
Simon : Well, when I first came to England people didn’t understand what I was 
saying, I mean (I like the Irish accent) I, I like the Irish accent as well 
(hhhhh) much better than the English accent (hhhhh) but people go What! 
and I go you know.
Meghrawi: It's much easier than the Scottish accent I think.
Simon : Um, the thing is, there’s not many people that live in Ireland, you know, 
there’s 4 million and there must be 20 accents. There’s three different 
accents just in Dublin, you know, very distinctive, so there’s a hugely diverse 
pool of accents in the country for such a small population. (Ah right). Some 
of them are absolutely unintelligible, just really, really, thick.
Meghrawi : Why is that, it's a very small area, well, no, I mean (yes, it is a small area) 
is that because they come from different, originally they come from 
different parts of the world or different (er, it's because, I think) many 
immigrants, no, I’m not talking about today’s immigration, I mean (yeh, 
historically) historically.
Simon : Um, not really, I mean there was a lot of English soldiers settled in Ireland, 
em, but I don’t think they really impacted the accents, I think it's because the 
different regions are quite isolated from each other.
Meghrawi: Oh right, it's mountain.
Simon :Very mountainous (oh right, mountainous) em, well, in different regions it's, 
it's, you know, quite mountainous.
Meghrawi : Er, er, each and every, I mean, every group of people, they just live in 
(yeh)in that area and they are satisfied with, I mean, («exactlyj have their 
own food (yeh) and resources and everything.
Simon :Yeh, yeh, most people, certainly in the old days, you know, there’s no TV or 
radio, and most people wouldn’t travel to the big cities, em, so, you know, 
you’re never exposed to the other accents, I suppose.
Meghrawi : This is happening on a large, much, much larger scale in the Arabic
world. (Oh, really) It's amazing because, er, 20 years ago if you bring, 
er, say, a guy from Morocco and a guy from Lebanon or from Kuwait or 
something it's a huge, it's a very, I mean (a vast distance) yes, very vast 
distance, they would both speak Arabic but each would speak his own 
dialect, or, so sometimes it's very difficult to, to communicate properly 
but nowadays, 20 years later, er, because I think it's the impact of 
television and (I was gonna say, yeh) people very easy communicate with 
each other, I mean, the gaps are bridging very nicely.
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Simon : Yeh, but it's the same with the whole world really.
Meghrawi: It's the same with the whole world I think, yeh.
Simon : I mean Japanese schoolchildren speak English with an American accent and 
(hhhhh, yeh) you know, the first words French schoolkids learn are the 
words of pop songs with an American accent (that’s true, yeh) and so, you 
know, the whole world’s getting smaller (getting smaller, true) or 
something.
Meghrawi: Yeh, but not very tolerable, I could say, could add (hhhhh)
Simon : Well, no, no
Meghrawi: So have we passed the half hour, (hhhhh)
Simon : I dunno (hhhhh).
(hhhhh) (hhhhh) //
Meghrawi: I er spent, er, 3 years in, em, before I married, in a, a, a, an
accommodation here; it was like er, er, rooms with er, with er, a common 
kitchen.
Simon : Oh yeh, a university ( university accommodation, yhs) oh, a hall of 
residence.
Meghrawi : Yeh, well, it's not, yeh, it's a hall of residence but for post-grads and there 
was a guy from, er, Ireland, he was there for two years, I think I had the 
most er, fruitful conversations with him actually. (Oh really) I really 
enjoyed talking to him because I think Irish people are quite friendly I 
think.
Simon : I think so, I think, well, the Irish have a reputation for being, you know, good 
hosts I suppose, but I think (only women or men as well) er the women as 
well, (hhhhh) the women are worse than the men. (hhhhh)
Meghrawi: That’s what I’m saying, only women I thought (oh, no, no, no) (hhhhh).
Simon : I think that could be quite rude (hhhhh) but yes, it's true.
Meghrawi : No, no, just joking. Yeh, he was a very nice guy and er, yeh, but he never 
liked politics anyway he, he, (oh really) he, he said no, he just don’t like 
to talk about it, (don ’t talk about it) unless he is very drunk or something 
(hhhhh).
Simon : And another thing.
Meghrawi : Yeh, exactly.
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Simon :I think a lot of Irish people are like that because we don’t talk about politics 
at home , you know, because it can get you killed, you know I (that’s true) 
em, well, my family’s from Belfast and they just, they never talk about 
politics with their friends because you don’t really want to know. Er, if you 
meet someone and you like them, then really, why should you talk about 
something that might ruin a friendship, you know.
Meghrawi : That’s true, that’s true; very dangerous, politics and religion, that’s what I
have been told..............................So how’s it, er, going here?
Simon : It's going, it's going well, em, skirting round politics now, quite well.
(hhhhh) I finished my PHD about six months ago now, em, and so I’m 
working post-op stuff, it's quite good. It's different from what I was doing 
before for my PHD. I’ve changed labs, em, and it's quite, it's quite fun. The 
experiments aren’t as physically demanding as they used to be. (Oh right, 
OK) I used to do, my experiments were all between 14 and 16 hours long so 
yeh, phew, you know, it used to kill you. At the end of the day you’d be just 
like, oh God, you know, please kill me. Er, good now, it's fine. Do you 
work clinically or are you doing research?
Meghrawi: No, I’m doing research, er, lab based, so I work with er, tissue cultures.
Simon : Oh right, OK, is that down the hill or?
Meghrawi: Yeh, it's in the eye hospital, the ere, the research labs at the back.
Simon : Yup, what’s that like?
Meghrawi : Er, well, it start very well and then (hhhhh sounds familiar) and then it's 
reached a stage where it's not gonna end hhhhh (sounds familiar) so I 
think I had enough, I think I got enough data and my supervisor want me 
to do a bit more.
Simon : Yeh, a few more experiments, a few more experiments (yeh, exactly) what 
field are you doing?
Meghrawi :I am, er, well, it's er, about, it's about corneal preservation in er, organ 
culture medium so it's about cell viability survivals and different
Simon : Yeh, how long have you been doing research for?
Meghrawi: Er, a good er, three years.
Simon :Um, but do you want to stay in research .or do you want to go back to clinical.
Meghrawi : Now I’m actually; I think I’m going back to my country actually so I’m 
not, I’m not doing research there, well, I might do but it wont be my main 
(no)er, main work so I’m going back to clinical, yeh. I also miss my v 
clinical work.
Simon : I bet,I bet, I mean it must be nice to work with people, you know (yes, yes) 
the rats are fun but (hhhhh) they don’t talk very well.
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Meghrawi: No, cells don’t as well (hhhhh)
Simon : No, cells are even worse (hhhhh)
Meghrawi : Exactly, well they talk to each other, that’s what we say, that’s what we
think.
Simon : Clinical, I’d really like to do some clinical stuff. I did some clinical work 
during my undergraduate degree in a hospital and it was really fun, you 
know, it was just neurology, working with some patients that had had some 
knee injuries and er, it was really, it was nice to talk to people, it was cool.
Meghrawi: Yeh, you always get, you know, different, a, a mixed bag, you know.
Simon :Yeh, this is it, although I have some friends who used to work in A & E and 
they hated it. I mean, I suppose it depends // on who you are working with.
Meghrawi : Yeh, people who come to an ER most likely, you know, (yeh) are the type
you don’t really want to see every day (hhhhh)
Simon : Yeh, beaten up. (hhhhh) Well, 80% of them are, shouldn’t be there. My
aunt works in A & E in Belfast as well and em, she was saying that, on
Christmas day, they only had 3 people the whole day and they were, like, 
this is what it should be like every day, you know, only coming to the 
Accident and Emergency if it really is an emergency, em, and they usually 
get maybe a hundred people a day, it's unbelievable.
Meghrawi : Yeh, they just don’t want to, you know, go through the routine (normal 
channels) yeh, normal channels, exactly
Simon : I think we must be done now.
Meghrawi : Yes, that’s enough.
(hhhhh)
Simon : Very nice to talk to you
Methrawi: Yeh, thanks very much
Simon ; Yeh, good luck.
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: No, I don’t understand, what do you mean-
: Basically, my story for 23 years old and your story for 33 years old
: Hhhhh, hhhhh // hhhhh, because your birthday tomorrow, isn't it, that’s right. Ah 
so tomorrow you will be 23.
: It certainly flies though, doesn’t it
: Yeh, time is flying very fast, very fast. Aah, he hasn’t got admission, you know, 
this letter for friend of mine, looking for admission; regret to inform you that we 
are unable to offer you a place.
: U-hum, what does he want to do, is it PHD, Masters?
: Yeh, PHD in er, management // but this is maybe default, yeh, default?
: But you’ve had quite a few haven’t you of, there's quite a few letters have come in.
: Yeh, but most of them just, you know, informing that, er, they are receiving the 
documents (aah) but, er, this is the fourth which is saying that they are unable to 
offer him a place; which is, er, unfortunate. (Ahem) So what’s your story up to 23 
then?
: Is this recording now?
: Yeh
: Oh, er, bom in India 1978 (1978, yeh) came to this country when I was about 2 Vz, 
’80, ’81 (OK) em, lived here since, most lived in West Midlands, Walsall, er, left 
Walsall in 1991 for Birmingham. Stayed there, I went to school and college and 
now University.
: And you still, er, live in the same place.
: Yeh, still live in the same place.
: OK, how about, er, oh, that’s very short
: That’ very short, innit
: No, come on, it's 23 years, hhhhh, // 20 seconds hhhhh, but how about your 
parents, did they move here, or
: They moved here in, er, 1960’s, (what) Dad did, (oh right) yeh (OK) he’s been 
here for the last 30 years, 40 years (oh, that's quite a long time) late 1960’s, early 
‘70’s, yeh, about that time.
: So why did you choose Hallam to study in 
Er, the course actually, the course (oh right) the course, at that time when I started 
to apply only er,Sheffield Hallam did the course, networking and communications, 
BSc honours, so that’s why (you chose that) I chose Hallam, my cousin was 
studying here as well (your cousin studies here) my cousin studied here, (ah, 
studied here, OK) so he was the first one to say, why not Sheffield Hallam and 
then, I looked at the prospectus, looked at their computing courses and I thought, 
ah, yeh, communications.
: That’s good, do you like coffee or tea?
: I’ll have tea with my toast // that’s good // hhhhh
: Tea bags, yeh
: Yeh, I like tea bags. So what’s your story then?
: Ah, my story is shorter than yours, anyway hhhhh 22 seconds hhhhh you know, I, 
er, of course I was bom in Libya and raised as well in Libya so I didn’t er, I didn’t, 
no thank you very much, so I didn’t have a change to be er, bom in a country and 
raised in another country and em, I studied in the same, er, the same village. It's a 
small village where I live (yeh) and er, er, for university degree I studied and, I 
think, the second university or the first university you can say in Libya (em) it's
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about a hundred, er, a thousand kilometres away from my village, so, I did my er, 
partial degree there (in er, accounting) accounting, yeh and then I studied for a 
Master degree as well there (in accounting), in accounting, yeh and then, after the 
Master I taught university for a er, a year and a half (mmm) and then I went to, to, 
er to Canada.
: Oh yeh, Canada, whereabouts?
: Yeh, I went to Montreal (ah Montreal) I stayed there for a er, ayear (yeh) doing my 
English courses there (oh right) yeh and em, er, at the beginning I was supposed
to, to do m y  year there as well, m y  English courses but, I couldn’t er, get
get er, a-a-acceptance, in Canadian universities, because, you know, they have, er, 
like trouble, you know, trouble (yeh) er, highest score I think it's about 550 and in,
also, there is another exam they call Gmat, it's very, more, more difficult th a n .....
(yeh) and they require about 600 I think, so, so I couldn’t, I, I came at the top, I got 
to 1200 score but I couldn’t, thanks, without sugar, but I couldn’t manage to get, 
er, the Gmat (mmm) and I was allowed only to stay in Canada a year (mmm) and to 
get an admission, otherwise I have to go back to Libya (aah) and look for another 
place to study. So I didn’t manage to get admission there, went back to Libya, 
while I was in Canada I managed to get admission from Sheffield Hallam 
University and er, Manchester Metropolitan University. So I went back to Libya, I 
taught er, a course there while I’m changing my, er, (mmm) you know, my 
sponsorship to, to England and then came back here in 19, er, 1998. Working 
here, I have, I have two choices, either study in Manchester or (Hallam) or Hallam 
(is it) so I went (study Sheffield.) yeh, hhhhh so I chose Sheffield. I didn’t like 
Manchester anyway, I don’t know why (mmm) I didn’t like the, the, the city itself, 
not, not people, I mean, city, although it's bigger than Sheffield (yeh) but er, I 
dunno, maybe because I used to, to, to Canada; when I came here I didn’t expect, 
you know (yeh, yeh) it's, it's, it's a lot different.
: Oh yeh, definitely, I’ve been to Vancouver.
: You’ve been, ah yeh
: Three times
: Three times, ah, I didn’t go, I didn’t have a chance to go to Vancouver, I’ve heard 
it's very, very nice place, (oh beautiful) It's the best place I think in Canada, (yeh) 
‘specially, er
: Apparently, it's the best place in the world, (oh right, yeh) for living.
: Oh, for living, yeh, OK (yeh, for living) and especially the Asians (yeh) from Japan 
and China // they like (yeh, umm).
: So what’s your friend gonna do with all this tape stuff?
: Apparently he’s going to listen to it first of all (yeh) and then (have a good laugh) 
hhhhh. Why? hhhhh . First of all, he going to listen to it and then, I dunno what 
to, he’s going to, er, ‘cos he’s studying, he’s studying, he’s studying, er, I think er,
English, er; I dunno. It's, I mean,  the, the conversation I think between, I
dunno, the conversation between native and non-native anyway. (Ah right) He’s 
looking for er, native and non-native intercommunication or communication 
aspect. I dunno, I dunno that he, what he’s study about.
: You know English, I know English; the only difference I can see is the accent.
: Yeh, the accent but the fluency as well. {Yeh, yeh) The fluency and understanding; 
you might say something that I don’t understand (mmm) ‘cos I don’t know all the 
vocabularies.
: Neither do I // sayings, yeh. I mean it's so surprising how you pick up languages.
: Yeh, you know, when I started doing my em, because of course when you came 
here, two years and a half, you learned both of the languages I think at the same 
time; your mother tongue language and the English language, but when I want to
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Canada to study English, at the beginning, ‘specially the three or four month, first 
three or four month, I realised how much I learned because, you know, you pick 
many more, many vocabularies, many new things and, er, the amount of, of, of, 
understanding, your understanding, is increasing (sure) very high at the beginning 
but then after (it levels off) yeh.
Matt : Yeh, but that’s with everything.
Mosstfa : Yeh, and then you start, oh come on, I have been here for er, 6 month or 7 month
and my level of understanding is, is the same as when I was 4 month, or 4 month
ago, so the level of improvement, not, not very increasing very high, (mmm) Yeh,
it's, it's, er, amazing how you can pick up and understand, communicate with other 
people in short time, (mmm) Also body language is very important, because at the 
beginning (ah, yeh, yeh) when you cannot, when you cannot say something you 
can hhhhh.
Matt : Some orange juice.
Mosstfa : So what are you going to do for your party then.
Matt : My party, nothing.
Mosstfa : Oh come on Man
Matt : No, no, I got to  work, revise, revise all day Monday. Exams aren’t far
away, you see, and these are my finals so I think I might as well forget it.
Mosstfa : Yeh, you should, er, I’m not saying you shouldn’t but, er, it's (a bit of clubbing) II
Matt : Er, OK, that’s clubbing, yeh, that’s, that’s one thing. I didn’t mean to, to, to waste
the whole day just on (no, no, no, just in the evening). OK. (mmm) So you said 
you were praying. (Yeh) So, er, what er, dunno, what type of praying do you do?
Mosstfa : Just; my mother is Punjabi which is, em, from India, Punjab (OK) and it just em,
. obviously every religion has their own prayers, (yeh, yeh) I mean you do yours 
three, four times a day do you?
Matt : Er, five times, yeh.
Mosstfa : Yeh, five times a day, but we, we’re supposed, we do ours about three times a day,
you see.
Matt : Oh right, yeh, so I didn’t know that.
Mosstfa : Yeh, (so) I think every religion, I dunno, I think personally, there's one God (yeh)
and there's so many different paths leading to it. (OK) Sikhism, Christianity, 
Buddhism, Islam, Hinduism, Judaism and they’re all gonna get you there and 
there's no point saying oh, my religion’s better than your religion and 
everythings’s (yeh, it's not the point of better) no, no.
Matt : So how do you practice, is it, is it by physically or just by staying and saying some.
Mosstfa : Yeh, just chanting, well not chanting, just reading from a (a book) yeh, prayer
book (prayer book, OK) yeh.
Matt : Do you have certain position to be in or just to (no) yeh, because for Moslems, we
have to, to direct ourselves to (yeh, yeh, towards) to Mecca (mmm, mmm) and er, 
we have certain er, er, when, what do you call it, not prac, practices, yeh, we have 
certain practices to do during, during each time and they are different between, 
within 5 times, (mmm)
LONG PAUSE
Mosstfa : Yeh, it's going, (yeh) it's going very nice.
Matt : Yeh, ah good, good, good. That’s if your friend can understand me when I’m
eating my food. Hhhhh
Mosstfa : No, I think he, I think he will manage hhhhh some way, some way or another he
will do that.
Matt : Well, we’ll do it again if you want. Hhhhh
Mosstfa : So how about after graduation?
Matt : Father’s business.
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: Ah, working with your father’s business, yeh.
: IT stuff, webb development (OKyeh) er, networking, things, just small things like 
that, er, databases. (u-hum) Just what basically I’ve learnt over the last four years 
implemented to the factory. (OK)
: . So it will be very good for (fingers crossed) hhhhh, no I’m sure it will be, because 
you know, you are studying at IT (mmm) and then you try to implement this in 
your business.
: Yeh. I worked, em, for my placement in Cambridge, (u-hum) I was there for a 
year working for em, TWI, and was IT support. ‘Cos the business was er, it's a 
research and development organisation; they research into different welding 
techniques on fatigue, for example, er, (for what, sorry) fatigue. You know when 
you’ve got steel (yeh) welding, (OKyeh) Measures basically pressures on different 
welds and stuff like that, for example, but they’ve got industries like petro­
chemical, er, mechanical, aerospace (yeh) nuclear, er, stuff like that, oil and gas, 
where, for example, Esso (u-hum) the er, (big oil company) oil company, they, 
obviously they’ve got pipes leading from the, er, sea bed (oh right) to the shore 
(OK). Obviously you aren’t gonna get a 100, 200 foot pipe, you’re gonna have 
small sections (yeh) and those sections will be welded together (OK yeh) using 
various techniques, and what they, they do is basically research into those welding 
techniques (oh right, yeh) and then obviously once you’ve done one they probably 
test it as well, under various pressures of heat and exhaustion and stuff like that (u- 
hum) and same for the car industry, welding the chassis together, pivoting, things 
like that, so that’s what they’re doing and I was part of the support team, IT, we 
have most things on computers these days (oh right, yeh) so they were using things 
like word processing, e-mail, and, you know, (so you all could, er) I was part of it, 
networking, IT supporting. (Oh, that’s good) I learnt a lot.
: Yeh, that’s good in your CV.
: Well, definitely, ‘cos I’d never worked before and that’s a big chunk on my CV. 
I’ve learnt a lot though. I didn’t know how to upgrade computers before I went 
there, now I can upgrade, build my own computer if I wanted to.
: Oh right, yeh. So you are good, yeh, you are good in computers now aren’t you,
so how about a, a laptop. I’m thinking about buying a laptop. Do you know much 
about laptops.
: How much do you want to spend? It's all about money.
: It's about £800, £700, £800 yeh.
: Yeh, you’ll get a nice one.
: I can get nice one. What, what’s the best, em, make?
: Em, Toshiba’s nice, (u-hum) Toshiba, ‘cos at work we used to have Toshiba
laptops and Panasonic, er, Sony.
: What about er, there's one called Compaq, something like that. (Compaq)
Compaq, is that nice one or er,
: Yeh, they’re all OK, they’re good well-known companies; it's just like the 
hardware specifications, speed, the memory, the screen size (u-hum, u-hum). For 
£700 or £800 you could get a nice laptop.
: But you cannot update it, can you?
: Hum?
: You cannot update the laptop, after.
: You can, but it get, ends up expensive, you see, because with a PC, with a 
computer you’ve got a mother board and you can, it's easy to upgrade it's not a, 
‘cos sometimes they’re only about that big, (yeh) the latest ones out (mmm) so you 
have to buy new memory modules and different, the, the overall structure’s 
slightly different.
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Mosstfa : Yeh, (mmm) but, but computers you can upgrade easily.
Matt : Yeh, easy, easy.
Mosstfa : So you can upgrade a laptop but it's more expensive to upgrade it.
Matt : Yeh
Mosstfa : OK, so I thought, I thought you cannot upgrade it.
Matt : You can, you can. Yeh, but mostly you see, you don’t, you don’t, if you buy a
new laptop now, there's no, there's no main reason for upgrading ‘cos they come 
with 64 megabyte RAM, pretty high specification, big hard drive.
Mosstfa : But after maybe two or three years hhhhh (yeh but that’s) you would have a huge //
{exactly) different speed or different specification and you need to {Well 
technology changes every day) yeh.
Matt : I mean, I remember at work we put this laptop in, Sony laptop, in and er, and you,
you ever seen James Bond, you know what I mean, a tracking system (yeh), you 
know, like dddddddddddd, you know like, em, what’s it called, like a tracking 
system, almost you know like a James Bond tracking system. //
Mosstfa : If, if, er, you track somebody or something, (yeh) ok yeh, I understand.
Matt : Anyway, you load the software up on this laptop and you put this card, data card
and what the PC will do is track it, so if you are moving across the screen (right) 
the data card will actually, the software will actually track it moving across the 
screen and basically, if you’ve got, let’s say, in a, a company, if you’ve got, er, a 
stock item (OK, u—hum) you can scan it in front of the computer now. Just all 
you need to do, you just place it in front of the computer. (Oh right, bits in front of 
the computer.) Yeh, yeh. Technology changes so fast.
Mosstfa : That’s amazing, that’s amazing. A friend of mine bought a mobile phone, a
Siemen, er, the latest model, not sure what it is and he paid, em, £280 something 
for it and, er, I listened to music from it, you know, (oh, yeh, yeh) I listened to 
music, ahh, that was amazing and (yeh, yeh) he recorded my voice on the mobile 
phone and I heard my voice hhhhh recorded and, em, he said you can download 
music from the internet to your mobile phone (yeh) and listen to it. That, that, 
very, // and you can access the internet from it. That’s very, very interesting but // 
very expensive, (oh yeh, definitely) £280 for a mobile phone, no, come on // no 
too expensive, (yeh, too expensive) But myself, you know, pay as you talk is, er, is 
you know // hhhhh. Although I try to convince him to swap (ah, hhhhh, that’s 
better, that is). Hhhhh, yeh, yeh, this is better yeh, I told him, this is bigger 
(reception hhhhh). Hhhhh, bigger in size, smaller in screen, you know hhhhh. 
Actually I’m looking another handset, (yeh) yeh, this handset is not, although I 
don’t want to spend much, you know. (No)
Matt : So when you going back to Libya then?
Mosstfa : I dunno, after I finish.
Matt : . When do you finish?
Mosstfa : I dunno, hhhhh
Matt : Can you, can you stay here next year sure.
Mosstfa : Yeh, not that we want, if I want, if my Supervisor wants. (No) Because, you
know, individually it is difficult to decide when you finish, depend on new work 
and Supervisor’s satisfaction.
Matt : ‘Cos I mean, this is a thesis, isn't it
Mosstfa : Yeh, so, er, every time and then my Supervisor come and give me, er, what have
you done about this, (mmm) when I see it, when he see it, sometimes he says OK 
but after a while, er, give me again that work we did, when I give him, or you 
need, you know to do more on this one, this one, this, so every time, and then you 
change (yeh) whatever, even if you agree on something, you might change it again, 
so it's very hard, although,
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Matt : What’s your objective for the thesis?
Mosstfa : You mean, from getting a PHD or for the thesis itself?
Matt : For the thesis, for the,
Mosstfa : Er, er, the objective of the thesis, yeh, I’m looking at, em, the process of providing
information, accounting in public law, within Libyan context, Libyan companies 
and em, accountability relationship between companies, and er, because, you 
know, in Libya it's er, we have like a Ministry or a Secretary which is responsible 
for companies (ah right) and because it's em, publicly ownership companies, not 
like here, private companies most of the companies here. I’m looking for a public 
company and it's relationship with that particular Secretary. (Ah right) You know, 
because, it's, it's it's like, you know, this company is like, owned by the Secretary 
(em) because it's a public company (em) and this Secretary is supervising that 
company so I’m looking for the relationship between them. (Ah right) Like how 
the information flow between these two organisations, accountability relationship 
between these organisations and, (sounds hard) yeh, I’m looking at, you know, the 
whole, the culture you know, because it's er, it's different from European market 
economies and also, because this company is a joint venture; there is an Italian 
. partner, yeh, it's owned by the Libyan Government and by an Italian company.
Matt : Oh right, what’s the company called?
Mosstfa : . Er, CalibrasifCalibrasi) yeh, it's an Italian company so, also there is, you know, a
foreign partner here (oh right) so what accountability are there between the 
company and this foreign partner and between the Secretary and this foreign
partner, so it's (like a trail) Yeh, like a triangle, yeh, so yeh, that’s the main (so it's
very complex then) the main, yeh, the main thesis is very complicated, you know, 
although it's; add to that my Supervisor is very, you know, demanding (um), every 
time ah, do this, do this, ah, forget this, do this you know, it's very, very hard work 
(em) but hopefully, hopefully // will finish one day hhhhh (hhhhh one day).
Matt : Who is your Supervisor?
Mosstfa : Er, Professor Tony Perry.
Matt : Oh, professor?
Mosstfa : Yeh, (oh right) even my second Supervisor is a professor as well.
Matt : What’s the status with , OK, you get doctors, OK, if you do a PHD but what’s the
status with a professor, how do you get the professor status?
Mosstfa : Yeh, it's by your publications, by your contribution to knowledge.
Matt : Ah right, to industry.
Mosstfa : Yeh, because after, after you get your PHD, if you get your PHD and done
nothing, (yeh) so that’s it, you’re still a doctor, forever (yeh) but if you contributed 
to knowledge, like in er, by doing research, by em, yeh, publishing, er, publishing, 
em, publications, books or articles or whatever, so yeh, by that after, I think, I 
dunno how, it's different between country and country. After many years they 
assess your contribution and then they grant you with higher status (oh right). You 
know, the professor is not the last thing but is, is, I think the highest, well, I don’t 
know, not sure the last rank, what it is but after your doctorate you got different er, 
What is // Er, do you know where is the key for this window?
Matt : No, no, I’ve never
NOISE INTERFERENCE 
Mosstfa : That’s nice in the recording, isn't it? (Right hhhhh) hhhhh.
LOUD BANGING NOISE 
Matt : That’s the next door neighbour banging holes into the wall hhhhh.
Mosstfa : Hamza, don’t worry about this noise, you know, hhhhh, don’t analyse it hhhhh.
BANG BANG BANG BANG BANG 
Mosstfa : You know, they’ve started demolishing this building, did you noticed?
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: Yeh, they’ve started down there haven’t they.
: Yes, they started down there and er, yesterday they moved one of the, what do you 
call it?
: The er, girders, or, they make steel.
: Yeh, the metal, yeh, yeh.
: They were supposed to build a massive leisure centre here you know (this building 
here) yeh, ‘cos all this is owned by Sheffield United football club, you see.
: Oh right, even these, these houses.
: Well, three of these are. (OK) Yeh, I think that next door and the rest of them 
round here; this one’s owned by, obviously, the Landlord.
: So maybe Sheffield United wants to buy this house as well (maybe they will) yeh, 
if they owned all the area and then, yeh. Yeh, it's better actually, I don’t like, you 
know .........
: That’s Sheffield for you, it's a very old, old city, steel city you see (u-hum) and 
they make, they used to make all the, sort of, make all the cutlery.
: Cutlery yeh, and it was bombed a lot in, during the second world war.
: Yeh, yeh, they’ve started to redevelop the city now (yeh). They’ve really started to 
put money in, money into it (em) ‘cos you’re getting a lot of, getting a lot er, ‘cos 
it's the fourth, fourth largest city in England, (fourth) fourth, Sheffield is the fourth. 
(Really) Yeh, {doesn’t, er, Manchester er) er, London, Birmingham, Manchester, 
Sheffield.
: Ah (um) I didn’t know that (um) the fourth, but it's very different from London, 
from Birmingham, hhhhh. Different from Manchester.
: It's more rainy hhhhh
: Yeh, OK, hhhhh, a lot of hills, you know.
: You get a lot of er, you’re getting a lot of er, money coming from the United States 
and, you know, because there's a lot of steel companies here (em) engineering 
firms, that aren’t making any money now and the Americans are buying them (OK 
yeh) so a lot of money coming in. So now I think they can afford to start 
rebuilding Sheffied.
: . Even the European Union, I think, contributing a lot (yehyeh) ..... time.
: I mean er, as you walk down Shore Street, they’ve built BBC online, tt, the BBC 
offices (yeh, the BBC offices) er, they’re building these halls, they’re building new 
housing and they’re demolishing that whole warehouse, aren’t they?
: Yeh, I’ve seen the demolition, yeh.
: Yeh, opposite the student accommodation, they, they’ve demolished everything.
You’ve seen it, I think you have seen it.
: Yeh, OK. (Yeh) So, you know, that’s why the Landlord want (yeh) sold the other 
house because there are new (yeh) considerable accommodation in the area, so it's 
not, it's not very profitable.
: I really think he’s gonna put this on, er (on sale as well) on sale soon.
: Yeh, he said that, yeh, I think he waiting for the end of the contract, (yeh)
contracts.
: Should be enough.
: You think so, go home now.
: Yeh, going university (hmm) doing some revision.
: Studying on Saturday?
: Yeh, yeh, you know, no rest for the wicked.
: The wicked? Ah no rest.
: It's another saying, you see.
: Hhhhh, no rest for the wicked hhhhh that’s nice.
: But I think because you’ve been brought up you pick up the sayings, (yeh) every
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language has their own little (yeh, their own sayings) sayings, yeh.
: So, no rest for the wicked, you mean you are the wicked.
: Well, you know, people work hard, you know.
: OK, hhhhh sorry I didn’t (no rest, you see) OK, no rest for the wicked.
: Don’t know what it means, but just say it hhhhh
: Oh, thank you very much for this nice conversation and we might continue as well, 
if you (yeh yeh) depends if er, er, (if he likes you or not) if he likes you or not, yeh, 
if he is satisfied or not.
: Maybe if he finds it funny he may say do it again.
: Do it again, yeh.
LONG PAUSE
: Oh right, what’s the time now.
: Half past
: Sometimes I smell gas, I don’t know why, and check everything’s OK. My nose 
are, er very (very sensitive) not sensitive, no, lying to me, hhhhh.
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Conversation (4)
Salam = Non-native Speaker
Simon = Native Speaker
Salem : My name is Salam, I am from Libya
Simon :Can you spell your name for me, please.
Salem : S A L  A M
Simon : Ah, OK, there’s a place called Salem, I have to know the spelling to picture it 
in my mind. My name is Simon which is similar. I wonder if Salam is a 
Libyan equivalent to Simon. So how is it that I’m sitting here talking to you, 
I mean why are you doing this?
Salem : Well actually, this topic is related to the cultural effect of how people speak to 
each other and I find myself in the same position now because I think how 
can I make conversation with you, how can I start, what topic might
make sense to you, to discuss with you.
Simon :Yes, well of course the stereotypical British way of breaking the ice is to talk 
about the weather or, if you’re at the bus stop, how late the bus is; finding an 
area that you are both going to agree on, something that’s not too 
controversial. That seems to be the way, establish agreement first and then 
you can move on from there. But, I’m aware that in Britain that kind of polite 
conversation relies on the weather being so interesting because it’s so 
different all the time but I presume, and I may be wrong, that in Libya the 
weather’s probably always the same.
Salem :Oh, all the same, that’s right, especially the area where I come from, Southern
Libya, where the area is desert actually and the area is dominated by summer and winter.
Summer during the day and winter during the night.
(Hhhhh)
Simon : That’s the only change in the weather?
Salem :Yes, that’s all you have.
Simon :So, do you not have a winter?
Salem :Well, we have winter but where the sun rises after 2 o’clock it will be warm 
but after sunset it will be colder. Generally speaking, it’s not as clear as 
Britain or Northern Libya because the Mediterranean Sea dominates this area.
Simon :1s it very, very hot in the summer?
Salem :Yes, sometimes 40 degrees.
Simon : Hot enough, I would like that I think. I like it as hot as possible really. Mind 
you, that’s in the context of Britain or Europe. When I go on holiday I quite 
like it to be 30 degrees.
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Salem : Where do you usually go?
Simon :I’ve been to Greece for the last couple of years, have you been to Greece? 
Salem :No, I haven’t, but I’ve been to Morocco, Tunisia, Syria, I’ve been to Ghana. 
Simon : It’s a lot of travelling, a lot of miles. Was that as a tourist?
Salem : As a tourist, yes, especially Europe
...............and the conference there o n .............................. dissertation......................
Simon: Why not.
Salem :Very nice (Hhhhh). Africa, the whole area is green, green. Actually, when I 
think of my country and other Southern African sections of the Sahara, I 
thought this applied to where I live, but there are some nice places, rain, 
grass, trees, very different.
Simon : I would like to see it, I like to travel anyway but I’ve only been inside Europe 
so far. So how come you’re here now in Sheffield of all places?
Salem :Sheffield? It’s all right.
Simon : Sheffield is nice. I’m not from Sheffield, I chose to come here.
Salem : Well, before I came to Sheffield I was in Wales, a city called Swansea.
Simon: Swansea?
Salem :Yes, it’s a nice place, quiet.
Simon : I thought Wales was quite a depressed place.
Salem : Yes, it’s a remote area but when I compare it with Sheffield, Sheffield is a 
reasonable place to live in terms of rent, housing and I found Sheffield multi­
cultural. There is the Yemeni community there, Pakistani community, Indian, 
African, Libyan but Swansea i s .................
Simon : Did you find the Welsh very exclusive?
Salem :I think so.
Simon : They have a reputation, maybe a stereotype, I don’t know, but they have a 
reputation to be quite exclusive.
Salem :Yes, I noticed that. Generally speaking, it feels difficult to make friends, it’s 
too difficult to go deep with such people, I don’t know. I have lived in 
Sheffield now for nearly 5 years, it’s so difficult, not easy. I know the British 
people are very kind, very helpful and if you need anything they will give you 
assistance, but otherwise difficult. I don’t know if I am right or wrong, 
correct me if you think so.
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Simon : Well, in terms of Britain, the North of Britain is supposed to be is supposed 
to be significantly warmer, more friendly, than the South. I don’t know if 
you’ve been to the South of England.
Salem: No.
Simon : Well you’d probably find it much harder, but I’m aware that the British can 
use politeness as a shield, really. In a way you have this superficial kind of 
politeness or friendliness but, as you’ve noticed, try to get beyond that and it’s 
quite difficult.
Salem : Yes, I’ve found that myself, according to my experience, but I’m not quite 
sure. In my experience, in other ways, there is something that is not clear to 
me in the sense that I say to my colleague in the department I say good
morning. Some people say hi, other people just ...................  I don’t know
......................  Sometimes I found myself disappointed to be honest because
in my country if I said to you good morning you would reply good morning 
but since I have been in the UK, especially in Sheffield, I found it difficult, 
some people say good morning, other people say hi, other people say
......................  I don’t know what you mean by that. Is it good morning or did
you want to speak to me.
Simon : Yes, it’s a little rude isn’t it?
Salem : But culturally, I think I found it hard sometimes to talk actually because in 
my mind what is serious or sensitive or useful might not be in your culture, it 
makes sense actually.
Simon : Is Libya quite a sparsely populated country?
Salem: Yes
Simon : Right, I wonder about that because, obviously, England and cities like 
Sheffield are quite densely populated and I think people tend to be more 
perhaps, in those sort of situations. I’m only theorising, I don’t know. I 
remember a Texan, an old boss of mine, saying that back in Texas it used to 
take him nearly half an hour to walk down the road because everybody he 
came upon wanted a conversation with him. I think where he’s from is quite 
a large sparsely populated area, I don’t know, I may be wrong about that. If 
you acknowledge a complete stranger in Sheffield or anywhere in England 
when you are walking down the road, give them a look or even say hello, they 
are very startled. They’re completely surprised. But its interesting that, and 
this is to do with space, when you are out walking, and a lot of people do 
around Sheffield, go out to walk in the country, in the Peak District, if you 
encounter somebody coming the other way when you are out in the country 
you always say hello.
Salem: I see.
Simon : It’s interesting, isn’t it, that the very same person, if you see them walking 
down the road in town, you completely ignore them.
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Salem :It seems the area, the pressure of the city where people work so hard and they 
concentrate on work.
Simon : I would suggest that maybe a city is a very competitive environment but on a 
larger sociological perspective I would say that in the last 10 years or so, 
maybe 10 or 15 years, in this country anyway we are encouraged to be more 
individualistic and isolated and competitive with each other. We couple that 
with fear of crime and I won’t say crime but fear of crime. People are very 
guarded and I say fear of crime because I think crime is not as prevalent as 
people think because they are afraid of it and they feel they can’t trust 
anybody. So amongst your friends, has it been hard to make friends here, are 
you friends with any native Sheffield people?
Salem : My landlady actually.......................................my fam ily  so I
go to her house every two weeks, maybe three weeks, just sit and chat with 
her, she knows my family, but the people in the department, in the University, 
the people that are more educated and they know my case because I am a 
student and I’m doing the same reading and writing, I talk about the same 
problems, if I can say that, because they are working hard, there is common 
ground between us, more closely than other people. People in the street might 
ignore you because, as you said before, stress in the city and fear of crime and 
so on but if you sit in the same place, sharing the same desk, the same 
computer and you meet each other every day, its an interest, that’s right.
Simon: Common ground.
Salem : Yes, common ground and, I don’t know, it’s not easy actually.
Salem : So have you made friends with immigrants, for want of a better name.
Salem Yes
Simon : So most of your friends would be non-English.
Salem: Non-English, yes.
Simon : Is that easier.
Salem : Easier, yes. I feel it’s easier than English people.
Simon : @ Is there a large expatriate Libyan population in Sheffield.
Salem :Well, there is.
Simon : How do you find each other?
Salem : Well, because actually during the   and say hello,
how are you, how’s it going with your study, ask about the family and there is 
another student, a friend of mine, who is in Sheffield, that’s how I came to
Sheffield and this i s  and he is fro m .................... and he has come to
do a PHD or Masters Degree or how long at the University and this is the
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communication. Sometimes after there i s   celebration you call
.................. All the family and people from Libya come to sit together.
Simon : Do you think it’s easier to make friends with other Libyans here in England 
than it would be in Libya because you’re in shared circumstances.
Salem : That’s right, yes.
Simon : I lived abroad, again in Europe, in Hungary, I lived there for about a year and 
a half and I made friends. I met a lot of English and Americans and made 
friends with them just like that and, of course, here in England, you’re quite 
selective about who you make friends with but, over there, you’re English. 
I’ll be your friend / might be / yes, sure and culture and shared 
circumstances. Again, you’re all outsiders to some extent. What’s interesting 
though is that you become really good friends. So I wonder if we are a bit too 
selective.
Salem : Yes, that’s right.
Simon : So back home in your own country.
Salem :Yes, who is on the top of the list, that’s right.
Simon : Interesting, isn’t it, how we grade people, how we put people into a 
hierarchy.
Salem : A hierarchy, that’s right, who is the best friend, because if you have close 
friends you are sharing a lot.
Simon : It’s hard to create the friendships that you have when you grow up with
somebody from school and go to college with and all these things. People 
that you’ve been friends with since you were a child. You can never seem to 
create those depths of friendships ever again, can you when you become an 
adult? Especially, you will find as I have, when you move home you leave all 
your oldest friends back home and you have to start all over again and you 
never quite get those close friends back, do you? Particularly, you’ve moved 
around a lot haven’t you?
Salem :Yes, that’s right, and did the area need to be, shall I say ,.....................  To
choose which place you can live in terms of what might be, because if you’re 
in a different ethnic minority you will choose the area where you can find 
what you need. I’m asking is there an interlink#there or not, is there a Halal 
butcher to buy meat, that’s another factor when I select the area, if they are 
available there, I will move. Also, will it be cheap or expensive in terms of 
money. There is a lot.
Simon : There’s this debate isn’t there, integration, assimilation, what you’re
suggesting is that you would favour, well, the term they use is ghettoisation, 
which is a really unpleasant term, about creating ghettos within cities for 
immigrant populations rather than integrating with everybody else.
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Salem : Yes, because in Sociology we study this phenomena to see why people move 
from one place and naturally go to another place where they have relatives, 
people with the same culture. As I said before, much of the reason to move 
from one place to another.
Simon : People want to be with, well, I won’t say their type, but they want to be 
with people who share cultural values.
Salem : Well there might be a social factor.
Simon : There’s an economic factor as well, don’t you think?
Salem :I’m not quite sure. If you move, for instance, from Sheffield to London or 
another part of Britain, what are your priorities for choosing the area. Would 
it be in terms of income, economic factor or social factor or reputation? The 
area, or what?
Simon : For myself, I think I’m very aware of crime, again. There are areas of
Sheffield where I wouldn’t want to live for that reason because, whether its 
true or not, I have an idea, based on what I’ve heard or read, that you’re in 
danger of burglary, robbery. There are places where they have a lot of 
poverty, for example. These are the areas which I would choose not to live 
in, because I would expect problems. Problems with theft of my car, burglary 
of the house, robbery on the street, anti-social behaviour, so that’s something 
that I would think about. Of course, economics is an important issue. The 
area in which I would really like to live is Netheredge, I don’t know if you 
know it, it’s a very nice area, Netheredge
Salem : What’s the best area of Sheffield now?
Simon : I would say that within the city Netheredge is the one that I really like. The 
other ones are really beautiful suburbs on the outside like Fulwood and 
Tapton. They’re getting out more into the country, very leafy suburbs but, 
within walking distance to the city, Netheredge is where I would like to live. 
Its very bohemian, leafy, quiet, beautiful houses, but of course I couldn’t 
possibly live there, it’s too expensive, so I live quite near to there.
Salem : Are there problem areas in Sheffield?
Simon : Oh, there’s a few, The Manor is the first one that comes to mind, Bum Green, 
Pitsmoor, Firth Park. It tends to be towards the north of the city. The north 
part of the city tends to be poorer than the south but that seems to be the case 
so often doesn’t it? It’s the case with the country as well, the north is always 
poorer. Is it true in Libya? Is the north poorer than the south.
Salem : Usually, the role is different. South is more the rich area and Southern Libya 
north is a rich area and Southern Libya is different.
(Hhhhh)
Simon : Interesting. Have you discovered any customs or habits or cultural things in 
Britain that you really like?
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Salem : Yes, if you have an appointment at, say, 5 o’clock, they come sharp at 5
o’clock and I will keep this habit during my life. People work so hard to keep 
their jobs and there is supervision inside.
Simon: Self discipline.
Salem : Self discipline. In comparison, there are advantages and disadvantages and 
the advantage is the money, but they forget the disadvantage. Actually, I’ve 
been to Spain. Spain is more friendly, it might be because they like tourists a 
lot. Have you been there?
Simon : Yes, I went to Madrid, very friendly, yes.
Salem : They like to help people.
Simon : Possibly, but I think the climate makes a difference. The warm climate tends 
to make people more relaxed. That’s how it feels to me, certainly in Greece 
and Spain, it’s true of Italy too, lovely climate, the people really relaxed.
Salem : You think the weather helps people to relax?
Simon : I do think so, yes. I don’t have any evidence for that, but I do suspect it, that
climate has a direct bearing on people.
Salem : Well, that’s a good idea for me.
Simon : As I said, it’s not proven, I haven’t researched it. It’s interesting isn’t it,
maybe there’s a PHD there for me. If I did a PHD in that, it would mean I
could travel all over the world, wouldn’t it? Research, but I do think so. In
places like Manchester, especially, it rains all the time. It rains and rains and 
rains and rains, and Sheffield it rains a lot, but Manchester more, and they say 
it’s the Pennines, you know, the mountain range makes it rain and people 
have a certain attitude which they don’t have in, for example, the West 
Country. You know, down in the south west which is a sunnier place and 
East Anglia where it’s warmer. People are very different down there, so it’s 
just a theory which I haven’t researched.
Salem : Well, it’s a good theory.
Simon : There could be economic reasons, as well, particularly in Spain and Italy and 
places like Greece. When the sun comes out, everybody’s happier aren’t 
they, you feel it in yourself. Well, in England anyway.
Salem : Well, if that’s all they have, sun all day, like where I come from people will
say oh, I’m fed up with it.
Hhhhh.
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Conversation (5)
Mary = Native Speaker 
Ali = Non-native Speaker
Mary : Are you doing a PHD?
Ali : Now I just, hu, am starting to do mphil upgrading to PHD 
Mary : Ah, yes, yes, and what is your project focused on?
Ali : ah, hh, My project is focused on (0.0) aa boron (0.0)
Mary : [ ]oh, yes,
Ali : <and plant physiology.
Mary : emh, I’m afraid I don’t know much about science
Ali : =Yes, just in plant science
Mary : Right [ ]
Ali : in connection with plant physiology
Mary : < alright, and how long have you
been working on it?
Ali : [ ] Just from September.
Mary : = right, is it going well?
Ali : yha
Mary : Great, do you have a supervisor through mphil or is it
Yes
Mary : ] = taught in a
group?
Ali : [ ] Yes, yes, just I have a supervisor to (0.0) to supervise working in
my Mphil.
Mary : emh, ah, ah, I’ve just finished my PHD.
Ali : [ ] Yha, Great
Mary : [ ] Yes, its wonderful to
have finished,
Ali : [ ] Yes,
(0.10)
Mary : but I haven’t had my VIVA yet
Ali : [ ]When
Mary : < In four weeks time.
Ali : < In four weeks
time
Ali : you have to do a VIVA
Mary : [ ]Yes
Ali : ]In which field your PhD
Mary : Its in (0.0) English Literature, in the English Studies Department,
Ali : [ ]Yha
Mary : and, ahm, but the subject of it is a cross between Sociology and English.
Ali : [ ]Yha
Mary : and it’s quite interesting for me;
Ali : [ ]Yha
Mary : and it its really about cultural snobbery in the 1920’s and 1930’s and why 
people looked down 
Ali : [ ]Yha
Mary : [Jon what other people well read it.
Ali : [ ] Yha
(hhhhhhhhh)
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Mary : I think so, yes, yes (0.0) but at the moment I’m trying to keep my ideas fresh
because, with the VIVA coming, it would be easy just to look at my PHD
and think, ah, you know, that’s all passed 
Ali : [ ] Yha
Mary : <so I’m trying to read
some new stuff (0.0) to help 
Ali : to help you in your PhD.
Mary : = yes, (0.0) so that I don’t get bored and tired of it.
You know, So how many years will it take you to complete your Mphil? 
Ali : just two years and after two years we upgrading to PHD
Mary : Oh great, yes,
Ali : < so all with PhD it takes three years
Mary ; Yes, so a long haul.
Ali : [ ]I think so.
Mary and Ali : (hhhhhhhhh)
Mary : < I knew a man who taught botany at the University
called Mr. Gupta, but I think he’s stopped teaching now. His wife ran an 
Indian Restaurant called Nemals in West Street and Mr. Gupta was a 
lecturer in botany at the University.
Ali : ah, ah
Mary : Yes
(0.10)
Ali : <And you do some teaching behind your
studying?
Mary : Yes, I teach two courses, one modem novel and one 1930’s novel
Ali : [ ]ah,ah
so most of my subject is on the 20th century 
Ali : < In English schools?
Mary : In the English Department next door, but in my life I have taught in schools 
and colleges and a little bit in the University 
Ali : [ ] yha
Mary : so I think I have taught in every single kind of school except for 9 year old.
I’ve never taught 9 year olds.
Ali : Yha,yah, (0.0) You have some international students with you?
Mary : ahm, Not many this year, Ali, actually because I’ve taught on this course 
here for the last 4 years but in previous years I’ve had more international 
students than this year and I don’t know why. Are you an international 
student?
Ali : Yes,
Mary : [ ] Where is i t .,
Ali : <1 come from Libya.
Mary : Oh do you. Six years ago I used to teach English as a second language with 
Sheffield College 
Ali : [ ] Yha
Mary : and sometimes we had Libyan students and I met one
lady from Libya and I think she told me how to make cous-cous.
Ali : <Yes, its
interesting food.
Mary : Really
Ali : <Yah, Yha
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Mary ; [ ] very complicated.
Ali and Mary : (hhhhhhhhhhhhhh)
Ali : It’s very complicated to make cous-cous 
M ary: [ ]yha
Ali : but in Libya its simple to make.
Mary :Really? But she said you had to dissolve all the grain and then dry it and then 
bake it.
Ali : <yha,yhayhsa
Mary : <It didn’t sound simple, Ali, to me at all.
Ali : I think its not simple to you but I think in Libyan culture its simple to make a 
cous-cous and other food which is normally eaten in Libya.
Mary : Yes. (0.0) Is the dried cous-cous you can buy here (0.0)
Ali : [ ] Yes,yes
Mary : good?
Ali :Yes, yes, I can buy cous-cous in some shops here in Sheffield 
Mary : [ ]yes,yes
Ali : and I can
make cous-cous in my house, to eat with 
Ali and Mary : (hhhhhhhhhhh)
Ali : < some vegetable,
Marry : [ ] oh, yha
Ali : something like that, some meat.
Mary : I like it very much, I buy it from Tesco 
Ali : [ ] from Tesco, yha
Mary : and, ahm, because it takes up the flavour 
Ali : [ ] Yah, yha, yha
Mary : <of whatever you’re
cooking.
Ali : Yha, Yha
Mary : <Is your family with you.
Ali : <Yes
Mary : <Oh, that’s nice.
Ali : And, sometimes, they have some cous-cous too.
Ali and Mary : (hhhhhhhhhhhhh)
Marry : you all like it
Ali : Yah
Ali and Mary : (hhhhhhhhhhhhh)
Mary : ( 0.15) What else do you eat in Libya that
Ali : <There is many famous foods in
Libya, such as bazeen.
Mary : Bazeen
Ali : <Bazen yha
Mary : Right
Ali : Bazen is made from barley 
Mary : [ ]Yes,
Ali : <and you mix it with water then put it into
boiling water 
Mary : [ ]Yes,
Ali : <and when it is ready, take it out and you can add some
other liquid to it with vegetables and meat.
Mary : Oh
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Ali : Yes, that is famous food
Mary : <Is it like a soup?
Ali : I don’t know about soup.
Mary : <is it liquid or solid?
Ali : <Solid
Mary : . aha
Ali : <You know barley
Mary : Yes
Ali : You put the barley in water and leave it above the fire, leave it until
the water is boiling and then cook it 
M ary: [ ]Yha
Ali : <for about half an hour until it is
ready to eat.
Mary : Right, (0.0) it sounds a little bit like English porridge.(0,0)
Ali : <oh yha
Mary : They eat it more in Scotland, which is oats
Ali : [ ] Oats, yah.
Mary : and you boil it and then its quite solid, and we have 
it with sugar and milk.
Ali : <wiith sugar and milk,
Mary : [ ]Yah
Ali : [ Jreally?
Mary : Yes, but this is .() your bazeen is savoury.
Ali : Yes, it is diffweerent,
Mary : but Cous-cous is made from a grain isn’t it?
Ali : < Yah
Mary : [ ]Semolina is it?
Ali : Yes, I think it’s from wheat,
Mary : <Yaha
Ali : but i think, it is a soft grain.
Mary : Yeh, yeh
Ali : You need the Cous-cous
Mary : So, why do you think people made cous-cous and didn’t just eat the
semolina because it seems a lot of work to change the semolina to the cous 
-cous.
Ali : [ ] to the Cous-cous yeh, I think they make cous-cous because its more
solid and the grain is bigger than the semolina.
Mary : ah ah
Ali : when you make Cous-cus you can have cous-cous is bigger than the
semolina.
Mary : I see,
Ali : so you have the quantity of the cous-cus It’s a lot of quantity to eat.
Marry : I see, so it condenses, so I suppose if you were travelling and you had 
cous-cous it would be like having a great big bag of semolina all squashed.
Ali and Mary : (hhhhhhhhhhhh)
Mary : I would love to go to Libya because I think there are a lot of Roman remains
there. Is it where Carthage is. I don’t know what the Libyan name for it is,
the old big Roman city.
Ali : Is it Jermar?
Mary : < Maybe
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Mary :This is the other part that includes the conversation one utterance by the other
between the two interactants
Ali : I think so.
Mary : Where is your family from Ali? What part of Libya?
Ali : In the south of Libya which is called Sebha city. It is in the desert, so I have
come from a hot place to England which is a cold place, so it’s very different to 
enjoy the weather. I remember when I arrived here in Sheffield it was difficult to 
go out into the cold to walk and to travel.
Mary :Do you find it depressing, the weather here, does it make you feel low?
Ali : Sometimes
Mary :Yes, I can imagine. I think it does English people too.
Ali : I think English people are more used to living here in Sheffield or England and 
to travel and work and do everything.
Mary : I like the cold weather, I must admit, because I grew up in Pakistan and India. I 
lived there because my father wrote text books for those countries so we lived 
there and Burma. Pakistan was very, very hot, so I used to get up at 5 o’clock in 
the morning and work from 5 o’clock until 10 o’clock.
Ali : Just until 10 o’clock?
Mary : Well, at my books, at my studies and then I would go out with my mother at 
10 o’clock but when it got to 2 o’clock I hated it.
Ali :Also in Libya its very hot weather. During the afternoon its very, very hot. In 
the summer its 43 or 45 degrees.
Mary :So do you go to sleep in the afternoon?
Ali :Yes, normally, just to sleep with the air conditioning.
Mary :Oh, lovely.
Ali Just to sleep and not do anything.
Mary :Good
(Laughter)
Mary :In Sebha do you have a monsoon, do you have one time in the year when there 
is some rain, or never?
Ali :Sometimes a little bit in the winter, but never in the Summer.
Mary :So where do you get your water from?
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Ali Just from deep in the earth.
Mary :Really, very deep wells.
Ali :Yes, very deep wells to take water from deep in the earth by pump. We use 
pumps and electricity to get water.
Mary :1s the water table staying quite high or does it get low because, in India, the 
water is going lower and lower.
Ali :Yes, it is in Libya. The water is going lower and lower because they use a lot of 
water in industry and agriculture.
Mary :In your work, your botany, does it relate to Libyan plants?
Ali :Yes, I’m going to study the physiology of boron in plants and to know the role of 
boron which is the chemical element in plants, how the boron affects the plant, so 
boron is the element the plant needs for nutrition.
Mary : So is it a lot of chemistry that you have to know as well as the botany.
Ali :Yes, a lot of chemistry and a lot of ? to use a microscope and sometimes I use 
the English technique and I use computers to count the cells and the ? inside the 
plants like the boron.
Mary :How interesting. So when you go back to Libya will you extend that research 
do you think?
Ali :I would doubt it but if I have some materials which I use in that research, I would 
continue. So my project is response of ? ? to elevated boron which is the title 
of my project.
Mary :And how do you spell boron?
Ali :B O R O N
Mary : Right, I’ve never heard of it. Do you have actual plants that you study or is it 
mostly computer modelling?
Ali :For the ? ? I use it as a model system in my research.
Mary : Right, is that a Libyan plant?
Ali :No, just from European countries but I have some plants from Libya in the same 
family as ? ? so as a model system I use it in my projects to study the plant and 
to have some results.
Mary :How interesting, so why have you chosen that plant and not another one?
Ali :Because that plant is good to grow in the lab and is suited to the conditions of the 
lab and I can have many seeds from that plant when I grow it in the lab. Many
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, many seeds are produced from some numbers of plants.
Mary : I see, and it grows rapidly does it?
Ali : Yes, it takes from 5 to 8 weeks to complete the life cycle of the plant to produce 
the fruit and the seed, so I save time by using that plant for research.
Mary : That’s interesting. You should use my plant at home. Somebody gave me an 
Amaryllis. Amaryllis is like a bulb this big and I just put it over water and 
within 4 weeks it has grown this high. It grows almost as you look at it, an 
extraordinary plant and it will grow into a huge lily like a trumpet, it’s like a 
lily.
Ali :1s it a shady plant?
Mary :No, I think it likes the light, the outside light. It can’t grow outside but I put it 
in my window so it gets a lot of sunlight.
Ali : You know, the light is very important to plants, to make photosynthesis which is 
very important for plants to make food.
Ali :So if only you had the water in Libya you would have a wonderful growth of 
flowers. Mary :Do you have many greenhouse cultivations in Sebha.
Ali :Yes, yes.
Mary :You do, vegetables growing?
Ali :Yes.
Mary :I like to travel very much. Have you been to England before?
Ali : No. I have been here now for 1 year and 3 months so I’ve not been back to my 
country in that time.
Mary :Really, you haven’t been back?
Ali :So, if I have the chance, I would like to go back soon with my family so see some 
people there.
Mary : I’m sure. But to take the whole family back is very expensive back isn’t it.
Ali : Yes, it’s very expensive to have a plane ticket.
Mary :Your English is very good, did you learn it mostly here or did you come already 
having learnt it?
Ali : When I came from Libya I knew a little bit of English but I studied English 
language here at Sheffield University and I’m maybe a little but English.
Mary :Oh yes, so you must feel that you are able to cope with all the reading you have 
to do for your botany.
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Ali :Yes, I’m planning to have some reading on my topic and, as you know, a lot of 
information can be found from the Internet and from books but you need to 
have specific information about my topic but its very difficult to focus in to find 
information about my topic.
Mary : Learning to focus can take so much time can’t it? I find that when I’m
preparing my seminars, I can read forever, but in the end you have to say, 
whoops, do I need this?
Ali :So can you advise me how to focus on reading as you have experience in your 
PHD?
Mary :I suppose, what helps me Ali, is when I think, why am I reading this, what do I 
need this for. I am very easily distracted. If I read something I think that’s 
interesting and that’s interesting but I try to say to myself, why am I reading 
this, what will my students need to know or, if I’m writing my PHD, how does 
this connect with what I have already raised and that helps me but sometimes 
when you don’t focus I find interesting things can come in so if you’re too 
focused I suppose it can narrow you but, more usually, I need to ask myself 
questions.
Ali :Every time you ask yourself questions do you, to focus in and to narrow the topic?
Mary :Yes, that’s right and talking to other people is, I think, a great help.
Ali :To talk to other people, to have someone ?
Mary Absolutely, have you got fellow students that you talk with about your topic?
Ali : Yes, sometimes. I go to some colleges and someone with me in the laboratory so 
sometimes I discuss things with him. There are different groups in the laboratory 
and different topics and sometimes you cannot find somebody who has the same 
topic as you so it is difficult to find people to discuss the topic with. I think it’s 
a problem.
Mary : I’m sure because when you’re doing an mphil or PHD you are narrowing the 
focus of your studies, so obviously there will not be so many people working in 
the same area. Do you find you have any other Arabic speaking students with 
you?
Ali : Yes, some students from Libya and sometimes they don’t speak English so its
difficult to learn some more English, speaking Arabic you know.
Mary : I found that when I was teaching my Arabic speaking students, now that there is 
satellite TV they just spend their time at home watching Arabic television, 
whereas 10 years ago they used to watch some English programmes and learn 
some English that way. Now they never listen.
Ali :I think it’s difficult for International students to have a foreign language, if  they 
are listening to English to practice and to have some information about the 
language and to solve some problems.
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Mary : Certainly and I think if you go to an English class, sometimes you meet more 
people who speak your own language.
Ali :Yes, but the teacher in the classes says you must not speak Arabic or another 
language, just speak English so when I’m in class to learn English I speak only 
English, just to practice.
Mary :Does you wife speak some English?
Ali : A little bit but one thing that’s interesting is my child who is a few years old 
and speaking very good English now.
Mary : Wonderful, Ali.
Ali Also, I have two daughters who are twins so they are also speaking English well.
Mary : That’s wonderful and how old are your twins?
Ali : Four years old.
Mary : So your older daughter, the seven year old, where is she at school?
Ali ;? ? ? which is in ? Park.
Mary : And you have been to the school?
Ali :Yes.
M ary: Good.
Ali :Yes, its good to learn English and something about mathematics and science.
Mary :They’re so lucky, when they’re little they just learn the language.
Ali : Yes, it’s very, very simple, there’s no difficulty.
Mary :That’s right and then when we are older we are working so hard. I tried to learn 
some Japanese last year because I visited my brother-in-law in Japan.
Ali : Does he study there, in Japan?
Mary : He works there and he speaks Japanese fluently but I found it the most hard
language to learn ever. I didn’t get very far, but my Arabic students gave me a 
book to try.
Ali : To try to learn the Arabic language, I think it’s not difficult.
Mary :What is nice is that it’s so logical, I could understand the system but when I tried 
to write it, it didn’t look anything like it should so I thought no, I’m not going to 
be able to write it.
Ali : To learn the Arabic language the first time is a little bit difficult but you keep
trying to learn.
Mary :Yes, if I were teaching Arabic students again I would try again with some
spoken Arabic but I don’t think I’d try to write it, somehow. My father learnt 
Urdu and I think there are similarities between Urdu and Arabic. Is that right, 
or not?
Ali : Yes, I think so. I think writing Arabic is the same as writing Urdu, I think so.
Mary :And is the counting the same?
Ali :No, counting is different, I think.
Mary :My sister’s son grew up in India and he grew up speaking English and a
language called Telagu, which is spoken by about 50 million people I think but, 
of course, nobody outside of India. He has forgotten all his Telagu now but he 
remains a very good linguist. He learns languages very quickly and my sister 
thinks that maybe it is because he grew up learning two languages together. 
Your son and your daughters will be able to use English.
Ali :Yes, but I think the child learns English very quickly when the child is small 
. When they grow up, I think they have forgotten the English or another language.
Mary :In Libya, if you are studying at University, maybe he can use English.
Ali :Yes, now in Libya there is a system which uses the English language, to have 
some terms and some mathematics just in English.
Mary :But Arabic, of course, is spoken so widely isn’t it. You can travel so much using 
Arabic. I was going to ask you is Libyan Arabic the same as Iraqi Arabic, 
Yemeni Arabic
Ali :Yes, all the same. You can understand when you travel to Egypt or Iraq or Saudi 
Arabia, any Arabic country. I can understand the language.
mary :1s there a variation of accents?
Ali : Yes, the accent is different in some countries. The Libyan accent
xciii
Working Papers on the web
Reviews
1. Gino Eelen, A Critique of Politeness Theories, reviewed by Abdurrahman 
Hamza
2. Ann Bayraktaroglu and Maria Sifianou, eds., Linguistic Politeness across 
Boundaries: The Case of Greek and Turkish, reviewed by Corinne Boz
3. Saeko Fukushima, Requests and Culture: Politeness in British English and 
Japanese, reviewed by Andrew Merrison
4. Helen Spencer-Oatey, ed., Culturally Speaking: Managing Rapport through 
Talk across Cultures, reviewed by Sara Mills
1. Gino Eelen, A Critique of Politeness Theories, Manchester: St. Jerome's Press, 
2001, ISBN: 1-9006-5040-1, 280 pp., £17.99.
Reviewed by Abdurrahman Hamza
For about more than fifteen years, politeness has been one of the most important and 
productive areas of research in pragmatics and sociolinguistics. Its importance in 
cross-cultural communication is obvious, and comparative studies of the 
conceptualisation and manifestations of politeness in different cultures must 
therefore be regarded as vital in an era of growing internationalisation.
Gino Eelen, in his critique of politeness theories is very critical of the theoretical 
assumptions of the major politeness theorists, Brown and Levinson, and that of 
many other theorists influenced by their work, for example, Gu, Lakoff, Leech, 
Blum Kulka, Fraser and Nolen, Ide, and Arndt and Janney. He is critical of them on 
a number of counts: because of their reliance on Speech Act theory, they all focus 
too closely on the speaker, at the expense of the hearer; they also assume that all 
politeness is strategic. For him, these theorists reify politeness, characterising it as 
something which hearer and speaker can unproblematically recognise. He discusses 
two perspectives on politeness which he argues most theorists of politeness confuse: 
politenessl (the common-sense notion of politeness) and politeness2 (the scientific 
conceptualisation of politeness). He argues for the importance of the distinction 
between the two perspectives on politeness in research: ‘politeness 2 concepts 
should not just be different from politeness 1 concepts, or given different names, but 
rather the relationship between both notions should be carefully monitored 
throughout the entire analytical process-not only at the input stage.' (Eelen 2001:31). 
He discusses politenessl and classifies it to include two aspects: the action-related 
side which refers to the way politeness actually manifests itself in communicative 
behaviour; and the conceptual side which refers to common-sense ideologies of 
politeness. He extends the discussion to involve, as characteristics of politenessl a) 
evaluativity, where he argues that politeness and impoliteness are connected to
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social values and always evaluative in nature; b) argumentativity, where it is always 
associated with situations where there is something to lose or gain; c) ‘polite’-ness, 
where each individual considers themselves and their cultural group as polite, where 
only others are impolite; d)- normativity, where politeness is the result of the 
pressure of social norms; and e) modality and reflexivity, which refers to optionality 
of polite interactional strategies for the actor. For him, politeness2 is the scientific 
conceptualisation of the social phenomena of politeness; in that sense it is the theory 
of politenessl. Politeness2, he argues, describes how politenessl works, and also 
what it does for people. He argues unlike politenessl which is restricted to the polite 
end of the polite-impolite continuum, politeness2 should cover the whole range of 
the continuum. Eelen claims that the core politeness theories fail to distinguish 
between what he calls politeness one and politeness two because of the normative 
nature of most of the theories. He argues that impoliteness becomes not only a 
matter of speakers' producing behaviour, but also of hearers' evaluating that 
behaviour. He argues that the norms that govern appropriateness are social norms. 
They are not individual norms held only by the hearer, but rather pertain to situations 
and cultures, and norms are not individual but shared by all.
In sum, for Eelen, his critique of the theoretical frameworks are: (1) that they 
involve a conceptual bias towards the polite end of the polite-impolite distinction: 
(2) that they conceptualise politeness and impoliteness as opposites; and (3) that 
their conceptualisations of politeness are biased towards the production of 
behaviour, or towards the speaker in the interactional dyad.
Eelen’s critique is based on the work of Pierre Bourdieu which involves a different 
way of looking at politeness. On the basis of Bourdieu's sociological thinking, Eelen 
suggests a possible alternative conceptualization of politeness. Bourdieu’s notion of 
'habitus' is used as a guide in the development of such a theoretical framework where 
the social-cultural is the result of human interaction rather than the opposite.. 
Depending on Bourdieu, Eelen considers the issue of culture as the core issue in the 
field of politeness. Eelen asks the question ‘how do these theories handle the 
normativity of commonsense politeness and the situation of culture?" He argues that 
politeness is subject to cultural expectations arising from cultural norms.
Eelen considers the notion of politeness differs from culture to culture and that 
cultural norms reflected in speech acts differ not only from one language to another, 
but also from one regional and social variety to another. Probably this is why he 
chooses to base his critique on a sociological theory, even though culture is not 
explicitly theoretically defined in terms of its particular social characteristics. (Eelen 
2001:164) He claims that his approach inspired by Bourdieu’s notion of ‘habitus’, 
takes full account of the hearer’s position and the evaluative moment; deals with 
both politeness and impoliteness; and provides a more dynamic, bi-directional view 
of the social-individual relationship. He believes that the driving force behind the 
system of politeness is the socioculturally shared norms. He considers that norms 
belong to the level of culture and part of the sociolinguistic system of which 
politeness is subsystem: ‘communicative success depends on the right amount and 
kind of politeness applied at the right time to the right speech act, as determined by 
social norms that stipulate what is appropriate for a specific interactional 
situation" (Eelen, 2001:128)
Eelen considers the aspects politeness and impoliteness on the same level, and 
claims that they are captured by the same concept: the empowerment of the hearer 
and of individual in general in spite of the belief that only polite behaviour can ever 
be culturally appropriate, while impoliteness is somehow non-cultural in nature.
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‘The most important characteristics of the notion of'culture' as employed in theories 
of politeness are its vagueness and its transformation form an observational into an 
explanatory notion". (Eelen 2001:169)
However, although this book is an excellent and provocative critique of politeness 
theory, it does not offer us a workable model of analysis. There are still some issues 
insufficiently investigated, in spite of his criticism of previous theories for failing to 
provide adequate explanation for them, for example, he does not give a clear 
definition of politeness on which we could base future analysis. He also claims that 
the core theories of the book fail to make a clear distinction between what he calls 
politeness one and politeness two, but his model is not clearly identifying its 
principles and leaves many elements vague and ill-defined, for example the 
definition of the terms 'norm’ and 'culture’. However, this book provides a thorough 
critique of the main theories of politeness and their major findings. Whilst not 
providing a clear theoretical framework for the analysis of politeness, he does 
provide suggestions for further discussion and research in the field. This book then 
will prove to be a of value to social scientists and linguists and for those interested in 
understanding the relationship between language culture and society.
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Religion and Politeness in Arabic and cross-cultural interaction
Abdurahman Hamza 
Sheffield Hallam University, UK
Religion is ah important factor that influences almost every type of interaction in 
Arabic-speaking cultures, whether male/male, female/female, male/female or any other 
type of interaction. Religious expressions are mentioned whenever people meet in 
almost any interactional context to ensure the speaker appears appropriate and polite. In 
every context of interaction there are religious expressions used before, after or in 
between the utterance used. For example, certain religious expressions may be used in a 
conversation when people meet for the first time, when people invite each other, enter 
houses or places of work, agree/disagree, accept an invitation, blame, promise, greet, 
etc. to signal appropriateness.
All interactants are expected to use an appropriate religious expression that defines the 
context of interaction, and ensures that an acceptable level of politeness is maintained. 
In meeting, for example, interactants usually use religious expressions along with the 
number of formal and informal greetings to express welcome and concern for their 
interactants and their family’s health including children and wife. If, in such contexts, 
these religious expressions are not used by one interactant to the other (where they 
should be used) then this may cause one of the interactants to assume the other is being 
impolite.
The aim of this poster is to investigate the role that religious expressions play in 
creating harmony and conveying politeness in Arabic between interactants, and how 
they are perceived by non-Arabs in cross-cultural interaction. It discusses whether the 
use of such expressions causes any misunderstanding between interactants in 
intercultural interaction and whether politeness is conveyed in the same level to non- 
Arabs. Politeness is differently expressed and interpreted across cultures, especially in 
cultures such as Arabic where religion plays an important role in interaction, and most 
of the time provides interactants with the expressions that they need to appear polite in 
different contexts.
